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Although armaments touch on essential elements of sovereignty, a Europeanisation of 
this field has been occurring since the late 1980s. This process led to the approval of 
EU Directives in 1990 regulating respectively arms procurements and arms intra-
Community transfers. This “Defence Package” has attracted scholarly attention 
because it contains the first supranational acts in this core state power and represents 
a departure from the standard understanding of CSDP as an intergovernmental policy 
area. However, academics have only focused on the decision-making process which 
led to the approval of these Directives.  
This thesis addresses this gap by investigating domestic policy and institutional 
changes, as consequences of this Europeanisation process.  
Using Europeanisation literature as an analytical lens, and focusing on a top-down 
understanding of this process, the thesis operationalises EU Directive 2009/43/EC, 
creating an internal arms market as the independent variable, and the national 
transposition regulations in three case studies (UK, Italy and Hungary) as the 
dependent variables. 
In order to assess the direction and intensity of change, the thesis analyses the two 
main ideas for regulating arms exports: the “pro-industry” model and the “restrictive 
model”. Each model is identified along eight dimensions. The thesis investigates the 
direction and intensity of domestic change in each case study and compares them in 
order to verify whether there is convergence and if so, around which model.  
Providing new insight into the domestic changes to arms transfer legislation, the study 
finds that, even in the traditional intergovernmental field of arms transfers and 
production, the direction of the Europeanisation process is unbalanced in each 
dimension and overall favours a pro-industry model as opposed to an ethically and 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1. Aims of the dissertation and research questions 
 
1.1 Aims of the dissertation  
 
The dissertation is focused on the impact of EC Directive 2009/43/EC (which aims at 
facilitating the circulation of defence-related products within EU boundaries) on 
national laws regarding arms exports.1 This Directive is intended to remove obstacles 
to the free circulation of defence-related products within the EU market, by reducing 
administrative burdens and by simplifying terms and conditions for obtaining arms 
export licences. The main changes revolve around two new types of licences, general 
licences and global licences, to be used for arms transfers within European borders, 
and a new certification system for companies, aimed at establishing trustworthy 
relations among European partners and among governments dealing with certified 
companies, thus considered “reliable” ones. Though the Directive was meant to 
regulate only the intra-European exchanges, its outcomes might have a relevant 
impact not only on the restructuring of European industries and on the internal arms 
market, but also on arms export control and transparency. 
The aim of the dissertation is threefold: 
The first aim is to assess the intensity and direction of domestic change in the three 
case studies (Italy, Hungary and the UK) as a consequence of the transposition of 
Directive 2009/43/EC. The domestic change is articulated through eight dimensions 
which concern transparency and responsibility in the arms export control system, but 
also the interrelation between institutions. Empirically, I would like to assess the 
presence or absence of the transformative power of European integration. 
Normatively, I would like to appraise the legitimacy, transparency and accountability, 
                                                                
1 European Union (2009).Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 May 
2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community 
[2009] O.J. L146/1, called also intra-Community transfer Directive, hereinafter Directive 2009/43 or ICT 
Directive or simply Directive. 
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responsibility and outcomes of Europeanisation in the arms export control field at the 
domestic level.  
The second aim is to compare direction and intensity of domestic change in these three 
countries, using the same eight dimensions and the same taxonomies.  
The third aim is to discover whether MS are converging or not, and around what. 
Overall, I would like to identify the direction and trajectory of the Europeanisation 
process in the arms transfers control field.  
 
1.2. Contribution of the dissertation and why it matters 
 
With this thesis I want to fill a lack in the academic literature because there are currently 
no in-depth studies concerning arms export control regulation at the domestic level and 
the Europeanisation process. These legal instruments represent useful tools in the 
hands of MS and the EU, besides the use of force, in order to maintain peace, prevent 
conflicts and protect human rights, but they are often neglected in the literature. It is 
extremely difficult to find any in-depth information on regulation for two of the case 
studies in particular, Italy and to an even greater extent, Hungary.  
Secondly, I would like to explain how Europeanisation works in practice in this delicate 
field, by investigating the variety of transposition and implementation of Directive 
2009/43/EC. In this way I will fill a gap in academic literature which is mostly focused 
on the Brussels-based process and less on the concrete dynamics of Europeanisation. 
Thirdly, I would like to assess the impact not just on the arms export control regimes 
but also on the relationships between institutions, transparency and accountability. 
Lastly, I would like to offer empirical findings which can reveal the overall direction of 
the Europeanisation process in the arms export control field. In fact, although 
armaments and their trade touch on essential elements of sovereignty, since the late 
1980s a process of Europeanising arms export control and transparency regulation 
has developed. However, the direction of this process is unclear and sometimes the 
output risks being inefficient or inconsistent with other EU actions and policies in the 
field of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP.) Being aware of the 
trajectory of EU arms export control policies is the first step in assessing the degree of 
3 
  
coherence and consistency with other EU initiatives in the CSDP and in the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).  
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
The thesis revolves around the following fundamental questions: 
1) As a consequence of the transposition of EC Directive 2009/43/EC what and how 
much has changed domestically in Italy, the UK and Hungary? 
2) Do MS converge, and if so, what do they converge around?  
3) What is the direction of the Europeanisation process in the arms export control field? 
Is the Europeanisation process making the arms export control field more or less 
restrictive? 
In order to assess the direction and intensity of change, the thesis analyses the two 
main ideas for the regulation of arms exports: the “pro-industry” model and the 
“restrictive model”. Each model is identified along eight dimensions: (a) balance 
between political strategic variables and economic-industrial variables; (b) balance 
between legislative and executive power in regulating arms exports; (c) balance 
between primary law and secondary law in regulating arms exports; (d) balance 
between transparency and opacity in arms transfers data; (e) balance between 
national responsibility for the final destination of co-produced goods and mutual 
recognition principle/delegation to partner country; (f) balance between centralisation 
and checks and balances in authorisation and control procedures; (g) balance between 
the role and weight of the state with respect to the role of the companies; and (h) 
balance between common standards and fragmentation in arms export control rules. 
In order to measure the direction of change more precisely as well as the intensity of 
change at the domestic level, I use a scale of intensity, a synoptic scheme which 
indicates the direction and degree of change for each of the eight dimensions. Overall 
lower values are associated with a pro-industry model of European arms exports 
whereas higher values are associated with a restrictive model, where ethical and 
political values prevail. 
The thesis investigates the direction and intensity of domestic change in each case 
study and compares them in order to verify whether there is convergence and if so, 
around which model.  
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My hypothesis is that the Europeanisation process - in the period starting from 2007 
until mid-2015 - is unbalanced towards lower values of each dimension, and overall 
that MS are converging around a pro-industry model rather than a restrictive model. 
 
Table 1.1 Boundaries of the research 
 WHAT IS CORE WHAT IS NOT 
Object of the thesis NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT 
CONTROL REGULATIONS IN 
THREE CASE STUDIES 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
TRANSPOSITION OF THE 
DIRECTIVE ON INTRA 
COMMUNITY TRANSFER 
 
Kind of arms CONVENTIONAL ARMS NON CONVENTIONAL ARMS (NUCLEAR, 
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS) AND 
DUAL USE MATERIAL, SMALL ARMS FOR CIVIL 
USE. 
Precise aspect of arms 
covered by the thesis 
ARMS TRANSFER 
REGULATION AT THE 
NATIONAL LEVEL 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES, DEFENCE 
ECONOMICS IN PEACE AND WAR, MILITARY 
PRODUCTION, ARMS PRODUCTION, 
CONVERSION, ARMS TRANSFERS AND 
EXPORT, ARMY, MILITARY SERVICE AND 
FORCES, MILITARY PERSONNEL. 
Period covered 2007-2013 1990-2007 AND 2014-2020 (BREXIT, 
RISING POPULISM, DE-EUROPEANISATION 





POLITICAL ECONOMY, ECONOMICS OF 
DEFENCE (AND ITS PECULIARITIES WITH 
RESPECT TO POLITICAL ECONOMICS), 
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS.  
Theoretical framework EUROPEANISATON BIG EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORIES 
(FUNCTIONALISM, NEO FUNCTIONALISM, 
POST FUNCTIONALISM, LIBERAL 
INTERGOVERMENTALISM, AND SO ON) 
Level DOMESTIC LEVEL: 
DOMESTIC CHANGE AS A 
CONSEQUENCE OF THE 
DIRECTIVE TRANSPOSITION 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL, EU LEVEL, ROLE, 
PREFERENCES, BEHAVIOUR AND 
INTERACTIONS OF EU BODIES AND 




FROM EU TO MS 
BOTTOM UP (UPLOADING) FROM MS- AND 
OTHER NON-STATE ACTORS- TO THE EU: 
THE PROCESS THAT LED TO THE APPROVAL 
OF THE ITC DIRECTIVE, THE ROLE AND 
WEIGHT OF DIFFERENT ACTORS AND THEIR 
INTERACTIONS IS NOT THE CORE OF THE 
THESIS. 
 
Methods CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
BASED ON THE COMPARISON 
OF NATIONAL ARMS EXPORT 
CONTROL LAWS ALONG 
EIGHT DIMENSIONS AND TWO 
MODELS. 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS BASED ON ARMS 
EXPORT PRACTICES AND DATA, QUALITATIVE 
METHODS BASED ON INTERVIEWS, FOCUS 





2. The context 
 
“Arms control refers to restrictions upon the development, production, stockpiling, 
proliferation, transfer and testing and usage of weapons (small arms, conventional 
weapons and weapons of mass destruction)”. 2 
The period that immediately preceded the Europeanisation process of arms export 
control regulation was particularly favourable for arms control. In fact, between the mid-
Eighties and the early Nineties, international arms transfers and military expenditures 
started to decrease sharply. These years were characterised by the signing of 
disarmament agreements between the East and West, such as the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear forces Treaty signed by Reagan and Gorbachev on 8 December 1987 
to eliminate long-range nuclear and conventional missiles. Germany and other 
European allies were critically important in encouraging both the United States and the 
USSR to discuss and sign the agreement.  
This agreement had symbolic value. Whereas during the Cold War strong scepticism 
towards arms control instruments had prevailed, this treaty was perceived as the 
beginning of a new era of peaceful understanding, and a period of hope for possible 
arms control measures to overcome the Cold War and to effectively contribute to peace 
and security. 
In this favourable atmosphere the General Assembly of the United Nations started to 
deal with the important question of transparency as a measure to increase confidence 
between the states, and as a means to encourage restraint in arms transfers and 
production, with two important resolutions asking states to examine methods to 
increase publicity and transparency.3 In 1991 a third resolution established the UN 
Register of Conventional Arms, according to which governments provided information 
and data on their transfers of major conventional weapons. 4  Confidence-building 
measures were intended as a means to replace the so-called security dilemma, which 
                                                                
2  S. Bauer (2010). “Post-Cold War Control of conventional arms”. In A. Tan (Ed.), The Global Arms 
Trade A Handbook London: Routledge, p. 309. 
3 UN General Assembly (1988). Bilateral nuclear-arms negotiations (UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/43/75 7 December 1988). New York: United Nations; UN General Assembly (1989). General and 
complete disarmament: a prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological 
weapons (UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/44/116 15 December 1989). New York: United 
Nations. 
4 UN General Assembly (1991). Transparency in Armament (UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/RES/44/36 December 1991). New York: United Nations. 
6 
  
explained the arms race from a realist perspective as a consequence of lack of 
knowledge and confidence between state actors in an anarchic international system. 5  
Focusing on conventional arms transfer control, for big arms exporting and producing 
states, a debate on introducing a responsible export policy began, which was 
consistent with foreign policy and aimed at conflict prevention, human rights defence, 
cooperation and development. They also discussed transparency measures and the 
opportunity to introduce ways of reporting to the Parliament on arms exports. In Italy 
for example, a new law was approved in 1990 which introduced the principle of 
responsibility on arms exports and a number of bans to arms exports concerning 
human rights, conflict prevention, development and cooperation, and required sending 
a mandatory detailed report to Parliament. Data revealed that after this law entered 
into force, Italian arms exports to countries in conflicts decreased from 43% to 19% of 
total Italian exports; arms exports to countries whose governments were responsible 
for gross violation of human rights decreased from 49% to 7% and to developing 
countries from 90% to 23%.6 
This nourished faith and hope that national, regional and international arms legislation 
could be really effective and could become tools at the disposal of states to tackle 
threats to peace and international security, to promote human rights, and together with 
diplomacy, aid development and conflict prevention.  
The Europeanisation process of arms export control regulation started in this 
favourable period. The event that triggered the debate was the data on the list of 
European companies that had supplied Saddam Hussein’s Iraq regime, the very same 
European countries that had taken part in military action in 1990 against Iraq in 
operation “Desert Storm”. The inconsistency of arms export policies of several EU 
countries with their foreign policy emerged clearly. As a consequence, a political 
debate started aimed at improving arms export control and introducing ethical criteria 
to arms export control regulation at the national and European levels.  
 
 
                                                                
5 L. Bozzo (1991). Exporting conflicts: international transfers of conventional arms. Florence: F Cultura 
nuova; Bauer (2010), p. 309. 
6 Data and analysis of the Italian Observatory on Arms Trade on the basis of various reports over time 
produced by the Italian Parliament: Italian Parliament (n.d.). Report on the operations authorized and 
carried out for checks on the export, import and transit of war material, Parliamentary Acts, Doc. CVIII, 
Rome: Chamber of Deputies and Senate of the Republic; US ACDA (United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency) (n.d.). World military expenditures and arms transfers. Washington, DC: US 
Government Printing Office; and the Oscar Report n. 15 (1998) May-June, Trento: Publistampa, p. 8.  
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3. Brief overview of the Europeanisation process  
 
3.1 Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and 
national regulation 
It is known that Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome (then Article 296 of the Treaty of the 
European Union and now Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union) exempted defence matters from any common regulatory regime. As a 
consequence, the MS of the European Union were free to maintain national legislation 
on matters of control and transparency in arms exports. National legislation is strongly 
influenced by different perceptions on issues that lie at the heart of the nation state, 
national security and national interest, as well as by national commitment to principles 
of international law (protection of human rights, peace and development); it is also 
influenced by economic factors, such as the weight of the national arms industry within 
the national economy and its influence on national exports policies and by the weight 
of different state and non-governmental actors (non-governmental organisations for 
peace and disarmament and of course companies). As a result, national laws on arms 
trade varied strongly across countries. Profound differences existed between a more 
restrictive legislation, adopted, for instance, by Italy, Germany and Sweden, and a 
more flexible one, adopted, for instance, by the United Kingdom. Differences involved 
three main aspects of national regulation: principles and bans, transparency and 
controls. 
 
3.2 Europeanisation processes 
 
Despite the wording of Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, since the early Nineties the 
Europeanisation process has followed two main channels: a political/ethical pathway 
and an economic/industrial one.  
The political channel originated after the Second Gulf War from the debate on 
harmonising European arms exports policies: the publication of those European 
companies that exported arms to Saddam Hussein’s regime revealed, to political 
leaders and public opinion, the incoherence between arms exports policies and the 
foreign policy of several EU governments. As a consequence, a political harmonisation 
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process started within the context of the EU Council. The main outcome of this process 
was the Code of Conduct on European arms exports (1998), which became Council 
Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (8 December 2008) defining the common and 
legally binding rules governing the control of exports of military technology and 
equipment. The Code was part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and was negotiated by a traditional intergovernmental approach. The principle of 
unanimity and the limits of Article 346 led inevitably to vagueness and compromise 
based on the lowest common denominator.7 
The second economic-industrial channel originated as a consequence of the 
progressive integration of European defence companies. In order to find ways to tackle 
the decrease in arms demand after the end of the Cold War, defence companies began 
a transnational merger process both at the European and international levels and 
asked the political authorities to adapt their regulatory frameworks to this changing 
interdependent context. This process of integrating key arms industries found its first 
natural institutional partner in the EU Commission. In this case, the main outcome was 
the so-called Defence Package and in particular EU Directive 2009/43/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of May 6th 2009, which simplified terms and 
conditions for the transfer of defence-related products within the Community, and 
which is the core of this research project.  
The political channel has been hampered by differing MS positions, and the output was 
first judged too weak and soft and then too generic in its formulation, leaving MS a 
wide margin of choice in maintaining their arms export policies. The economic industrial 
channel was deemed more effective, as a real powerful driving force, able to 
circumvent traditional intergovernmental opposition and stalemates and to reach 
effective and concrete results in forms of binding EU acts (albeit in the form of a 
Directive). The thesis focuses on the output of this second channel, and in particular 




                                                                
7  B. Schmitt, (2001). “A Common European Export Policy for Defence and Dual Use Items?”. EUIIS 
Occasional Paper (25), Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).13. Available 
online at http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ25.pdf (last accessed 19 December 2018). 
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4. Directive 2009/43/EC on intra-Community transfers: how did it come about? 
 
As previously explained, the Directive 2009/43/EC that this thesis is going to analyse 
is not the result of a traditional intergovernmental process, but of a process 
characterised by the participation of different non-state actors. Firstly, societal actors, 
in this case defence companies which asked for further integration and harmonisation 
and non-governmental organisations working for peace and disarmament. There is a 
natural contraposition between these two groups of non-state actors, because NGOs 
aspire to restrictive arms export policies, with some representatives who strive for 
complete disarmament. On the contrary, representatives of defence companies aim 
primarily to increase company profits, thus expanding exports, enlarging third markets 
and/or increasing internal procurement and military expenditures. With this in mind, in 
the introductory part of each case study I briefly explain the context and role of these 
two fundamental societal actors beyond the position of the governments and 
bureaucracies. 
There are also other actors involved in the armaments field, such as trade unions. 
However they are not directly involved in arms exports regulation which is addressed 
in the dissertation. Rather, they are active in arms production and reconversion issues. 
For example, they didn’t undertake any action on arms trade in the UK, but campaigned 
to keep factories open when closure was threatened. An example is the BAE Systems 
factory in East Yorkshire, which was threatened with the cut of 1300 positions and 
closure.8 Similarly in Italy, albeit participating in the Italian Network of Disarmament, 
trade unions are involved mainly in production, restructuring and conversion issues. 
However in Italy there are few cases of trade union representatives having collaborated 
with NGOs, or having investigated illegal arms trade, such as the case of Elio Pagani, 
an employee of Aermacchi, who denounced exports to South Africa during the 
apartheid regime and thus stimulated the campaign to approve Italian Law n. 185/90. 
(See Chapter 4, Section 2). Lastly, in Hungary worker participation in trade unions is 
low and there is no trace of their involvement in the arms trade. 
 
                                                                
8 P. Mistry (2012). “End of an era for BAE aircraft manufacturing in Brough”, BBC News, East Yorkshire, 
1 March 2012, available at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-humber-17217413 (last accessed 




4.1 The role of defence firms 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of a bi-polar system, and the signing of the 
first disarmament agreements led to a drastic reduction in world military expenditure. 
This had a profound impact on the state of the Western arms industry, resulting in a 
significant reduction in sales and employment, followed by a process of rationalisation. 
The fall in global demand for armaments resulted in increased competition between 
exporters. At the same time rapidly increasing economies of scale in the production of 
armaments, made possible through the use of new technologies, drew attention to the 
inefficiency of the national armaments markets in Europe. 9 
Despite national variations the response of the European arms industries to the 
changed security environment can be summarised in three main trends: 
- concentration on key business areas and acquisition of other companies by 
those companies that wanted to remain active in the armaments market; 
- internationalisation of companies through equity participation, collaborative 
programmes, joint ventures, consortia or mergers at the inter-European or 
international level; 
- privatisation of state controlled arms industries.  
These processes and developments in military technology completely reshaped the 
Western system of arms production. In the 1990s this process grew more intensive 
particularly on a European level, resulting in the establishment of numerous 
collaborative armaments programmes. The figure below exemplifies the quick process 
of integration and concentration that started in the late Eighties and led to the 2008 
consolidation immediately prior to the approval of Directive 43/2009 of four dominant 
defence companies in the EU: BAE Systems and EADS (now Airbus), Finmeccanica 
(now Leonardo) and Thales. After the 2000s however this consolidation trend slowed, 
and firms adjusted to the acquisitions of the late 1990s. An attempted merger between 
EADS and BAE Systems failed in 2012 due to Germany's opposition. Thus the same 
big four dominated in 2007 immediately prior to approval of the ICT Directive and now 
in 2020. 
                                                                
9 B. Schmitt (2003). “The European Union and Armaments. Getting the bigger ban for the Euro”. EUISS 
Chaillot Paper (63). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Available online at: 




Figure 1.1 The process of concentration of the European defence industry 
 
Source: L. Mampaey (2008). “Il sistema militare industriale.” In: C. Bonaiuti and A. Lodovisi (Eds.) 
L'industria militare e la difesa europea. Milano: Jaca Book, p. 35 
 
As a consequence of this integration and the growing number of coproductions, EU 
firms worked together and started to push their demand for a harmonisation of MS 
regulations on arms export control and transparency. In fact, according to the defence 
companies, different arms transfers control regulations and different operational 
requirements among MS hampered cooperation considered essential for the survival 
of the EU defence base. Thus, they asked to establish a European defence market of 
sufficient size that would harmonise acquisition procedures and operational 
requirements. 
Defence companies enjoyed the role of first mover in this process. They were able to 
analyse the situation (promoting and carrying out studies on the European defence 
industry), quickly organise transnationally, speak with one voice, and place their 
demands in a wider political and economics narrative. These tasks were facilitated by 
the ability that the strongest defence companies had already developed at the national 
level in networking and lobbying. 
In fact, in the Eighties there were already three associations of defence companies, 
revolving mainly around the aerospace sector, which is the most integrated sector: 
AECMA (European Association of Aerospace Industries), EDIG (European Defence 
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Industries Group) and EUROSPACE, the Association of the European Space 
Industry.10 In 2004 these associations merged as ASD, the Aerospace and Defence 
Industries Association of Europe, with the purpose of enhancing the competitive 
development of the Defence Industrial Technological base.11 Secondly, they carried 
out studies and analysis of the economic and political situation for the European 
defence industry. 
Lastly, they were able to speak with one voice at a time when MS were divided. In fact 
in 1994 and 1995 EDIG published two different reports which clarified the interests and 
objectives of defence companies with a focus on the simplification of intra-Community 
transfer and common defence procurement12. 
EDIG proposed the reduction or even elimination of national controls and authorisation 
procedures with regard to the exchange of parts and components between industries 
participating in collaborative programmes, and in favour of harmonising national arms 
export regulations. “The free exchange of parts and components in the framework of 
collaborative programmes is hindered by the existence of diverse national legislations 
with complex authorization and control systems. This has the effect of slowing down 
the production process and has a negative effect on the competitiveness of the 
European industries.” 13  For this purpose, the demand was for a clear distinction 
between intra and extra European trade. With regard to the first, EDIG asked for an 
inter-state agreement on the removal of all restrictions. 
Secondly, for exports to third countries they demanded a common European arms 
export regulation. Considering the difficulties and time necessary to reach this 
ambitious aim, companies pragmatically asked that in the meantime MS adopt the 
principle of delegation to the partner country in case of export outside the European 
boundaries, extending the mutual recognition principle (with some corrections) to the 
arms transfers field as well. 
                                                                
10  The European Defence Industries Group, EDIG for short, set up in Brussels in 1990 as an 
International Association under Belgian Law, draws its membership from all the national defence 
industry associations of the Western European Armaments Group nations. 
11 Unisys (2005). Intra-Community transfers of Defence Products. Final report of the study “Assessment 
of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products” carried out by Unisys 
for the European Commission 
12 European Defence Industries Group (EDIG) (1995). The European defence industry: an agenda item 
for the 1996 InterGovernmental Conference (Memorandum, 30 May 1995). Brussels: EDIG, p. 11; EDIG 
(1994). EDIG policy paper on conventional defence equipment export (Reference EPP/94/07, 13 Jan. 
1994). Brussels: EDIG, p. 1. 
13 EDIG (1995), p. 11. 
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Thirdly, abandoning the liberal perspective they had adopted for arms transfers, the 
companies asked the EU to increase military expenditures and investments in research 
and development in military fields, in order to close the gap with the United States and 
to gain sufficient economies of scale able to guarantee independent European 
production. Lastly, they asked for government support to export defence equipment 
that could take a variety of forms: political, military and financial. At the 
intergovernmental level they proposed creating a European Export Support Office 
tasked to support European arms exports towards third markets. However, despite 
their lobbying power, the reality was that there have always been clear differences 
between the interests of the most integrated and strongest firms and small, often still 
nationally based, suppliers.14 
Since the early proposal of Defence Companies in 1995 which put forth some of the 
core themes of the EU Commission and main features of Directive 2009/43/EC, 
defence companies and especially the big four have been involved intensively in EU 
Commission activities and studies, such as: the 2002 European Advisory Group on 
Aerospace, participation in the 2004 Group of Personalities on Security Research, and 
the most recent Group of Personalities, established in 2015, to advise the Commission 
on establishing a Preparatory Action on Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP)-related research.15 Similarly many defence company representatives have 
been invited to the European Defence Agency annual conference, totalling 230 
representatives of European Defence companies in 2019.16 Overall, the four biggest 
defence companies have been actively involved in EU institutional initiatives towards 
creating a CSDP. 
 
                                                                
14 J. Mawdsley (2008a).”European union armaments policy: options for small states?”, European 
security, 17(2-3): 367-385. 
15 In 2015, the European Commission invited key personalities from European industry, government, 
the European Parliament and academia to advise it on establishing a Preparatory Action on Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-related research. The primary mission of this Group of 
Personalities was to help establish recommendations for a long-term vision for EU-funded CSDP-related 
research which can boost European defence cooperation. The group published its final report in March 
2016 explicitly endorsing the establishment of a Pilot Project and Preparatory Action on military research 
(currently running with a €90 million budget until 2020) and setting out proposals on "the next steps" - 
likely to be a multi-billion euro European Defence Research Programme to run, initially, between 2021 
and 2027. A. D. James (2018). “Policy Entrepreneurship and Agenda Setting: Comparing and 
Contrasting the Origins of the European Research Programmes for Security and Defense”, in N. 
Karampekios, I. Oikonomou, E. Carayannis, (Eds.). The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy: 
from innovation to Militarization, Berlin: Springer. pp. 15-43. 
16 EDA website, Information on the annual conference, available online at https://eda-
ac19.b2match.io/page-611 (last accessed 14 October 2019). 
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4.2 The role of non-governmental organisations 
 
Peace organisations and NGOs (non-governmental organisations) on arms control and 
transparency can be subdivided into two main groups: the first aims to stop arms trade 
and arms production completely (European Network Against Arms Trade); the second 
aims to regulate arms trade, and focuses especially on human rights, conflict 
prevention and promoting development (Bruxelles Group, Iansa, Controlarms). There 
are about thirty NGOs in Europe specialising in the complex theme of arms control, but 
there are also hundreds of other organisations dealing with similar subjects, such as 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian defence, human rights, developments and 
so on (Amnesty International, Basic, Oxfam). 
These organisations started to collaborate at the European level during the 1990s, 
playing an important role in promoting and approving the Code of Conduct on Arms 
exports in 1992 and 1998. The Code of Conduct empowered the newly formed NGO 
networks and organizations which used it as a focal point for their activities. In 
particular, by identifying the worrying gaps between common aspirations (as 
expressed in the preamble of the Code) and the sobering reality, NGOs increased their 
leverage on states. 
The main institutional interlocutor at the European level is the Parliament, but there are 
also links developed with the Council, and informal annual meetings of a specific 
Committee dealing with conventional arms (Council Working Party on Conventional 
Arms Exports). Networks with the Commission have not been developed yet, except 
sporadically. This is also due to the fact that European arms exports is still under the 
CFSP framework and the Commission has only recently started to legislate the internal 
arms market (with the exceptions that will be explained in detail in the second part of 
this section). As a consequence NGOs did not benefit from consistent funds from the 
Commission, as opposed to what happened, for example, to environmental 
associations17. This has contributed to further widening the gap of resources between 
the two main groups of private, non-state actors, associations and companies (and the 
gap between representation of general and particular interests at the European level).  
 
                                                                
17 M. A. Pollack  (1997). “Representing diffuse interests in EC policy-making”. Journal of European 
Public Policy, 4(4): 572-590. 
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4.3 The role of the European Court of Justice 
 
Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union removes arms 
exports policy from common European regulation. In particular it envisages that:  
1. The provisions of this Treaty shall not preclude the application of the following rules: 
(a) No MS shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure of which it considers 
contrary to the essential interests of its security;  
(b) Any MS may take such measures as it considers necessary for the protection of 
the essential interests of its security which are connected with the production of or 
trade in arms, munitions and war material; such measures shall not, however, 
adversely affect the conditions of competition in the common market regarding 
products which are not intended for specifically military purposes.  
This article has never been amended. For a long time it has been interpreted widely 
by MS as excluding the defence sector from the whole EU law. However, the European 
Court of Justice with thirteen decisions has offered a new interpretation of Article 346, 
expanding the EU law domain .18 
In a nutshell the guidelines which emerged from the decisions of the European Court 
of justice can be summarised as follows: 
Article 346 (formerly 223 of the Treaty of Rome and then 296 of the Treaty of the 
European Union) is no longer an automatic exclusion from the EU law. On the contrary 
“it is just one of the Treaty-based derogations which deal with exceptional and clearly 
defined cases which must be interpreted strictly.” 19 
Article 346 can be invoked by MS only if their essential security interests are at stake. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has specified: “It is for MS to prove that the 
                                                                
18  European Court of Justice (1999). Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 16 September 1999 
(Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Spain, Case C-414/97). Luxembourg: ECJ, 
p. 417. This interpretation was reiterated in Commission, Interpretative Communication on the 
Application of Article 296 of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement COM(2006)779 final. This 
position has been confirmed and further refined in subsequent judgments, including for example: the 
Agusta judgments. See European Court of Justice (2008b). Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 
8 April 2008 (Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. Case C-337/05 p. 203); and 
European Court of Justice (2008a). Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber) of 2 October 2008 
(Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic. Case C-157/06). Luxembourg: ECJ, 
p.530. 
19 V. Randazzo, (2014), “Article 346 and the qualified application of EU law to defence”. EUISS Brief 
No. 42: 2.Available online at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_22_Article_346.pdf  (last 
accessed 1 April 2019). 
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measures they take are necessary in order to protect their essential security interests, 
and that such an objective cannot be achieved through less restrictive means. In doing 
so, MS have first to identify the ‘essential security interests’ they intend to protect. 
Hence, MS must make a credible case that the interest at stake is a security (not an 
economic) one, and that it can be defined as essential.”20 On this issue, MS do, in fact, 
enjoy a margin of discretion: neither the Commission, nor the Court of Justice, nor 
national courts would second-guess the MS choices in identifying their security 
interests or in qualifying them as essential.  
Secondly, Article 346 can be invoked only where specific conditions are fulfilled: the 
first concerns the material scope, i.e. what type of product is covered; the second is 
about the necessity and proportionality of the MS’s specific measure for the protection 
of its essential security interests.  
This evolving interpretation of the Court has dramatically enlarged the field of 
application of the European law, moving from a whole exception, to the exemption from 
European law, only when the essential interests of state security are at stake. In this 
trajectory the Court has been influenced by the Commission. According to Koutrakos: 
“In this vein it is worth pointing out that the Communication on the application of Article 
346 TFEU also features in the subsequent judgements of the court. There emerges, 
therefore a direct interaction between these institutions based on a shared 
understanding of this wholly exceptional provision. While the Commission’s initiative 
does not bind the Court, it signalled a shift in its enforcement approach which enabled 
the latter to respond and apply in the manner examined in the previous sections.” 21 
According to the European Commission “the internal market principles will finally apply 
in sectors which have been traditionally excluded from community law.” 22  These 
interpretations have been the basis to change perspective from analysing the intra-
Community transfers as a foreign policy issue to an internal market perspective, 
starting to consider, in principle, defence goods like other civil goods. This was the 
legal terrain from which the Directive originated.  
 
 
                                                                
20 Ibidem, p. 3. 
21 P. Koutrakos (2013). The EU Common Security and Defence Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
p. 269.  
22 European Commission (2009), Press release, 25 August 2009. Available online at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-1250_en.htm?locale=en (last accessed 20 October 2018). 
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Figure 1.2 The expansion of the domain of the EU law in the armaments field as a 
consequence of ECJ decisions.  
 Arms transfers (imports and exports within 
the EU) 
Arms exports to third 
countries 




Before 1999  Outside the EU Law  
  




4.4 The role of the European Commission  
 
Despite the limits of Article 346, the role of the Commission in the field of arms 
production restructuring and indirectly of arms transfers, at least within EU boundaries, 
has been particularly active and dynamic. Starting in the Nineties, this institution has 
been able to create the terrain in order to legislate even in areas that were traditional 
domains of the nation state, both indirectly, by stimulating for example the judicial 
interpretation of the ECJ of the primary law, and directly by creating secondary 
legislation in this field.  
 The Commission has used all the instruments at its disposal ranging from 
communications, infringements procedures, preparatory actions, impact assessment 
procedures, creating groups of politicians, academics, think tankers and CEOs from 
defence industries, called “Group of Personalities on defence research” who are able 
to make recommendations for the defence field, reframing the issue, activating the 
ECJ, and using its agenda-setting power. The following are the most important 
documents concerning intra-Community transfers which led in the end to the approval 
of the ICT Directive which is at the core of the analysis. 
The activism of the Commission in the defence and military sector starts with two 
Communications in 1996 and 1997 and an action plan “with the aim to facilitate the 
development of cooperation in the defence industry sector”.23  
                                                                
23 European Commission (1996). Communication from the Commission. The Challenges facing the 
European Defence-related Industry, a Contribution for Action at European level (COM (96)10, final), 
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The Communication of 1996 had already put on the table all the key themes which 
would be articulated in the following years: the necessity of a restrictive interpretation 
of Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome for intra-Community transfers, the need to reduce 
internal barriers for transfers of defence material within EU boundaries and to export 
the aspiration for a unique regulation, and if this was not possible, to introduce other 
forms of mutual recognition. There is also reference to the progressive overlapping 
between civil and military research as a requisite for opening funds for research firstly 
in the dual-use and then military sectors.24 
All these proposals are preceded by a description of the dramatic situation which the 
defence industry experienced after the collapse of bipolarism, their reaction based on 
integration and internationalisation and the necessity to eliminate those national 
barriers that hamper intra-Community transfers. 
On December 4, 1997 the Commission published a Communication entitled 
Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence-Related Industries that defined, 
for the first time, a real strategy for intervention in the military sector. 25  This 
Communication is considered the first “comprehensive approach to the restructuring 
and consolidation of the defence industries of the MS, based on an assessment of the 
economic problems and challenges facing their fragmented state in an increasingly 
globalised market.” 26 
The Communication set up an action plan that identifies the final objectives of the 
efforts of the EU in the area:  
- strengthen the competitiveness of the European defence industry; 
- preserve the Defence Technological and Industrial Base; 
- favour the integration of European Defence Technological and Industrial Base 
in the general economy to avoid duplication of efforts between the civil and the military 
areas; 
- create the necessary preconditions for a European Security and Defence 
Identity.  
                                                                
Brussels Commission of the European Communities; European Commission (1997). Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, the economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions. Implementing European Union strategy on defence-related 
industries (COM (97)583, final). Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. 
24 European Commission (1996), ibidem. 
25  European Commission (1997). Implementing European Union Strategy on Defence Related 
Industries (91 COM (97) 583 final, adopted on 12/11/1997). Brussels: European Commission. 
26 See Koutrakos (2013) and European Commission (1996). 
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The document also dealt with public procurement standardisation and technical 
harmonisation, competition policy, structural funds, export policies, and import duties 
on military equipment.  
The second important step is represented by the Communication of 2003 “Towards an 
EU Defence Equipment Policy” in which the Commission reiterated the need for a 
coherent cross-pillar approach to the legal regulation of defence industries with special 
emphasis on standardisation, intra-Community transfers, competition, procurement, 
exports of dual use goods, and funds for security research.27 More importantly the 
Commission envisaged the possibility of a legal initiative in this field and planned an 
impact assessment to evaluate the reliability of this kind of initiative.28  
In particular, regarding intra-Community transfers, the Commission stated that “a 
simplified licence system could help to reduce the heavy administrative procedures, 
which impede the circulation of components of defence equipment between EU 
countries.” 29 The Commission proposed launching an impact assessment study and 
starting to elaborate the appropriate legal instruments.  
In 2003 a Green Paper on defence procurement and future initiatives was published. 
Despite focusing primarily on procurement, it represents an important turning point 
because for the first time it was worked on by the DG (Directorate General) Internal 
Market and Financial Services instead of as previously by the DG External Relations.30 
The reframing of the issue is extremely important because arms transfers (within the 
EU) became an internal market issue, and as a consequence, subject to the rule of the 
internal market, albeit of course with the exception of Article 346. This passage has 
been favoured by ECJ decisions reducing the field of application of Article 346. This 
enables EU law to intervene in harmonising relevant national laws for the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.31 Defence goods are assimilated 
                                                                
27 European Commission (2003). Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. 
European Defence-Industrial and market issues. Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy (COM 
(2003)113, final). Brussels: European Commission.  
28 Ibidem.      
29 Ibidem, p.3. 
30 European Commission (2004). Green Paper. Defence Procurement (COM (2004)608, final). 
Brussels: European Commission; European Commission (2005). Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the 
consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and on the future of Commission 
initiatives (COM (2005)626, final). Brussels: European Commission; J. Strikwerda (2017). “Sovereignty 
at stake? The European Commission's proposal for a Defence and Security Procurement Directive”. 
European Security, 26(1): 19-36. 
31 M. Trybus, &  L. R. Butler, (2017). “The internal market and national security: Transposition, impact 
and reform of the EU Directive on Intra-Community transfers of Defence Products”. Common Market 
Law Review, 54(2):408. 
20 
  
to all other civil goods. And MS are legally and normatively linked to the internal market 
rules, despite the relevant exceptions envisaged in Article 346.  
In 2005 the EU Commission promoted a study aimed at analysing the nature of legal 
and administrative obstacles to intra-Community transfers of military equipment and to 
delineate possible measures to facilitate such transfers with a view to increasing the 
efficiency of the internal market. This study was carried out by Unisys.32 In the same 
year, after the Commission promoted a online consultation with stakeholders 
concerning the EU Directive, companies and non-governmental organisations 
uploaded their observations on the possibility of introducing general and global 
licences.33 
In December 2006, the Commission adopted the Interpretative Communication on the 
application of Article 296 [then 346 TFEU] of the Treaty in the field of defence 
procurement. Its objective is to prevent possible misinterpretation and misuse of Article 
296 in the field of defence procurement, and give contract-awarding authorities some 
guidance for their assessment whether the use of the exemption is justified. The thrust 
of the Commission's initiative is that both the field and the conditions of application of 
Article 296 must be interpreted in a restrictive way. 34  Despite the fact that the 
communication was not legally binding, the Commission explained that it has the 
power to assess whether the conditions for applying Article 296 are fulfilled and 
consequently if it may bring infringement actions against non-compliant MS. 
 Its main features can be summarized as follows: 
1. The scope of the exception is sufficiently wide to cover not only the goods on 
the military list, but also services and works directly related to the list of goods. 
However it does not cover dual use goods. 
2. Regarding the conditions of application, if it is the prerogative of the MS to define 
its essential security interest, this interest cannot be of an economic or industrial 
nature. 
3. Regarding the role of the Commission, it is not for the Commission to assess 
the essential security interests of MS, nor which military equipment they procure 
                                                                
32 Unisys (2005). Intra-Community transfers of Defence Products. Final report of the study “Assessment 
of Community initiatives related to intra-community transfers of defence products” carried out by Unisys 
for the European Commission. 
33 S. Depauw (2008), “The European Defence Package: Towards a liberalization and harmonization of 
the European defence market”, Background Note, Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 7 April 2008. 
34 Koutrakos (2013). 
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to protect those interests. However, as guardian of the Treaty, the Commission 
may verify whether the conditions for exempting procurement contracts on the 
basis of Article [346 TFEU] are fulfilled. 
4. Concerning the burden of evidence, when the Commission investigates a 
defence procurement case, it is for the MS concerned to furnish evidence that 
its essential interests are at stake.35 
In conclusion, according to Koutrakos, “In this vein, it is worth pointing out that the 
Communication on the application of Article 346 TFEU also features in the subsequent 
judgments of the Court. There emerges, therefore, a direct interaction between these 
institutions based on a shared understanding of this wholly exceptional provision. 
While the Commission's initiative does not bind the Court, it signalled a shift in its 
enforcement approach[..]”.36 Furthermore, after the reframing of armament issue within 
the DG Internal Market, this communication represents another important step in 
binding MS towards both the legal and unwritten rules of the internal market. The 
Commission warned MS that, as guardian of the Treaty, it may verify whether the 
conditions for exempting procurement contracts are fulfilled, and thus it can stimulate 
integration by law, albeit with some relevant limits, also in the field of procurement and 
intra-Community transfers.  
 On 5 December 2007, the European Commission submitted the so-called “Defence 
Package”, setting out a set of proposals aimed at strengthening the competitiveness 
of the defence industry, including a Communication “A strategy for a stronger and more 
competitive European defence industry” and two Directive proposals. 37  The first 
Directive deals with defence procurement. The second one relates to simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community.38 Thus 
in a single package deal the Commission includes both defence procurement and an 
intra-Community transfer directives proposal (which had created suspicion from MS 
and from some companies). The defence package represents the most important 
                                                                
35 Ibidem. 
36 Ibidem, p. 93. 
37 European Commission (2007a). Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-
related products within the Community (hereinafter “Impact Assessment”, SEC(2007)1593). Brussels: 
European Commission. 
38 European Commission (2007b). Proposal for a Directive on simplifying terms and conditions of 




output of the Commission in the armaments field. It aims to improve the functioning of 
the European defence market. 
 
5. The Directive’s aims, boundaries and content 
 
5.1 Aims and boundaries of the Directive: a change in perspective  
 
Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council simplifying terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community was 
adopted on 6 May 2009.39 The deadlines for MS were 30 June 2011 to adopt the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with the Directive, and 
30 June 2012 to enter these provisions into force. Considering the high degree of misfit 
between the spirit and letter of the Directive, and some prescriptive MS regulations 
based on individual licences and ex ante controls, the transposition period was quite 
long for some MS, but at the end of the second deadline all MS had adopted and 
entered the Directive into force. In this section the Directive is outlined briefly as the 
focus in the thesis is on its transposition at the domestic level. 40 
                                                                
39 European Union (2009). Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the 
Community [2009] O.J. L146/1. 
40 For an exhaustive legal analysis of the ICT Directive and the legal context of EU Common Security 
and Defence Policy, see Trybus & Butler (2017): 403-441 and Koutrakos (2013). For analysis of the 
legal text and political debate around the ICT Directive see F. Liberti, S. Matelly & J.P. Maulny,  (2010). 
Pratiques communautaires internes de contrôle des exportations et des transferts intracommunautaires 
de produits de defense. Paris: Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, available at 
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/104465/1019134/EPS2009_pratiques_communautaire
s.pdf (last accessed 14 January 2020); H. Masson, L. Marta, P. Leger & M. Lundmark (2010). “The 
Transfer Directive: Perceptions in European Countries and Recommendations”. Fondation pour la 
Recherche Stratégique Recherches & Documents, No. 4. Available online at: 
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/119430/ RD_201004.pdf (last accessed 18 October 2018); L. Mampaey 
and M. Tudosia (2008). “Le Paquet défense de la Commission Européenne. Un pas risqué vers le 
marché européen de l’armement», Note D’Analyse du GRIP, 25 June 2008. For impact assessments 
and studies on the implementation of the Directive, see the following: L. Mampaey, V. Moreau, Y. Quéau 
and J. Seniora (2014). Study on the Implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on Transfers of Defence-
Related Products Brussels: Groupe de Recherche et d’information sur la paixet la securite. Available 
online at: http://www.grip. org/en/node/1421 (last accessed: 10 May 2016); H. Masson, K. Martin, Y. 
Quéau & J. Seniora, (2015). The Impact of the ‘Defence Package’ Directives on European Defence. 
Study for the European Parliament (Brussels: European Parliament). Available online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/549044/EXPO_STU(2015)549044_EN.pd
f (last accessed 18 October 2018); European Commission, Evaluation of Directive 2009/43/EC on the 
Transfers of defence-related products within the Community Final Report (prepared by Technopolis) 
June 2016. P. Sartori, A.Marrone and  P. Sartori, A. Marrone  & M. Nones (2018). “Looking Through the 
Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and Implications for the European Defence Industry”. Documenti IAI (18): 2-76. 
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The purpose of the Directive is to reduce the administrative burden in intra-Community 
transfers of defence material. According to Article 1.1 the aim of the Directive is to 
simplify the rules and procedures of intra-Community transfers.  
In principle, with this Directive defence goods are considered like other goods and “the 
rule on intra-Union transfers and on public procurement are adopted on the basis of 
the Union’s market internal power”.41 The ICT was adopted under Article 114 TFEU 
which enables EU legislation to harmonise relevant national laws for the establishment 
and functioning of the Internal Market.42 
This point of departure reflects an important change in perspective, a reframing of the 
issue with a new approach to the armaments field. The starting point is no longer 
represented by foreign and security policy approaches but by an EU internal market 
approach. The DG of reference is Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and 
SMEs. This new perspective is a way to circumvent MS opposition towards a 
supranational intervention in a core state power like armaments. This procedure 
presents analogies with the dynamics of penetration by law which has characterised 
other fields such as telecommunications or the health care sector.43 This change in 
approach is also important because it implies a change in the consequential order 
between political and economic variables. It exchanges principles, with exception. Now 
the principle is the free movement of defence goods (with a series of limits), and all 
political and constitutional principles and bans regulating arms export become the 
exception.  
This leads to the first limit of the Directive, which regulates only intra-Community 
transfers and not exports to third countries. According to Article 1.2, the Directive does 
not affect the discretion of MS as regards policy on the export of defence-related 
products. Arms exports to non-European countries shall be considered an 
intergovernmental issue which falls under Chapter 5 of the TFEU, in the framework of 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy: “While the rule on intra-union transfers and on 
public procurement are adopted on the basis of the Union’s market internal power, the 
rules on exports of armaments are set out in a measure adopted within the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy framework.”44 
                                                                
41 Koutrakos (2013), p.223. 
42 Trybus and Butler (2017): 403-441. 
43J. H. H. Weiler. (1991). “The Transformation of Europe”. The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 100, No. 8, 
Symposium: International Law, (June): 2403-2483. 
44 Koutrakos (2013), p. 234. 
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In compliance with this limit, the Directive introduces the fundamental distinction 
between transfers and exports. “Assuming that the risks of exporting defence-related 
goods within the European Union is low or simply non-existent, the newly established 
regulatory framework seeks to reduce the administrative burdens for defence firms and 
national authorities arising from the lack of coordination between the export control 
regimes of MS.”45  
Secondly, even within the EU boundaries the Directive has two further important 
exceptions concerning intra-Community transfers, which are linked to the sensitivity of 
the defence goods and that makes it impossible to create an internal free market of 
armament sic et simpliciter (see Art.1.3). The first limit is represented by Article 346 
which originally de facto exempted defence matter from EU regulation, but since 1999, 
in line with the ECJ decisions and the interpretation of the Commission, it has been 
interpreted in a restrictive way, thus to be invoked only if the security of the MS is at 
stake. This limit is absolute and implies a total exemption from ECJ jurisdiction. 
The second limit is represented by Article 36 of the TFEU which includes all the 
exceptions to the free market rules, envisaging the possibility to derogate to the 
prohibitions or restrictions on exports, imports and transit on the basis of public security 
reasons. According to this article, the fundamental rights of free movement of goods 
within EU borders “shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or 
goods in transit justified on the grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security, protection of health and life of humans, animal and plants, the protection of 
national treasures with artistic, historic or archaeological value, the protection of 
industrial property."46 Article 36, which condenses history of law and entire parts of 
national constitutions into a few words, is extremely important and also refers to public 
security, thus representing the third important exception to the Directive. In this case 
the exemption for the EU law is partial, because it does not concern ECJ jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the direct application of the free movement principles alone is insufficient to 
remove national restrictions in light of their potential to be justified under Article 36 or 
                                                                
45  M. Trybus (2014). Buying Defence and Security in Europe: the EU Defence and Security 
Procurement Directive in Context, Cambridge: CUP; p. 1 and D. Fiott (2017).”Patriotism, Preferences 
and Serendipity: Understanding the Adoption of the Defence Transfers Directive”. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 55(5): 1045-1061. 
46 Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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346 of the TFEU.47 Thus “licences albeit in a simplified form must subsist”48. In other 
words, Directive 43/2009 recognizes the reality that licensing measures remain, in 
principle, justifiable on public security and/or essential national security grounds in 
exceptional circumstances. 
 
5.2 The content of the Directive in a nutshell 
 
In a nutshell, Directive 2009/43/EC firstly introduces a basic distinction between intra-
Community transfers and exports to non-EU countries.  
Secondly it envisages new, very simplified types of export licences - the general 
licences and global licences, to be used for arms intra-Community transfers within 
European borders with reliable partners. Thirdly, it foresees a new certification system 
for companies, aimed at establishing trustworthy relations among European partners 
and governments dealing with certified companies. The system of ex ante control tends 
to be replaced with ex post controls, founded upon inspections carried out by the 
authorities. This way it tends to move responsibility for export controls from the state 
to the companies, whose reliability should have been verified by a certification. Lastly, 
for intra-Community transfers, it introduces a system of ex post controls founded upon 
inspections carried out by the authorities, instead of the highly complex and articulated 
systems of ex ante control which had characterized most of the domestic national 
regulation (particularly the more restrictive and prescriptive ones). 
Though the Directive was aimed at regulating only the intra-European exchanges, it 
can have a relevant impact not only on the traceability of internal transfers of spare 
parts and components, and thus on internal security, but also on extra-European 
exports, considering the fact that European MS have different regulations with varying 
degrees of strictness. Its outcomes are going to have a relevant impact not only on 
restructuring European industries and the internal arms market, but also on arms 









5.2.1 General licences 
General licences are thought to make exchanging defence materials easier and to 
lighten administrative burdens. Instead of following complex authorization procedures 
for each defence material, one licence may authorize several transfers to more than 
one recipient. In particular, according to Article 5 of the Directive, MS shall publish 
general transfer licences directly granting authorisation to suppliers established on 
their territory, which fulfil the terms and conditions attached to the general transfer 
licence, to perform transfers of defence-related products, to be specified in the general 
transfer licence, to a category or categories of recipients located in another MS. 
According to Article 4.5 of the Directive, MS shall determine the terms and conditions 
of transfer licences for defence-related products. According to Article 5.2, the 
publication of general licences is mandatory in at least four circumstances: a) when 
the recipient is certified in accordance with the ICT’s certification provisions; b) when 
the recipient is part of a MS’s armed forces or a defence contracting authority, 
purchasing for the exclusive use by that MS’s armed forces; c) when the transfer is 
made for the purposes of demonstration, evaluation or exhibition, and d) when the 
transfer is made for the purposes of maintenance and repair. 
 
5.2.2 Global licences 
Global licences play an intermediate role between general and individual licences. 
They authorize one supplier to send one or more shipment to one or more specified 
recipients. According to Article 6 of the Directive, MS shall decide to grant global 
transfer licences to an individual supplier, at its request, authorising transfers of 
defence-related products to recipients in one or more EU countries. MS shall determine 
in each global transfer licence the defence-related products or categories of products 
covered by the global transfer licence and the authorised recipients or category of 
recipients. A global transfer licence shall be granted for a period of three years, which 
may be renewed by the MS. MS may define all conditions for the release of transfer 
licences. Some MS with stricter legislation have detailed the defence material to be 
exported and the maximum quantity of each kind of armament material that is permitted 





5.2.3 Individual licences 
Individual licences in intra-Community transfers must be considered an exception with 
respect to general and global licences and shall be used only in specific and particular 
cases, linked to the protection of essential security interests or in exceptional cases of 
suspected unreliability of the recipient.  
In fact, according to Article 7 of the Directive, MS shall decide to grant individual 
transfer licences to an individual supplier authorising one transfer of a specified 
quantity of specified defence-related products to be conveyed via one or several 
shipments to one recipient where: 
(a) the request for a transfer licence is limited to one transfer; 
(b) it is necessary for the protection of the essential security interests of the MS or on 
grounds of public policy; 
(c) it is necessary for compliance with international obligations and commitments of 
MS; or 
(d) a MS has serious reason to believe that the supplier will not be able to comply with 
all the terms and conditions necessary to grant it a global transfer licence.  
 
5.2.4 Reporting requirements 
According to Article 8 of the Directive, MS shall ensure and regularly check that 
suppliers keep detailed and complete records of their transfers, in accordance with the 
legislation in force in that MS, and shall determine the reporting requirements attached 
to the use of a general, global or individual transfer licence. Such records shall include 
commercial documents containing the following information:  
(a) a description of the defence-related product and its reference under the Annex;  
(b) the quantity and value of the defence-related product; 
(c) the dates of transfer; 
(d) the name and address of the supplier and recipient; 
(e) where known, the end-use and end-user of the defence-related product; 
(f) proof that the information on an export limitation attached to a transfer licence has 
been transmitted to the recipient of the defence-related products. 
The lightening of export procedures and reduction of information required ex ante when 
a company applies for a general and global licence are counterbalanced by the 
information required ex post through the register in which companies must write all the 
information describing the defence-related product transferred, the quantity, value, 
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date, name and address of the supplier, and attach proof that the recipient of the 
defence materials has been informed about export restrictions. 
 
5.2.5 Transparency 
The Directive makes no reference to transparency nor reporting to National Parliament 
about defence materials transferred under general, global and individual intra-
Community transfers. The only reference to a form of communication for data 
transparency in the Directive is laid down in point 41 in the Directive’s long Preamble, 
according to which the Commission should regularly publish a report on the 
implementation of this Directive, which may be accompanied by legislative proposals 
where appropriate.  
This lack of reference prompted strong criticism from European NGOs acting in the 
field of arms transparency and disarmament and among researchers from independent 
research institutes (see sub-section 6.3). 
 
5.2.6 Certification 
Certification is one of the core elements of the Directive and introduces a new approach 
to the system of defence transfer control. The objective of recipient certification is to 
establish their reliability for receiving defence-related products under a general transfer 
licence published in another MS. It is a confidence-building measure and a tool to 
reinforce ex-post controls. It is intended as an alternative form of controls to traditional 
ex ante controls, and as a means to reduce the risk of illicit transfers and enhance the 
traceability of the defence-related products transferred under a general transfer licence 
and mutual trust in compliance with legal requirements, paying particular attention to 
re-export, and quality of internal control programmes.  
The Directive indicates the procedures and criteria to be followed at a national level in 
order to certify the reliability of a company. Paragraph 8 of Article 9 states that MS shall 
publish and regularly update a list of certified recipients and inform the Commission, 
the European Parliament and the other MS about the list.  
The Commission shall make a central register of recipients certified by MS publicly 
available on its website.49 
 
                                                                
49The Commission website address is       




The Directive clearly states that, in compliance with the EU Treaties, the norms apply 
only to the internal market and do not touch the MS’s discretion concerning their export 
policies. 
In line with this distinction, Article 4.6 of the Directive states that MS shall determine all 
the terms and conditions of transfer licences, including any limitations on the export of 
defence-related products to legal or natural persons in third countries having regard, 
inter alia, to the risk for the preservation of human rights, peace, security and stability 
created by the transfer. MS may, whilst complying with Community law, avail 
themselves of the possibility to request end-use assurances, including end-user 
certificates, or may not.  
In other words MS have full control on exports to third countries, and their foreign policy 
on their export policy, in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Rome if 
they want, but they also have the possibility to change their national regulation in a 
liberal way or to transpose the vague formula of the Directive. In countries with strict 
regulation this might create an opportunity to soften end-user control (also encouraged 
by the Commission) while transposing the Directive. Each MS, on the basis of the 
characteristics and tradition of its national arms export control regulations, may decide 
whether to maintain full control or to delegate responsibility of re-export to the partner 
country.  
The ICT applies to defence-related products (Arts. 2 and 3.1). These are set out in an 
Annex which must correspond to the EU Common Military List (“CML”) adopted in the 
context of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on European Arms Exports (8 
December 2008)50 
 
5.2.8 Vagueness of the Directive  
Given that the Directive treats aspects which are the domain of the nation state, such 
as security and foreign policy, several Articles are formulated in a vague or flexible 
way, leaving MS to choose how to apply them to get the best fit with their domestic 
regulation. In fact, firstly, terms and conditions of general licences, arms covered by 
general licences are left to the decision of each MS. More importantly, in cases of re-
export the state may or may not include a clause to re-exports and it may or may not 
                                                                
50 Trybus and Butler (2017): 414. 
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delegate the responsibility on the final destination to the government of the European 
partner country in coproduction; it may or may not include an End-user certificate. 
Secondly, even the process of company certification is voluntary, thus its application 
is left to the discretion of MS and their companies. 
Lastly, the lack of reference to transparency and ways of reporting to the Parliament 
for the new kind of simplified licences leaves the state the possibility once again to 
choose in the transposition phase whether to extend transparency to the new kinds of 
licences or not. 
In conclusion, the binding force of the Directive remains extremely limited and most 
crucial aspects are left to the discretion of MS. In most cases - particularly those 
concerning exports to third countries - the lack of prescriptiveness of the Directive is 
intrinsically linked to the internal market. If the Directive had taken a specific approach 
with regard to third countries, it would have lent itself to a legal challenge. The 
ambiguity and flexibility on many crucial aspects such as transparency, or delegation 
to the partner country in cases of re-export to third countries, or controls on end use or 
certification might not be not completely neutral. In fact, it transforms obligations into 
possibility and - if transposed sic et simpliciter - it may introduce a margin of ambiguity 
and flexibility at the domestic level as well, replacing the preceding formulation that is 
more and better detailed by primary law, unless a majority is able to agree on a specific 
disposal. Given the sensitivity of the issue, it is not always easy to come to an 
agreement on this. Thus, even voluntary norms may favour Europeanisation and 
impress a precise direction to domestic change and to the Europeanisation process. 
I argue that, despite the vagueness and voluntary formulation of many parts in the 
Directive, its impact on the marketisation process of arms export regulation has been 
relevant. The transposition has led to sensitive domestic change and towards a pro-









6. The reaction to the Directive 
 
6.1. The reactions of MS to the Directive 
 
Initially MS were sceptical about the Defence Package, because it represented an 
important step towards the intervention of the Commission and more generally, of the 
EU law in a field which was considered “core” state power touching the heart of nation 
states, with attention to its capacity for defence and state survival.51 
However, scepticism and a critical attitude was openly expressed by only two MS: the 
UK and France. These two key actors, albeit expressing very different traditions and 
approaches to European defence - the first one more supranational and prescriptive, 
the other more liberal and flexible - converged on a very similar position. They 
supported a European defence equipment market but preferred that it be managed at 
the intergovernmental level.52  
In fact the UK - which has seen the European Union as no more than a market and 
which has for a long time opposed a “closer Union”- was naturally suspicious of this 
step which also had symbolic value. More concretely, UK government and companies 
feared that the Directive would have entailed new additional administrative burdens for 
companies compared to a national regulation which was characterised by flexibility and 
lightness of touch.53 Secondly, the UK Government was worried that the Directive- 
which focused on simplifying intra-Community exchange- would have penalized UK 
commercial and political relationships with their transatlantic ally, the USA. In the UK, 
in fact, these simplified procedures including general and global licences, already 
existed and had been used both with EU countries and with some non-EU countries 
including both western allies like the USA and other Middle East countries such as 
Saudi Arabia. 54  
                                                                
51 Strikwerda (2017) and Fiott (2017). 
52 Since 2004 in response to the Green Paper from the Commission in 2004, “the United Kingdom (UK) 
and France voiced that they saw no need for a Directive” and expressed their preference for an 
intergovernmental channel in which each MS could have the final say. In that period in fact British and 
French attitude had converged for different reasons towards the creation of EDA with a British 
leadership”.(Strikwerda (2017): 20). 
53 “A Directive would mean a burden on the already existent structure and not make the defence market 
more effective and efficient”. See Strikwerda (2017): 27.  
54 Furthermore in that period the UK had the presidency of EDA (the European Defence Agency) and 
this guaranteed the London government better control of this delicate subject. 
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The French Government was initially sceptical as well. Despite France having 
traditionally supported l’Europe de la Defence and believing that armaments 
cooperation must serve the cause of European Political Integration, its government 
was equally suspicious towards an increasing role for the Commission in this field. 
According to Fiott, “foremost among the French Government’s demands were 
reservations about how far an ICT Directive would empower the European 
Commission”. 55  Béraud-Sudreau argues that “The Directive was perceived as 
infringing upon national sovereignty as it opens doors to challenging licence denials at 
a supranational judiciary institution. [..] They were all worried that the Commission 
would meddle in their business.” 56  Furthermore, the French Government and 
bureaucracies were afraid that, for the so called “principle of parallelism between 
internal and external power”57, the power of the Commission on intra-Community 
transfers would also be extended to arms exports to third countries. As Béraud-
Sudreau points out: “after having organised the free-circulation of military goods within 
the EU, the Commission could take competences on exports to the rest of the world.”58 
Therefore, also in this case, at first national interests prevailed over the idea of a 
European defence and unique defence market, if it were not led and shaped by 
France.59 
On the other hand, Germany, which had rigorous and strict regulation, feared that the 
Directive might be too liberal and flexible particularly with regard to re-exports. They 
were concerned that free movement within the European boundaries would have 
facilitated exports from the countries with the most permissive regulations in order to 
                                                                
55 Fiott (2017): 9; L. Béraud-Sudreau (2014). French adaptation strategies for arms export controls 
since the 1990s. Paris Paper n° 10: 31. French Government (2010) LOI n°2011-702 du 22 juin 2011 
relative au contrôle des importations et des exportations de matériels de guerre et de matériels 
assimilés, à la simplification des transferts des produits liés à la défense dans l’Union européenne et 
aux marchés de défense et de sécurité. Available online at: 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000024228630&categorieLien=id 
(last accessed: 20 March 2016). 
56 Béraud-Sudreau, (2014): 31, note 58.  
57 According to a doctrine of implied powers developed by the European Court of Justice, and codified 
in the Lisbon treaty, where the treaties assign explicit powers to the EU in a particular area, it must also 
have similar powers to conclude agreements with non-EU countries in the same field: T. Konstadinides, 
(2014). “EU Foreign Policy under the Doctrine of Implied Powers: Codification Drawbacks and 
Constitutional Limitations”, European Law Review. 39(4): 511-530. 
58 Béraud-Sudreau, (2014): 33 and note 67.  
59 “Free trade would be good for both the budget of the Ministry of Defence, and the SMEs in France. 
For France, the main concerns during these informal meetings with the Commission were the scope of 
the Directive. French officials had instructions to make sure that the Directive would not unnecessarily 
touch upon the sovereignty of the state” Strikwerda (2017): 27.  According to Fiott, “ foremost among 
the French Government’s demands were reservations about how far an ICT Directive would empower 
the European Commission: Fiott (2017): 9.  
33 
  
extend exports to third markets, thus circumventing those regulations which were 
stricter and more rigorous.60 This risk of congregating towards the lowest common 
denominator was also shared by NGOs, particularly in the first phase and for the first 
version of the Defence package (see sub-section 6.3). Divergently, German defence 
companies are reported to support the Directive which was seen as a tool to lower 
administrative burden and support German arms exports, enlarging the opportunities 
to sell in third markets.61 
Italy, Sweden, and Spain - which were characterized by strong and integrated defence 
companies but at the same time had prescriptive and rigorous regulations - were 
overall in favour of the Directive. Sweden and Italy in part had already initiated a 
process of liberalisation and marketisation of their arms transfers regulation at the 
domestic level; they were among the six which participated together with the UK, 
France, Germany in the “Framework agreement” which simplified the exchange of 
coproduced defence equipment and all suffered from declining demand following the 
end of the Cold War. Thus, despite their rigorous regulations, this time the trend 
towards liberalisation prevailed. Worries about re-exports which could have weakened 
their rigorous procedures and bans were counterbalanced by the hope for advantages 
for their domestic companies. 62 
Italy is reported to have enthusiastically supported the Directive and even to have 
pushed for more harmonised regulation. 63  Some sectors of the governments, 
administration and companies saw in the approval of the Directive, the opportunity to 
completely update their national regulation in order to make domestic industry more 
competitive. 64  Sweden supported the Directive because its aims matched a 
“marketisation” process of Swedish domestic regulation and defence industrial policy 
                                                                
60 According to Fiott, “the German Federal Government were concerned that the proposed Directive 
could weaken Germany’s strict export policies and, as a consequence, supersede German law. As one 
German law-maker succinctly put it, the ‘most important prerequisite for the implementation of Directive 
2009/43/EC is […] that MS retain control of their own arms export criteria’. Berlin was unwilling to see 
the national export authority (BAFA) lose its oversight responsibilities. It did not want to create the 
undesirable situation whereby other EU MS could re-export German defence equipment to non-EU 
countries with suspect human rights records”. Fiott (2017):8. 
61 German firms were interested in offsetting decreased demand, supporting German arms exports and 
lowering administrative costs: Fiott (2017):  8. 
62 “We believe in an open, market liberal and transparent market, because otherwise we cannot have 
a competitive industry in Europe that actually will be globally competitive and survive in the long run”. 
Strikwerda (2017):27.  
63 M. Nones, & L. Marta, (2007). Il processo di integrazione del mercato della difesa europeo e le sue 
implicazioni per l’Italia. Senato della Repubblica, Contributi di Istituti di ricerca specializzati (82).   
Dossier No 82, November 2007. Available online at: http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/pi_a_c_082.pdf 




which had already begun in preceding years65. The Directive was adopted under the 
Swedish Presidency of the EU.  
Similarly for Spain the Directive was a way to introduce a “more flexible mechanism for 
their companies”66 and “of boosting the competitiveness of Spanish defence firms”.67 
“In Poland, government and industry generally viewed the proposed Directive as 
positive because it could help Polish manufacturers to export more easily to the EU 
market and to lower the cost burden on its national export authority.” 68 Overall for all 
these countries patriotism and the hope of boosting and revitalising domestic 
companies prevailed over worries of losing control in this sensitive field and softening 
their national regulation. 
The overall position of countries with smaller and medium defence was less 
enthusiastic and more suspicious. 
For example, the Netherland Government on the one hand hoped that the Directive 
would create opportunities for domestic companies69 and facilitate their entry into the 
defence market. On the other hand, they feared that the Defence Package would 
benefit only prime contractors and the strongest companies. Similarly, the Norwegian 
Government and companies shared scepticism with companies towards the Defence 
package and especially the procurement Directive, fearing that they might end up 
favouring the larger nations (e.g., Germany, the United Kingdom [UK] and France) at 
the expense of the smaller countries (e.g., Norway and Sweden).”70 Likewise, the 
Hungarian Government thought that the ICT Directive might only favour prime 
contractors, major subsystems producers and integrators. Similarly Hungarian 
companies perceived a double standard, differentiating between small and medium 
companies left alone to market forces, and prime contractors, protected, hugely 
subsidised and supported by domestic government and by European Union 
institutions.71 
                                                                
65 M. Britz, (2010). “The Role of Marketization in the Europeanization of Defense Industry Policy”. 
Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 30 (3):176-184.  
66 Fiott (2017): 7. 
67 Ibidem. 
68 Ibidem.. 
69 Strikwerda (2017): 27. 
70 F. Castellacci,,A.M. Fevolden,, & M. Lundmark. (2014). “How are defence companies responding to 
EU defence and security market liberalization? A comparative study of Norway and Sweden”. Journal 
of European public policy, 21(8):1219. 
71  J. Black et alii (2016). Central and Eastern European countries: measures to enhance balanced 
defence industry in Europe and to address barriers to defence cooperation across Europe. Technical 
Annex: Country Profiles and Appendixes to the RAND’s report to the European defence Agency on 
balanced defence industry in Europe, p.52, Available online at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-
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However, their position was basically in favour and their scepticism was expressed 
mainly behind closed doors. Furthermore, the two important players, France and the 
UK, ended up changing their minds and eventually the Directive was approved. In fact, 
after a while the French position towards the Directive changed and became 
favourable. In particular, civil servants responsible for export promotion viewed the 
Intra-Community transfer Directive as an opportunity to simplify control processes and 
convinced the new French Government of this.  
Overall, France’s domestic commercial interests like Italy’s and Sweden’s, prevailed 
over concerns about losing control of the final destination of coproduced goods and 
about the loosening of national arms export control regulations, and about the growing 
role of the Commission in respect to nation-states in the armament field.72 
Similarly, between 2005 and 2006, the UK’s position also changed and became 
favourable to the internal market Directive. The reasons for this change of attitude are 
difficult to gather because of often differing and conflicting declarations and they are 
widely explained in Chapter 6. In a nutshell, once the UK understood that the 
Commission had legal competence to initiate a legislative process and that this 
process could not be blocked, the UK Government tried to influence the process. 
British representatives at the EU tried to shape the content of the Directive, and they 
were successful. As the then UK Secretary of State for Defence, Desmond Browne, 
reported: “we did not agree with the early proposals. We argued for a set of proposals 
which were much more akin to the scheme that we have in this country”. 73 Indeed, the 
Commission realized during the negotiations that the Germany–UK ‘three-tier’ system 
offered an efficient blueprint for the proposed EU regime.74 In the end they agreed 
because de facto the Commission promoted the British German export model and 
because the administrative burden was eased given that the certification process was 
                                                                
source/documents/rr-1459-eda-central-and-eastern-europe-report---technical-annex---final.pdf (last 
accessed 18 March 2019). 
 . 
72 However there are also other explanations for the change of attitude of the French Government. For 
example according to another interview with a representative of the Defence Ministry carried out by 
Beraud-Sudreau, the main variable that determined the French Government’s change in attitude was 
the reframing of the issue from one of external relations to an internal market that “bound” the French 
Government to adhere to it: “at first, French authorities were rather against the ICT Directive. For the 
people responsible for export controls, this had to do with the core of what can’t become supranational. 
[…] But the Commission came with a package presented as “internal market”. […] This way the 
Commission managed to convince the Ministry of Foreign Affairs […].”Béraud-Sudreau, 2014:32, note 
60. 
73 Fiott (2017). 
74 Liberti et alii (2010), p. 6. 
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not obligatory but voluntary. As a consequence the Directive on intra-Community 
transfers was adopted on 6 May 2009. 
 
6.2 The reaction of defence companies to the Directive 
 
Defence companies (in particular prime contractors and big associations of defence 
companies) were overall in favour of the ICT Directive mainly because it met most of 
the requests that they had advanced in preceding years. In fact, as explained before, 
EDIG, the European Defence Industries Group, had presented two documents in 
1994/5 in which companies complained about the fragmentation of the European 
armaments market which penalized the competitiveness of the European arms 
industry and addressed three main proposals:  
1) The supply of defence equipment to European Governments and the sale of 
components and subsystems to European exporting companies should be 
unrestricted; 
2) Until a European export policy outside Europe has been agreed upon and a 
European authority has been given the responsibility to apply it, such sales of 
European defence equipment towards third countries should be controlled by 
the nation of the exporting companies.  
3) Lastly they asked for financial, political and military support from MS to export 
to third countries. 75 
The Directive 43/2009 distinguished between intra-Community transfers and exports 
and included two of the three points enshrined in the document elaborated by the 
companies 14 years before. Furthermore, in its preamble the Directive 43/2009 adopts 
a similar narrative to that elaborated by the EDIG group.  
As a consequence, European defence companies (particularly prime contractors and 
their associations) supported the Directive. This positive attitude is confirmed by the 
documentation on the consultation undertaken by the Commission for the Directive 
and by a study commissioned by the Commission in 2005 carried out by Unisys. 76 
                                                                
75 European Defence Industries Group (1994 and 1995). 
76 Unisys (2005); European Commission (2007c). Accompanying document to the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on simplifying terms and conditions of transfers 
of defence-related products within the Community. Commission Staff Working document 
SEC(2007)1593. Brussels: European Commission, p. 87. 
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According to Depauw, the preceding consultations between the Commission and the 
European defence industry showed that the Commission’s initiative was received 
positively by the defence industry, who saw a significant need for harmonisation of the 
defence market and a simplification of the licensing system in the European Union. 77 
The defence companies also contributed to shaping the Directive: “The certification of 
companies which is introduced in the proposed Directive to offset this as a confidence-
building measure was actually an industry proposal.”78  
The position of the strongest companies and their associations read harmonisation in 
the arms export control field in more liberal terms than supranational. They prioritised 
the reduction or even elimination of national controls for intra-Community transfers 
(interpreted as measures having the equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions) and 
the opportunities for enlarging export to third markets with respect to supranational 
management of the European arms market. 79  And in line with this interpretation, 
companies blocked the proposal to create a database able to follow and monitor in real 
time the passage of all parts and components of co-produced defence material moved 
within EU boundaries.80 
The final version of the Directive is less liberal than what was requested by companies 
both in the formulation of general licences and global licences, and in re-exports 
because it does not simply delegate the responsibility of export to the partner country 
but leaves it to the MS to decide whether or not to apply conditions on re-exports. But 
overall the spirit and narrative/approach are similar and the attitude of the defence 
companies is broadly favourable to the Directive. 
However, the group of companies is not homogeneous in terms of aims and interests: 
fractures exist according to the state where they have their headquarters, sectors, 
more (aeronautic) or less (naval) integrated, and their place in the supply chain. The 
most important fracture is between a few big prime contractors and a myriad of small-
sized and medium-sized companies which supply the prime contractors. These latter 
companies were more sceptical towards the Defence Package, showing indifference 
towards the ICT Directive and criticism towards the other twin Directives on Defence 
                                                                
77  Depauw (2008): 11. 
78 Ibidem.  
79 Thus, harmonisation in the arms export field, is mainly intended by companies to be in terms of 
liberalisation and negative integration, and less in term of positive integration. “Onerous licensing 
requirements are seen as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions according to 
Article 35 TFEU” that is as obstacle to free trade. Trybus and Butler (2017): 409. Licensing measures 
remain justifiable only as an exception under Article 36 and Article 346 of the TFEU. 
80 Depauw (2008):11. 
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Procurement. They feared that the Defence Package would benefit only prime 
contractors. 81 
 
6.3 The reaction of non-governmental organisations and civil society 
associations dealing with arms control and disarmament 
 
On the contrary, NGOs and associations working on arms transfers control and human 
rights were very critical towards the Directive on intra-Community transfers. They 
started from a different narrative which did not focus only on the synergies between 
strengthening the defence industrial base and creating a Europe of Defence, and a 
Common Security and Defence Policy. They highlighted the contrast between the 
economic and political dimensions, and the risks that the latter dimension would be 
subordinate to the first one.  
The perspective of NGOs is well summarised by Luc Mampaey in a note referring to 
the first version of the Directive: “By privileging a market approach which completely 
ignores the foreign policy and geopolitics aspect of the arms trade and without a 
harmonised and legally binding instrument for controlling arms export, the Defence 
Package threatens to reduce the European policy on arms export to its lowest common 
denominator, implying a serious setback in terms of transparency, which in turn would 
increase the risk of unwanted re-exportation of arms towards third countries.”82 
The proposal for a Directive simplifying transfers of defence-related products in the 
Community raised three main points of concern that were considered incompatible with 
the progress made in the area of transparency and democratic control achieved after 
ten years of operation of the mechanisms established by the EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports (adopted on 8 June 1998). 83 
 
The main points of friction were: 84 
                                                                
81 J. Mawdsley (2002), “The Gap between Rhetoric and Reality: Weapons Acquisition and ESDP” Bonn, 
Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, BICC Papers, 26 ; Castellacci et alii (2014); 
Mampaey et alii (2014). 
82 Mampaey and Tudosia (2008): 1.  
83 ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade) (2016b). Why the EU should not subsidy military 
research. ENAAT Position Paper on the proposal of Preparatory action on Defence research. Available 
online at http://enaat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ENAAT-Position-on-Defence-research-





Risks of unwanted re-exports: despite the Directive leaving the possibility for MS to 
introduce limits to re-exports, according to the representatives of NGOs it is likely that 
MS will not use this opportunity and tend to leave the final say to the government of 
the country where the assembling and exporting co-producing company is located. 
Thus, according to them, the principle of global or general licences would make it easy 
for a company that considers its domestic regulation too restrictive, to send the 
equipment first to a subsidiary located in a MS deemed to be more conciliatory, less 
restrictive and to export from that country. The harmonisation of European arms export 
policy would thus be reduced to its lowest common denominator.85 
Enterprise certification: NGOs expressed criticism around the growing responsibility of 
the companies in managing and reporting back data on arms exports, particularly with 
attention to maintaining the registers on arms exports and the certification procedures. 
“In their view companies cannot be expected to subordinate company interests to the 
protection of peace and security. Therefore government must guarantee that it will 
assess such factors individually for each transaction even for transfer of military 
equipment within the EU”. 86 
 
Transparency: The third objection regards transparency and possibilities for public and 
parliamentary control on arms trade. Overall for Depauw, “from a parliamentary point  
of view, the provisions adopted in the Directive are more worrisome. The Directive 
does not contain any prescription on how MS should report to their national 
parliaments.”87 Moreover, according to the same author: “Furthermore, the Directive 
initiates a shift from ex-ante to ex-post controls which might entail loss of transparency 
at the national level. Whereas national licensing officers used to assess licence 
applications before transfers of goods took place – in most MS licences were granted 
on an individual basis – they will now only be able to check what has been traded from 
                                                                
85 ENAAT (2016b); D. Dell’Olio, “Il dibattito sulla normativa comunitaria in materia di commercio di 
armamenti: situazione attuale e prospettive future”, Sistema informativo a schede-Archivio Disarmo – 
1-2 /2010, avaliable at http://www.archiviodisarmo.it/index.php/it/2013-05-08-17-44-50/sistema-
informativo-a-schede-sis/sistema-a-schede/finish/57/91, (last accessed 11 January 2019). 
86 Depauw (2008): 12 and note 24.  
87 S. Depauw (2011). “Risks of the ICT-directive in terms of transparency and export control”. In S. 
Depauw,  and A. Bailes (Eds.) Export controls and the European defence market: Can effectiveness be 
combined with responsibility? Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, p. 70. 
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their territory to other MS under general and global licences after these transfers have 
taken place”. 88  
In conclusion, the position of NGOs is more critical towards the ICT Directive. However, 
like other categories of actors in this field, it is possible to identify different attitudes 
within this category of actors. The researchers of research institutes which belong to 
the networks of associations working for arms controls warned about the possible risks 
in terms of loss of transparency and responsibility of the Directive (Flemish Peace 
Institute, Group de Research sur la Paix and sur les Conflits). They were followed by 
the European Network Against Arms Trade and by those NGOs which had a more 
radical position against arms trade and arms exports. These groups of organisations 
started to focus more on the Commission’s acts because they realised that this channel 
would have been much more effective than the intergovernmental one. On the other 
hand, NGOs such as Amnesty International, Saferworld, Controlarms, gave priority to 
and concentred their efforts on strengthening the European Code of Conduct on Arms 
Exports and on the creation of the Arms Trade Treaty, considering the issues treated 
by the Directive to be too technical and complex to be communicated to the public.89  
 
7. Outline of the thesis 
 
After this introduction, the thesis revolves around five fundamental chapters.  
The first chapter explains the theoretical framework of the thesis. Starting from the 
debate on European integration theories applied to the Defence Package and the 
Directive on intra-Community transfers, it offers a critical view of this debate, and 
explains why a change of approach is necessary. Then, it overviews the general 
Europeanisation literature, in terms of key themes and key relevant authors and 
undertakes a critical assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Secondly, it focuses 
on the European literature with respect to security and armaments issues, undertaking 
a critical analysis that enlightens the gap in their empirical understanding. Lastly, it 
explains the theoretical perspective shaped on the issue of the thesis. 
The second chapter explains the methodology based on three case studies. Firstly it 
clarifies the criteria followed to select the three case studies and why the ICT Directive 
was chosen. Then it explicates the methodological approaches and procedures. 
                                                                
88 Depauw (2008), p. 12. 
89  Béraud-Sudreau (2014). 
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Operationalizing European Directive n. 43/2009 as the independent variable and the 
national transposition measures in three case studies as the dependent variables, the 
methodological framework refers to Europeanisation in an EU perspective with a top-
down understanding of the EU’s impact on three MS. Thus, the chapter explains the 
chosen methodological tools in detail, in order to assess the direction and intensity of 
domestic change: two ideal models, eight dimensions and a universal taxonomy 
articulating each dimension on a scale from 0 to 5 are explained. The universal 
taxonomy also allows for comparing the different case studies and answering the 
fundamental question on the direction of the Europeanisation process in this field. 
The third, fourth and fifth chapters are the core of the thesis and correspond to the 
three case studies: Italy, Hungary and the UK: one country with especially intrusive 
and strict regulations (Italy), one country with more flexible regulations (the UK, which 
inspired the Directive), and one country with new regulations. All three case studies 
follow the same scheme. Firstly there is an introductory section which offers 
information about defence industry and the main societal actors, and their weight and 
role in that specific country. The second section of each case study chapter 
investigates in detail the domestic arms export control regulation as it was before the 
approval of the Directive. The third section explains the regulation as it appears 
immediately after the transposition of the Directive. Then, using the eight dimensions 
and assigning a mark for each of them before and after the transposition, on the basis 
of the taxonomy illustrated in the methodology, it is possible to assess direction and 
intensity of domestic change for each dimension and overall in respect to the two ideal 
models.  
Finally, the conclusion of the thesis compares the three different case studies in a 
diachronic and comparative perspective using the two models and the eight 
dimensions as a universal reference. The conclusion answers the fundamental 
question and verify whether states converge and, if so, around what they converge. 
The empirical findings are that the Europeanisation process is unbalanced toward the 
lower values of each dimension and overall that MS converge around a pro-industry 
model rather than an ethically and politically regulated one. However, this process of 
convergence is not absolute, but relative, and it presents several limits and 












This chapter explains the theoretical framework of the thesis. Starting from the debate 
on European integration theories applied to the Defence Package and the Directive on 
intra-Community transfers, it offers a critical view of this academic debate, and explains 
why a change of approach from grand theories to the mid-level theory of 
Europeanisation could be fruitful. Then, it overviews the general Europeanisation 
literature, in terms of key themes and key relevant authors and undertakes a critical 
assessment of its strengths and weaknesses. Finally, it focuses on the 
Europeanisation literature with respect to security and armaments issues, undertaking 
a critical analysis to show a gap in the literature. Lastly it explains the theoretical 
framework shaping the thesis. 
 
2. “Big” European integration theories and the scholars debate around the 
“Defence Package” 
 
For a long time, studies concerning arms transfer and production have been dominated 
by a realist and intergovernmentalist approach. The Intra-Community transfer Directive 
and the Defence Package have attracted the attention of scholars because they 
represented the first supranational acts in the field of armaments and defence which 
until then had been viewed as essential to the remit of a sovereign nation state90. 
Furthermore, the process leading to the approval of the Defence Package was 
characterised by the participation of different actors and factors which offered 
multifaceted food for thought to academics: 
1.  Transnational defence companies had pressed for the liberalisation and 
harmonisation of the defence market for years.  
                                                                
90 For an overview of this stance see K. Krause (1995). Arms and the state: patterns of military 
production and trade. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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2. The European Court of Justice since 1999 had ruled ten times that Article 223 
of the Treaty of Rome (the defence exemption) should be interpreted in a 
restrictive way, considering armaments similar to other goods, thus changing 
the approach to regulating the arms market, and extending the EU law domain 
also to this state core field, albeit with several exceptions and strong limitations.  
3. Since 1996/7 the European Commission has played a persistent and active 
defence policy role. To meet this aim the Commission used all the wide range 
of powers and acts at its disposal: communications, infringement procedures to 
stimulate the work of the Court in this field, preparatory actions, the creation of 
a group of experts, green papers, reframing the subject changing perspective 
and DG, strategic use of the ECJ decisions, and to conclude, power of initiative, 
drawing and promoting the Defence Package. The Commission placed its 
actions within a coherent architecture which was articulated in three main 
objectives: simplifying internal arms transfers, harmonising defence 
procurement and increasing defence research funds. All these three led to 
concrete results.  
4. Lastly, MS, particularly those with a strong defence industry and prescriptive 
national regulations (such as Italy and France), after initial diffidence, changed 
their mind, accepted the defence package and tried to obtain the maximum for 
their national companies. Thus some of the key state actors used the directive 
to strengthen and project their domestic defence companies and to promote 
reform that would have changed their regulation in a more liberal and flexible 
way.  
This richness of actors, variables and dynamics of course has stimulated the academic 
debate. In particular, the emergence of transnational and supranational actors in a field 
which had always been considered intergovernmental nourished and strengthened 
supranational and neo-functionalists theories and studies. 
In the following sections, I will show how the academic debate of scholars from the 
discipline of European integration theories developed their analysis of integration, and 
then applied it to the Defence Package, including the Directive on Procurement and 
the directive on intra-Community transfers, and on very similar issues such as the 
European Defence Fund. I will conclude by arguing that the debate has missed some 





2.1 Neo-functionalism, supranationalism and the role of non-state actors as 
drivers of integration  
 
This paragraph embraces not only neo-functionalist scholars in strictu sensu, but also 
all those scholars that see supranational actors and non-governmental actors as 
drivers of change/European integration in the defence field particularly with regard to 
arms transfer control and transparency.  
Neo-functionalism is one of the most relevant European integration theories. Its birth 
dates back to the late 1950s with the publication of “The Uniting of Europe” by Ernst 
Haas, one of the founders of neo-functionalism.91 Other publications have followed by 
other eminent scholars who have used this approach for European integration theories 
such as Lindber and Schmitter.92  
Haas defines integration as “the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political 
activities toward a new centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new 
political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”93  
According to neo-functionalists, the dynamics of integration revolves around the 
concept of spillover. Three main kinds of spillover have been formulated by neo- 
functionalists. 
The first is a functional spillover which explains change from one sector to another. 
Functional spillover refers to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration 
in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within 
and beyond that sector, and create authoritative capacity at the European level.94  
The second is a political spillover. This takes places when non state actors such as 
interest groups, members of bureaucracy and other domestic actors direct their 
expectations and activities at the new supranational level of decision-making. 95 
                                                                
91 First published in 1958 and then printed in 1968. E.B. Haas (1968). The uniting of Europe; political, 
social, and economic forces, 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
92 L. Lindberg, and S. Scheingold, (1970) Europe’s Would-Be Polity. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
P.C. Schmitter (1971). “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration”. In: L. Lindberg, S. Scheingold, (Eds.): 
Regional Integration. Theory and Research. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 232-264. 
93  Haas (1968), p. 16. 
94 Ibidem, pp. 283-317. 
95 Ibidem, p xxxiv. 
45 
  
Interest groups, bureaucrats and other domestic actors will exercise pressure and 
influence on governments and press them to advance the process of integration.96  
The third is called institutional or cultivated spillover and it is deployed by the activities 
of the EU’s supranational institutions, such as the Commission, the European Court of 
Justice and the European Parliament, which create additional pressure for further 
integration and also support the formation of a transnational coalition. 
Overall, neo-functionalists recognise the importance of interest-based actors, technical 
actors and supranational actors in driving the process of European Integration 
(Richardson 58): “The economic technician, the planner, the innovating industrialist 
and trade unionist advanced the movement of European integration not the politicians, 
the scholars, the poet, the writer”.97  
Stone Sweet and Sandholtz are considered scholars who provide the most prominent 
example of research in the tradition of Erns Haas.98 In their famous 1998 publication 
“European integration and supranational governance” they explain the dynamics of 
integration offering interesting analogies with those dynamics in the armament field. 
99They argue that European integration is provoked and sustained by the development 
of causal connections between three factors: a) transnational exchange, b) 
supranational organization, and c) European Community (EC) rule-making: “We 
explain the transition, in any given policy sector, from national to intergovernmental to 
supranational governance, in two ways. First cross-border transactions and 
communications generate a social demand for EC rules and regulation, which 
supranational organizations work to supply. [..]Second, once EC rules are in place, a 
process of institutionalization ensues, and this process provokes further integration”.100 
In their interpretation the drivers of integration are non-governmental actors on the 
demand side and EU supranational institutions on the supply side.  
One of the first authors to deal with the armaments field using a neo-functional lens, 
was Terrence Guay (1997) who, observing the integration of defence companies, 
hypothesised a functional spillover would also occur in the armaments field. He found 
that, since the early Nineties, the “Commission and Parliament have played key roles 
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in expanding the EU’s policy-making machinery to include defence industrial matters, 
while the Council of Ministers has tried to resist such actions.”101 In 2003 Ulrika Mörth, 
before the approval of the Defence Package, predicted the strategy of the Commission 
which would “reframe” the defence market issue from an industrial issue to an internal 
market one.102  
In 2011 Chantal Lavallée was one of the first scholars to focus on the role of the 
European Commission in Common Foreign and Security Policy. In particular she 
identified the Commission as a “meeting point” where MS and non-governmental 
actors (defence companies and NGOs) were included in these new activities such as 
conflict prevention and defence research. This inclusive attitude formed the basis of a 
new collective European security governance, intended in a wider sense. She focused 
more on the proactive role of the Commission as aggregator, and less on the 
asymmetries in the involvement of different non-governmental actors.103  
More recently neo-functionalism has been particularly applied to one of the three main 
streams of the EU Commission, the one concerning funds for defence and security 
research.  
For example, Edler and James (2015) studied the emergence of the European Security 
Research Programme (ESRP) under the Seventh Framework Programme. 104 They 
claimed that the new area of security research was open thanks to the 
entrepreneurship of the EU Commission and in particular to some mid-ranking officials 
of the Commission who were able to identify a window of opportunity, to mobilise 
interests around a proposal for a new research theme (security).105 Mawdsley argues 
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that the dynamics and narratives that led to the European Defence Fund are similar to 
those that led to the approval of the ESPRIT (European Strategic Programme for 
Research and Development in Information Technologies) programme from 1984 to 
1998: “like with ESPRIT, the momentum behind the programme came from the 
European Commission with some prominent backers in the European Parliament 
associated with the Kangaroo group”.106 
 
In a similar vein, Pierre Haroche (2018) investigated the origin of the Commission 
Proposal for a European Defence Fund (EDF). The author, using qualitative 
methodologies based on interviews with officials from the Commission, MEPs and 
defence officials, concludes that the origin and development of the EDF can be 
explained with neo-functionalist lenses: he stated that the Commission was at the 
origin of the reform and “mobilised transnational economic interests”107 According to 
Haroche, “the EDF illustrates the interdependence between industry—a sector over 
which the Commission possesses significant power—and defence—a sector 
traditionally managed by intergovernmental procedures. Spillover logic allowed the 
Commission to seek to extend its power from the former to the latter, with the potential 
to become a key player in the field of defence.”108  
Castellacci, Fevolden and Lundmark 109  focused on the European Defence and 
Security Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC and studied how the defence industry 
reacted to the Directive. The authors used qualitative interviews undertaken with 
representatives of companies and focused on two case studies: Norway and Sweden. 
Their theoretical framework is once again neo-functionalism as formulated by 
Sandholtz and Sweet. They concluded that the defence companies in these two case 
studies “believe that the liberalization of the European defence market will at best be 
partial and fear that the new regulations might end up favouring the larger nations (e.g. 
Germany, the United Kingdom and France) at the expense of the smaller countries 
(e.g., Norway and Sweden). The companies’ scepticism and response to the Directive 
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vary according to the defence industrial policy regime they are part of and their position 
in the defence industrial value-chain.”110  
Among scholars, including those supporting (claiming) neo-functionalist theories, 
some scholars emphasise the entrepreneurial role of the Commission (Lavallée, Guay, 
Edler and James; Haroche),111 whereas they exclude the role of defence companies 
as a driving force of change. There are only a few exceptions in the academic world 
such as Schilde, Castellacci et alii who argue differently.112 On the other hand, moving 
from the academic world to commentators closer to policy-making, there is much more 
of a focus on the “powerful driving force” of the defence companies for the integration 
process,113 or on the substantive power of influence of the big enterprises which is 
carried out via a large number of informal meetings and conferences in collaboration 
with think tanks.114 As I will explain more fully at the end of this section, these different 
conclusions are also due to the use of different methodologies and the limits of 
qualitative methodologies based on interviews with main actors and on process 
tracing. 
Limits 
Despite being declared “obsolescent” by its same founder and despite initially being 
considered valid only in the areas of low politics, neo-functionalism is able to grasp 
several important aspects of the dynamics of integration in the armament field, leading 
to the approval of the ICT Directive. In fact the role of transnational actors such as the 
more integrated defence companies and supranational bodies, such as the 
Commission is undeniable and has emerged powerfully, particularly since the 
Nineties.115 
However, there is one fundamental limit which is even more evident in the armament 
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field. This concerns the excessive optimism of the spillover processes (despite some 
authors having then theorised about the possibility of spill back). The self-sustaining 
dynamic and inexorability of the process of regional political integration has not been 
confirmed by evidence in recent years. It is, however, worth remembering that the 
same neo-functionalist scholars envisaged that not only spillover but also spill back—
intended as the retreat on level and scope of authority, perhaps returning to the status 
quo prior to initiating integration—was possible.116 
In the specific arms export control field, what emerges clearly is that despite the intense 
activity of supranational bodies and the pressure of defence companies and the set-
up of several committees and institutions, and approval of EU acts, this dynamic has 
not generated a common arms export policy, nor a CSDF/CFSP. This is linked to one 
of the main critic addressed to neo-functionalists, according to which the increasing 
transnational exchanges do not create a political Europe or an identity in Europe. 117 
Neo-functionalism expects MS convergence due to supranational institutions and large 
transnational firms but this overlooks the reality of MS differences and contexts. 
  
2.2 Rational choice institutionalism 
 
Institutionalist approaches are built around the claim that institutions do matter, they 
are able to shape both process, policy outcomes and the behaviour of actors. The 
intuitionalist literature is diverse and articulated according to the kind of institutionalism 
(historical, rational choice and sociological) and the level of analysis (global, USA, EU, 
etc.). 118 
In the EU context, among others, Fritz Scharpf is one of the eminent scholars applying 
rational choice institutionalism to the European integration theories, motivating this 
approach with the fact that neo-functionalism had ignored and underestimated the role 
of decision-making rules on the integration process. “The institutionalist turn in 
integration studies dates back at least to Scharpf’s seminal articles (1985, 1988) on 
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the joint-decision trap.” 119  
He argues that the inefficiency of EU policies are due to specific rules such as 
unanimous decision-making and joint decision-making. However, there are some exit 
strategies to this trap.120The first exit strategy is led by the ECJ which can promote 
integration by law, circumventing stalemates from intergovernmental and joint 
decision-making processes. Later Suzanne Schmidt focused on another exit strategy, 
orchestrated by the Commission, which could strategically use the decisions of the 
ECJ to push MS into initiating legislative procedure. This legislative procedure can be 
better controlled by MS than a simple integration by law which is beyond MS control.121 
This second exit strategy presents some interesting analogies with the dynamics that 
led to the approval of the Defence Package. 
In fact, one of the first articles published about the Defence Package that triggered 
academic debate was written by Weiss and Blauberger in 2013.122 It can be placed in 
the rational choice institutionalist perspective. The two authors observed that MS 
seemed to be diffident towards an increasing power of the Commission in the field until 
2005 but then they changed their mind and accepted the Defence Package and 
Procurement Directive. Thus, they asked why MS changed their attitude towards the 
EU Directive on Defence Procurement. As a methodology, they used a process-tracing 
analysis based on official documents and also on structured and semi structured 
interviews. 123 Their conclusions supported an institutionalist perspective, and in 
particular Scharpf’s (and Schmidt’s) lenses of European integration, according to which 
an exit strategy to the impasse of the intergovernmental solutions was represented by 
the strategic use by the Commission of the ECJ decisions to push MS to accept a 
directive in this delicate field.124 They explain that “the Commission’s role as a strategic 
policy entrepreneur was crucial for pushing and pulling MS governments towards 
approval of EU secondary legislation. In contrast to previous, unsuccessful initiatives, 
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the Commission was able to draw on new case law of the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), threatening to leave integration (uncontrolled) to the judges, while devising a 
regulatory ‘middle ground’ which allowed MS to re-establish legal certainty and to 
regain political control.”125 A directive is thus interpreted as a “lesser evil” with respect 
to an integration by law managed by the ECJ, which is more uncertain and more 
difficult for MS to control.126  
This analysis once again emphasises the entrepreneurial role of the European 
Commission but offers institutional reasons for this behaviour and overall for the 
dynamics that led to the approval of the Procurement Directive. In fact, the possibility 
for the ECJ to integrate by law, and the regrouping by the Commission of different 
kinds of powers (in particular the power of initiating infringement procedures, to be the 
guardian of the treaty and at the same time the power of initiative of the legislative 
process) explain why MS did change their mind and accepted an expansion of the EU 
law. This article has attracted scholarly attention and has opened a wide debate about 
European integration in the armaments field especially as concerns the Defence 
Package. 
Limits  
Rational choice institutionalism and in particular Scharpf’s theory on the joint decision 
trap and its exit strategies fits well in explaining the interinstitutional dynamics that have 
characterised the arms export control field in the EU, including their stalemates and 
imbalances. It is able to explain a significant part of the interinstitutional dynamics 
between the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament and the ECJ, the 
effectiveness and stalemates of different decision-making modes and the overall 
asymmetries. 
However, it presents two fundamental limitations.  
Firstly it deals mainly with the EU level, focusing on interinstitutional dynamics and their 
imbalances and asymmetries but with no sufficient tools to explain and follow the 
differentiated implementation of the EU act at the national level, nor to explore the 
diversity of the impacts of these interinstitutional dynamics at the domestic level. 
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The second limit, connected more to the rational choice declination, is the postulate 
according to which actors act in a rational and egoistic way and that their preferences 
are fixed. This postulate, which is shared by two other fundamental theories of 
European integration, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism has been heavily 
questioned in recent years with Brexit and rising populism: “The debate about Brexit 
in the UK has been and still is an excellent example of how emotions and other 
irrational variables in domestic polities impact the EU”.127 
 
2.3 Realism, intergovernmentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and economic 
patriotism  
 
Realism is the oldest theory of international relations. It is a family of theories dating 
back to Thucydides, and including Hobbes, Machiavelli and Waltz. One of the most 
famous scholars is Morgenthau who wrote in 1948 “Politics among nations” which 
explains some of the pillars of realism: states are the dominant actors in the 
international system which is considered anarchic. Their priority is to survive by 
maintaining military security. In order to do that they are postulated to act in a rational 
and egoistic way. 
Intergovernmentalism is realism applied to regional studies and to European 
integration theories. According to Hoffman, one intergovernmentalist scholar, the 
European integration process is the result of bargaining between MS, which are the 
primary actors, whereas the EU and other forms of cooperation are temporary 
instruments for the pursuit of national goals. 128 
Liberal intergovernmentalism is a theory which adds the liberal model of preference 
formation to the intergovernmental perspective. Thus, on the one hand EU and 
international institutions are the result of bargaining between states pursuing their 
interest. On the other, this interest is the result of combining the interests of domestic 
actors, such as the legislature, the executive and societal groups. One of the most 
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famous scholars is Andrew Moravcsik, who in his book The Choice for Europe 
enshrined all these basic principles of liberal intergovernmentalism.129 
Liberal intergovernmentalism argues that steps towards economic integration and the 
liberalisation of regulatory regimes are explained by the interests and preferences of 
larger MS.130  
In 1993 Moravcsik explained defence integration through an intergovernmentalist lens: 
 Ideally, defense firms prefer national policies that protect domestic 
markets from foreign competition, while simultaneously promoting arms 
export abroad. However, after the end of the Cold War, defense 
contractors have called for greater political cooperation and demand 
consolidation at the EU level, in order to alleviate the heavy pressure of 
decreasing defense budgets and intense competition with US firms.131 
 
Daniel Fiott applies a combination of economic patriotism and liberal 
intergovernmentalism to explain why MS adopted the ICT directive. Economic 
patriotism refers to “economic choices which seek to discriminate in favour of particular 
social groups, firms, or sectors understood by the decision-makers as “insiders” 
because of their territorial status”.132 The fundamental question and methodologies are 
very similar to those used by Blauberger and Weiss: Fiott asks why MS accepted the 
intra-Community transfer Directive, despite its limited effectiveness and MS’s initial 
scepticism. His methodologies are based on interviews with representatives of MS 
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and literature on the field. The empirical 
findings support both economic patriotism (for the initial phase) and liberal 
intergovernmentalism (for the second phase of MS bargaining)133. 
In a nutshell, according to Fiott, economic patriotism explains how national industrial 
interests drive forward EU Defence industrial co-operation.134 The author quotes a 
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specific case study: “In the specific case of France, ‘economic patriotism’ has provided 
a compelling explanation for why the ICT Directive was high on the French 
Presidency’s agenda. The fact that France decided to reform its domestic licencing 
regime within an EU setting bears testament to the theoretical claim that defense-
industrial Europeanization reflects the interests of major defense-industrial actors. 
France could not realistically reform on a national basis without putting in place a level 
playing field at the EU level.” 135  In a second phase, liberal intergovernmentalism 
“shows how these various industrial interests play out through 
negotiations/intergovernmental bargaining between MS governments’ and lead to the 
Directive.” 136 
Catherine Hoeffler uses economic patriotism to explain why MS did agree to liberalise 
and integrate their defence companies. According to her, arms-producing countries 
have promoted common market-oriented procurement and liberalisation at the 
European level as industrial strategies intended to support national and European 
firms. 137 
Limits  
Intergovernmentalism has dominated the debate for a long time starting from the failure 
of the European Defence Community in the 1950s to the mid-1990s. Armaments touch 
the heart of a nation state because they are linked to its survival, thus it is unlikely that 
a state would delegate this crucial task to a supranational authority. However there are 
two fundamental limits to this group of theories as applied to arms transfer control and 
transparency in the EU context. 
The first one is that even in a core state power, in the EU context the role of non-state 
actors, such as the Commission, the ECJ and defence companies is undeniable. In 
the specific case of the ICT Directive, this was approved despite initial resistance from 
MS, particularly Britain and France which are two of the strongest actors in the EU 
context, and thanks to the alliance between the EC and ECJ under pressure from 
defence companies. Even the liberal intergovernmentalist declination, which takes into 
account the role of domestic actors in the construction of national preferences, 
underestimates the transnational networks and activities which have been extremely 
relevant for the approval of the ICT Directive and the role of supranational institutions. 
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The second fundamental limit – which is shared with neofunctionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism – is the initial postulate implying that MS are rational and egoistic 
actors, a claim that clashes with recent events like Brexit which indicates the need for 
a positive or negative identity more than a egoistic economic calculus. 
With respect to the other theories, liberal intergovernmentalism is also more aware of 
domestic context but tends not to drill down to focus on MS differences, except in terms 
of broad national interests. The complexity of institutions and political battles over 




For constructivists institutions are understood broadly to include not only rules but also 
informal norms, and these rules and norms are expected to constitute actors, and to 
shape their identities and their preferences.138Actor preferences therefore are not 
exogenously given and fixed as in rationalist models, but endogenous to institutions 
and individuals’ identities that are shaped and re-shaped by their social environment. 
Constructivist generally reject the rationalist conception of actors as utility maximises, 
operating according to a logic of consequentiality in favour of March and Olsen’s 
conception of a logic of appropriateness. 139  Institutions and values influence 
preferences and identities in a more profound way.140 This alternative approach is 
chosen by authors whose studies of the CFSP have suggested that actors in this policy 
area are also led by norms.141 Some scholars have emphasised the civilian power of 
EU as it might represent a new ethical actor in international affairs who bases its 
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strength and its strategic culture on the normative principles of peace, freedom, 
democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality and social justice. 142 
Strikwerda is a scholar who applies constructivist theories to the armament field and 
in particular to the approval of the Procurement Directive. She asks the same research 
question as her predecessors: Why did MS change their mind between 2004 and 2007 
and accept the Procurement Directive? Her methodology is process-tracing based on 
official documents (discussions in national parliament, reports, official statements on 
defence procurement) and on semi-structured interviews. Strikwerda focuses on four 
case studies (the Netherlands, France, Sweden and the UK)143. 
Her conclusions differ from those of the other scholars such as Fiott and Blauberger 
and Weiss and support a constructivist approach. According to Strikwerda, MS 
accepted the Directive because they had a sense of obligation towards internal market 
rules (written and unwritten). The turning point is represented by the “reframing” of the 
issue from defence/external relations to the internal market. When the internal market 
rules were extended also to defence goods, they explicated their normative force over 
MS who felt a sense of obligation towards these fundamental rules of the EU: 
“Contravening internal market rules or not acknowledging the competence of the 
Commission in this policy field would be a high cost.”144 That is why MS accepted the 
Directive. Strikwerda claims that the normative variable is more determinant than the 
legal one, because MS were not formally obliged to accept the Directive. 145 
Limits 
The general limit of constructivism is that it does not explain why ideas change and it 
tends to underestimate the material variables which influence the change of ideas. 
There are some studies that identify a relationship, for example, between financial and 
economic crises and there is a lack of clarity about the interplay of ideas and material 
forces.146 Constructivism in the form of Strikwerda’s work has the most nuanced sense 
of how states may react to reframing but there are questions about how to 
systematically demonstrate this and how to drill down. In this specific case this limit is 
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also connected to limitations in methods used in the armament field, which is more 
exposed to ambiguity, rhetoric and hypocrisy as will be explained in the next chapter.  
 
3. The Europeanisation literature 
 
3.1 The Europeanisation literature 
 
Europeanisation literature originated in the 1990s as a reaction to the debate around 
big integration theories, in particular intergovernmentalism versus neo-functionalism 
which seemed to have lost part of its analytical appeal. Europeanisation scholars 
wanted to open up a new perspective, a new angle to observe the European integration 
which had been until then neglected: the domestic level. Whereas the classical 
European integration theories started from an ontological question about the nature of 
integration, or why countries decide to pool sovereignty and create institutions like the 
EU, Europeanisation moved from a “post-ontological position” observing that EU 
institutions have developed and generated effects on domestic politics.147 
 
Definitions and different approaches: uploading and downloading 
Europeanisation is a wide and very elastic concept which has covered different 
dimensions and different definitions according to the scholars that have adopted it. 
Radaelli, one of the most famous Europeanisation scholars, had appropriately 
introduced the term of conceptual stretching to define Europeanisation. 148 
An initial fundamental distinction concerns the perspective according to which the 
Europeanisation process is analysed. On the one hand, a group of scholars has 
conceptualised Europeanisation “as the process of downloading EU directives, 
regulations and institutional structures at the domestic level.” 149  Another group of 
scholars has extended this concept to the process of uploading to the EU shared 
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beliefs, informal and formal rules, discourse, identities.150 The first one is a top-down 
perspective where top is the EU and down is the domestic level. The second one is a 
bottom-up perspective where bottom is the domestic level, and MS and up is the EU. 
Among the authors that have adopted the top-down perspective, Ladrech is one of 
those that better captures this approach in his definition. In fact he defines 
Europeanisation as “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of 
politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the 
organizational logic of national politics and policy-making.”151 
Some scholars, however, have adopted a bottom-up perspective. With this approach 
they investigate how MS seek to upload their policy preferences onto the EU agenda. 
Risse, Cowles and Caporaso define Europeanisation as the emergence and 
development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of 
political, legal, and social institutions associated with political problem-solving that 
formalise interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specialised in creating 
authoritative European rules.152  
According to some academics the bottom-up approach can coincide with traditional 
studies of Europeanisation theories (which try to explain the nature of the EU and the 
process of integration starting from the MS level). For example, according to Irondelle 
when considering a bottom-up approach, "the focus is on the process of integration 
itself and on the creation of common institutions and policies that contribute to the 
emergence of a European polity. Neo-functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and 
multi-level governance follow this approach." 153 
Overall most of the Europeanisation scholars recognise that between the two 
approaches and directions there is continual interaction. The top-down and bottom-up 
approaches are interlinked and mutually constitutive as they happen at the same time. 
Europeanisation is not just a result or a consequence of policy, but also an ongoing 
and mutually constitutive process, as the responses of MS to the EU integration 
process feed back into EU institutions. In practice these two processes are interlinked. 
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154 Borzel found that some MS upload their policy preferences at the EU level through 
the policy-making process to ease the downloading of these policies once they have 
been adopted.155 
As reported by Howell, the first perspective considers that the EU level initiates 
changes and creates an outcome at the domestic level, whereas in the second 
perspective the domestic level initiates changes and creates an outcome at the EU 
level. In the top-down perspective European integration is an independent variable and 
change in domestic systems is the dependent variable. In the bottom-up perspective 
European integration is the dependent variable whereas MS and their policy 
preferences are the independent variables.156  
A second different declination of the interpretation of Europeanisation concerns the 
different aspects affected by Europeanisation. Domestic adaptation may involve policy 
(norms, goals, policy instruments and style, organisational structure and actor 
networks); polity (government-parliament relations, administrative structures, judicial 
structures and intergovernmental relations), politics (party and electoral politics, 
interest intermediation, public opinion) and institutions.  
Radaelli also adds shared belief, styles and ways of doing things, thus offering one of 
the widest and most used definitions of Europeanisation, as a “Processes of (a) 
construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and 
politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies.” 157 
Possible output of Europeanisation process 
To link the variables of EU policies and domestic impact, Europeanisation literature 
created a framework of possible outputs of the Europeanisation process in a top-down 
approach at the domestic level. According to Knill and Lehmkul (and developed by 
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Radaelli) there are four main typologies of output which are listed by scholars158: a) 
absorption - which entails only small non-fundamental changes whereas the core is 
maintained without real modification of essential structures and neither change to the 
logic of political behaviour; b) transformation - which entails deep changes in the 
fundamental logic of political behaviour; c) inertia - which is a situation of lack of 
change, lags, delays in the transposition, sheer resistance; and d) retrenchment (that 
is intended as a paradoxical effect, as it implies that national policy becomes less 
European than it was, strengthening coalitions of domestic actors opposing reform).  
Fit and misfit 
One of the first theoretical findings of the Europeanisation literature is represented by 
the idea of fit or misfit. Risse and collaborators express this concept as follows. The 
(degree of) adaptational pressure for change depends on the degree of fit or misfit 
between European institutions, rules and practices and the domestic structure if 
institutions, rules and practices differ from the European ones. 159  “The lower the 
compatibility (fit) between European institutions on the one hand and the national 
institutions on the other the higher the adaptational pressure.[…] We will thus expect 
domestic change particularly in those cases where the misfit is high and the 
adaptational pressures are therefore strong”. 160 
Mediating factors 
However this condition is necessary but not sufficient. In fact as explained by Börzel 
there are obviously domestic factors and actors that may block change or on the 
contrary emphasise domestic change, pulling this well beyond what is requested at the 
European level.161 Graziano explains that in case of high adaptational pressures the 
presence or absence of mediating factors is crucial for the degree to which domestic 
changes adjusting to Europeanisation should be expected.162  
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The first resistance might (or might not) emerge from the same government or 
bureaucracies which “will try to defend their existing policy tradition and not accept 
deviation from the status quo”.163 According to Duina, implementation policies with 
significant misfit were either doomed to fail due to a reluctant domestic government 
and or administration. 164According to Knill and Lenschow, the main difficulties and 
obstacles to implementation were due to administrative resistance.165 The unwilling 
state machinery needed to be forced by societal actors to comply, but empirical studies 
problematised this first theoretical assumption. 
Benzen created a typology of national variables (which may differ from one author to 
another), that influence the domestic impact of the Europeanisation process and 
explains the great empirical variation in the effect of the EU policies and the differential 
impact in different MS. These national variables are:  
- the domestic culture of compliance with European Union measures; 
- the institutional capacity, intended as a highly developed institutional capacity 
to implement changes which increase the likelihood of successful adaptation;  
- the existence of veto players: “Veto points in the domestic decision making 
process provide actors with entry points to block unwanted changes, and thus 
a high number of veto points will lead to problematic conditions for change 
arising from EU pressure, whereas few veto points eases the process. If pro-
change actors have access to resources from supportive formal institutions this 
will obviously also help tip the power balance in their favour”.166 
 Different mechanisms of European integration  
A final classification traced by Europeanisaton scholars refers to the different 
mechanisms of European integration. Knill and Lehmkuhl argue that different 
mechanisms of Europeanisation may influence the kind of domestic adaptation. They 
identify three types of EU pressure: positive integration, negative integration and 
framing integration. 
                                                                
163 O. Treib (2014) “Implementing and complying with EU governance outputs”, Living Reviews in 
European Governance, Vol. 9, (2014), No. 1. 
164 F.G. Duina, (1997). “Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union”, International Journal 
of the Sociology of Law, 25(2): 155–179. 
165 C. Knill and A. Lenschow, (2000). “Do New Brooms Really Sweep Cleaner? Implementation of New 
Instruments in EU Environmental Policy”. In C. Knill, A. Lenschow (Eds), Implementing EU 
Environmental Policy: New Directions and Old Problems, Manchester. Manchester University Press, pp. 
251–282. 
166 S. R. Bentzen (2009), Theorising top-down Europeanisation Examining the implementation of the 
1992 Maternity directive in Denmark. Dissertation on EU Studies, p. 14. Available online at: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12518744.pdf (last accessed 17 April 2019). 
62 
  
Positive integration involves a model prescribed by the EU for the MS to follow which 
will take the shape of specific, articulated requirements which MS must implement, 
found in new regulatory policies meant to curb the negative externalities, arising from 
the internal market167. As examples of policy areas using mechanisms of positive 
integration, Knill and Lehmkuhl mention environmental regulations and policies having 
to do with health and safety at work.  
The second mechanism is negative integration, “which is found in old regulatory 
policies focusing on creating the internal market, typically through requirement upon 
the MS to liberalise or deregulate.” In this second mechanism Europeanisation may 
empower a specific group of actors wishing to liberalise the market. 168  The third 
mechanism of Europeanisation is called by Knill and Lehmkul “framing integration”. 
This is found in policy areas where the EU is only able to formulate vague and symbolic 
policies, usually due to lack of competences to regulate in a hierarchical manner. 169 
Strengths and weaknesses of Europeanisation studies 
The Europeanisation literature has the great advantage of having called scholarly 
attention to domestic adaptation and the impact of European regional integration. 
However, there are three fundamental limits. It is interesting to note that these limits 
are recognised and indicated by the same Europeanisation scholars. 
First, the top-down approach risks focusing too much on compliance performance, thus 
adopting a pro-European normative stance. “This top–down school is interested in 
comparing the intended and actually achieved outcomes of implementation, where the 
degree of the goal attainment serves as an indicator for implementation success. 
Implicitly or explicitly, top-down perspectives tend to view discretion and the resulting 
deviations from the centrally decided rule as a control problem.” 170 
2. The second fundamental limit is the confusion about the causes of domestic change. 
It is not always easy to distinguish EU sources of change from cross-border influence 
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or from global or other European supranational actor influence. When a scholar is 
analysing the domestic change as adaptation to the European environment he may 
tend to overestimate European variables over global or domestic ones. This is also a 
methodological problem that several scholars have tried to address, finding certain 
methodological strategies to tackle the problem.171 But, given the high number of 
variables at different levels that may influence domestic change, the problem has not 
yet been completely resolved.  
3. The third limit concerns the lack of elements about the causes of Europeanisation. 
This literature describes a process and a domestic change but does not investigate the 
reasons why this domestic change happens, nor what the main factors and actors 
driving European integration are. 
 
3.2 The Europeanisation literature in the armament field 
 
3.2.1 Europeanisation, defence economics and armaments: an introduction 
The debates concerning the Europeanisation of the armaments sector started with the 
assumption that European states in NATO should collaborate more closely on 
procurement, research and industrial policy to improve efficiency and achieve 
economy of scale and reduce duplication. Faced with the drastic reduction of military 
expenditures following the collapse of bipolarism and increasing competitiveness, 
companies looked for strategies to tackle this hard situation, firstly by reducing the 
costs of productions.  
One of the most quoted clear examples of fragmentation and overlapping in Europe 
was and is represented by the competition in fighter jet production Three different 
defence companies developed three fighter jets, a project which carried high 
production costs: the Rafale realised by Dassault in France, the Eurofighter Typhoon 
produced by EADS, Alenia Areonautica and BAE Systems (UK) and the Gripen 
constructed by Saab, a Swedish company.172 Hartley adopting a defence economic 
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perspective “calculated that Europe could realize efficiency gains of 10-20 per cent 
through improved inter-European defense-industrial cooperation .”173 
Under this pressure, during the late Nineties the first agreements concerning arms 
production and restructuring were signed by some of the European countries. In 1996 
WEAO (Western European Armaments Organization) was created under the WEU 
(Western European Union) to fund armaments research. 174 In the same year OCCAR 
(Organisme Conjointe de Cooperation en Matiere d’Armement) was created by four 
MS - Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Germany - and then enlarged to other 
EUMS with the aim of improving production collaboration.175 In 2000 a Letter of Intent 
(LOI) and then a Framework Agreement was signed. It touched on topics such as: 
security of supply, transfer/export procedures, security of information, research, 
treatment of technical information and harmonisation of military requirements. It 
introduced a Global Project Licence aimed at facilitating exchange of components and 
spare parts which presents strong analogies with the Global and General Licences 
envisaged in the ICT Directive which was approved seven years later and which of 
course covers all the EUMS:176 
However, early studies on the extent to which this was happening suggested that the 
effect of Europeanisation was limited, considering the intergovernmental nature of 
these armament institutions and that OCCAR and LOI involve only a part of the EUMS 
and in particular the main producers and exporters.177  
The birth of the ESPD and CSDP opened new scholars' perspectives. In 2003 the EU 
launched European Security Strategy (ESS) identifying threats and challenges, as well 
as the EU's objectives and goals in defence and security.178 In 2004 the European 
Defence Agency was created to develop defence capabilities in the crisis management 
sector; to promote and strengthen European armaments cooperation; to contribute to 
strengthening the EDIB and to creating a European market for internationally 
competitive defence materials. Also the European Commission, since 1996 has been 
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dealing with the armaments field to facilitate collaboration in the armament sector, to 
increase funds for security and defence research and to ease intra-Community 
transfers of defence materials. 
The growing initiatives and institutions that revolved around the CSDP and CFSP 
stimulated a new stream of studies with different academic perspectives. Constructivist 
scholars (like Manner, Meyer and Stricknann), who claim that identity, discourse, 
culture and ideas form the key driver for policy choice in the field of International 
relations, focused on the normative power of the CFSP. 179 According to Manners the 
EU is committed to doing the least harm by promoting nine universal normative 
principles: peace, freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, equality, social 
solidarity, sustainable development and good governance.180 Other scholars such as 
Webber adopted a security governance approach, claiming that the creation of 
supranational institutional structures would have favoured élites socialisation. 181 
Another stream of studies revolves around the growing role of the two supranational 
EU bodies, the Commission and the ECJ, but this will be addressed in the next section. 
On the other hand, studies on the EDA stressed the largely intergovernmental nature 
of this agency and the limited engagement with it by larger states,182 and the continuing 
“techno nationalism”, maximising military-technological autonomy in order to maximise 
national strategic autonomy” thus leaving defence industry and technology still well 
rooted at the national level of EU MS.183 
EU and armaments is an immense theme. Under this broad umbrella, a plurality of 
aspects relating to armaments can be analysed, of which the most important are: arms 
production, military expenditures and arms procurement, arms exports, arms export 
control, foreign and defence policy at the national and EU levels. Different kinds of 
arms require different approaches (for example, light arms and weapons of mass 
destruction have their own specific literature). Furthermore, different academic 
perspectives can be included, such as political economy, economics (micro and macro 
economics), but also international relations, strategic studies, war studies, geopolitics, 
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military studies, comparative, European and international law, history, European 
integration theories, political science and decision-making processes. There are also 
myriad streams of studies which could be analysed, such as the complex relationships 
between NATO and the EU armament policy, the complex intertwining between 
European integration and globalisation dynamics in the restructuring of arms 
production and its consequences, and so on. 
The present dissertation covers only one dimension of armaments (arms export 
control) and one main disciplinary perspective (European Integration theory), which is 
explained in the following section. 
 
3.2.2 The Europeanisation literature in the field of arms exports control  
 
The Europeanisation literature has also inspired researchers in the armaments field. 
Most of the authors are not scholars but are researchers from peace research institutes 
or practitioners. Their studies are extremely interesting. If on the one hand their 
theoretical references are less articulated and their methods less sophisticated, on the 
other, practical experience gives substance to the Europeanisation tools and offers 
some interesting suggestions for further studies. Another characteristic of these 
studies is that they focus mainly on the European Code of Conduct, whereas there are 
no studies applying Europeanisation to the Directive on Intra-Community transfer, thus 
showing a lack of studies in this field, a gap which this thesis will help to bridge.  
Kyree Holm’s contribution is one of the best structured. Holm investigates the impact 
of another instrument the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports on national legal 
frameworks using three case studies (Italy, Germany and Belgium) and 
Europeanisation theories as theoretical references. The aim is to assess domestic 
change in arms export practice and whether there is convergence among MS on their 
arms export control policies. 184 The cases are chosen, among other factors, in order 
to represent high regulation countries (Germany and Italy) and low regulation countries 
(Belgium). Holm observes that despite the voluntary dimension of the European Code 
of Conduct on arms exports “has served to pressure Italy and Germany to lower their 
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levels of export control, while nevertheless improving Belgian standards.”185 The result 
is a convergence trend toward a median level outcome.186 
Mark Bromley, a senior researcher of SIPRI, in two successive publications reaches 
conclusions compatible with those of Holm. The first study is realised together with 
Brzoska, another well-established researcher on arms control. Using quantitative 
methods, the study finds that the Code of Conduct had some impact on national arms 
export policies, but was limited to reducing arms export to the countries whose 
governments are violators of human rights and to states in conflicts. However, the 
impact is limited, it does not affect broader norms concerning democracy and 
economic development. Furthermore, according to these two authors, there was little 
evidence that the adoption of the Code of Conduct had improved harmonisation of 
national arms export policies.187 
Another study by Bromley in the same year, dealt with the domestic impact of the EU 
Code of Conduct focusing on three case studies: the Czech Republic, the Netherlands 
and Spain. He used qualitative methods and in particular interviews with main actors 
in the field. He found that the adoption of the non-binding Code of Conduct on 
European arms exports has favoured an increase in transparency and parliamentary 
accountability in the three case studies: “Especially in countries that were not so 
transparent to start with, the implementation of the Code of Conduct has led to greater 
public transparency. This has led to more information being available on arms exports, 
which in turn has led to political parties and civil society in some MS citing examples 
from other MS to push for domestic change. In this way the Code’s implementation 
has indirectly, through the process of benchmarking, increased the levels of 
parliamentary accountability across the EU.” 188 
However, with the passage of time, this moderating influence with respect to domestic 
change in the direction of a more transparent and responsible arms export policy 
seems to have decreased or even disappeared. For example, Bromley in 2012, 
undertaking an assessment of the impact of the EU Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
on European Arms Exports (8 December 2008) – which is the new more binding 
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formula of the Code of Conduct – indicates that the trend of increasing transparency 
continues but “there were signs that this dynamic might be losing its momentum.”189 
More drastically other researchers and NGO representatives identified an inversion of 
the direction of the Europeanisation process, toward more pragmatic arms export 
policies and practices. For example, Nils Duquet of the Flemish Peace Institute, 
analysing EU arms export policies towards the countries of the Arab spring, basing the 
analysis on quantitative methods drawn from EU consolidated report on arms exports 
and national reports on arms exports, claims that “Instead of a more restrictive 
approach to arms exports, several MS have continued their relaxed arms export policy 
vis-à-vis the Arab region, or have further eroded their traditionally restrictive arms 
export policy for this region.” 190 
In conclusion, armament studies show a moderate impact of the EU Code of Conduct 
on domestic arms export policies towards a more responsible and transparent arms 
export control system. However, this influence is weak and declines until nearly 
disappearing from the late 2010s. Overall Europeanisation studies on armaments offer 
extremely interesting contributions, concerning the output of domestic change as 
consequences of the Europeanisation process as a result of the intergovernmental 
channel. However, they focus mainly on the European Code of Conduct, whereas 
there are no studies applying Europeanisation to the Directive on Intra-Community 
transfers and there is thus a gap in the literature.  
 
4.Conclusion: the rationale for Europeanisation 
 
After reviewing the European integration scholars’ debate on EU arms export control 
regulation I explained their strengths and weaknesses and identified their limits that 
can be summarised as follow. Neo-functionalism expects MS convergence due to 
supranational institutions and large transnational firms but this overlooks the reality of 
MS differences and contexts. Rational choice institutionalism has the conceptual tools 
to look at differences in MS structures and contexts, but has not focused on these 
differences in explaining the defence policy area. It has not drilled down. Liberal 
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intergovernmentalism is also more aware of the domestic context but has tended not 
to drill down to focus on the question of MS differences, except in terms of broad 
national interests. Constructivism in the form of Strikwerda’s work has the most 
nuanced sense of how states may react to reframing but there are questions about 
how to systematically demonstrate this and how to drill down which need more 
explanation. 
Moreover all these “big integration theories” share a fundamental limitation when 
applied to arms export control and especially to the defence package: they are not 
falsifiable. In order to answer the fundamental question “why did MS accept the ICT 
Directive?”, the most appropriate methods are interviews, process tracing or focus 
groups. But these methods, as I explain in depth in the methodological chapter, are 
particularly weak in the armaments field, because actors (representatives of 
governments, bureaucracies, companies) tend not to disclose all the information, and 
change their answers according to the interlocutor, thus making the basis of a 
theoretical castle extremely irregular. That’s why different scholars (Fiott, Strikwerda, 
Blauberger and Weiss) asking the same fundamental question and using the same 
research methods, reach opposite conclusions, validating intergovernmental, 
constructivist and institutionalist theories respectively. 
 
In order to address these theoretical and methodological weaknesses which 
characterise a “big theories” approach to the armament field in general and to the ICT 
Directive in particular, I decided to circumvent them, by changing perspective (top-
down), theoretical framework and methods. Europeanisation theory appears to be the 
most flexible approach, allowing a top-down perspective to investigate how European 
integration works in practice.  
Besides this, there are a number of other reasons why I chose the Europeanisation 
lens to investigate domestic change as triggered by the transposition of the Directive 
on intra-Community transfers. 
Firstly, Europeanisation allows gathering a great variety of responses between 
different MS and the diversity of the transposition pathways of each MS, in harmony 
with the different weight and role of the defence industry and other social actors, 
different legal traditions, as well as different social and economic conditions. This 
flexibility and concreteness allows gathering original MS contributions for re-defining 
and re-appropriating European commitments in domestic policy arenas. 
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Secondly, in the specific arms export control field, MS focusing on the differences 
between MS and their domestic actors is even more important. As Mawdsley has 
argued, treating the EU as a sui generis actor, where the knowledge gained from 
studying defence economics at a national level can be ignored, can lead to misreading 
the particular issue.191 My thesis argues that combining insights from the national 
public policy-making literature with measures designed to take into account the 
unusual nature of the armaments field can, in fact, give a better understanding of the 
direction that Europeanisation is taking in this sector. Rather than concentrating on 
negotiations in Brussels as other scholars have done, I concentrate on the national 
transposition of the Directive in three states and look for evidence of policy change.  
Thirdly, the ICT Directive which is at the core of the present dissertation, is very general 
and vague in its formulation because it touches on a topic which has been jealously 
guarded by MS and managed at the intergovernmental level. As a consequence, it 
leaves a wide marge of manoeuvre to MS in transposition measures. Thus, MS 
decisions are crucial to the success and failure of the EU policy.  
Fourthly, I fill a lack in the arms export control literature considering that most of the 
studies focus on the supranational level of the ICT Directive. There are only a few 
cases that study the Europeanisation of arms export control from a domestic 
perspective and a few comparative analyses of the domestic impact. Domestic 
regulation and change have also been neglected by scholars because of the effort that 
research of this nature requires.  
Though adopting Europeanisation as the theoretical lens, the thesis also tries to 
address the main weaknesses of Europeanisation literature in reference to the three 
main points explained in section 4 as follows:  
1) That Europeanisation is good a priori. The thesis does not adopt the formula of the 
“goodness of fit” which characterises Europeanisation literature. The direction and 
content of EU policies or acts can be another important variable influencing the attitude 
of MS and of European citizens. And so in the thesis I investigate the direction of the 
Europeanisation process. As a consequence the term of comparison for domestic 
change is not represented by the European directives (the European act disposal) in 
terms of compliance, but by the national legislative situation preceding the approval of 
the Directive.  
                                                                
191  Mawdsley (2000).  
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2) The Europeanisation literature is characterised by confusion about the causes of 
domestic change. Being aware that this limit cannot be completely overcome, I assess 
domestic change by analysing the national laws transposing the Directive 43/2009. 
Despite expressing also national and even global variables, the national laws 
transposing the Directive are undeniably linked to the European level. 
3) Europeanisation is not a grand theory and does not investigate the overriding factors 
that generate European integration, but looks at the domestic change as a 
consequence of EU variables. I use Europeanisation lenses exactly for what they are: 
a tool that enables studying the direction of the Europeanisation process and the 
domestic adaptation. I do not pretend to explain what drives the Europeanisation 
process but just the direction of change. Asking what type of model is emerging and 
asking who gains from that model also indirectly sheds light on the question of who the 
driving actors are in this field. 
In conclusion, I adopt a top-down approach focusing on the domestic change in three 
national case studies as a consequence of the implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC 
on intra-Community transfer using two models and eight dimensions measured from 0 
to 5. In this way the analysis offers an original contribution to the Europeanisation 
process in the field of arms transfers control and transparency. This analysis allows 
me to investigate the direction of the Europeanisation process in the armaments field 
at a domestic level. As instruments to investigate domestic change, I use national 
domestic laws on arms export control and transparency before and after the 
transposition of the Directive, in order to avoid basing methods on declaring which are 
extremely changeable in this field. It also allows me to draw on national public policy 
literature to ensure that my understanding of domestic change is sensitive to the 





Chapter 3. Methodology  
 
 
5.4.1.1 Introduction  
 
 
Colin Powell’s famous UN speech showing a model vial of anthrax and presenting 
evidence on Iraq’s development of biological weapons – most of which has since been 
proved false – is emblematic for understanding the risks and difficulties in investigating 
arms (conventional and unconventional) control. It shows how representation, rhetoric 
and non-knowledge are used in the arms control field, and the infinite traps connected 
to long chains of non-knowledge which starts from an anonymous “witness” and arrives 
at the UN, becoming a casus belli for military intervention.192 
In the armament sector, the risk of relying on statements that do not correspond to the 
truth are theorised by strategic studies and are confirmed by empirical findings. 
Strategic studies teach that perception of threat plays a fundamental role. 193  For 
example, a state might be interested in overstating its military equipment, armed forces 
and even military expenditures for deterrence reasons. By contrast, a government 
might be interested in understating its armaments exports towards unreliable 
governments because of internal social pressure to commit to responsible arms 
transfer control and to be consistent with the domestic obligation of rule of law or other 
democratic values.194  
Secondly, a state might adopt rhetoric or hypocritical declarations, making far reaching 
commitments that they are not willing or able to keep.195 It might happen that a state 
adheres to a treaty or to an arms control instrument in order to obtain a façade of 
                                                                
192 “Full text of Colin Powell's speech”, 5 February 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/feb/05/iraq.usa, last accessed 12 may 2019. 
193 Bozzo (1991). 
194 J. Erickson (2015). Dangerous trade: arms exports, human rights and international reputation. New 
York: Columbia University Press, p. 23. 
195 S. Krasner (1999). Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. A. 
Héritier (1997).“Policy-making by subterfuge: interest accommodation, innovation and substitute 
democratic legitimation in Europe - perspectives from distinctive policy areas.” Journal of European 
Public Policy, 4(2):171-189.  
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ethicality, but that they formulate it in such a vague way as to render it easy to 
circumvent.  
Thirdly, in the specific field of conventional arms export control, it might happen that 
actors in this sector change versions according to the interlocutor. A member of 
government might want to appear more restrictive and ethically oriented with the 
parliament and with civil society, whereas with operators in the sector and peers they 
are freer to show a more favourable attitude toward a liberal and flexible market within 
and outside European boundaries. There are several empirical instances that confirm 
this. For example, a representative of the Italian Presidency of the Council declared 
during a meeting with the NGOs that the Italian Government pushed from the beginning 
to make the Directive stricter particularly with respect to the joint responsibility of MS 
on the final destination of coproduced goods.196 Nevertheless, the representatives of 
the Italian Foreign Ministry asserted their desire to liberalise arms export policies with 
non EU members and extended the principle of delegation beyond the Directive.197 A 
similar double attitude can be found in the UK Government when explaining the 
reasons for its scepticism towards the Defence Package: in interviews by scholars 
these officials answered that the Directive was too burdensome on domestic 
regulation,198 but to the House of Commons they said the Directive was too light to 
sustain rigorous domestic regulation.199 The secrecy that characterises this sector 
makes it more difficult to control the veracity of a declaration, especially if a meeting 
takes place behind closed doors.  
Fourthly, some actors and companies rarely disclose their interests and admit that they 
want to influence the Commission or a political body. They tend to leave few written 
traces of their lobbying activity. It is more likely that they use a think tank to shape their 
interests and perception in a wider political perspective in a consistent narrative. For 
this reason, the use of a methodology such as process tracing analysis might 
overestimate the role of those actors leaving written traces compared to those who use 
less evident or less direct ways to influence a political body.200 As a consequence, an 
                                                                
196 Minutes of the meeting between Italian NGOs Rete Italian per il Disarmo and the Representatives 
of the Italian Government, held on the 30 May 2009, not published, author attended. 
197 F. Azzarello of the UAMA declared that the Italian law was penalising for Italian companies. During 
a hearing in the Senate Defense Committee, he claimed: "I am referring to a desirable introduction, in 
article 13 of law 185/90, of the provision of a global export license, already provided for within the EU, 
for movements outside the EU.”, 24 May 2017, IV Commission of the Italian Senate, Affair n. 912, 
https://www.senato.it/leg17/3655, last accessed 15 March 2019. 
198 Fiott (2017). 
199 Ibidem. 
200 D. Collier (2011).”Understanding process tracing.”  Political Science & Politics, 44(4): 823-830. 
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analysis based on process tracing or voluntary declarations can reach different results 
compared to assessment using a sort of network analysis extended to informal 
meetings and other forms of socialization.  
Another strategy used by companies and which seems successful is that of 
complaining regardless, even when they are quite satisfied with a legislative measure 
or the economic situation. Furthermore, they tend to paint the economic situation as 
worse than it actually is in order to obtain more support from the states and the EU. 
For example in 2016, a representative of the most important Italian defence company 
complained about a crisis in the sector. The representative asked for major support 
from the Italian state in terms of public expenditures, political support for exports and 
investments on research and development.201 However, upon examining the official 
data including the research presented in that meeting, no trace of crisis in the sector 
was found; the representative was merely exaggerating in order to stimulate state 
support. It might happen that these kinds of exaggerated claims are reported in a 
document that is then quoted as a point of departure in a scholar’s paper, resulting in 
a chain and multiplication of non-knowledge.202  
Fifthly, the boundaries between each category of actors are blurred. For example, the 
same person working as a consultant for the government administration might be 
collaborating simultaneously on several projects with defence companies and writing 
essays for a think tank. This makes it hard to understand who he is representing when 
making a declaration or a political move. Furthermore, there are cases of “revolving 
doors”, where high officials are hired from domestic companies.203 
Lastly, the analysis is complicated by the fact that each actor category is fragmented: 
for example, studies reveal clearly different positions within the administration between 
                                                                
201 Flyorbitnews (2016). “Dove va l’industria della difesa Italiana”, June 2016. Available online at 
http://www.flyorbitnews.com/2016/06/09/dove-va-lindustria-della-difesa-italiana/ (last accessed 07 
September 2019)). 
202 A. Brzozowski (2019). “European Defence Fund talks reveal rift over EU’s defence future”. Euractiv. 
Available online  at https://www.euractiv.com/authors/alexandra-brzozowski/ (last accessed 15 March 
2019); Mawdsley (2018); ENAAT (2016b). “Why the EU should not subsidy military research.” ENAAT 
Position Paper on the proposal of Preparatory action on Defence research, available online at: 
http://enaat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ENAAT-Position-on-Defence-research-PA_FINAL.pdf 
(last accessed 15 March 2019). 
203 Among others see, I. Davis, (2002). The regulation of arms and dual-use exports: Germany, 
Sweden and the UK. Oxford: Oxford University Press; A. Stavrianakis (2010). Taking aim at the arms 
trade. NGOs, global civil society and the world military order. London: Zed Books. L. Mampaey, (2008). 
“Il sistema militare industriale.” In: C. Bonaiuti and A. Lodovisi (Eds.), L'industria militare e la difesa 
europea (pp. 32-43). Milano: Jaca Books; P. Holden (2016). Indefensible: seven myths that sustain the 
global arms trade. London: Zed Books. 
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officers responsible for controlling arms exports and officers tasked with supporting 
arms exports. 204  Similarly, at the EU level, the positions of different DGs are 
differentiated with regard to human rights or how to distribute funds for military and civil 
research. As explained before, there is also a differentiation between the category of 
defence companies (prime contractor and subcontractors) and between NGOs 
(opposing the arms trade or in favour of strict regulation). Thus, it might appear 
superficial to attribute a position to a category of actor after just a few interviews given 
in the same context with the same interlocutor with the same segment of that actor 
category.  
For all the reasons mentioned above, the arms control field is extremely vulnerable to 
these variabilities. Consequently, the use of qualitative methods, and particularly 
interviews and process tracing, must be treated with caution; otherwise, the overall 
theoretical castle may be built on the quicksand of changeable declarations from actors 
in this field.  
The question of the limits of quantitative and qualitative methods in the armaments 
field has been discussed among scholars who have dealt with armament issues for a 
long time. For example Williams et al brought together a group from critical military and 
war studies to examine methodologies for military-related research.205 Most of the 
group’s attention is devoted to access, data sources and qualitative methods. At the 
same time, there are also useful references to quantitative methods. For instance, 
Mawdsley engages with quantitative methods and the limits of the existing datasets, 
but also small N comparison and process tracing.206 Another scholar who devoted time 
to qualitative methods and especially to issues with process tracing based on official 
documents and interviews is Deschaux-Beaume. Despite focusing mainly on military 
personnel, she reports difficulties related to the unavailability of certain documents due 
to the sensitivity of the subject but also of reticence of those being interviewed. “In any 
research project on defence matters an essential methodological problem quickly 
emerges: the problem of access to internal documents, very opaque technical jargon, 
specific languages and social codes. The environment is difficult and suspicious.”207 
                                                                
204 For France, see Béraud-Sudreau (2014); for the UK, see Davis (2002) and Stavrianakis (2010). 
205  Williams et alii (2016). The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods, London: 
Routledge.  
206 J. Mawdsley (2016). “Comparing Militaries: the challenges of Datasets and Process-Tracing.” In A. 
Williams et al. (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Military Research Methods. London: Routledge, pp. 
115-125. 
207 D. Deschaux-Beaume (2012). “Investigating the military field: qualitative research strategy and 
interviewing in the defence networks.” Current Sociology, 60(1): 101–117.  
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She argues that it is not sufficient to rely on a few interviews to rebuild a fact, because 
the actors are often neither objective nor sincere. “The interviewees cannot be 
assumed to be objective, as they are personally involved. There are peculiar 
methodological challenges particularly due to the status of military speech”. 208 
Consequently, she combined two techniques. She opted for a multiplication of 
interviews at different levels of the decision-making processes in order to avoid 
unilateral and official discourse and to triangulate the collected data and sources.209 
As Mawdsley and Holden have argued, the armaments field is extremely disposed to 
exchanging opinions for facts and creating myths that are not scientifically 
demonstrated. Mawdsley analyses EDA documents and explains how not all of the 
principles on which they are based are scientifically demonstrated nor consistent with 
each other. 210  Holden demolishes “seven myths” which do not have any strong 
scientific basis but which are, however, widespread in the arms environment and 
reported as fact - not just by economic and political actors who are directly involved - 
but also by EU bodies and even by the newly arrived scholars, as a premise for their 
analysis.211 
Given that it is not only possible but likely to find opposite declarations from different 
actor categories, it is also easy to confirm a thesis or refute another depending on 
which declaration you want to pick up. This also affects the principle of falsifiability of 
the hypothesis that each scholar wants to test. That is perhaps why different scholars 
asking the same fundamental question using the same methods in the same discipline 
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2. Methodological approach of the thesis  
 
2.1 Approach of the thesis 
 
Being aware of the methodological limits mentioned above, this thesis has used a 
different methodology, and perspective. Trying to avoid methodological traps and 
unilateral perspectives, it is based on source and methods that are less exposed to 
subjectivity and changeability. 
The research involves a comparative study of the implementation of the EU Defence 
Package and especially on the impact of EU Directive 2009/43/EC (6 May 2009) on 
different national arms exports control legislations. The specific aim is to assess the 
impact of the Directive on some crucial aspects of national legislations and policies on 
arms export control and transparency in EU countries. 
The thesis revolves around the following fundamental questions: what is the direction 
of the Europeanisation process in the field of arms export control and transparency? 
In particular, do MS converge and what do they converge around? Do they converge 
around a strict arms export model where commercial variables are subordinate to 
political ones, or around a more flexible and liberal model or do they tend to converge 
around a mediation between these two models? Is there an imbalance in this 
convergence with regard to one model or another? 
In order to answer these questions, I narrowed the field of analysis to one Directive, 
Directive 43/2009, and three case studies: Italy, the United Kingdom and Hungary. 
Operationalising the Directive as the independent variable, and the national 
transposition and implementation as the dependent variable, my analytical framework 
refers to Europeanisation in an EU perspective, with a top-down understanding of the 
EU’s impact on the MS through the formulated policy of the internal arms market 







2.2 Why the three case studies 
 
I selected the UK, Italy and Hungary as case studies on the basis of the following 
criteria. These criteria principally concern the kind of legislation on arms export control 
and the degree of transparency. The legislation and rules about transparency can be 
more or less advanced, and more or less strict (with respect to transparency, we are 
referring particularly to internal and end-user control and exports prohibitions). I chose 
these three EU MS because of their very different levels of strictness and rigor 
concerning national arms export control regulation: one country with especially 
intrusive and strict regulation (Italy), one country with more flexible regulation (the UK), 
and one country with newer regulation (Hungary). I was able to evaluate the differences 
and similarities in the transposition of the Directive and its impact on national regulation 
of arms export.  
The three case studies differ also in size, structure and technical autonomy of the 
national defence industries (including relatively large industries capable of developing 
various kinds of weapons, well-integrated at the European level, as well as medium 
and small defence industries that involve smaller capabilities or produce small parts 
and components for larger systems). The three case studies differ also in weight of 
societal actors: defence companies are strong in Italy and the UK but are minimal in 
Hungary. Similarly, non-governmental organisations are strong in Italy and the UK but 
not in Hungary.  
The hypothesis is that, despite great differences between these three case studies (in 
terms of their regulations, constitutions, institutions and relationships between the state 
and the market), these three case studies tend to converge around a similar arms 
export control model, as a consequence of the domestic change generated by the 
Europeanisation process in this field.  
 
2.3 Why the Directive 2009/43/EC? 
 
EU Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 6 th 
2009, simplifying terms and conditions for the transfer of defence-related products 
within the Community, is intended to remove obstacles to the free circulation within the 
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EU market of defence-related products, by reducing administrative burdens and 
simplifying terms and conditions to obtain arms exports licences. The directive’s aim is 
to strengthen the technological and industrial bases of the European defence industry.  
I chose this Directive for the following three main reasons. 
First, the Directive is the first EU binding act on the delicate subject of conventional 
arms transfers. As explained in the introductory chapter, armament issues have long 
been exempted from EU regulation for legal reasons (due to a restrictive interpretation 
of Article 223) but also for political and strategic reasons. The ICT Directive is the first 
in the arms transfer field. 
The second is because it is the output of an unconventional decision-making process. 
The process differed from the traditional inter-governmental approaches to armament 
issues. By contrast, this directive has seen the proactive role of the Commission in 
collaboration with the ECJ in the phase of the initiative.  
The third is that that the ICT Directive is grounded in the rules of internal market and 
freedom of movement of goods, as opposed to a CFSP perspective, as a way to 
harmonise arms export control regulation. I investigate the advantages and 
disadvantages of this perspective applied to the armaments field and the 
consequences of influence/consistency with the CFSP. 
This directive has generated a wide debate both politically between practitioners and 
representatives of NGOs and academically representing a point of departure from the 
traditional intergovernmental decision-making processes that has dominated EU 
armament issues. 
 
2.4 Two models and eight dimensions 
 
In order to assess the direction of domestic change and compare the different case 
studies, I use two fundamental arms export regulation models. They are two ideal 
types. The first one is the restrictive model. This model focuses on ethical variables 
such as respect for human rights, peace and development. In the model, the rule of 
law prevails over commercial ones in arms exports, where there is maximum 
transparency and active involvement of civil society, strict bans and an emphasis on 
the principle of responsibility for all the actors involved.  
80 
  
At the opposite of the spectrum there is the arms export control pro-industry model, 
intended as an arms export control regulation characterised by the maximum weight 
given to commercial variables over ethical and even strategic ones. In this model 
transparency is minimal and also the obligations of the executive branch with respect 
to parliament are reduced to minimum terms. This leaves maximum flexibility to the 
executive power in deciding arms export policy, emphasising pragmatism. 
Consequently, the aspects regulated by primary law are exiguous, with most regulated 
by executive acts or bureaucracies, and/or just analysed case by case. In the pro-
industry model, the principle of responsibility is replaced by the principle of delegation, 
including delegating the export decision to a country with lower barriers to exports. The 
first ideal model emphasises checks and balances, and is characterised by the 
presence of different actors that may slow down the decision-making process but can 
offer better guarantees against corruption and illicit traffic. The second model is 
extremely centralised. The first is transparent and accountable whereas the second is 
opaque and most of the information is not reported to the public. Of course, these are 
two ideal types and the concrete domestic arms control regulations can be placed in 
one of the different intermediate points of the continuum linking these two poles.  
In order to identify these two models, I used eight dimensions: (a) balance between 
political strategic variables and economic-industrial variables; (b) balance between 
legislative and executive power in regulating arms exports; (c) balance between 
primary law and secondary law in regulating arms exports; (d) balance between 
transparency and opacity in arms transfers data; (e) balance between national 
responsibility on the final destination of co-produced goods and mutual recognition 
principle/delegation to partner countries; (f) balance between centralisation and checks 
and balances in the authorisation and control procedures; (g) balance between the role 
and weight of the state with respect to the role of the companies; and (h) balance 
between common standards and fragmentation in arms export control rules.  
 
3. The comparative taxonomy to assess direction and intensity of domestic 
change 
 
Having established the dimensions, there remains the question of how to assess the 
individual policy characteristics that shape each dimension. What are the key 
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indicators and evidence for domestic change? According to Hall, domestic change can 
involve: 1) the overarching goals that guide policy in a particular field; 2) the techniques 
or policy instruments used to attain those goals, that is to adjust arms export licensing 
procedures or control in order to pursue the fundamental goals; and lastly 3) the 
precise settings of these instruments.212  According to the variables involved, Hall 
distinguishes three kinds of changes. He defines a first order change where instrument 
settings change in light of experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals and 
instruments of the policy remain the same. When instruments of policy are altered but 
the overall goal(s) remain the same, there is a second order change. The third order 
change alters the hierarchy of goals and fundamental paradigms that shape the values 
and objectives pursued in the policy.213 
Building on Hall, Graziano investigates domestic change as a result of the 
Europeanisation process in Italy, comparing three different sectors (agricultural policy, 
cohesion policy and employment policy). 214  He uses four political institutional 
dimensions to assess the Italian case: executive-legislature relationships, centre-
periphery relationship,- political party-interest group power balance and bureaucratic 
functioning. According to the number involved in change Graziano classifies the 
intensity of change. He calls “policy transformation those cases in which all four policy 
structure dimensions show relevant change, policy adjustment when two or three 
policy structure dimensions change significantly, and policy continuity when one 
dimension significantly changes or no policy structure change is detected.”215 
Building on Graziano and Hall, I assess domestic change along my eight dimensions. 
I measure each of these dimensions on a scale from 0 to 5. This scale allows me to 
assess better the intensity of change. Some of the eight dimensions involved relate 
directly to the fundamental goals and principles of arms export control policies: for 
example, the first dimension which concerns the balance between economic and 
strategic, political and ethical variables. The way in which each MS orders the different 
variables (ethical, political and strategic issues on the one hand and economic and 
industrial on the other) in case they conflict directly, informs policy goals, according to 
which principles and bans on exports are defined. Thus, the number of dimensions, 
                                                                
212  P. Hall (1993). Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state: the case of economic policymaking 
in Britain. Comparative Politics, 25(3): 275-296. 
213 Ibidem. p. 278. 
214 Graziano (2013).  
215 Ibidem, p. 17. 
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the intensity of change along the scale but also the relevance of the dimensions with 
respect to the paradigms and goals of arms export policy will be considered in order to 
assess domestic change.  
To assess the direction and intensity of change at the domestic level, I use a scale of 
intensity expressed in the form of taxonomy for each of the eight dimensions. The scale 
is based exclusively on the legal disposal and formulation of the regulation of arms 
export control and transparency. Overall lower values are associated with a pro-
industry model of European arms exports whereas higher values with a restrictive 
model, where ethical and political values prevail. The taxonomy is articulated as follows 
for each of the eight dimensions: 
 
3.1 First dimension: political and strategic variables versus economic and 
industrial variables  
 
The first dimension concerns the balance between economic and industrial variables 
on one side and political and ethical variables on the other. In order to measure this 
first dimension, I use a scale of intensity from 0 to 5, where 5 indicates the maximum 
weight of political and strategic variables, and 0 the minimum weight of political 
variables (and maximum weight of economic variables in the formulation). It is 
important to remember that the measurement is undertaken on the letter of the laws 
and not on the practices in arms exports. Thus, if the main regulation makes no 
reference to economic industrial variables in the text and disposal of the law and in 
assessing arms export policy, the rank is 5. Where there are explicit references to 
economic and industrial variables, in assessing export criteria, plus other references 
to the right of secrecy and commercial confidentiality, without a clear priority of the 
political variables over the economic ones, the rank is 1. If there is no regulation and 
the only criteria followed is just that of profit with no regard to security and ethical 
values, the rank is 0. Between 0 and 5 there are other intermediate levels as illustrated 






Table 3.1- Balance between political and economic variables: scale of intensity 
Rank Scale description 
5 In the main legislation (primary law), there is no reference to economic-industrial 
variables in assessing arms export policy. 
4 Economic industrial variables are quoted in primary law on arms export control and 
transparency but they are clearly subordinated to the political and strategical ones. 
3 Economic and industrial variables are present and there is no clear hierarchy/order of 
priority between political, ethical and economic variables de iure or de facto. 
2 Economic and industrial variables are present in the regulation and there is also one of 
two elements: a) a member of the Ministry of Economics or of International/European 
trade is responsible for the authorisation procedures and not the Foreign and Defence 
Ministry; b) in primary law there are explicit references to the right to secrecy and 
commercial confidentiality of the companies as limits to transparency.  
1 Economic and industrial variables are present in the regulation and there is also one of 
two elements: a) a member of the Ministry of Economics or of European/International 
Trade is responsible for the authorisation procedures instead of the Foreign or Defence 
Ministry; b) in primary law there are explicit references to the right to secrecy and 
commercial confidentiality of the companies as limits to transparency. 
0 Economic industrial variables have full priority over political ones (strategic, defence, 
security and ethical variables), or there is no regulation of arms exports. 
 
 
3.2 Second dimension: primary law versus secondary law 
Considering the role and weight of primary law with respect to secondary and sub-
legislative regulation, I created a scale from 5 to 0. If the primary law precisely details 
(thus limiting the discretion of the executive) the three keys pillars of any arms export 
regulation, which are a) the export control licensing procedures and ex post control, b) 
the criteria or bans on exports (in a binding, unique and immediately applicable way), 
and c) the quality and quantity of data to be reported to the Parliament, the mark is 5. 
If the executive branch enjoys a wide margin of discretion for all these three pillars in 
the framework of a primary regulation, without any approval from the Parliament the 
rank is 1. If the executive is completely free without any primary law framework, the 








Table 3.2 - Balance between primary and secondary law: scale of intensity 
Rank Description of the scale 
5 The primary law precisely details a) the criteria and bans on exports, indicating 
ways to implement them automatically as well b) the procedures for authorisation 
(including terms and conditions for using general licences when introducing end-
user controls), c) the quality and quantity in details of the information on 
transparency. 
4 The primary law accurately details two of the above-mentioned elements. 
3 The primary law accurately details one of the above-mentioned elements. 
2 The primary law details general principles and allows the executive to define the 
details with previous approval of the Parliament.  
1 The primary law details general principles and allows the executive to define the 
details without previous approval of the Parliament. 
0 There is no primary law, arms exports regulation is a competence of the executive.  
 
 
3.3. Third dimension: legislative branch versus executive branch 
 
The third dimension indicates the power of the parliament in comparison to the power 
of the government in arms transfer policy. This is a very central dimension in the debate 
on the Europeanisation process and its direction because there is some important 
Europeanisation literature explaining the “democratic deficit” of the European Union 
and demonstrating that Parliaments are the losers in the Europeanisation process.216 
Seikel notes that “the EU’s policies and institutions have been frequently criticised for 
being technocratic and undemocratic”. 217  According to Graziano, “European 
integration (which is, as discussed above, the construction phase of Europeaniation) 
has weakened Parliaments in four ways. First, the transfer of competences from the 
national arena to the EU level has removed decision making (involving 
Europeanization and domestic policy change) with respect to a wide range of activities 
from the purview of national legislatures. (...) Second, the Union’s decisional processes 
disadvantage national Parliaments. (...) Third, the EU privileges executives over 
legislatures, offering them opportunities to bypass Parliamentary control. (...) Fourth, 
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Parliaments lack the resources and the independence needed to scrutinize effectively 
the action and activity of their governments in Brussels."218  
Furthermore, the defence and security field and arms transfer have been covered by 
military secrecy for a long time and are not accessible to the members of parliament. 
However, in most European countries after the collapse of the Cold War bipolarism, 
the scandals due to exporting European-made arms to states in conflicts or not 
respecting human rights, also thanks to the secrecy and tacit consensus of the 
exporting governments and bureaucracies, opened a debate for greater transparency. 
As a consequence, the traditional power of the executive in this field has been 
progressively integrated with that of parliament, thus enabling the legislature and public 
opinion to influence, address, orient and control the executive power in the defence 
and armaments sector. This process has followed different patterns and rhythms 
according to the history and traditions of each MS. Thus, there is a wide range of 
possible relationships between the executive and legislative branches.  
In order to measure this important relation between the executive and legislative 
branches, I use three dimensions, two of which are among the eight basic dimensions: 
a) the power to limit the discretion of the executive with the detail and breadth of 
primary law; b) the specified provision of information as a means of exercising control 
over arms export policy, assessing government action and thus directing it; and c) the 
kind of parliamentary power with respect to export licences which can be preventive or 
successive.  
I created a scale from 5 to 0 moving from the maximum control of the legislature to the 
complete discretion of the executive in this delicate field. Firstly, when it is parliament, 
which (by assuming power over the control and direction on the arms trade) dictates 
and details primary law, the principles and criteria, export procedures and the level of 
transparency, all these aspects act as guidelines and limit the discretionary actions of 
the executive power; secondly, when it is the legislature that establishes the quality 
and quantity of information that the executive must report to parliament, including all 
crucial data and sensitive information; and thirdly, when parliament has a preventive 
power in the decision of licence granting, the rank is 5. By contrast, when armament 
matters are the exclusive competence of the executive, there is no transparency and 
                                                                




the executive enjoys wide discretion in applying the three classical pillars of any arms 
export control regulation, the rank is 0. The intermediate levels are explained in the 
table below.  
 
Table 3.3 Balance between executive and legislative branches: scale of intensity 
Rank Description of the scale 
5 It is the legislature that, by assuming power over the control and direction of the arms trade, 
dictates primary law; the principles to be followed by the competent bodies in the decision-
making process on licences, their subsequent controls and the level of transparency. All 
these aspects act as guidelines, and limit the discretionary actions of the executive power. 
Secondly, the parliament has a preventive power in licence granting. Thirdly, the information 
in relation to the parliament is decided by the parliament in the details, by primary law and 
covers all sensitive and non-sensitive information. 
4 It is the legislature which, by assuming power over the control and direction on the arms 
trade, dictates primary law in the three above-mentioned principles. All these aspects act 
as guidelines, and limit the discretionary actions of the executive power. However the power 
of the parliament in assessing arms export licence is successive and not preventive. This 
means that the parliament is informed about authorisation to export after these have been 
granted by the government. Thirdly, the information in the report to the parliament is decided 
by the parliament in the details, by primary law and covers sensitive and non-sensitive 
information. 
3 The legislature dictates primary law in two of the basic pillars of national regulation. 
Secondly the parliament has a successive power in the decision of licence granting. The 
information delivered to the parliament does not cover sensitive information such as 
companies and banks involved in arms export, but they offer the legislature some basic 
information so as to carry out controls. 
2 The legislature dictates primary law details for just one of the basic pillars of each arms 
trade regulation, whereas the other two pillars are treated in a more general way, leaving 
the executive a wide marge of discretion in their interpretation and application. Secondly, 
the parliament has successive power in the decision of licence granting. Thirdly, the annual 
report is incomplete and does not cover some relevant parts of arms exports, such as 
general licences or deliveries, thus making it difficult for the legislature and public opinion to 
have a reliable picture of arms exports direction and policy.  
1 The legislature defines only general guidelines and principles concerning the three pillars of 
any arms trade regulation (licensing procedures, criteria and transparency). This information 
is generic and leaves a wide marge of discretion to the executive. The regulation leaves the 
final say to the executive power which may or may not apply criteria, decide the level of 
transparency and may or may not apply the end-user certificate, with previous approval of 
the parliament. 
Secondly the parliament has successive power in the decision of licence granting. Thirdly 
there is a lack of sensitive information in the report to the parliament, concerning an 
important/essential part of national exports, such as deliveries. 






3.4. Fourth dimension: transparency versus opacity 
 
In order to measure the degree of transparency/opacity, I created a scale of intensity: 
the highest rank of 5 is given to those countries which offer the Parliament an annual 
report where all data on exports to be reported to the Parliament are detailed by 
primary law, including all crucial data (such as a description of the material, quantity, 
value, end-user, and ultimate end-user; also, in cases of coproduction and re-export, 
banking transactions) and sensitive data (such as banking transactions, and the names 
of the credit institute and exporting companies), covering both licences and deliveries. 
All these data are entered in the same row of a table, thus allowing cross-checking 
controls between fiscal, financial, licensing and delivery values, including brokering 
expenses. If the information concerns the single licence connecting all these data, the 
report to the Parliament is, of course, very transparent. It offers both the Parliament 
and individual citizens’ tools not only to stay informed and assess government policy 
on arms exports, but also to effectively control arms exports, to identify cases of illicit 
transfers, bribery and corruption. At the other end of the spectrum, if there is no 
reference to transparency by primary law or there is no report at all, the mark is 0. 
Table 3.4 Balance between transparency and opacity: scale of intensity 
Rank Description of the scale 
5 
  
All export data are detailed by primary law and binding. They include basic 
information (value, quantity, and final destination) and sensitive data (banks and 
companies). These data are not aggregated but are detailed licence by licence, in the 
same row, thus allowing cross-checking comparison. The information concerns all 
kinds of arms exported (including small arms), and all licences (and deliveries), 
including co-productions and global licences and re-exports. All these data are not 
aggregated. For each licence it is possible to connect all sensitive and crucial data 
concerning it, thus enabling the Parliament and public opinion to carry out cross-
checking.  
4  All export data are detailed by primary law and binding. They include basic 
information (kind of material, value, quantity, and final destination) and sensitive data 
(banks and companies). These data are not aggregated. The information concerns 
all kinds of arms exported (including small arms), and all licences (and deliveries), 
including co-productions and global licences. However, it is not possible to connect 
and cross-check the data.  
3  The annual report does not contain sensitive data concerning banking transactions 
or companies, but it does include all the basic information concerning the military 
category of arms, the value and the final destination. The data are aggregated by final 
destination and military category. They include both licences and deliveries. The 
information concerns all kinds of arms exported (including small arms), and all 
licences (and deliveries), including co-productions, global and general licences. This 
corresponds to the best standard practice of the information required for the EU 
consolidated report.  
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2  The reference by primary law is generic, there is a consistent part of the information 
which is not included in the report (IE some kinds of licences, for example general 
licences, and/or deliveries). It is impossible to have a clear picture of this country’s 
exports particularly as regards general and global licences.  
1  No reference to transparency in primary law. However, there is a generic report 
describing exports. 
0  There is no report to the Parliament nor primary regulation. 
 
 
3.5 Fifth dimension: responsibility versus delegation 
 
During the late Eighties several countries, including Italy and the UK, were 
characterised by an export control policy with a low level of responsibility. It was 
possible to export to a partner country without any conditions for re-exporting to 
unreliable countries, or countries in conflicts. These old systems are placed at one 
extreme of our responsibility scale, with a 0 rank (minimum responsibility and maximum 
delegation), whereas the maximum rank is given when the exporting state is 
responsible for all defence material produced in its country and the final destination, 
including parts and components. In the middle there are several gradations combining 
a lower degree of responsibility, decreasing only with reliable partner countries, or 
parts and components which are not considered strategic for the finished defence 
good.  
 
Table 3.5 Balance between responsibility and delegation: scale of intensity 
Rank Description of the scale 
5  Maximum control, information and responsibility on all the kinds of arms, finished 
systems, parts and components produced and exported from the country. End-user 
certificate required for all parts and components. Control and transparency on the final 
end-users. 
4 Delegation only to (reliable) EU countries of decisions (responsibility) on the final 
destination of small parts and non-strategic components of coproduced goods, but 
required to be informed about the final destination of these parts, and of re-export. 
Control on all the goods with the exception of non-strategic parts and components, but 
transparency also on parts and components. 
3 Delegation only to (reliable) EU countries of the decision on the final destination of 
small parts and non-strategic components of co-produced goods, without needing to 
be informed about the final destination of these parts. 
2 Delegation only to a short list of reliable countries (with similar export regulations) of 
the power to decide on the final destination of all co-produced goods and finished 
products, and needing to be informed about the final destination of these parts. 
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1 Delegation to all (or a category) of the other countries of the final decision on the final 
destinations of exports of co-produced goods, previously a general declaration not to 
export finished goods for non-conventional arms use, and embargoed destinations or 
illegal purpose (with a simple assurance), without needing to be informed about the 
final destination of these parts. 
0 
  
Delegation with no conditions to all the partner countries to re-export or export the co-
produced goods, without any obligation to be informed on the final destination 
(legalized triangulation).  
 
 
3.6. Sixth dimension: common standards versus fragmentation 
 
 
There is abundant literature and debate in particular among international law scholars 
about the process of fragmentation of international and European law. At the 
international law level, the theme of fragmentation (due to the growing proliferation of 
international regulatory institutions and law with overlapping jurisdictions) is viewed in 
two different lights. On the one hand, some authors point out the positive aspects of 
this institutional pluralism that has produced more progress toward integration and 
democratisation. 219  On the other, legal scholars underline the risks of erosion of 
democratic and egalitarian international regulatory systems and undermining the 
reputation of international law for integrity and certainty. According to Benvenisti and 
Down,220 fragmentation limits the opportunities for weaker actors to build the cross-
issue coalitions that could potentially increase their bargaining power and influence. 
Because of fragmentation, the legal panorama is more and more complex. In order to 
move in this law jungle and to “shop” for the best solution, it is necessary to invest a 
great amount of resources in legal advisors. Thus, indirectly, complexity might favour 
the most powerful and richest actors (multinational companies for example) compared 
to those with fewer resources at their disposal, such as NGOs.  
At the European level in the specific field of arms export control and transparency, 
some scholars have observed that the Common Position on European Arms exports 
and the Directive on intra-Community transfers, both approved in the same years but 
following different procedures, might overlap in some articles and create problems of 
incompatibility, particularly in the norms concerning end-user certificates. 221 
                                                                
219 M. Maduro (1998). We, the Court. The European Court of Justice and the European Economic 
Constitution: A Critical Reading of Article 30 of the EC Treaty. Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
220 E. Benvenisti and G. Down (2007). “The empire’s new clothes: political economy and the 
fragmentation of international law.” Stanford Law Review, 60 (2):595- 632. 
221 S. Depauw (2010). The Common Position on arms exports in the light of the emerging European 
defence market. Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute. 
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Furthermore one of the worries expressed by some analysts 222  was that the 
introduction of general (and global) licences was so vague and flexible in its 
interpretation that there would be a risk of a jumble of different general licences, with 
different conditions which would have complicated instead of simplified intra-
Community transfers. In fact, a report for the European Commission on the 
implementation of Directive 43/2009/EC describes a very differentiated panorama of 
general licences among MS, specifically the kinds of arms covered and terms and 
conditions, which is represented in a non-uniform multi-coloured table.223 
The ambiguity and vagueness that characterise the Directive in some points are also 
read in two contrasting lights. First, there are those who state that ambiguity is linked 
to norms dynamics, and may favour a virtuous learning process leading to a stricter 
and more uniform regime;224 second, there are scholars, lawyers in particular, who 
posit that ambiguity provides “interpretive leeway” and allows circumvention of norms, 
thus creating space for material interest under an ethical façade.225At an international 
level, Shaffer and Pollack 2010 explain that ambiguity and vagueness in the 
formulation is one of the three dimensions of soft law, beside non-binding force and 
the absence of a judicial authority to enforce norms.226 Thus it erodes binding force 
and certainty of law. The analysis is further complicated by the fact that its armaments 
field is characterised by a veil of rhetoric, ambiguity and secrecy. 
In order to measure this dimension articulated in fragmentation and vagueness, I 
created a scale of intensity from 0 to 5 where 5 represents the absence of ambiguity 
in formulating export criteria and by unique, clear procedures for export licence 
granting and control. 0 represents maximum flexibility and diversification in licence 
granting and control procedures and export criteria, which fall to the discretion of the 
executive. 
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Table 3.6 Balance between common standards and fragmentation: scale of intensity 
Rank Scale description 
5 All procedures are unique and established by primary law. There is only one kind of licence, 
and one kind of end-user certificate for all licences. Criteria are formulated in a clear and 
unique way. Norms on transparency are clear and there is one way to report exports to the 
Parliament. They have one way of interpretation and application, which is established at the 
primary law level and equal for all kinds of exports and licences.  
4 There are two or three main kinds of licences and two or three differentiated procedures on 
the basis of the reliability of the partner (EU/NATO and extra EU/NATO), simplified 
procedures, some of which are simplified in terms of negotiation licences and end use 
controls. However, bans, criteria and end-user controls are the same for all kinds of licences. 
They are applied in a clear and unique way. 
3 There are few kinds of licences and end-user certificates established by primary law. Export 
bans and criteria have a unique application (referring to one supranational or scientific 
source), but it is possible to not request end-user certificates. There is a degree of vagueness 
and correspondingly of executive discretion in cases where end-user certificates are 
requested. However, bans and norms on transparency are valid for all the kinds of licences 
and procedures. 
2 There are few kinds of licences and end-user certificates established by primary law. Export 
bans and criteria have a unique application (referring to one supranational or scientific 
source), but it is possible to not request end-user certificates. There is a degree of vagueness 
and correspondingly of executive discretion in cases where end-user certificates are 
requested and concerning transparency for some kind of licences. Furthermore there is 
ambiguity on how to report part of the exports, and transparency is affected by this ambiguity. 
However, bans are equally applied to all exports. 
1 There are different kinds of licences, with different controls on end-users, and different 
application of the bans and criteria. A degree of ambiguity and flexibility concerns the 
interpretation of criteria and bans, export procedures and controls. There is flexibility in 
choosing the kind of licence and wide use of general and global licences, different degrees 
of controls and different procedures.  
0 There are no clear procedures in arms export licences but all fall to the discretion of the 
executive, which may choose better combinations on a case-by-case basis. 
 
3.7 Seventh dimension: checks and balances versus centralisation 
As with the previous dimensions, in order to measure the degree of centralisation in 
arms export control and transparency management, I created a scale of intensity from 
0 to 5. On one end of the spectrum (maximum checks and balances) different 
authorities are involved in different phases of authorisation and control procedures. 
The highest number of actors is introduced in order to limit corruption and illegal traffic 
which can be prevalent in the armaments sector. Different ministries and actors are 
responsible for dealing with: licence granting, delivery controls, banking transactions, 
and end-user controls data. Political, administrative and judicial tasks are clearly 
subdivided and managed by different autonomous actors. In this case, the mark is 5. 
On the other end of the spectrum (maximum centralisation), there is one single body 
that has centralised a wide range of political, administrative, control and judicial tasks. 
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In this case the mark is 0. In the middle of the spectrum, there is a range of varying 
degrees of centralisation.  
 
Table 3.7 Balance between checks and balances and centralisation: scale of intensity 
 Rank Scale description 
5 There is a clear separation of powers among the fundamental legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. The licence granting and control procedure is characterised by 
different ministries and actors being responsible for dealing with autonomously and 
respectively 1) licence granting, 2) delivery controls, 3) banking transactions, 4) end-user 
controls data, and 5) audit and inspections. Political, administrative and judicial tasks are 
clearly subdivided and managed by different autonomous actors. The legislature has the 
tools to exercise controls in each of these phases. The high number of actors is 
introduced in order to limit corruption cases and illegal traffic to which the armaments 
sector is highly vulnerable. 
4 There is a clear separation of powers among the fundamental legislative, executive and 
judicial branches. The licence granting and control procedure is characterised by the 
participation of a few administrators and ministers for each phase. Executive political 
tasks are assigned to a smaller group of ministers. The legislative controls ex post that 
arms export licences procedures are correct.  
3 There is a clear separation of powers among the fundamental legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches. At the executive branch level there is a collegial inter-ministerial 
committee which takes the political decisions for assessing licences. At the 
administrative level, there is a collegial administrative body which carries out several 
tasks from licence granting, to collecting data on deliveries, audit and ex post controls. 
This committee has a collegial nature and it is helped by other subjects in different tasks 
(for example custom controls or judicial authorities in the delivery and ex post control 
phases). 
2 There is a clear separation of powers among the fundamental legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches. However, practically, there is only one administrative body, which is 
represented by one person or a small group, under the direction of only one single 
minister, which centralises a group of tasks (licences granting, controls of arrival at final 
destination, collecting end-user certificates, granting certification for companies, 
undertaking audits and controls in companies). 
1 The three basic powers are not completely separated from, equal to and independent of 
each other: the judicial branch is heavily influenced by the executive power. The 
legislative branch is limited in its function of control and orienting arms export policy 
because the information at its disposal does not cover an important part of arms exports. 
There is one administrative body, such as a single person or under the direction of only 
one minister, which centralises several functions (licences granting, controls of arrival at 
final destination, collecting end-user certificates, granting certification for companies, 
undertaking audits and controls in companies). 
0 There is no separation of powers in the field of arms export controls. All the responsibility 
is in the hands of the executive. 
 
3.8 Eighth dimension: states versus companies 
There is abundant literature concerning the relationships between state and 
companies, which covers very fundamental themes of political science and political 
economy. This literature ranges from the discussion about the varieties of capitalism 
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to debates about post-democracy and new relationships between state and 
transnational companies. Focusing on the European dimension, some scholars state 
that the Europeanisation process has increased the power of non-state actors and 
interest groups with respect to the power of the state, or of the party system. Graziano 
has investigated the balance between traditional political parties and interest groups.227 
He quotes some authors who claim that the Europeanisation process has made 
decision making more inclusive and more pluralistic, such as the Spanish debate about 
environmental policy; 228  new corporatist interests have been included in the 
implementation of the EU directives, such as in the French implementation of the water 
directives.229 
Other scholars with a different theoretical framework have observed that in some 
sectors, the Europeanisation process has strengthened transactors (i.e. those 
nongovernmental actors integrated at the European level), and in particular has made 
those economic actors more integrated (usually first tier and prime contractors) and 
more Europeanised. Sandholtz and Sweet note how the neo-functionalist perspective 
views transactors as a driving force for integration. The overall view is optimistic and 
the advantages are then distributed to the whole community. However, they argue that 
“supranational governance serves the interests of (1) those individuals, groups, and 
firms who transact across borders, and (2) those who are advantaged by European 
rules, and disadvantaged by national rules, in specific policy domains.”230 In terms of 
relationships between states and transnational companies, the same authors claim 
that “the long-term interests of MS governments will be increasingly biased toward the 
long-term interests of transnational society, those who have the most to gain from 
supranational governance”.231  
In this section, I focus the analysis on the degree of control/responsibility of the state 
versus the company with respect only to the arms export regulation dimension. 
Consequently, I measure and compare the company’s degree of responsibility to the 
state’s responsibility on arms exports and rank them from 0 to 5. On one end of the 
spectrum, the state (keeping in mind the sensitivity of defence goods and the dangers 
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linked to uncontrolled diffusion) controls companies step by step, in a very intrusive 
way. On the other end of the spectrum, companies are left with nearly total freedom 
and flexibility in selling weapons outside national boundaries.  
Table 3.8 Balance between state and company responsibilities: scale of intensity 
Rank Scale description 
5 Maximum intrusiveness by the state: Companies are controlled by the state in a wide 
range of tasks: a) the authorisation procedure collecting ex ante all the necessary 
information; b) final delivery (collecting all the information); c) end-user certificate, which 
must be signed not just by the importing company but also by the importing government; 
and d) payment to limit cases of corruption and collusion. The application of bans and 
criteria is assessed and directly controlled by the state. These controls are undertaken 
systematically for all arms and components exported.  
4 High intrusiveness by the states. Companies are controlled in quite a wide range of tasks, 
but some sensitive data, such as banking transactions, are not requested from the 
companies. Furthermore, it is possible to not always involve the importing government 
in signing the end-user certificate as the signature from the importing company is 
sufficient. 
3 Medium intrusiveness by the state with respect to the companies. Companies are 
responsible for some tasks such as checking the reliability of the partner in cases of 
coproduction and communicating to the partner coproducing company the national bans 
which must be respected for exports. Companies are responsible for keeping registers 
of their arms exports under general licences. These registers contain information on 
quality, quantity, data, and final destination. Economic operators are obliged to 
communicate these data twice a year or more to the government, which checks the 
registers regularly. 
2 Medium low intrusiveness. Companies are responsible for keeping registers on their 
arms exports. However, they are not obliged to send these data to the government 
regularly. On the contrary it is the government which may organise inspections in the 
companies, after phone calls to the company, in order to verify whether procedures and 
bans are being respected. 
1 Companies must only have a register of their exports and they are responsible for the 
reliability of the buyer, and for the final destination of the goods. The application of bans 
and criteria is left to the discretion of the companies which however must formalise them 
in a company code of conduct and provide a report on ethical responsibility to the public. 
0 Companies are not bound at a national level either, and are able to influence not just 
demand of military goods but also the executive (legislative and judiciary) branch. 
 
 
3. Investigating domestic change 
 
For each of the three case studies, I assess the positioning on the taxonomy of each 
of the eight dimensions based on their domestic regulation before and after the 
transposition of the ICT Directive. This quantity of data allows me to evaluate each 
case study diachronically: by comparing the MS sector and legislation before and after 
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the transposition of the Directive, I can assess the direction and intensity of domestic 
change. Secondly using a common taxonomy for the three case studies allows me to 
assess whether there is convergence or not, and around which arms export control 
model.  
The comparison and study is based exclusively on legal documentation, including 
laws, decrees, and regulations concerning arms transfers control and transparency in 
the three case studies. For each case study I compare the arms trade control regulation 
as it was before the approval of the ICT Directive (in 2008) with the arms trade control 
regulation following the approval of the Directive and after the transposition of the 
directive at the national level.  
The choice to focus on laws in order to assess domestic change was made in order to 
address two methodological weaknesses. The first concerns the Europeanisation 
literature, in particular those scholars following a top-down approach. As explained in 
the theoretical chapter, the main weaknesses of a top-down approach study are that it 
is difficult to assess whether the domestic change is due to the directive at the EU level 
or to other factors present at the domestic level and even the global level, based on 
political or economic indicators. While the regulations/laws that are approved in order 
to transpose the Directive are clearly linked to the same Directive and to the European 
level, this does not exclude the presence and weight of other domestic (and global) 
variables which intervene during the change and shape the final law transposing the 
directive. In any case the transposition measures will trigger domestic change. 
A second point emerged from the methodological limits of the armaments field where 
the use of interviews or other political documentation is extremely vulnerable to 
misperception, manipulation and changing versions according to the circumstances 
and the interlocutor. Furthermore, despite the secrecy that has characterised and is 
still characterising this field, there is an overabundance of political documents 
produced by different EU actors and bodies that often do not address crucial points of 
arms control issues but just side aspects. In contrast when a law or an article of this 
law has to be approved it is more difficult to misrepresent the position. That is why I 







Chapter 4. The impact of Directive 2009/43/EC on Italian regulation 





This case study, Italy, has been chosen as representative of those European countries 
characterised by intrusive and rigorous arms export control regulation and by a history 
of a strong presence of the state in the economy. Countries with strict arms export 
control laws are those that have faced the biggest challenges in rethinking their arms 
export control regime, as Directive 2009/43/EC embodies an economic-industrial 
model based on the principle of free movement of goods, which seeks to remove 
“lawful” barriers to trade.232 As a consequence, for these countries the degree of “misfit” 
with the new European rules is higher. Furthermore, Italy is characterised by the 
considerable weight of, and active participation by, the most important societal actors 
in the armaments field: defence companies (ranking in the top eight in the world) and 
a wide network of NGOs dealing with peace and disarmament.  
The chapter begins by illustrating the context relating to arms production and export in 
Italy and describes the role and weight of the two fundamental societal actors in this 
sector: defence companies and NGOs. Section 2 analyses the legal instruments and, 
in particular, Law 185/90, which regulated arms export control and transparency prior 
to Directive 2009/43/EC. Section 3 examines the Italian regulation after the Directive, 
focusing in particular on Legislative Decree 105/2012, which transposes the Directive. 
Section 4 compares the previous regulation with the new one, in order to investigate 
the degree and direction of domestic change along eight fundamental dimensions and 
two models. Lastly, Section 5 draws the main threads of this chapter together, and 
assesses the overall regulatory and policy impact of the Italian implementation of the 
ICT Directive.  
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97 
  
1.1 The main features of the Italian defence industry 
  
Arms production in Italy has developed since the end of the Second World War thanks 
to the acquisition of technology from the United States, both under US licences and 
autonomously. In the early Seventies, the public presence in the Italian military industry 
strengthened with the control of Fincantieri, one of the most important shipbuilding 
companies, and with the acquisition of control of Finmeccanica, the main defence 
company in Italy.233The upward trend, sustained by promotional laws, high investments 
in research and development and by the increase in military expenditures, both 
domestically and by the main Italian arms importers, continued until 1989. Between 
1990 and 1995 Italian military production was characterised by a consistent decline. In 
the first half of the 1990s, the entire aerospace sector in Italy lost 17,200 jobs (34%).234 
Since the 2000s, the aerospace and defence sector has recovered. Finmeccanica 
followed an upward trend reaching the value of 14,560 million dollars of arms sales in 
2011, followed by a slightly downward trend reaching 8500 million dollars of arms sales 
revenues in 2016. 235  Overall, according to a study by Prometeia for the Italian 
Association of Defence Industries, the whole value of defence production in Italy is 
reported to have reached 13.942 billion euro in 2016.236 The same study estimates the 
“direct” Italian employees of the Defence sector were 44,173. 237 The defence and 
aerospace sectors are privileged in terms of resources invested in Research and 
Development. In 2016 investments in research and development reached 1376 million 
euro, corresponding to 10% of total revenues (sales).238  
The size of Italian defence production is medium-high. Leonardo (former 
Finmeccanica) the most important Italian defence company, covering approximately 
                                                                
233 G.Alioti (2008). “Conversione tra produzioni militari a civili: Storia e prospettive”. In C. Bonaiuti & A. 
Lodovisi (Eds.). L’industria militare e la difesa europea. Milano: Jaca Book,,p. 136. 
234 Ibidem. 
235 Sipri, Sipri Arms Industry database. Available online at: 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry (last accessed 15 April 2019). 
236 A. Mottola (2017), “Convegno AIAD sull'industria della Difesa italiana data”, Rivista Italiana Difesa, 
06-07-2017. The article reports a synthesis of a study on the Italian defence industry: Studio Prometeia 
on the impact of the industrial system of the aerospace and defence sector on the country system in 
2016, presented by A. Lanza, during AIAD Conference on the Italian Defence Industry, of the 06 July 
2017. The study concerns only Italian companies (without subsidiaries abroad) and takes into account 
only the "industrial phase" of the defence system (excluding contributions deriving from the Ministry of 
Defence activities related to personnel, current expenses, etc.). 
237 Ibidem. According to the same study which is addressed to the defence sector representative, the 
defence sector has 44,173 employees and, supports more than 110,000 employees of the entire Italian 
economy, if we calculate indirect employment (73,041 workers) and related industries (41,289 people). 
238  Ibidem. 
98 
  
70% of the domestic production in the defence and aerospace sector, ranked 9th in the 
list of main arms producers in 2016, after US companies Lockheed Martin (1), Boeing 
(2), Raytheon (3), General Dynamics (6), and L3 Communication (8), and after 
European companies BAE Systems (4) and Airbus group (7).239 According to the last 
estimation by SIPRI arms industry database, in the year 2016 Leonardo had sold arms 
for a value of 8 billion dollars (corresponding to 64% of the total turnover of over 13 
billion dollars) and employed 45,630 workers.  
 
Table 4.1 -The SIPRI top 100 arms-producing and military service companies in the 
world (excluding China) in 2016. Value expressed in million dollars  
 
Source: SIPRI Arms Industry Database,  available at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry 
 
Leonardo produces helicopters and aeronautics, unmanned aerial vehicles, defence 
systems, defence electronics, space, energy and transport. Besides Leonardo, there 
are several other important companies in Italy. These are big companies specialised 
in construction of merchant and military ships (Fincantieri is one of the biggest 
shipbuilding complexes), tanks and vehicles (Iveco), Electronics (Elettronica), missile 
systems and torpedoes (MBDA and WASS), munitions and light arms, land, naval and 
aeronautical defence systems (Oto Melara), space (Thales Alenia Space -Italia; 
Espace). Aerial and military propulsion (Avio), radar (Reinmetal Italia), naval and 







                                                                
239 SIPRI Arms Industry Database, available at https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry (last 
accessed April 2019). 







Arms sales as 






1 Lockheed Martin Corp. United States 40830 47248 86 5302 97000
2 Boeing United States 29510 94571 31 4895 150500
3 Raytheon United States 22910 24069 95 2174 63000
4 BAE Systems United Kingdom22790 24008 95 2351 83000
5 Northrop Grumman Corp. United States 21400 24508 87 2200 67000
6 General Dynamics Corp. United States 19230 31353 61 2955 98800
7 Airbus Group Trans-European12520 73652 17 1101 133780
S BAE Systems Inc. (BAE Systems  UK)United States 9300 10000 93 -- 29500
8 L-3 Communications United States 8890 10511 85 647 38000
9 Leonardo Italy 8500 13277 64 561 45630









Table 4.2 Turnover of the Italian Arms Aerospace and Defence Companies in 2015 
TURNOVER OF THE ITALIAN ARMS AEROSPACE AND DEFENCE 
COMPANIES IN 2015 
values are expressed in million euro  
 
Military 
sales Global sales 
LEONARDO 8395 12995 
AUGUSTA WESTLAND 2692 4479 
FINCANTIERI 1056 4183 
AVIO AERO 500 2000 
IVECO DEFENCE VEHICLES DV 470 470 
MBDA ITALIA 422 422 
OTOMELARA 365 365.2 
ELECTRTONICA 204 204 
TELESPAZIO 156 412 
WASS 103 103.3 
VITROCISET 78 150.4 
THALES ALENIA SPACE ITALIA 55 619 
REINMETALL ITALIA SPA 44 46.8 
SIMMEL DIFESA SPA 36 35.7 
AEREA SPA 29 28.7 
SECONDO MONA 24 44 
SELES ES 2 2115 
ALEINA AERMACCHI 2 3118 
Source: IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali), graphs and tables on Italian defence industry available at 

























Figure 4.1 Recent trend of Italian arms exports (million Euro-current prices) 
 
Source: Italian Parliament, various years. Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo 
dell’esportazione e transito dei materiali di armamento, (Report on the operations authorized and carried 
out for checks on the export, import and transit of war material), Parliamentary Acts, Doc. CVIII, Rome 
Chamber of Deputies, Senate of the Republic. 
 
Data from the annual report to the Italian Parliament offer a detailed picture of these 
last fifteen years (expressed in billion euro current prices) and distinguish between 
authorisation and deliveries.240Each arms export must be previously authorised and 
then it can be effectively exported. Usually the values of authorisations granted during 
a specific year do not coincide with the values of deliveries of the same year because 
it sometimes precedes the real export by several months and because not all the 
authorisations are utilised and become real exports. The knowledge of these two 
values is an instrument of control. Authorisations have increased from 1413 million 
euro in 2004 to 4911 euro in 2015. Similarly, deliveries rose from 630 million euro in 




                                                                
240 Italian Parliament (various years), Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo 
dell’esportazione e transito dei materiali di armamento, (Report on the operations authorised and carried 
out for checks on the export, import and transit of war material), Parliamentary Acts, Doc. CVIII, Rome 




























Table 4.3 Geographical distribution of Italian arms exports 
Regions % 2003-2008 % 2009-2014 
EU 41.4 27.8 
EUROPE NON EU 14.4 4.9 
NORTH AMERICA 7.0 10.0 
MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 13.9 37.2 
ASIA 18.3 14.4 
LATIN AMERICA 2.7 4.4 
AFRICA 2.2 1.3 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 
Source: Italian Parliament, various years. Relazione sulle operazioni autorizzate e svolte per il controllo 
dell’esportazione e transito dei materiali di armamento, (Report on the operations authorised and carried 
out for checks on the export, import and transit of war material), Parliamentary Acts, Doc. CVIII, Rome 
Chamber of Deputies, Senate of the Republic. 
 
The geographical distribution of Italian arms exports has changed during the last ten 
years. In fact, in the period covering 2003-2008 Italian arms exports were directed 
mainly to European and North American countries (63%), followed by Asian countries 
(18%) and Middle East and North Africa counties (14%).242 During the following five 
years (2009-2014) the percentage towards Middle East and North African countries 
increased sharply from 14% to 37.2% reaching first place geographically, whereas the 
percentage of exports towards European and North American countries decreased to 
42.7%243.(see Tab. 3). 
 
1.2 Societal Actors 
 
 NGOs 
Italy has been characterised by elevated electoral participation (higher than in most 
European countries) and by a strong tradition of participation in the political sphere and 
debate both via parties and NGOs, both by the left as well as by the moderate Catholic 
wing. During the cold war, the movement for peace and nuclear disarmament 
organised several demonstrations, which also included representatives from Italian 
trade unions. When in the Eighties scandals emerged about Italy’s unethical role in 
exporting arms to belligerent countries, regimes with apartheid and to repressive 
                                                                




governments, there was fertile terrain for a social campaign designed to make exports 
more ethical.  
The first network of NGOs and associations focused specifically on responsible arms 
exports was named “Campaign Against the Merchants of Death” and originated in 
1986 from four organisations (Associazioni Cristiane Lavoratori Italiani, Missione Oggi, 
Mani tese, Movimento Laici America Latina) and later involved several other 
associations. The starting point was an article written in the Missione Oggi newspaper, 
denouncing Italian arms exports to apartheid South Africa, based on what had been 
revealed by those same workers.244 Thanks to this capillarity and to active participation 
by Catholic and left-wing Members of Parliament, the campaign succeeded and led to 
the approval of Law 185/90 regulating arms exports, which was one of the most 
advanced in the European context at that time, and is widely regarded to be the result 
of this campaign. After the approval of the law, the NGOs created an observatory to 
monitor the application of the law, and constantly informed the public on Italian arms 
exports, thanks to the transparency they obtained in the annual report to the 
Parliament.245 The information in the annual report also included the role of banks in 
arms exports and have supplied citizens with another instrument of pressure directly 
towards their credit institutes, as savers. This form of pressure has been shown to be 
extremely effective in checking and promoting the correct application of the law, and 
in maintaining a responsible arms exports policy. It has favoured approval by the same 
credit institutes (including the largest) of internal ethical Codes of Conduct, 
strengthening and expanding the bans and criteria listed in the law. 246 
Since 2003, Italian NGOs committed to arms transfers control and transparency (arms 
control and disarmament) directly or indirectly (Amnesty International for example) 
have been joined under the umbrella of the Rete Italiana per il Disarmo network.247 The 
network includes twenty different NGOs and associations and independent research 
institutes at the national level and is part of European and international networks such 
                                                                
244 For a short history of the campaign see D. Cipriani (2013), “Contro I Mercanti di Morte”, Mosaico di 
Pace, Maggio 2013, available at the following address 
https://www.mosaicodipace.it/mosaico/a/38253.html (last accessed April 2019). 
245 The Italian Observatory on Arms Trade was founded in 1990 and regularly published a newsletter 
called Oscar Report, reporting data on Italian arms exports. See F. Terreri (various years), “Le 
esportazioni italiane di armi nel 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002”, Oscar Report nn. 18-20. 
246 For a complete picture of the role of the bank in arms exports and of their Ethical codes, see 
www.banchearmate.it. 
247 Rete Italiana Disarmo, website: www.disarmo.org. 
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as ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade), Controlarms and Iansa, ICAN at 
the International level.248 
Italian NGOs are characterised by three features: their transversal nature, meaning 
that they have roots both in the Catholic and left-wing electorate; their capillarity, 
meaning that they have a high level of territorial coverage and penetration; and the 
high degree of expertise that the people working in their campaigns have acquired on 
this difficult subject. These three strengths made these organisations prevail over 
strong industrial defence companies, as they were able to contribute to a law which 
gave priority to ethical principles over commercial variables, which they defended for 
over 20 years. However, interdependence, economic crisis, globalisation and 
Europeanisation (but also the changing balance between executive and legislative 
powers, the fragmentation of the law, the changing internal organisation of NGOs, and 
the growing gap in resources compared to their counterpart, the defence companies) 
have changed this balance of power. 
 
Defence companies 
Defence companies in Italy play a relevant role for the national economy and 
participate actively in the political debate. There are several associations of defence 
companies. The most important ones are AIAD (Federazione Aziende Italiane per 
l'Aerospazio, la Difesa e la Sicurezza - Federation of Italian Companies for Aerospace, 
Defence and Security), which is part of CONFINDUSTRIA (Confederation of Italian 
Industry).  
The larger defence companies are considered particularly important players for the 
Italian economy, for their contribution in terms of high technology feedback and in 
terms of employment. Leonardo is always involved through the Italian government in 
meetings that analyse domestic political economy and Italian foreign policy. There is 
close collaboration between companies and government representatives which have 
                                                                
248 Among others ACLI - Archivio Disarmo - ARCI - ARCI Servizio Civile - Associazione Obiettori 
Nonviolenti - Associazione Papa Giovanni XXIII - Associazione per la Pace - Beati i costruttori di Pace 
- Campagna Italiana contro le Mine - Centro Studi Difesa Civile - Conferenza degli Istituti Missionari in 
Italia - Coordinamento Comasco per la Pace - FIM-Cisl - FIOM-Cgil - Fondazione Finanza Etica - Gruppo 
Abele - Libera - Movimento Internazionale della Riconciliazione - Movimento Nonviolento - Noi Siamo 
Chiesa - Pax Christi Italia - Un ponte per...(www.disarmo.org). 
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organised several initiatives and conferences, with the participation of the main think 
tank in the field, IAI (Istituto Affari Internazionali- Institute for International Affairs).249.  
Leonardo (and the whole AIAD) is regularly consulted at the national level on 
amendments or revising the regulation process on arms export control and 
transparency, and it is one of the few big European companies which has often been 
involved at the European level in several initiatives by the European Commission 
touching on the defence and armaments sectors. Finmeccanica/Leonardo 
representatives have actively participated in several initiatives by the EU Commission 
in the defence field. These range from the participation in the 2002 European Advisory 
Group on Aerospace, to the participation in the 2004 Group of Personalities on Security 
Research, to Finmeccanica’s presence at the most recent Group of Personalities which 
was established in 2015 by the Commission, in order to advise it on establishing a 
Preparatory Action on Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-related 
research.250 
 
2. Italian legislation on arms export control and transparency preceding the 
approval of Directive 2009/43/EC: Law 185/90 concerning new rules on the 
control of the export, import and transit of armament materials, as amended until 
2008 
 
This second section is devoted to the Italian regulation of arms transfers control and 
transparency before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC: Italian Law n. 185 of 1990, 
concerning new rules on the control of the export, import and transit of armament 
materials as amended until 2008.251 I will briefly illustrate the history of Law 185/90, 
                                                                
249 See for example a recent presentation of the study by P. Sartori, A. Marrone and M. Nones 
(2018) “Looking through the Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and Implications for the European Defence 
Industry”, Documenti IAI 18, 16 July 2018, available at http://www.iai.it/it/eventi/brexit-scenari-e-
implicazioni-lindustria-europea-della-difesa (last accessed September 2019). 
250 In 2015, the European Commission invited key personalities from European industries, government, 
the European Parliament and academia to advise it on establishing a Preparatory Action on Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)-related research. The primary mission of this Group of 
Personalities was to help establish recommendations for a long-term vision for EU-funded CSDP-related 
research which can boost European defence cooperation. The group published its final report in March 
2016 explicitly endorsing the establishment of a Pilot Project and Preparatory Action on military research 
(currently running with a €90 million budget until 2020) and setting out proposals on "the next steps" - 
likely to be a multi-billion euro European Defence Research Programme to run, initially, between 2021 
and 2027, see James (2018) pp. 15-43. 
251 Law n. 185 of 9 July 1990, New rules on the control of the export, import and transit of armament 
materials [LEGGE 9 luglio 1990, n. 185, Nuove norme sul controllo dell'esportazione, importazione e 
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which helps to explain the spirit of the law and the reasons for its prescriptiveness. 
Then I will detail the provisions of Law 185/90 in its fundamental pillars (principles and 
bans to exports, licensing procedures and transparency) and, lastly, I will refer to the 
debate for its revision before Directive 2009/43/EC. 
 
2.1 The origin of Italian Law 185/90 
 
For a long time, arms trading in Italy was regulated by provisions which had to do with 
foreign trade in general. Arms were considered like any other goods and were therefore 
not placed under any restrictions or controls. Moreover, the entire subject of the 
purchase and sale of arms, as well as the regulations for the granting of export permits 
was covered by rules of military secrecy, and was not accessible to members of 
Parliament. A specific law did not exist, regulations were fragmentary and a general 
framework for reference was lacking.  
The absence of legal, ethical, and political restrictions therefore resulted in a policy of 
arms exports where commercial variables weighed more than political, constitutional 
or ethical variables. From 1980-85, during the "golden years" of the Italian arms export, 
countries in conflict, or countries with human rights violations were among the 
recipients of Italian armaments. Among Italy's most regular customers were Libya 
($850 million), Iraq ($490 million) and Iran ($410 million), as well as Somalia, South 
Africa and Saudi Arabia. In the same period, according to indicators developed by the 
Italian Observatory on Arms Trade, Italy exported 49.8% of the entire Italian export for 
that period to countries engaging in systematic repression of human rights, and 17.9% 
to countries perpetrating frequent repressions. 252  Finally, the recipients of Italian 
armaments were almost all countries of the global South engaged in difficult processes 
of reconstruction, self-determination and development (96.2% from 1978-82, and 
94.5% from 1983-87). 253 
                                                                
transito dei materiali di armamento. (GU n.163 del 14-7-1990 ), note: Entrata in vigore della legge: 29-
7-1990], Italian version available at the following address, https://www.normattiva.it/uri-
res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:1990;185, last accessed 3 January 2020. 
252 C. Bonaiuti and F. Terreri (2004). “Le esportazioni italiane di armi”. In C. Bonaiuti and A. Lodovisi 
(Eds.). Il commercio delle armi: l’Italia nel contesto internazionale, Primo Annuario La Pira Armi-




Despite the whole sector still being shrouded by military secrecy, the first scandals 
started to emerge in the Eighties and shed light on the unreliability of Italian arms 
importers and on illegal mechanisms including cases of corruption and collusion. The 
first case was reported by workers in a defence company and concerned Italian arms 
exports to South Africa’s apartheid regime. Elio Pagani, an employee of Aermacchi- 
an Italian aeronautic company, announced and documented that Aermacchi supplied 
70 HB-326K aircraft to the South African Air Force in January 1980, on an order of 140 
aircraft, a delivery that violated the UN embargo signed by Italy in 1977.254 
As a consequence, in January 1986 a social campaign started in order to “moralise” 
Italian arms exports and to introduce new regulation. The point of departure was an 
article written in a missionary review explaining Italy’s unethical and irresponsible arms 
export policy citing the denunciation described above, and calling into question the 
decision-makers of that time. 255The campaign was promoted by four NGOs working in 
developing countries which progressively aggregated a great number (hundreds) of 
associations and organisations. 
A second important scandal which exploded in 1987 involved an Italian state-owned 
bank, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) and Italian arms exports to Saddam Hussein 
in Iraq.256 The FBI investigating the US branch of BNL discovered a series of financial 
transaction involving armaments and know how towards Iraq.257 This scandal shed light 
on illegal practices, which had characterised Italian arms exports, including 
“clientelism”, bribes and corruption and generated heavy debate in the Italian 
Parliament, which resulted in the creation of two Parliamentary Inquiry Commissions.258 
                                                                
254 A second document was made up of three order forms for spare parts requested by Atlas Air Craft 
Corporation (the South African firm which produced Aermacchi aircraft under license) which would 
unequivocally demonstrate that relations continued at least until the date of issue of the bubbles, in 'April 
1985. See. https://www.peacelink.it/disarmo/a/2386.html, and Giorgio Beretta, "In origine era il piazzista 
d’armi", https://www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2017/03/29/piazzista-di-armi. 
255  For a clear synthesis see G. Beretta “In origine era il piazzista d’armi”, Osservatorio Diritti, 20 marzo 
2017, available at the following address. https://www.osservatoriodiritti.it/2017/03/29/piazzista-di-armi/ 
(accessed 20 April 2019). 
256 For a wider analysis see C. Bonaiuti and G. Beretta (Eds.) (2013). Boom economy: banche, armi e 
paesi in conflitto. Online report for FISAC, available at https://www.fisac-cgil.it/33368/boom-economy-
banks-arms-and-countries-in-conflict (accessed April 2019). 
Among the several books written on BNL scandal see, G. F. Mennella e M. Riva (1993). Atlanta 
Connection. Un grande intrigo politico finanziario, Bari: Laterza; F. Tonello (1993). Progetto Babilonia. I 
segreti della Bnl Atlanta e il Supercannone Saddam Hussein, Milano: Garzanti Libri. These reports, 
together with other materials, are included in L. Palazzolo (2004). Dossier BNL Roma-Atlanta-Baghdad. 
Milano: Kaos Edizioni. 
257 Bonaiuti and Beretta (2013). 
258 Several Parliamentary questions that dealt with these issues must be mentioned. For example La 
Valle and Masina, proposed establishing a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on exports of Italian 
arms to countries in conflict see. Bonaiuti and Beretta (2015). 
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At the civil society level, several local initiatives were organised including meetings and 
conferences, discussions among workers in defence companies, manifestations, and 
peace marches.259 At the parliamentary level, the campaign consulted and informed 
parliamentarians of all political parties and was audited in the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and the Defence Committee. 260 
The strong pressure applied by a large section of society in the Eighties to condemn 
the sale of arms to countries in a state of war such as Iran and Iraq, or subject to 
international embargo, such as South Africa, led the government to adopt new 
measures in 1986 to control exports. Several draft laws were presented by the Italian 
Parliament. In 1987, as many as five draft laws were presented mainly from Members 
of Parliament of the Catholic wing. 261 After five years of parliamentary debate a law 
was finally passed on 7th July 1990, Law 185, which brought in new rules for the control 
of export, import and transit of war material. 
In essence, Law 185/90 was an organic system of rules placing Italy in one of the most 
advanced positions in the European and international context. The principle of 
responsibility permeated the whole regulation and was extended to all those involved 
from the ministries to parliamentarians to companies, from banks to individual 
citizens.262 It profoundly innovated the regulation of the Italian arms transfers for three 
main reasons. First of all, it subordinated the decisions of arms transfer to the foreign 
policy and security of the Italian state, the Italian Constitution and to some of the 
principles of international law, thus bringing to an end the period characterised by a 
low degree of responsibility in arms trade, which had allowed Italy to sell arms to 
countries in a state of war or to governments guilty of serious human rights violations. 
Secondly, it introduced a system of controls by the government, setting out a clear 
procedure for granting licences, first, at the negotiations stage, then for the delivery of 
Italian arms, with a process for subsequent checks, thus ending the secrecy in arms 
trading and drawing clearly a distinction between legal and illegal trade. Finally, it 
                                                                
259 Ibidem. 
260 Ibidem. 
261 Stegagnini, Atto Camera 1244 of July 28, 1987; Zangheri and others Atto Camera 1419 of August 
6, 1987; Martinazzoli and others, Atto Camera October 9, 1987; Ronchi and others Atto Camera 1749 
of October 22.  
262 This paragraph widely draws on previous publications of the candidate. In particular, C. Bonaiuti 
and C. Corsi, (1999). La legge italiana ‘Nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e 
transito dei materiali di armamento’: i principi, la lettera e lo spirito. Oscar Report 16. Florence: IRES 
Toscana, May-June; C. Bonaiuti (2003). “La legge n. 185/90, nuove norme sul controllo, esportazione, 
importazione e transito di materiale di armamento”. In M. Brunelli (Ed.). Produzione e commercio delle 
armi: industria militare e politiche per la difesa, EMI, Bologna, 2003: pp.171-191. 
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accepted the need for transparency providing for a wide and significant explanation to 
Parliament and consequently, to public opinion, on the export and import of Italian 
arms, by means of an annual report to Parliament by the Prime Minister, which includes 
reports from the individual ministries involved and which relates to individual export, 
import or transit licences, deliveries, suppliers, the material exported, its value and the 
destination country.  
 
2.2 Principles and export bans 
 
Law 185/90 stipulated the general principles that regulate the arms trade. The first 
paragraph of Article 1 states that trade in arms should comply with Italy’s foreign policy 
and defence strategy and should be regulated by the state according to the principles 
of the Italian Constitution. 
The meaning of this paragraph is that arms export policy should not follow the criteria 
of profit, but should be subordinate to the foreign policy of the country. Economic and 
industrial reasons should not be the only considerations guiding such decisions. 
Moreover, arms exports should conform to the principles of the Italian Constitution and, 
in particular, Article 11, according to which Italy rejects war as an instrument of 
aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of 
international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the 
limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and 
justice among the Nations. Italy shall promote and encourage international 
organisations furthering such ends. This means that the Italian Government has to 
conduct a foreign policy which aims to bring about international peace, which, in turn, 
entails that trade in war material cannot but be in line with this policy. 
The principles of the first paragraph of Article 1 are immediately explained in 
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the same article. Paragraph 5 lists the criteria which should be 
followed in any arms transfer, as well as the granting of production licences confirming 
that this cannot go against the constitution nor against Italy’s international undertakings 
nor against those fundamental claims of state security, the fight against terrorism and 
maintaining good relations with other countries. Furthermore, there must be adequate 




Paragraph 6 introduces the following bans on the export of Italian arms:  
a) a ban on export to countries which are in a state of armed conflict, contravening 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,263 except for any international obligations Italy 
may have or the different decision taken by the Council of Ministers, to be adopted only 
following the consent of the two houses of Parliament. This first important ban tries to 
break with the bad practice which saw Italy in the Seventies and the early Eighties 
exporting arms to countries at war. Obviously, in accordance with the United Nations 
and customary international law, the ban allows for the possibility to supply arms to 
states undergoing an external attack and using the arms systems for self-defence; 
b) a ban on export to countries whose policies are at variance with Article 11 of the 
Constitution. This regulation states more clearly what can be found in the Constitution, 
and that is the ban on arms exports to countries which would tend to use them in 
aggressive action against other countries to settle international controversies; 
c) a ban on export to countries which are under total or partial embargo, declared by 
the United Nations. As stipulated in Article 39 of the United Nations Charter, the 
Security Council may decide to place an embargo on any state which threatens 
international peace and security. This regulation is meant to bring Italian legislation in 
line with decisions taken by the international community at the United Nations; 
d) a ban on export to countries whose governments are responsible for proven 
violations of international conventions relating to human rights; this ban interprets the 
requirements of the new international law and which see the violation of human rights 
as a violation of international law, and not as an internal issue to be left to the 
competence of the individual state involved; 
e) a ban on export to countries which, while receiving aid from Italy as sanctioned by 
act n. 49 of 26th February 1987, spend more than necessary for defence; towards such 
countries aid is suspended in terms of the law and exception is made only to aid people 
if they are victims of a natural disaster. In other words, there is a ban on arms export 
to countries which, while benefiting from aid through cooperation on the part of Italy, 
                                                                
263 United Nations Statute Article 51: “No provision in the present statute compromises the natural right 
of individual or collective self-protection in the case of an armed attack on a member of the United 




spend on military equipment resources which could be used for the purposes of their 
own economic and social development. 
Overall the law is guided by the Italian Constitution and by the principles of international 
laws regarding human rights, the ideals of prevention and settling of controversy and 
the cooperation and development which is slowly making headway in the international 
context.264 The Italian export criteria and bans act as guidelines and place limits on the 
discretionary power of the executive. In fact, they are legally binding and established 
by the legislator through primary law, which is superior to any act of the government. 
They are wide-ranging, in the sense that they apply to all defence materials exported 
and not just to some kind of defence material or to a specific function of that material. 
Lastly these restrictions are not ambiguous or in conflict with each other (for instance, 
there is no explicit reference to commercial interests among the criteria for granting an 
export licence).265  
 
2.3 The arms covered by the law 
 
The object of Law 185 is war material. Article 2 of the law defines war material as 
"material whose technical and structural characteristics are such that it can be taken 
to have been built primarily for military use and use by the armed corps and the police". 
This expression "primarily for military use", one of the most advanced internationally, 
refers not only to material used exclusively for military purposes, but also double (civil 
and military) use material. In particular, the law stretches to cover those materials 
which, while built specifically for military use, can also be used for civil purposes, if we 
take, for example, many instruments of high technology such as radar and software 
created specifically for military use. It does not apply to civil material which is 
subsequently painted grey-green (airplanes, trucks and sea craft), to be then used by 
the armed forces or by the police.266 
From a general statement like the one above the law goes on to specify and list, in 
paragraph 2, the 13 categories of war materials which include nuclear, biological and 
                                                                
264 Bonaiuti & Corsi (1999).  
265 Bonaiuti (2003). 
266 Cespi Iai (1998) Cinque anni di applicazione della legge n, 185/90, unpublished report for the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1998. 
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chemical arms, firearms, bombs, torpedoes, mines, rockets, missiles etc. The same 
article specifies that, for export purposes, parts and specific components are 
considered arms, as well as drawings, plans and any type of information needed for 
the manufacture, use and maintenance of war material. The latter are also subject to 
authorisation. This list may also be updated and new categories added to it through a 
decree issued by the Ministry of Defence. 
The law goes on to ban the manufacture, import, export and transit of biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as any research leading to the production or 
transfer of such technology. With law 384/97 the production, trade and use of land 
mines have been banned. 
On the other hand, small arms used for sport (hunting and shooting) have been 
excluded from this list (Article 1.10).267 
 
2.4 Export licensing procedures and subsequent controls 
 
The law stipulates the procedure for the export licences, naming the competent 
authorities and setting the time limit by which the authority has to decide. This is 
important in two respects: on the one hand, it is a vehicle for greater transparency in 
this sector, in order to exercise greater control and try to limit illegal traffic, and on the 
other, it is a guarantee for those who work in this sector and who finally see a clear 
administrative procedure to obtain an export licence. 
The Italian regulation indicates several stages in the complex procedure for export and 
control licences: 
A preliminary stage was, until 1993, the responsibility of the CISD (Inter-ministerial 
Committee for the Exchange in Arms for Defence Purposes), which was based at the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers and was made up of the ministers most involved 
in these matters. The CISD was responsible for formulating general guidelines for 
exchange policies in the field of defence, for dictating general instructions for export 
                                                                
267 The light arms that did not come under the controls of Law 185 were those which have a smooth 
internal part, used for sporting purposes, arms designed to be used with non-lethal bullets, arms which 
use cartridges without central percussion, common firearms and common short firearms, semiautomatic 
rifles, with a grooved barrel and manual loading, carbines and muskets with grooved barrels, 
semiautomatic pistols, revolvers, sport and hunting arms. (see M. Donati (1996), “Le armi leggere”, 
Archivio Disarmo, Sistema Informativo a Schede, year 9 n. 4, April 1996). 
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and supervising the activities of the bodies in charge of enforcing the law. The CISD 
was tasked to identify the countries which should come under the ban stipulated in 
Article 1.6. The CISD was dismantled in 1993, and its duties were transferred to the 
CIPE (Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning).268 
The first stage involves the creation of a national register of companies that operate in 
the arms sector, which is then passed on to the Ministry of Defence. In this way a 
complete set of information is obtained on the arms and the Italian companies that 
intend to put them on international markets. This enrolment has to be renewed every 
year. 
The second stage requires companies to notify the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the 
Minister of Defence of any contractual negotiations which may lead to the export, 
import and transit of arms. The law establishes that, within 60 days, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the Minister of Defence, can ban the carrying out of 
this trade. In the case of commercial exchanges with NATO and EU countries, which 
fall within the range of special intergovernmental agreements, it is sufficient to transmit 
such communication to the Minister of Defence who, within 30 days at most, may issue 
conditions or restrictions. This more simplified procedure is valid for the transfer of 
spare parts and already approved components as well.  
The third stage concerns the authorisation to export and depends on the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs; applications for a licence to export and import should be presented to 
this office and an investigation will be carried out before the licence is issued. This 
licence will be accompanied by other documents, including a certificate for the final 
use of the material issued by the government authorities of the destination country. 
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in agreement with the Minister of Finance, has 60 days 
to decide. 
The law explicitly provides for the obligation to suspend or revoke even the above 
permits when conditions for issuing the permit are not fulfilled, and it is important that 
the procedure for such a revocation or suspension is clearly indicated. 
In order to defeat illegal arms traffic, the law provides for subsequent checks in order 
to ensure that the material has actually reached the authorised destination. Article 20 
stipulates, in fact, that the firm should notify the Minister for Foreign Affairs at the 
                                                                




conclusion (even though it may be partial) of the authorised operations. The firm should 
also send to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, within 180 days of concluding operations, 
the documents which prove the introduction of the goods into the country of destination. 
Another important check against bribery and corruption is carried out with regard to 
banking transactions. According to Art. 27 of Law 185/90, all bank transactions relating 
to the export, import or transfer of arms supplies are controlled and require 
authorisation from the Treasury. The Italian banks must inform the Treasury of all such 
transactions. In response to a notification from a bank, the Ministry verifies that the 
transaction corresponds to an arms transfer authorised by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and, on the basis of this verification, it allows for the banking operation. This 
norm was requested by civil society and NGOs and introduced following the above-
mentioned scandals concerning the utilisation of funds to Iraq by the Atlanta branch of 
the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro.  
 
2.5 The end-user certificate and subsequent checks 
 
Article 1, paragraph 5, bans the release of arms in the absence of sufficient guarantees 
with regard to the final destination of the arms, and paragraph 4 states that export 
operations may only be permitted if the transaction is directly with a foreign government 
or companies authorised to receive the material by the government of the destination 
country. 
Italian law, in line with many other states, requires that there be an end-user certificate 
(EUC) attached to the application for an export licence. This certificate should be 
issued by the government authorities of the destination country, declaring that the 
material to be exported is for their own use and will not be re-exported without prior 
notice to the Italian authorities. It is significant that the law requires that the EUC be 
issued by the authorities of the importing country, and not only by the importing 
company. To avoid unauthorised traffic, the authorities of the importing country are 
involved in order to make them responsible for carrying out checks on the firms 
concerned. The EUC has to be authenticated by the diplomatic authorities or Italian 
consulates in the country where it has been issued to certify its authenticity. For 
countries which share common agreements with Italy in the field of arms export control 
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(NATO and WEU countries) the EUC is substituted by a Certificate of Import, issued 
by the government of the destination country. 
In conformity with the principle of responsibility, national authorities were required to 
have full control and responsibility for the final destination of equipment including Italian 
parts and components assembled abroad. The Italian industrial partner was obliged to 
disclose at the beginning of a programme not only the partner company and country 
but also the potential buyer country, which was required to issue the EUC and was 
subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It was therefore the end-user that 
was disclosed in the annual report to Parliament.  
In the case of international co-production within Europe or NATO, the rigorous 
authorisation procedures applied to each component to be exported to make sure that 
Italian parts and components were not assembled abroad and subsequently 
transferred to a third country considered not trustworthy or at risk according to Italian 
foreign policy and arms export regulation. Until 2003 there was only one kind of licence, 
the individual licence. However, after the ratification of the Framework agreement a 
new kind of licence was introduced in compliance with it: the Global Project Licence to 
be used between the six countries signatories of the Agreement and extended to NATO 
and EU countries.269  
 
2.6 Transparency and the role of Parliament 
 
An important pillar of the Italian regulation is transparency. Article 5 of Law 185/90 
stipulates that the government has to provide Parliament with its own report by the 31st 
of March of every year detailing the operations authorised and carried out by 31st 
December of the previous year. The report contains analytical information—concerning 
the types, quantities and monetary value—on the supplies relating to the operations 
                                                                
269 Framework Agreement Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring and Operation of the 
European Defence Industry presented during the Farnbourough Air Show on July 27, 2000. It was 
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programmes involving industries from two or more countries parties to the agreement or trans-national 
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Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Sweden and Italy. The introduction of a new type of licence, the 
Global Project Licence (GPL), addresses the need to liberalise the procedures for the exchange of parts 
and components in the context of collaborative armaments programmes with the aim to accelerate the 




defined in the contracts and indicates the annual state of progress on exports, imports 
and transfers of arms supplies, on exports of services subject to controls and 
authorisations under this law, and the list of recipient countries. The data contained in 
the report corresponds to the information required by the authorisation process and by 
the subsequent checks. Each Ministry reports, according to its competence, all the 
information gathered during these stages: for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reports on authorisations issued for the previous year's exports, with reference, for 
each individual licence, to the exporting company, the value of the exported product, 
the description of the type, quantity and final destination country of arms exported. The 
Ministry of Finance reports the same data collected by customs at the time of delivery; 
the Treasury reports on payments, details concerning supporting banks, export 
industry, arms, total value, any charges for financial intermediations, and the 
intermediate and final recipient.270 
The Italian report, therefore, complies with a dual purpose. On the one hand, it provides 
effective controls with a high degree of inter-ministerial collaboration which limits the 
possibility of corruption and illegal traffic; on the other hand, it guarantees the effective 
control of the Parliament.271 It represents an important instrument of transparency and 
may be consulted by any citizen. At the same time, it provides Parliament with a means 
of exercising control over foreign policy and a defence of the government in the matter 
of the transfer of arms. This, therefore, becomes a means of allowing Parliament to 
assess government action in foreign policy, thereby directing it as well. 
The transparency of the Italian regulatory framework displayed two main 
characteristics. A first key feature was that transparency was not a concession by the 
government, but a legal requirement: the fact that the legislature laid down the quality 
and quantity of the data, which had to be reported to Parliament, and the reporting 
schedule, was particularly significant. A second characteristic was the high level of 
detail, which included sensitive data, such as the name of the companies and of the 
banks involved in arms transfers.  
In conclusion, Italian Law 185/90, which regulated Italian arms exports before the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC, was characterised by a clear priority of ethical 
and political values over commercial ones, a high level of transparency and information 
to Parliament, by strict formulation of arms exports bans. The legislature had the power 
                                                                




to control and direct the arms export policy, thus establishing its prerogative in this 
field.272 The law was considered one of the most important conquests of civil society 
and revolved around the principle of responsibility (binding decision-makers, ministries, 
parliamentarians, but also banks, companies and citizens) in contrast with 
“irresponsible” arms export, which had marked the previous regulatory regime. 
 
2.7 Previous attempts to modify Law 185/90 
 
In the Nineties, there were also several attempts to modify or soften the law, which 
was judged too transparent and too rigorous, thus disadvantaging Italian companies 
over foreign ones. In particular, there were two bills proposed by Forza Italia members 
of Parliament, dating back to 1995 and 1997, which expressed the request from Italian 
companies.273 Among the various amendments proposed was one which would have 
reduced restrictions on export to countries guilty of serious human rights violations, to 
be applied solely to arms used for repression, in order to bring our regulations into line 
with the more permissive ones of some other European countries. Another amendment 
reflecting another recurring proposal from military lobbies to streamline procedure and 
liberalise trade within Europe, was the recognition that members of the European 
Union are responsible for exporting defence systems produced with parts and 
components made in Italy, in cases where it is they, the other European countries, who 
assemble the finished product and who effect the sales of such products. 274 
Nevertheless, all these amendment proposals to liberalise Italian arms transfers and 
to soften the rigorous control of Italian regulation were systematically blocked at an 
early stage by the Italian NGOs which had promoted Law 185/90 and which were able 
to mobilise large sectors of both the Italian Left and Catholic electorate and so the law 
was unamended for more than twenty years. 
                                                                
272 Bonaiuti (2003). 
273 Caputo ed altri, Modifiche alla legge 9 luglio 1990 sulla esportazione importazione e transito dei 
materiali di armamento (1923), pagina 10. Available at 
http://www.senato.it/service/PDF/PDFServer/DF/40002.pdf (last accessed July 2017); E S. 1551 (2 
assegnazioni); Ventucci ed altri Modifiche alla legge 9 luglio 1990, n. 185, sull' esportazione, 
importazione e transito dei materiali d' armamento e divieto di produzione delle mine anti – uomo, 4 
ottobre 1996. 
274  A similar request was addressed by European Defense Industries, regrouped under the old 
association EDIG (European Defense Industry Group) since the early Nineties. 
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However, the Europeanisation and globalisation processes, especially the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC, were responsible for bringing about a significant 
change to this regulatory framework. 
 
3. The transposition of Directive 2009/43 in the Italian context: the main features 
of Legislative Decree 105/2012 concerning amendments and integration to Law 
n. 185 of 1990 and implementing Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
In this third section I examine the changes of the Italian regulation after the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC.275 The main legal source to focus on is the 
Italian law transposing the Directive: Legislative Decree 105/2012 concerning 
amendments and integration to Law n. 185 of 1990, implementing EU Directive 
2009/43/EC by simplifying terms and conditions for defence intra-Community transfers, 
as amended by Directives 2010/80 and 2012/10,276 and Decree 19/2013 of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of Defence.277 Despite being placed at a lower 
level in the hierarchy of sources, the latter contains crucial provision. To complete the 
picture, it is also necessary to consider six decrees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
corresponding to the six main general licences released by the Italian Government.278  
                                                                
275 European Union (2009). Directive 2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 
May 2009 simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the 
Community. 
276 Legislative Decree n. 105 of 22 June 2012, Amendments and integration to Law n. 185 of 1990, 
implementing Directive 2009/43/CE by simplifying terms and conditions for defence intra-Community 
transfers, as amended by Directives 2010/80/EU and 2012/10/EU as far as defence products concerns, 
[Decreto Legislativo 22 giugno 2012, n. 105, Modifiche ed integrazioni alla legge 9 luglio 1990 n. 185, 
recante nuove norme sul controllo dell’esportazione, importazione e transito dei materiali di armamento, 
in attuazione della direttiva 2009/43/CE che semplifica le modalità e le condizioni dei trasferimenti 
all’interno delle Comunità di prodotti per la difesa, come modificata dalle direttive 2010/80/UE e 
2012/10/UE per quanto rigaurda l’elenco dei prodotti per la difesa](12G0133) (GU Serie Generale n.169 
del 21-07-2012) , Italian version available at: 
https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/atto/serie_generale/caricaDettaglioAtto/originario?atto.dataPubblicazio
neGazzetta=2012-07-21&atto.codiceRedazionale=012G0133&elenco30giorni=false (last accessed 8 
May 2019 2020). 
277 Decree n. 19 of 7 January 2013, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Ministry of Defence, n, 
19, of the 19 of January 2013, Regulation implementing the Law n. 185 of 9th of July 1990, according to 
Article n. 7 of the Decree Law n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. The decree was published in the Official 
Gazzette and came into force the 19 March 2013. (GU n.53 del 4-3-2013), [Decreto n. 19 del 7 Gennaio 
2013, Regolamento di attuazione della legge 9 luglio 1990, n. 185, ai sensi dell'articolo 7 del decreto 
legislativo 22 giugno 2012, n. 105, pubblicato sulla  Gazzetta Ufficiale  n.53 del 4-3-2013, entrato in 
vigore il  19/03/2013], Italian version available at the following address 
https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/03/04/13G00058/sg (last accessed 8 May 2020). 
278 AGT 1, 3352 DM, 1162, Decreto del Ministero degli Esteri (siglato dal Ministro degli Esteri) del 4 
luglio 2012; AGT 2, 3552 DM 1163, Decreto del Ministero degli Esteri (siglato dal Ministro degli Esteri) 
del 4 luglio 2012; AGT3, Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 3352 DM 326/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016; AGT4 
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As explained in the Introduction, the aim of Directive 2009/43/EC was to simplify terms 
and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, which 
in Italy’s case, necessarily implied a formal review of the regulatory framework. In fact, 
the Directive introduced a basic distinction between intra-Community transfers and 
exports to non-EU countries. Secondly, it envisaged new types of licences: the general 
and global licences, neither of which existed under Italian law, which were to be used 
for intra-Community arms transfers within European borders with reliable partners. 
Thirdly, it introduces a new certification system for companies. In this way it tended to 
move the responsibility on export controls from the state to the companies, whose 
reliability would be verified by a certification system. Fourthly, it changed the 
perspective of the system of controls, creating a system of ex-post control founded 
upon inspections carried out by the authorities, which was very different from the highly 
complex and articulated systems of ex-ante control that had characterised Italian 
regulation since 1990. In other words, some pillars of the Italian law were put into 
question, at least as far as intra-Community transfers of defence material were 
concerned. Overall, Directive 2009/43/EC implied the need for amendments to Italian 
Law 185/90 and a change of approach for intra-Community transfers compared to that 
of the national regulation. The approach of the Directive was so different from that of 
the Italian regulation, the “misfit” between national and European law was so high, that 
members of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in favour of domestic change used 
the term “Copernican revolution” to explain the changes needed to adapt the Italian 
regulation to the new European one.279 Furthermore, the Italian legislature went beyond 
what was prescribed by the Directive, interpreting some non-mandatory norms in the 
direction of further liberalisation. 
 
3.1 The debate preceding the approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
The debate preceding the approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC is 
extremely interesting because new elements were introduced with respect to 
preceding debates revolving around the modification of Law 185/90. In fact, in this case 
                                                                
Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 3352 DM 327/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016; AGT5 Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 
3352 DM 328/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016; AGT 6 Autorità Nazionale -UAMA3352 DM 329/BIS, del 13 luglio 
2016. 
279 Masson et alii (2010): 22.  
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the revision process was obligatory and could not be blocked. Furthermore, it was 
promoted by the European Union (and in 2009 the Italian electorate was still pro 
Europe). These elements strengthened those actors in favour of a liberalisation of 
exchanges in the defence sector (both the Berlusconi and Monti Governments, 
together with the public administration and companies) and triggered a process which 
had remained blocked for decades.280 
3.1.1 The Italian Government 
The Italian Government had officially supported the “Defence Package” and all the 
initiatives of the Commission to simplify the rules of the European defence market and 
pressed for European regulation of the internal arms market, even before the Directive 
was approved.  
The position of the Italian Government had already been clear and defined since 2007 
when the Directive was still under discussion, as revealed in a paper presented to the 
Italian Parliament, by Nones and Marta in 2007 from the Italian Institute of International 
Affairs. The paper explains that “Italy has supported the initiatives aimed at creating a 
European defence market from the very beginning”.281 Awareness that the European 
market will be integrated and treated as an internal arms market “is widespread in the 
government, administration and industry”.282 As stated by a high-level Foreign Ministry 
official, the Italian Government took an even more “Europeanist” position, pressing for 
a Regulation (a legislative act which is directly applicable and binding in its entirety) 
instead of a directive (an act which binds the MS only for results, leaving them free to 
choose the means of achieving such results).283  
Furthermore, a European directive was seen as an opportunity to open a revision 
process, and change the whole internal regulation, especially to re-centralize 
administrative export procedures: “On the institutional level a radical transformation of 
the administrative structure will have to take place. From this point of view we assess 
                                                                
280 M.Nones, and L. Marta (2007). Il Processo di Integrazione del Mercato della difesa Europeo e le 
sue implicazioni per l’Italia. Senato, XV legislatura, No. 82. Available online at: https://www. 
senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg16/attachments/dossier/file_internets/000/006/938/ 82.pdf 
(last accessed: 7 September 2016). 
281 Nones and Marta, (2007), p. 2 (author's translation). 
282 Ibidem. (author’s translation). 
283 Position expressed by a representative of the Presidency of Italian Government during a meeting 
with the representatives of Italian Network of Disarmament, Incontro Rete Italiana Disarmo con l’Ufficio 
del Consigliere militare Presidenza del Consiglio – Uffici responsabili dati export militare del 30 March 
2009, Report della riunione – Report of the meeting - internal minutes of the Italian Network of 
Disarmament. The candidate was present at this meeting. 
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whether the time has not come to unify the control activities carried out in a new agency 
rather than random manner by many administrations”284  
The European directive was seen as instrumental to achieving domestic changes, as 
a way of facilitating and expediting these changes, so as to avoid the long stalemate 
or traps from parliamentary debates, and from NGO opposition. In fact, the same paper 
explains that “The traditional sluggishness of the legislative process is one of the 
reasons for the propensity to privilege the Community initiatives that force the 
legislature to incorporate them into our legal system, while approval is slower for 
decisions taken at a political level. Instead support for the integration of the European 
defence market should be made a priority.” 285 
The document reveals that the strategy of delegating to the executive the whole 
transposition of the Directive and circumventing the legislature was already a possible 
scenario even before the Directive was approved: “Italy will have to commit itself 
seriously to avoid the risk of delays in regulatory adjustments that could occur both due 
to the long parliamentary times as well as the significant changes that will have to be 
made to our export control system”.286 The fear of delays referred also to the possible 
role of Italian NGOs as veto players. 
As predicted in 2007, when EU Directive 2009/43/EC was approved, the Berlusconi 
Government, in order to circumvent any possible vetoes or delays that may have 
emerged in a parliamentary debate, decided to introduce the transposition law through 
its powers to enact delegated legislation. Thus, in September 2010, the Berlusconi 
government communicated that the amendments to Law 185/90 would be effected 
through an “enabling law”, i.e. an act of Parliament delegating legislative powers to the 
government. A subsequent winning move by the same government was to reduce the 
“enabling law” to just one Article and include it in the so-called “Community Law" of 
2010—an annual law which transposes new EU legislative measures into Italian law.287 
This greatly facilitated the approval of this delegation to the government, as the pro-
European consensus on both sides of the Italian Parliament, as well as in civil society, 
made it extremely unlikely that this law would be rejected.  
                                                                
284 Nones and Marta (2007), p. 2 (author's translation and emphasis added). 
285 Ibidem, p. 17 (author's translation).  
286 Ibidem, p. 19 (author's translation). 
287  Italian Parliament (2010). Senate Act n. 2322 containing Disposals for the compliance with 
obligations for Italy as /member of the European Union. Communitarian Law 2010, October 2010. 
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In particular, Article 16 of the “Community Law 2010” delegated to the government the 
power to adopt one or more Legislative Decrees to implement Directive 2009/43/EC. 
The executive would have a very wide margin of discretion in drafting the decrees 
transposing the law. In fact, according to paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Community 
Law, the transposition would simply have to conform with the principles of Law 185/90. 
Given that these principles are enshrined at a very high level of generality, the margin 
of discretion enjoyed by the government would be equally wide.  
3.1.2 NGOs 
Italian NGOs were initially sceptical towards the Directive. They shared with other 
European NGOs and research institutes, the worries about risks in terms of decreasing 
transparency and controls on final destination that a transposition of the Directive could 
have entailed.288 Furthermore, they perceived a “domestic” risk of using the Directive 
as a specious way to modify the entire Italian regulation, including some fundamental 
pillars such as transparency and responsibility, like a Trojan horse, allowing several 
amendments to pass. On the other hand they didn’t want to oppose the Directive tout 
court, so as not to be considered anti-European Union. Italian NGOs have always been 
Europeanist and have worked for a common Code on European arms export.  
After an internal debate, the Italian NGOs decided to support the Directive and at the 
same time, press the government and Parliament to limit changes to what was strictly 
required by the Directive, without compromising the level of transparency and 
responsibility of Law 185/90. In particular, they insisted on transparency and the overall 
priority of ethical and political principles and bans over economic industrial interests.  
Another move that created difficulties for Italian NGOs was the delegation of the entire 
transposition to the government, whereas they had been prepared to deal with this 
difficult challenge in the context of a parliamentary debate. All the NGOs’ efforts 
converged against the “enabling law” and were in favour of a parliamentary debate. 
They organised a campaign against delegating the executive this important task, 
contacted MPs and civil societies and organised demonstrations. This time, however, 
they did not find sufficient parliamentary support where right and left wing 
representatives agreed on the imperatives of efficiency and simplification and 
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Europeanisation (in those years) and converged with the need to approve the decree 
quickly.  
Overall NGOs were weakened by the fact that a revision process was unavoidable, 
and that opposing it could have been read as anti-European. They were furthermore 
distracted by other campaigns, such as the approval of the Arms Trade Treaty, which 
absorbed time and part of the resources at their disposal. The complexity of the 
transposition and difficulty in communicating the aim of the campaign to civil society 
were two other factors which created difficulties for Italian NGOs.  
3.2.3 The Italian defence companies 
The position of Italian defence companies—especially the stronger and more 
integrated ones—was generally favourable toward the Directive. According to Nones 
and Marta, Italian industry had supported the creation of a European defence market 
and the Directive from the beginning.289 Furthermore, they also envisaged domestic 
gains. They realised that the impact at the European level may have been limited 
whereas the transposition process could have potentially changed domestic regulation. 
As we saw before, defence companies had criticised Law 185/90 from the beginning 
(because of its bans, bureaucratic burdens, and because of its complex system of end-
user controls) and proposed several amendments to the Law. Given that the Directive 
would have entailed modifying national regulation, it was viewed as a way to introduce 
those amendments which they had been waiting for decades to be introduced but had 
been blocked by NGO opposition and a wide section of Parliament.  
Defence companies actively participated in the transposition process. “Formal 
consultations were open with the AIAD, the Italian association representing aerospace 
and defence companies. […] These consultations were oriented towards 
understanding companies’ demands, sensibilities and concerns regarding the new role 
that they are called to play. Obviously big companies have an important say in this 
process but importance is also paid to SMEs.” 290  They saw the Europeanisation 
process as a way to update the regulation. 
Overall, defence companies, especially the stronger and more integrated ones, were 
strengthened by the approval of the Directive in three main aspects. Firstly, a revision 
process was required, something that had been impossible in the preceding years. 
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Second, this revision process was required by the European Union, which at that time 
was considered in a favourable light by the majority of the Italian people. Thirdly, it 
introduced a new regulatory approach to the arms market focused on strengthening 
the defence industrial base, and a concept of harmonisation which was nearer to the 
companies' perspective than the previous architecture of the law, which was based on 
ethical principles. 
In conclusion, the Community Law 2010 was approved by the Senate on 27 October 
2011 (under the Berlusconi Government) and by the Chamber of Deputies on 1 
December (under the Monti Government), and entered into force on 15 December 
2011.291 After six months, the Government (and the various ministers) 292 approved 
Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22nd of June 2012, which transposed Directive 
2009/43/EC.  
 
3.2 New kinds of licences and licensing procedures 
 
The overall aim of Directive 2009/43/EC is to ease the exchange of defence material 
within European boundaries with reliable partners, and to promote the strengthening 
of the European Defence Industrial Base (EDIB). For this reason, the Directive makes 
a clear distinction between exports to third countries and transfers among EU partners. 
In order to make the cross-border movement of defence material in Europe easier and 
quicker, it introduces the new general and global transfer licence to be used only within 
the EU boundaries among EU partners.  
In keeping with the letter and spirit of the Directive, Article 1 of Legislative Decree 
105/2012 (which is devoted to definitions), introduces a distinction between exports to 
third countries and exports within the EU boundaries, as required by the Directive. 
Intra-Community transfers are defined as any transmission, movement of a defence 
material from a supplier to a recipient both located in a MS of the European Union. 
Whereas for all exports to third countries the preceding regulation remains valid, the 
                                                                
291 Italian Law n. 217 of 15 December 2011, Disposals for the compliance with the obligations for Italy 
as part of the European Community [Disposizioni per l'adempimento di obblighi dell'Italia alle Comunita' 
europee - Legge comunitaria 2010. (12G0001)], GU Serie Generale n.1, 2-1-2012. 
292 According to Paragraph 3 of the same Article of the Community Law, the decrees were adopted on 
proposal of the Ministry for the European politics, in agreement with the Ministries for Legal 
Simplification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Interior, the Ministry of Finances and Economy. 
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decree introduces a new licensing system for exchanging defence materials within EU 




Article 10-ter of Legislative Decree 105/2012 introduces and explains general, global 
and individual transfer licences (to be used for intra-Community transfers) which are a 
completely new tool for Italian regulation.  
Italian transposition Law 105 introduces this new kind of licence in Article 10-ter. 
According to this provision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall approve General 
Transfer Licences between MS of the European Union with a decree. Such licences 
shall directly authorise suppliers established in the national territory, who respect the 
terms and conditions specified in the same licence, to carry out transfers of defence 
material specified in the same authorisation to one or more recipient categories located 
in another MS (of the EU). The procedure appears significantly more simplified than 
the traditional individual licences. It is no longer necessary to specify in the application 
form the quantity, value, or typology of the defence goods exported, nor is it necessary 
to attach an end-user certificate, nor to send a certificate of arrival at final destination. 
Rather it is sufficient to communicate to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry 
of Defence the intention to use the general licence for the first time. However, each 
single licence will specify further terms and conditions. 
 
-Cases of application (wide range of cases for general licences) 
According to the Directive, MS shall use general licences at least in the four main cases 
listed in Article 5: if the recipient is part of the armed forces of a MS or a contracting 
authority in the field of defence; if the recipient is an undertaking certified in accordance 
with Article 9; if the transfer is made for purposes of maintenance or repair, for 
demonstration or exhibition. MS may also use general licences for coproduction. 
According to Article 4(6), MS shall determine the terms and conditions of transfer 
licences for defence-related products.  
The Italian transposition is very faithful to the Directive. By 2016 the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs granted six general licences, thus introducing major changes to the 
Italian export system.  
The first two general licences, which were granted on the 4th of July of 2012 
(immediately after the approval of the transposition law and before the approval of the 
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implementing regulation) were limited to transfers related to specific intergovernmental 
programmes, which were listed in the decrees authorising these two general 
licences. 293  The first one (AGT1) 294  enabled transfers of defence material strictly 
concerning these programmes only for final use for armed forces of European Union 
MS. The second one (AGT2)295 concerned transfers with certified companies of the 
European Union, strictly within the above-mentioned programmes. 
The four new general licences issued in 2016 are broader because they are not limited 
to a specific programme. They are classified according to the four main typologies and 
purposes listed by the transposition law and the Directive: defence transfers for the 
purpose of maintenance and repair (AGT3),296 for certified companies (AGT4),297 for 
armed forces of a MS of the EU (AGT5),298 for demonstration, evaluation or exhibition 
(AGT 6)299, as shown in table 1. 
Table 4.4 Italian General Licences classified according to their purpose and scope 
Name AGT1 AGT2 AGT3 AGT4 AGT5 AGT 6 
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293 These intergovernmental programmes were the following: ATHENA, FIDUS , EFA, EH10, ESSOR, 
FREM FSAF, HAWK VIABILITY, IRIS-T, JSF, MEADS, METEOR MIDS, MLRS, MU90, NATO ACCS, 
NSP2K, NH90, ORIZZONTE PAAMS, SICRAL, STAND OFF, U-212, VULCANO. 
294 AGT 1, 3352 DM, 1162, Decreto del Ministero degli Esteri del 4 luglio 2012. 
295 AGT 2, 3552 DM 1163, Decreto del Ministero degli Esteri (siglato dal Ministro degli Esteri) del 4 
luglio 2012. 
296 AGT3 (Maintenance and repair), Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 3352 DM 326/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016. 
297 AGT4 (Certified enterprises) Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 3352 DM 327/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016. 
298 AGT5 (Armed Forces) Autorità Nazionale – UAMA 3352 DM 328/BIS, del 13 luglio 2016. 




Their interpretation is particularly broad. In fact, none of these licences indicates 
specific bans or restrictions for re-export to recipients situated in third party countries 
and end-user certificates are not required. However, for some of them, according to 
Article 10 of the implementing regulation, it is explicitly written that consent from the 
National Authority, which is the Unit for the Authorisations of Armaments Material of 
the Foreign Ministry (UAMA), will be necessary before re-export.  
Overall, in Italy the transposition of the Directive concerning general licences is very 
wide and flexible, because it exploits and uses all the (binding and non-binding) 
opportunities offered by the Directive. In fact the Italian version permits the use of 
general licences also for intergovernmental and inter-company projects (which the 
Directive left to the discretion of MS); secondly it applies general licences to a very 
broad spectrum of categories of arms material (broader than in other countries); thirdly 
in the text of the six general licences issued by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, there is 
no explicit reference to limitations, restrictions or bans concerning the final recipient 
and the end-user certificate has never been required (in the six licences granted until 
2016). Despite the high degree of misfit between pre-existing national regulation and 
the text and spirit of the Directive, the Italian Government does not use the margin of 
manoeuvre and flexibility offered by the Directive to limit changes and remain in line 
with the national tradition, but, on the contrary, adopts one of the most liberal 
interpretations of the provisions envisaged by the Directive, thus using 
Europeanisation as a tool for liberalisation.  
Global licences 
As explained in Chapter 1, global licences authorise one supplier to send one or more 
shipments to one or more specified recipients, and MS with stricter legislation have 
detailed the defence material to be exported and the maximum quantity of each kind 
of armaments material that it is permitted to be exported within the three year period.  
The Italian transposition of the Directive reflects an extensive and flexible interpretation 
of Article 6 of the Directive, because there is no limitation on quantity and value of 
defence materials exported with global licences. In fact, according to Art. 10-quater of 
the transposition law, which concerns global transfer licences, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs shall authorise the global transfer licence on a request from the single supplier 
for the transfer of specific defence material, without any limitations on quantity and 
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value, to authorised recipients located in one or more MS.300 Global transfer licences 
may also be authorised to allow transfers related to equipping armed forces or national 
Police. In accordance with the directive, a global transfer licence is authorised for a 
period of three years which may be renewed. 
The terms and conditions for granting a global licence are no longer specified, such as 
in the case of general licences, by primary law, but are relegated to secondary 
legislation.301 The implementing regulation adds a list of information which must be 
provided when the company applies for a global licence ex-ante. These are the same 
as those required for individual licences, and include the identity of the recipient which 
must be a government or a company, possible conditions or limitations to transfers of 
the product in case of re-export, end-user certificate and, where required, information 
on the banking transaction. Significantly, however, there is no reference to quantity 
and value. Moreover, it is not clear whether it is necessary to declare the identity of the 
final acquirer of the product at the beginning of the authorisation procedure, or if it may 
be sufficient to communicate the identity of the intermediate recipient (i.e., the 
company with which the Italian enterprises coproduce). Indeed, a literal reading of the 
relevant provision suggests that it is sufficient to identify only the intermediate 
recipient. 302  In conclusion, even with regard to the formulation of global licences, 
despite the presence of a particularly strict national regulatory approach pre-dating the 
Directive, the transposition of the Directive is remarkably vague and flexible. However, 
according to the same above-mentioned article, the company applying for a global 
licence has to attach an import certificate or an end-user certificate when required by 
the Foreign Ministry. 
Individual licences 
Individual licences for intra-Community transfers must be considered as an exception 
with respect to general and global licences and are to be used only in specific and 
particular cases, linked to the protection of essential security interests or in exceptional 
cases of suspected unreliability of the recipient.  
                                                                
300 Art.10-quater of the Legislative Decree  n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
301 Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, n. 19, of the 7 of January 
2013, op.cit. 
302 According to Art. 9.1 letter (r) of Decree 19/2013, “The undertaking has to specify the final recipient 
or the intermediate destination”. 
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The Italian law is, again, very faithful to the Directive.303 The implementing regulation 
304 adds a list of information which must be provided when the company applies for an 
individual transfer licence. It is the same for global licences. In addition to those data, 
applicants for individual transfer licences should also indicate the value of the contract 
and the quantity of the material, with relative units of measurement.  
 
3.3 End-user controls and re-export to third countries  
 
The Directive concerns only intra-Community transfers of defence material. However, 
it indirectly touches on the field of export to third countries where coproduction is 
concerned. The European Commission's impact assessment study identified two main 
reasons for retaining a licence regime: the “infancy” of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and the coexistence of national and international control regimes. 305 
The aim of the Directive is to simplify the rules and procedures applicable to the intra-
Community transfer of defence-related products in order to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market, in line with the previous ruling of the European Court 
of Justice, and with Interpretative Communication on the application of Article 296 [now 
346 TFEU] of the Treaty in the field of defence procurement. However, EU law in this 
field aimed at reducing obstacles to the free movement of goods and services is 
constrained by the limits of EU competences, as arms export policies remain the 
domain of the nation states and of unanimity decision-making in Common Foreign and 
Security Policy : “While the rule on intra-union transfers […and on public procurement] 
are adopted on the basis of the Union’s market internal power, the rules on exports of 
armaments are set out in a measure adopted within the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy framework.” 306  The Directive clearly states that, in compliance with the EU 
Treaties, the norms apply only to the internal market and do not touch the discretion of 
the MS concerning their export policies. 
In line with this distinction, Article 4(6) of the Directive states that MS shall determine 
all the terms and conditions of transfer licences, including any limitations on the export 
                                                                
303 Art. 10-quinquies of Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
304 Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence n. 19 of the 7th of January 
2013. 
305 Unisys (2005). 
306 Koutrakos (2013), p. 315. 
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of defence-related products to legal or natural persons in third countries having regard, 
inter alia, to the risk for the preservation of human rights, peace, security and stability 
created by the transfer. MS may, whilst complying with Community law, avail 
themselves of the possibility to request end-use assurances, including End-user 
certificates, or may not. In other words MS have full control on exports to third 
countries, on their export policy and on their foreign policy, in accordance with the spirit 
and letter of the Treaty of Rome. Each MS, on the basis of the characteristics and 
tradition of its national arms export control regulations, may decide whether to maintain 
full control or to delegate responsibility of re-export to the partner country.  
However, the Italian legislator (the government, in this case) does not specify this 
formula, according to its national legal tradition but, on the contrary transposes exactly 
the same vague and optional formulation of the Directive. In fact, according to Art. 10 
bis paragraph 2 of the transposition law, suppliers who effect an intra-Community 
transfer of defence materials shall use general, global or individual transfer licences. 
For subsequent re-export to recipients situated in third-party countries, bans, 
restrictions or conditions may be imposed, and guarantees concerning the final use of 
the material, including end-user certificates may be required.  
The use of the verb “may” has enormous consequences on the final control of Italian 
arms exports. In fact, in cases of re-export to non-European countries controls on final 
destination of coproduced goods under Community licences and then transferred to 
third countries are no longer an obligation but an opportunity. The Italian authority may 
or may not maintain controls on the final destination, may or may not apply bans and 
export restrictions, may or may not ask for an end-user certificate. The criteria for 
maintaining controls or not are not clarified by primary law but remain vague and are 
delegated to secondary regulation or to a case-by-case analysis. What before was 
stated by the Italian Parliament and acted on as a limit to the discretion of the executive 
power, now is newly delegated to executive authority albeit in the framework of the 
Italian law as amended. This is the result of two different factors. The first is a legal 
factor. The Directive does not preclude a stricter approach with regard to third 
countries. The reason why it is not prescriptive with regard to exports to third countries 
is linked to the limitations of the legal basis, which is intrinsically linked to the internal 
market. If the Directive had taken a specific approach with regard to third countries it 
would have lent itself to legal challenge. It is nonetheless interesting to note that the 
Italian legislature saw the Directive’s limited scope as an opportunity to liberalise the 
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system in an area not covered by the Directive. Thus, a voluntary EU norm is able to 
change legislation in Italy. This is a norm that, despite being non-binding, and only 
introducing an opportunity in a liberal direction, is able to trigger a revision process and 
change national laws which seemed unmodifiable until then, and to empower the 
weight of some actors in favour of major liberalisation. This process is not limited to 
EU boundaries but is extended to EU exports.  
However, the implementing regulation offers an important contribution to clarify this 
ambiguity and to maintain Italian controls on the final destination of coproduced goods 
re-exported to non–European countries. Implementing regulation 19/2013 specifies 
that in any case National Authority shall give its consent for re-export to third countries. 
According to its Article 10, devoted to general principles for authorisation of intra-
Community transfers, for further re-export of defence materials transferred under intra-
Community transfer licences towards recipients situated in third-party states, the 
consent of the National Authority shall be required. Furthermore, according to Article 
11 par. 2 letter c of the same implementing regulation, companies using intra-
Community transfer licences must inform the UAMA of any possible changes in the 
final and intermediate recipients following the release of authorisation.307 
With this formulation, the Italian Government maintains control of the final destination 
of coproduced goods, realised under Community licences. 
However, there are some limits:  
1) The request for consent by the Italian authority is formulated not by primary law 
but by secondary law, i.e. an implementing regulation. This means another 
equivalent act from the government is sufficient to modify or eliminate this 
request, without involving the Italian Parliament; 
                                                                
307 According to Article 11.2, Companies using intra-communitarian transfer licences must respect the 
following conditions: 
a) Inform their foreign counterparty of possible conditions and limitations to exports established by 
the National authority, including those concerning the final use and export to third-party states; 
b) Respect the conditions and limitations, including restrictions concerning classified information; 
c) Inform the National Authority (UAMA) on any possible changes in the final and intermediate 
recipients following the release of authorisation; 
d) Provide, where required, documentation of article 20.1 of the law to the National Authority and 
inform it of any possible non-use of the authorised licences within the time limits specified in the licence; 
e) Adhere to, at the time of the transaction requirements as to the types of material, recipients, the 
terms and all other prescriptions indicated in the license; 




2) The request for consent is made to the UAMA which in an administrative office 
of the Foreign Ministry, without involving the Italian Parliament. Furthermore, it 
is not clear which procedures will be followed (and which bodies will be involved, 
which criteria will be applied) for the release of the consent to re-export.  
3) It is not clear if and when the final destination of the coproduced goods will be 
reported in the annual report of the Government to the Parliament (if and when 
the final destination will be communicated to the Parliament) the degree of 
transparency and communication to the Parliament of the final destination of 
these kinds of transactions. It is not clear if and when and in which part all this 
crucial information will be reported in the annual report to the Parliament.  
  
 
3.4 End-user controls and re-export of components  
 
As regards components, the Directive encourages MS not to impose any export 
limitations (with only a few exceptions) and to leave the decision on the final destination 
to the partner country, in case they are integrated and re-exported as finished products. 
In fact, according to Art. 4(7), MS shall determine the terms and conditions of transfer 
licences for components on the basis of an assessment of their sensitivity of the 
transfer according to, inter alia, a) the nature of the component in relation to the 
products in which they are to be incorporated and any end use of the finished product 
and b) the significance of the components in relation to the products in which they are 
to be incorporated. Except when MS considers the transfer of the component to be 
sensitive, they shall refrain from imposing any export limitations on components where 
the recipient provides a declaration of use in which it declares that the components 
subject to that transfer licence are integrated or are to be integrated into its own 
products and cannot at a later stage be transferred or exported as such. 
The spirit of the Directive is to liberalise transfers of components, in the perspective of 
mutual trust and to facilitate the creation of a defence industrial base, with only a few 
exceptions, which are linked to the nature of the component, the possible end use, 
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sensitiveness of the component and the percentage of this component on the final 
product. 308 
The Italian transposition of the Directive is even more liberal. In fact it liberalises the 
transfers of components and spare parts, without any limitations or reference to the 
nature of the components, to the possible end use (conflicts or human rights violation 
in the country of final destination), the weight of the component for the final product or 
its sensitiveness. The only exception to this liberalisation and delegation to the partner 
country, in line with the decision of the European Court of Justice and with the 
communication of the Commission, is represented by a serious threat to national 
security. In fact, the transposition law provides that: “Except in cases where their 
transfers may represent a serious threat to national security, transfers for components 
or spare parts cannot be subjected to any restrictions or export bans if the recipient 
provides a declaration of use testifying that transfer licences are integrated or are to 
be integrated into their own products and cannot at a later stage be transferred or 
exported as such, except for repair or maintenance”.309 
 
3.5 Reporting requirements  
 
The lightening of export procedures and reduction of information required ex ante when 
a company applies for general and global intra-Community transfer licence are 
counterbalanced by the information required ex post through the register in which 
companies must write all the information describing the defence-related product 
transferred, the quantity, value, date, name and address of the supplier, and attach 
proof that the recipient of the defence materials has been informed about export 
restriction. Thus, most of the information collected during the authorisation procedure, 
before granting a licence is now collected ex post, after the company has delivered the 
defence material. Similarly, most of the cross-checking controls that were carried out 
by comparing information collected ex ante and in the phase of delivery, are replaced 
by ex post inspections and control of the registers.  
                                                                
308 There is a sort of ambiguity in the last part of the article according to which MSs shall refrain from 
imposing export limitations if the recipient declares that the components are in its own product and 
cannot be re-exported as such. In fact, it seems that, on the contrary, components can be re-exported 
as a final product. 
309 Article 10-bis of Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
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The Italian transposition adheres faithfully to the letter of the Directive concerning the 
minimum standard of information that must be collected according to Article 8 of the 
Directive.  
In fact, according to Art. 10-septies of the transposition law, companies are obliged to 
keep a detailed and complete record of their transfer together with commercial 
documents containing the following information:  
a) Description of the defence-related product in compliance with the list in Article 
2.3; 
b) The quantity and value of the defence-related product; 
c) The date of transfer; 
d) The name and address of supplier and recipient; 
e) Where known, the end use and end-user of the defence-related product; 
f) Proof that the recipient of defence material has been informed about export 
restrictions attached to the transfer licence. 
In case of delivery using a general, global or individual transfer licence, brokerage, or 
grant of licences of production, intangible transfer of software and technology and 
delocalisation of production, the company is obliged to keep and provide for five years 
any documentation related to material exported which demonstrates arrival at the final 
destination. The register of comma 2 must be kept by the exporter for a period of at 
least five years from the last registration. It must be made available, upon request from 
the competent MS authorities from whose territory the defence materials have been 
transferred. In case of general licences these data must be transmitted to UAMA every 
six months.  
Overall, the Italian transposition of the provision of the Directive is faithful and does not 
add any additional information, conditions or restrictions to those requested by the EU, 
despite the Directive allowing this possibility. However the transposition of the letter of 
the Directive may create some ambiguity. In fact, in case of export under general/global 
and individual intra-Community transfers, exporters have to specify the end use and 
end-user of the defence-related products, “where known”. These two words may create 
a sort of incompatibility with the principles of Law 185/90, in particular with Article 1, 
paragraph 5, which bans defence goods exports in the absence of sufficient 
guarantees with regard to the ultimate destination of the arms to be sent.  
Another indirect consequence of the new formulation of reporting requirements 
concerns the timing of parliamentary oversight and its power of orienting and 
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controlling the act of the executive and the companies in this delicate field. In fact, 
whereas before Parliament was informed ex ante at the moment of the authorisation 
and often before the delivery, thus able to check and revoke or block an export before 
its deliveries, it is now informed once the defence material is delivered to the recipient. 
Furthermore, it is not clear when and if the Parliament will be informed of the final and 
real destination of coproduced goods in cases of general, global or individual transfer 
licences.  
 
3.6 Certificate of reliability of companies 
 
Certification procedures play a central role in the architecture of the Directive. In fact, 
they are one of the main pillars for controlling the reliability of the companies and 
activating new forms of controls against illicit traffic and the possibility of re-export 
toward unreliable recipients. The spirit that clarifies the certification system is clearly 
explained by the Commission in its report to the Parliament and to the Council in 2012:  
 Certification is one of the core elements of the Directive and introduces a new 
approach in the system of control of defence transfers. The objective of the certification 
of recipients is to establish their reliability for receiving defence-related products under 
a general transfer licence published in another MS. It is a confidence-building measure 
and a tool to reinforce ex-post controls. It is intended as an alternative form of controls 
with respect to traditional ex ante controls, and as a means to reduce the risk of illicit 
transfers and enhance the traceability of the defence-related products transferred 
under a general transfer licence and mutual trust in compliance with legal 
requirements, with particular attention to re-export, and quality of internal control 
programmes.310  
 
The Directive indicates (in Article 9) the procedures and the criteria to be followed at 
a national level in order to certify the reliability of a company. 311  
                                                                
310 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on transposition of 
Directive 2009/43/EC simplifying terms and conditions for transfer of defence-related products within 
the EU, Brussels, 29.6.2012, COM(2012) 359 final, p. 11. 
311 Further details and clarification on criteria to be followed in the certification process, in order to 
favour national transposition and harmonisation in the certification process of different EU countries, 
have been enshrined in one further specific act of the Commission, namely Recommendation 
2011/24/EU of 11 January 2011 on the certification of defence undertakings under Article 9 of Directive 
2009/43/EC which provides guidelines on the certification criteria. Its main objective is to ensure a 
convergent interpretation and application of the certification criteria so that, for example, the certificates 
can be mutually recognised more swiftly. 
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The Italian transposition of Article 9 and of all verification norms, is very faithful to the 
Directive. Article 10- sexies of Italian Decree 105/2012 transposes word for word Article 
9 of the Directive, just adding or specifying a few more aspects, as I will explain below. 
The period of validity (which according to Article 9 of the Directive shall not exceed five 
years in any case) is three years.312 The competent authority designated by the Italian 
legislator to carry out the certification of the recipients in Italy is the Italian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. In particular the Unit, UAMA, in agreement with the Ministry of Defence, 
is responsible for issuing certificates of reliability.313 
When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in compliance with the disposal of the law, finds 
that the holder of a certificate established on the territory of its MS no longer satisfies 
the criteria and conditions established by European and national law, appropriate 
measures may be adopted, including the possibility of revoking the certificate, and the 
Commission and other MS will be informed of its decision.314 
Italy recognises the validity of certificates issued in accordance with the Directive in 
other MS. Further specification of all the information, material and attachments that 
shall be presented to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to obtain certification, are 
listed in the long Article 12 of the implementing regulation, including, it is worth 
mentioning, the person responsible for the intra-Community transfer, the description of 
the company’s industrial activity with reference to the integration of systems and 
subsystems, and a long list of paperwork, documents and acts to be attached to the 
application. 
Lastly, certified companies must promptly communicate electronically with the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and must provide all information online related to each single 
shipment.315 It is important to mention that the Commission created the database 
CERTIDER. 316 This system was designed in cooperation with a dedicated work group 
composed of MS representatives. The system was tested and validated by MS 
representatives who will feed the register with information about the certified recipient 
undertakings. 
 
                                                                
312 Art. 10-sexies par. 5 of the  Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
313 Art. 10-sexies par. 6 of the Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
314 Art. 10-sexies par. 7 of the Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
315 Article 12, par. 9 Legislative Decree n. 105 of the 22 June 2012. 
316 CERTIDER was available at the following address 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/defence/certider/, (last accessed 6 May 2018).  
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Despite the Italian transposition law being very faithful to the text of the Directive, it 
does not envisage an obligation of certification for companies using general and global 
intra-Community transfer licences. It is interesting to note that none of the Italian 
companies have been certified until now. Italy is one of the few countries in the 
European Union without any certified companies. Despite this, general licences have 
been granted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and these are widely used by 
Italian companies. How can we explain this gap? It is likely that the certification 
procedures and all the attachments required have discouraged some companies from 
embarking on such a difficult process, and imposing a heavy administrative burden. 
Secondly, Italian companies may apply for general and global licences and enjoy this 
simplified pathway to export without also being certified (there is no Italian law requiring 
Italian companies to be certified in order to use general and global Italian licences). 
Overall, this appears to confirm that the priority for Italian companies, and that of the 
government in transposing the Directive, has been to liberalise defence transfers and 
internal regulation for national aims, rather than to favour exchange in the European 
context, and offer guarantees to European partners looking for a stronger collaboration 
with Italian partners. One of the few instruments of positive integration has been 
formalised and transposed in the Italian transposition law but has never been applied.  
 
3.7 Other controls on intra-Community transfers 
 
Considering the relaxing of ex ante controls in the authorisation phase, ex post 
controls, together with the reporting requirements, and the certification of companies 
are particularly relevant for this new authorisation system concerning general and 
global licences. The transposition law, in conformity with the spirit and letter of the 
Directive, on the one hand reduces end-user controls, end-user certificates and control 
on arrival at final destination, mainly in intra-Community transfers, but, on the other, 
envisages new forms of controls, introducing the certificate of company reliability and 
new forms of verifications and inspections. Furthermore, the Italian legislator also 
decided to maintain some traditional controls such as on banking transactions, despite 
changing from having to obtain an authorisation for banking transaction from the 
Ministry of Finance to a simple notification to the same ministry.  
Control upon arrival at final destination. Despite the absence of a reference in the 
Directive, the Italian transposition law also dilutes the reference to the control upon 
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arrival at final destination. Whereas before, according to Article 20 of Law 185/90, it 
was necessary to send this kind of certification (certification of arrival at final 
destination, or the custom documentation) promptly once the defence good reached 
its recipient (it was a system to monitor the transfers of a component or finished 
product), now with regard to general licences, and also for certified companies using 
global and individual intra-Community licences, it is sufficient to keep this 
documentation for five years.317  
 
Verification and inspections. According to Article 20-bis of Legislative Decree 
105/2012, the activities related to controls, inspections and verifications (checks and 
audit) both before and after the export of defence materials, are of particular relevance. 
It is a task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration with other Ministries and 
administrations responsible for public security, order and custom authorities. Article 11 
of the Implementing regulation, the UAMA of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs exercises 
activities of monitoring and controls intra-Community transfer licences, collects all the 
documentation concerning arms transfers contained in the registers of each company 
(deliveries) and can issue hearings for companies in order to collect more information. 
 
Activity of oversight/vigilance/supervision. Furthermore according to Article 20-ter of 
transposition Legislative Decree 105/2012, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has powers 
of oversight and vigilance. In fact, it can gain access to all premises and collect copies 
of registers, data and internal regulations of the companies, in order to verify the 
adherence to legal obligations, normative prescriptions of the law, and implementing 
regulation as well as conformity with all conditions indicated in the certificate of the 
companies. It has the right to make visits to registered companies and send designated 
inspectors who can examine and acquire copies of records, data, and internal 
regulations concerning all the defence material produced, transferred and exported, or 
received on the basis of a transfer licence from another EU MS. 
Control on banking transaction. According to the transposition law, all financial 
transactions concerning Italian arms transfers and exports, thus including all 
movements covered by general, global and individual intra-Community transfer 
licences must be communicated to the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Art. 27 of 
                                                                




the law). This means that whereas before it was necessary to obtain an authorisation 
from the above-mentioned Ministry before carrying out any banking transaction, now 
an ex post communication to the Ministry of Finance is sufficient. Thus, the Italian 
legislator is able to maintain a precious form of control against corruption and illicit 
traffic for intra-Community transfers as well. The limits of this new formulation are, as 
in other cases, that the banks and credit institutes have the responsibility but there is 
no obligation for companies to communicate this data to banks. Thus, financial 
institutions have complained about how difficult it is to obtain this kind of data to then 
pass on to the Government. All this information is included in the annual report to the 
Parliament. This aspect, albeit transformed in communication rather than 
authorisation, is essential for controls against corruption and collusion. 
 
3.8 The institutional framework 
 
An important effect of the transposition law is represented by a new centralisation of 
different tasks and duties in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign affairs in general (for 
the general political guidelines) and in particular of the UAMA of a very wide range of 
new tasks contemplated by the Directive. The UAMA is an administrative body of the 
Foreign Ministry. It is directed by a diplomatic official (at least Minister Plenipotentiary 
appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs) and employs staff from other 
administrations including military personnel belonging to the Ministry of Defence. 
Article 11 of the implementing regulation details and clearly sums up the tasks of the 
UAMA:  
a) It grants transfers licences, issues certificates for companies, carries out 
controls (licences and certificates); 
b) it exercises monitoring and control activities (monitoring and subsequent 
controls); 
c) it collects all documentation concerning arms transfers contained in the 
registers of each company (deliveries); 
d) It can issue hearings for companies in order to collect more information;  
e) When irregularities are discovered it may suspend or revoke a licence for 
transfers or export,  
f) UAMA can impose fines and administrative sanctions; 
g) It is responsible for tasks related to the activities of investigation. 
139 
  
h) It may revoke or suspend authorisation or company certificates (Art. 11 
implementing regulation). 
In case of re-export, consent from the UAMA must be requested again. 
 
Thus, one single body has monopoly over a wide range of political, administrative and 
judicial tasks. If, on the one hand, it undoubtedly makes all the authorisation, 
subsequent checks and control procedures easier and quicker, on the other, there may 
be some disadvantages with respect to the checks and balances characterising the 
preceding legislation, in terms of risk of corruption and illicit transfers, which is higher 
if the number of subjects involved in different authorisation and control phases is lower. 
In the late Eighties the scandals about corruption and collusion in arms exports to Iraq 
led decision-makers to opt for collegiality over centralisation in arms export control 
procedures. 
It is important to emphasise that this kind of domestic change was not explicitly 




The Directive does not make any reference to transparency and reporting to national 
Parliament of the data concerning defence material transferred under general, global 
and individual intra-Community transfers. The only reference to a form of 
communication of data transparency in the Directive is laid down in point 41 of the long 
Preamble of the Directive, according to which the Commission should regularly publish 
a report on the implementation of this Directive, which may be accompanied by 
legislative proposals where appropriate.  
This lack of reference created strong criticism from European NGOs acting in the field 
of arms transparency and disarmament and among researchers from independent 
research institutes.318 
The Italian transposition law fills the gap opened by this lack of reference very clearly, 
by offering an example of good practice in line with the Italian tradition of arms transfers 
                                                                
318  By favoring a market approach that completely sidesteps the foreign and geopolitical policy 
dimension of the arms trade, and in the absence of a harmonized and legally binding mechanism for the 
control of arms exports, the "Defense Package" risks reducing the EU's arms export policy to its lowest 
common denominator is a step back in terms of transparency and could increase the risk of unwanted 
re-exports to third countries, Depauw, (2010); Mampaey and Tudosia (2008). 
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regulation. In fact, one of the three main pillars of the previous regulation is represented 
by transparency intended as a means of mutual trust among countries and preventing 
the development of conflicts. Article 5 of the previous Law 185/90 stated that the 
government had to give Parliament its own report by the 31st of March every year 
detailing the operations authorised and carried out by 31st December of the previous 
year. The report details the type of material exported, its monetary value, the end-users 
and the name of the exporting firm, the name of the bank involved and the transaction 
amount. The report represented an important instrument of transparency and could be 
consulted by any citizen. At the same time, it provided Parliament with a means of 
exercising control over foreign policy and defending the government in the matter of 
arms transfers. This, therefore, becomes a means of allowing Parliament to assess 
government action in foreign policy, thereby also directing it.  
The Italian transposition law fills the lack of reference in the Directive to transparency 
extending the whole Article 5 of Law 185/90 also to the new global and general licences 
and adds a paragraph to Article 5 devoted explicitly to transparency of data concerning 
general and global intra-Community licences. In fact, Article 5, paragraph 3 of the law 
states explicitly that exporters who use global project licences (and general, global 
transfer licences), must provide the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with an annual analytical 
report on the activities performed on the basis of the licences obtained, accompanied 
by data concerning all operations performed. This documentation is an integral part of 
the report. Furthermore, Article 5 specifies and explicates that the government report 
to the Parliament must contain information concerning global project licences, global 
or general transfer licences.  
Overall the Italian transposition of the law offers a very good practice for other MS in 
extending all the transparency norms to intra-Community transfers as well. It is equally 
important that these norms, which are strictly linked to the power of the Parliament to 
address and control arms export policies, are stated by primary law and are not 
delegated to any sub-legislative instruments. In this aspect, the Italian approach stands 
as unique with respect to the other two case studies (Hungary and UK). 
There are, however, some practical problems regarding when and how this information 
will be communicated to the Parliament. The first concerns the timeliness of information 
to the Parliament, considering that it is no longer possible to know all the data before 
the transfer, at the time of the authorisation, but on the contrary, this data is collected 
in the register of the companies and communicated, only after being exported and 
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delivered. Thus, the Parliament will be necessarily informed ex post and not ex ante, 
eliminating the margin for the Parliament to block or prevent an authorisation 
considered non-compliant with the law. The timeliness of reporting appears even more 
delayed and opaque in cases of re-export to third countries of a defence material falling 
under general or global intra-community licences: given that the company shall 
communicate the final destination only where known at the beginning of the 
authorisation process, the Italian Government will probably be informed of a re-export 
only at a later stage. It is not clear if, when and where this crucial information will be 
reported physically in the report, in which section and how each data will be linked with 
the previous general or global licence of reference.  
Secondly, there is only one source of information - the company register filled in by the 
same companies and based mainly on their good faith/auto-certification, whereas 
before it was possible to cross-check data coming from different sources and different 
ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the authorisation phase, the Ministry of 
Finance and customs data for the deliveries, and the Treasury for the banking 
transactions).  
Thirdly, instead of simplifying, in practice one effect of the transposition of the Directive 
risks creating more complexity and fragmentation. Whereas the law laid down only one 
kind of licence (the individual export licence) before, with only one way to report to 
Parliament, now there are four kinds of licences with different ways to be reported and 
different sections in the national report.  
In conclusion, Legislative Decree 105/2012, which transposed Directive 2009/43/EC, 
first of all, introduces some fundamental, and necessary, amendments. These concern 
the introduction of new kinds of licences (global project licences and general licences), 
amendments to a new certification system for companies, and new forms of ex post 
controls, such as reporting requirements and inspections.  
However, the Italian Government went beyond what was required by the Directive, and 
went further in the direction of liberalisation. In fact, it adopted a comprehensive 
formulation of general licences, covering a wide range of military categories, and 
allowing the executive to decide when and if to apply an end-user certificate. 
Secondly, in some cases, it transposed the same flexible/voluntary formulation of the 
Directive that at the supranational level is intended as a means of leaving MS free to 
choose a formulation which adheres better to their legal tradition, but that at the 
national level increases the discretion of the executive and administrative bodies. 
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Thirdly, the opportunity to review Law 185/90 has also been used to introduce a major 
degree of centralisation as required by some representatives of the public 
administration and government, centralising in one single administrative body a wide 
range of political, administrative and judicial tasks and the power of the executive in 
arms export policies. The Italian legislator saw the Directive’s limited scope as an 
opportunity to liberalise the system in an area not covered by the Directive.  
 
4.Comparing the Italian regulatory regime before and after Directive 
2009/43/EC: domestic change along the eight dimensions 
 
This last core section is devoted to assessing the direction and intensity of domestic 
change in Italy after the approval and transposition of the ICT Directive. In order to do 
this, I compare the Italian regulatory regime before the approval of Directive 
2009/43/EC with the architecture resulting from the transposition of the Directive. I do 
this along eight political-institutional dimensions: (a) balance between political strategic 
variables and economic-industrial variables; (b) balance between legislative and 
executive power in regulating arms exports; (c) degree of details of the primary law; 
(d) transparency and degree of Parliamentary control; (e) national responsibility on the 
final destination of co-produced goods; (f) checks and balances in the authorisation 
and control procedures; (g) role and weight of the state with respect to the role of the 
companies; (h) balance between common standards and fragmentation in arms export 
control rules.  
As explained in Chapter 3, each of these dimensions is assessed on a scale of intensity 
(from 0 to 5). A detailed explanation of the taxonomy of each dimension is presented 
in that chapter. Overall, lower marks are associated with a pro-industry oriented model, 
whereas higher values are associated with a more responsible and highly regulated 
model where ethical concerns play an important role. The comparison between the 
marks of the Italian regulation before the approval of the Directive with those of the 
Italian regulation after the transposition of the Directive permits an assessment of the 
policy and institutional change along these six dimensions and the degree and 






4.1  Political and strategic variables versus economic and industrial variables  
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43 
The principle underlying Law 185/90 is of a political nature, whereas economic and 
industrial motivations are subordinate to this political principle. In fact according to Law 
185/90, Italian arms trade and economic and industrial motivation must be in 
compliance with the Italian foreign and security policy, which is guided by the Italian 
Constitution (namely Article 11) and by the principles of international law regarding 
human rights, the ideals of prevention and settling of disputes and cooperation, and 
development, which are slowly making headway in the international context. Starting 
from this principle, Italian law enshrined several bans on exports. Arms trade was not 
forbidden but was subject to these political principles. 
Italian Law 185/90 preceding the transposition of the Directive did not make any 
reference to economic or industrial variables. Thus, the value assigned to Italian Law 
185/90 before the approval and transposition of the Directive is 5 (see synoptic table 
of the first dimension in Chapter 3).  
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The principle underlying the Directive is of an economic nature (assuring proper 
functioning of an internal market and competition) whereas national regulation on arms 
transfers are considered possible obstacles to free movement of goods and services, 
in this delicate matter. Free movement of goods (extended to defence goods with some 
caveats) is the principle, whereas political principles of national regulation (foreign 
policy, security policy and international law principles concerning respect for human 
rights, conflict prevention) in this sensitive field of arms exports, are exceptions which 
must be used only in extraordinary cases, if the essential security interest is at stake, 
under certain conditions (necessity and proportionality), with MS holding the burden of 
proof (in line with the interpretative Communication of the Commission and the 
following decision of the European Court of Justice).  
This reversal of perspective is never explicitly formalised in the Italian transposition law 
and the fundamental principles of the law are not modified. 319  Thus, formally, the 
                                                                
319 This is because of pressure by the non-governmental organisations dealing with arms export control 
and transparency, which asked the government to introduce only the technical modifications strictly 
required by the Directive, without changing the principles and spirit of the law. 
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principles remain the same as in the previous regulation and the mark for the Italian 
regulation after the transposition of the Directive is still 5. 320 
 
4.2  Legislative branch versus executive branch 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
With Law 185/1990, Parliament had established its prerogative in this field, which had, 
until then, remained the exclusive preserve of the government. In fact, in 1990, it was 
the legislator that by assuming power over the control and direction of such a delicate 
matter as the arms trade, dictated primary law and wrote the regulation; the principles 
to be followed by the competent bodies in the decision-making process on licences, 
their subsequent controls and the level of transparency. All these aspects acted as 
guidelines, and limited the discretionary actions of the executive power. Secondly, 
Italian Law 185/90 introduced a system of governmental controls by providing clear 
procedures for the authorisation of Italian arms at the negotiation and then at the time 
of sale, as well as subsequent control mechanisms. All these steps were detailed in 
primary law. Lastly, considering that the Italian Parliament had to be informed both on 
authorisations and deliveries by 31 March of the following year, its power was ex post, 
but could also be exercised to block several authorisations which had not been 
concretised in deliveries within the 31 March deadline. Thus, Italian law on arms export 
control and transparency before the transposition of the Directive scores 4.5.  
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
With the transposition law the executive power newly reacquires power, in line with the 
claim in the literature that national parliaments are the “losers” of 
Europeanisation. 321 The role of the Parliament diminished for three fundamental 
reasons. Firstly, it is the executive power that thanks to the very broad delegation given 
by Parliament with the so-called Communitarian law, is delegated to transpose the 
Directive, and write the new transposition law, despite final approval resting with the 
                                                                
320 However, de facto the new perspective inspires all the articles related to general and global intra-
Community licences and creates several problems of compatibility between principles of the first articles 
and norms concerning general and global licences.  
321 Graziano (2013), pp. 725-742.  
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Parliament. Secondly, the requisites, terms and conditions for using general, global 
and individual intra-community licences, are delegated to the executive. Thirdly, the 
very crucial assessment concerning whether, and in which cases, re-export will be 
delegated to the partner country, and when it is necessary to maintain national control 
and request an end-user certificate, is treated in the implementing regulation and 
delegated to the executive branch. Thus, with the transposition law the executive 
power reacquires power in this field. As a result, the overall mark of the Italian 
regulation after the transposition of the Directive is 3. 
 
4.3  Primary law versus secondary law 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The Italian law was characterised by a high level of detail in enshrining the three 
fundamental pillars of any arms export control regulation: bans; licensing procedures 
and transparency.  
In fact, firstly Article n. 1 of Italian Law 185/90 states that the Italian arms trade must 
be in compliance with Italy’s foreign and defence policy, the Italian Constitution, and 
the principles of international law. Then it details criteria regulating arms transfers and 
bans, which are legally binding and superior to any act of the government, and that 
apply to war materials as a whole without exception. Secondly, Law 185/90 stipulated 
the procedure for the application and granting of licences, and clearly specified the 
competent authorities and time limit in which each authority has to decide. It is intended 
to encourage greater transparency, as well as offer stricter controls against illegal 
traffic, cases of corruption and diversion. Thirdly it specifies the quality and quantity in 
details of the information on transparency. Thus, the score before the transposition of 
the Directive was 5. 
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
After the transposition of the Directive there is a clear decrease in the area regulated 
by primary law. In fact, the procedures for authorisation including terms and conditions 
for using the two new kinds of licences - general and global licences - are regulated by 
secondary law which also disciplines whether or not to require end-user certificates, to 
delegate the partner country with the choice for the final destination, and thus whether 
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to apply bans and restriction of Italian Law 185/90. Thus, the score for Italian regulation 
drops to 3. 
 
4.4  Transparency versus opacity 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
Before the transposition of the Directive, Article 5 of Law 185/90 stated that the 
President of the Council (the Prime Minister) must inform Parliament about the arms 
transfers authorised and delivered in the previous year by March 31st of each year. 
The annual report was intended as a means of allowing Parliament to control and direct 
the government’s foreign policy in the matter of arms trade. The report was composed 
of several annexes written by the various ministries involved in the arms trade. 
Individual ministers must provide data classified according to the type, quantity and 
financial value of the weapons and their recipients. By comparing the various annexes 
and reports, it was thus possible to obtain information on the transfers and to establish 
the connection (at least for the main transactions) between the exporting company, 
bank, kind of material, quantity, value and country of final destination. Transparency 
was not a concession by the government, but a legal requirement: it is of particular 
relevance that the legislator laid down the quality and quantity of the data, which had 
to be reported to Parliament, as well as the reporting schedule. 
In conclusion in Italy all data on export was detailed in primary law and binding. It 
included information on basic data (kind of material, value, quantity, final destination) 
and on sensitive data (bank and companies). Information on sensitive data offered the 
opportunity for citizens and NGOs to control and orient export policy also by pressing, 
not just on the government but also directly on companies or banks. Italian report data 
was not aggregated. The information concerned all kinds of exported arms (including 
small arms), and all licences (and deliveries), including co-productions and global 
licences. However, it was not always possible to connect and cross check all the export 
data. Thus before the transposition of the Directive, Italian regulation scores 4. 
 
 The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
With the transposition law, transparency, one of the pillars of law 185/90, has 
substantially remained the same. One of the main concerns expressed in particular by 
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NGOs with respect to Directive 2009/43/EC was the lack of reference to transparency, 
accountability and report to the Parliament for general and global licences, that could 
have decreased the level of transparency at the domestic level. Conversely, the Italian 
transposition law fills a lack of reference in the Directive by clarifying that all data 
concerning intra-Community licences (global, general and individual) shall be reported 
in the annual report to Parliament. Thus, the transposition law faithfully extends the 
norms on transparency in detail to these three new kinds of licences as well. In this 
way, Italy establishes an example of best practice. This specification was the result of 
the pressure of Italian NGOs that generated an amendment which formally extended 
the same details of transparency to general and global licences as well. Thus, formally, 
the Italian regulation after the transposition of the Directive maintains a score of 4.  
However de facto, the degree of transparency and the role of the Parliament are slightly 
reduced because with general and global licences the Parliament can be informed in 
detail only after the delivery and not before the authorisation to export (as partially 
happened before). Furthermore, it is not clear how these data should be reported in 
the annual report to the Parliament. Lastly, the very delicate aspects of final destination 
of coproduction and re-exports and the report to the Parliament are treated vaguely 
and thus indirectly affect the article concerning transparency. 
 
4.5  Responsibility versus delegation 
 
The Italian regulation before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
Italian Law 185/90 was originally based on the principle of responsibility for the final 
destination of every defence good including the smallest component exported by Italy 
to other countries. This chain of responsibility concerned all the actors involved in the 
authorisation and control process (ranging from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to all 
the other ministries, Italian Parliament, customs authorities, banks and single citizens). 
National authorities were required to assume full control and responsibility for the final 
destination of all equipment including any with Italian parts, components, technologies 
and licences. In cases of international coproduction, rigorous authorisation procedures 
applied to each component exported out of Italy (including end-user certificates), in 
order to ensure that Italian parts were not assembled abroad and transferred to a third 
country which was considered unreliable or at risk according to Italian foreign policy 
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and arms export regulation. When they applied for an individual licence, Italian 
exporting companies were compelled to disclose not only the partner company and 
country but also the potential buyer country, which was required to issue the end-user 
certificate and was subject to scrutiny by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The end-user 
was always disclosed in the annual report to Parliament. Thus, the score for Italian 
regulation was the highest at 5. 
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The ECJ promotes the mutual recognition principle as a way of achieving negative 
integration (which has the advantage of facilitating cross-border trade, but the 
disadvantage of triggering and favouring harmonisation toward the lowest common 
denominator or a "race to the bottom").322 The field of arms exports is a different case 
because it is an area characterised by the responsibility and discretion of each MS.  
With the Directive, MS are encouraged to reduce the principle of responsibility on final 
destination of parts and components transferred under general and global licences and 
re-exported to a third country, in favour of a delegation to a partner country, and of the 
mutual recognition principle. This aspect is implemented in the Italian transposition law. 
Furthermore, responsibility on the final destination of defence materials containing 
Italian parts or components to non-European countries is indirectly diluted. In fact for 
subsequent re-export to recipients situated in third-party countries, of a defence good 
previously transferred under global or general licence, bans and restrictions 
concerning the final use of the material, including end-user certificates are no longer 
an obligation but a possibility, whose application depends on the discretion of the 
executive power. Thus, the score for Italian regulation after the transposition of the 
Directive drops to 3. 
 
4.6 Checks and balances versus centralisation 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
What marked the Italian authorisation and control procedures envisaged by Law 
185/90 was the degree of intrusiveness and the involvement of different authorities in 
                                                                
322 F. Scharpf (2010). “The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a ‘social 
market economy ”.Socio-Economic Review, 8 (2): 211-250. 
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different phases of the authorisation and control procedure (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Finance, Treasury, custom authorities and so on). The licence granting and 
control procedure was run by different ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry 
of Finance, Treasury, custom authorities and so on), each responsible for a different 
phase of the authorisation and control procedure 1) licence granting, 2) delivery 
controls, 3) banking transactions, 4) end-user controls data, and 5) audit and 
inspections. Political, administrative and judicial tasks were clearly subdivided and 
managed by different autonomous subjects. The high number of actors was introduced 
in order to limit corruption which had caused serious scandals in Italian arms exports 
to countries under embargo as well as limit waste of public sources. The cross-
checking collaboration among different ministries reduced the risk of collusion and 
guaranteed efficient controls through a comparison of financial, fiscal, customs and 
economic data. Thus, the mark for Law 185/90 before the transposition of the Directive 
is 5.  
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The Directive and consequently the Italian transposition law changed the perspective 
of control completely from an ex-ante collegiality to a certification process for 
companies and ex post controls, including verification and inspections. Furthermore, 
since 2007, representatives of the Italian government advocated a “radical 
transformation of the administrative structure”323 in the direction of a “unification of the 
control activities carried out in a new agency by numerous administrations (Foreign, 
Defence, Customs, Economy and Finance, Internal) within a new agency.” 324 The 
Italian transposition law tried to put together both European and domestic aspects of 
controls.  
In particular, a collegial administrative body of the Italian Foreign Ministry UAMA (the 
Unit for Authorisation of Armament Material) centralised a wide range of tasks from the 
main responsibility for the authorisation procedure and for issuing licences, to granting 
certification to companies and to carrying out successive controls, to collecting and 
verifying all the data reported by companies, to holding hearings, conducting 
inspections, visiting companies, and imposing sanctions when irregularities are found. 
UAMA has a collegial nature and at the political level different ministries doing various 
                                                                




tasks remains valid. Therefore, the score for Italian regulation after the approval of the 
Directive falls to 3.5. 
 
4.7 Common standards versus fragmentation and ambiguity 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the Directive 2009/43/EC 
Law 185/90 stipulated the procedures for applying for and granting licences, and 
clearly specified the competent authorities and the time limit in which each authority 
has to decide. It detailed all the information required to be attached to the licence 
application. There was substantially only one fundamental kind of export licence, the 
individual export licence which followed the same procedures with only a few 
exceptions for NATO and EU countries. The ways of reporting to the Parliament was 
the same for all individual licences. This high level of precision in the text was intended 
to reduce cases of illicit traffic, corruption and diversion, but it was also addressed to 
offer clarity and legal certainty to Italian companies. Furthermore, the law was quite 
clear in all its three parts concerning export criteria and provisions on transparency. In 
fact, political and constitutional principles were put clearly above the economic 
variables and none of the restrictions were ambiguous or conflicting. They were legally 
binding and established by primary law. Thus, the mark for Italian regulation was 4. 
 
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The main aim of the Directive is to simplify exchanges of defence material authorisation 
procedures. However, in practice, one effect of the transposition of the Directive in Italy 
is the risk of increased complexity and fragmentation. Whereas before, the law laid 
down only one kind of licence (the individual export licence), with only one way to report 
to Parliament, now there are five kinds of licences (general, global, individual transfer, 
global project and individual export). Each of these licences follows different 
authorisation procedures, which are further differentiated if the company is certified 
(global licences, for example). These licences are also reported in different ways to the 
Parliament and are found in different sections in the national report. If we focus on the 
general licences, it is not clear when the End-user certificates will be requested and 
each of the six general licences issued covers a different range of defence materials. 
The situation appears even more fragmented if a comparison at the European level is 
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made. Thus the score for Italian regulation after the transposition of the EU Directive 
drops to 3. 
A side aspect which is worth mentioning concerns ambiguity. Law 185/90 was 
characterised by a high level of precision and specified all the pillars of an arms export 
control regulation. On the contrary, the Directive is necessarily vague and sometimes 
ambiguous or flexible when it deals with political principles, or responsibility of final 
destination of coproduced and re-exported goods, whereas economic principles 
concerning the reduction of the administrative burden in general and global licences 
are very well detailed. This reflects the approach of the Directive which is focused on 
removing obstacles to trade in defence goods, whereas political variables are treated 
in a general way and delegated to MS. Foreign and security policy objectives are 
formulated in a vague and anodyne way. 325  This “ambiguity” is a necessary 
consequence of the differences existing between MS arms export policies and of the 
Commission's caution in dealing with such a delicate matter. The Italian transposition 
law maintains all the national political principles enshrined in pre-existing Italian law, 
and all the criteria and bans on exports detailed in it. However, when dealing with 
norms in general and global licences, the licensing procedures are less detailed and, 
at times, the Italian legislator transposes this ambiguity wholesale at the national level. 
This ambiguity also touches on some crucial details, such as those concerning cases 
in which the Italian authority applies restrictions on exports to third countries, and when 
they are not applied, which are once again delegated to the executive power and to 
the implementing agreement. This may create some problem of incompatibility with 
some principles and criteria laid down in Law 185/90 (for example that national 
authorities are required to take full political responsibility for the final destination of 
arms). Furthermore, this increases the discretion of executive bodies and allows for 
case-by-case assessments, but at the same time diminishes legal certainty.  
 
4.8 State versus companies 
 
The Italian regulatory regime before the ICT Directive 
The original version of Italian Law 185/90 on arms export control and transparency 
allowed a high level of intrusion by the state into companies. Companies were 
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controlled by the state in a wide range of tasks: a) the authorisation procedure 
collecting all the necessary information ex ante; b) final delivery (collecting all the 
information); c) end-user certificates, which had to be signed not just by the importing 
company but also by the importing government; d) payment in order to limit cases of 
corruption and collusion. And, more importantly, bans and criteria were applied, 
assessed and directly controlled by the state. The Law allowed the operations of export 
and transit only with foreign governments or companies authorised by the government 
of the destination country. In this way, the legislator had attempted to make the 
governments of the receiving countries responsible in order to have stronger 
guarantees as to the destination and ultimate use of the war material. In order to stamp 
out illegal arms traffic, as well as provide strict national regulation, it was considered 
essential to involve the authorities of the importing countries, who should feel 
responsible and prevent any further export of the purchased material. These controls 
were undertaken systematically for all arms or components exported, thus the mark of 
the Italian regulation before the transposition of the Directive was 5.  
The Italian regulatory regime after the transposition of the ICT Directive 
With the Directive and the new transposition law, companies are made much more 
responsible. They must keep their registers in order and communicate ex post all the 
data concerning transfers and exports under general and global intra-Community 
licences. These registers contain information on quality, quantity, data, and final 
destination. They are responsible for communicating all export conditions and 
restrictions dictated by their governments to partner companies from other EU MS. 
Companies are responsible for some tasks such as checking the reliability of the 
partner in coproduction and communicating any national bans which must be 
respected for exports to the coproducing partner company. Overall, the transposition 
law strengthens the responsibility and auto-certification of companies, as regards the 
intervention of the government or of an independent authority. Thus, the mark of the 




The aim of this chapter was to analyse the effects of the Directive on the Italian polity 
and policy, in order to verify if Italy has changed its arms export model as a result of 
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its implementation. In order to assess the degree and direction of domestic change, I 
used two ideal models of domestic regulation on arms export control along eight 
dimensions. The first ideal model is an “ethical” one, characterised by clear priority 
given to ethical variables such as the respect for human rights, peace, development 
and the rule of law, over commercial and economic variables. The second is a pro-
industry oriented model, which gives priority to commercial variables, particularly those 
linked with the profit of their domestic companies, including measures aimed at 
expanding exports. 
In order to identify and distinguish each “ideal” model, I used eight fundamental 
dimensions: (a) balance between political strategic variables and economic-industrial 
variables; (b) balance between legislative and executive power in regulating arms 
exports; (c) balance between primary law and secondary law in regulating arms 
exports; (d) balance between transparency and opacity in arms transfers data; (e) 
balance between national responsibility on the final destination of co-produced goods 
and mutual recognition principle/delegation to partner country; (f) balance between 
centralisation and checks and balances in authorisation and control procedures; (g) 
balance between the role and weight of the state with respect to the role of the 
companies; (h) balance between common standards and fragmentation in arms export 
control rules.  
Each dimension was articulated along a scale ranging from 0 to 5 described in a 
synoptic table, which helped to identify the direction and assess the entity of domestic 
change. Lower values for each dimension corresponded to a commercial arms export 
regulation model, whereas a higher value indicated an ethical arms export legislation 
model. Not all these dimensions, however, are interdependent in practice and thus 
hybrid combinations of higher values for some dimensions and lower values for others 
are not excluded. 
 
5.1 The Italian regulation before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
The starting point of my comparison was Law 185/90 as amended until 2008 - the 
years before the approval of the Directive. Law 185/90 was found to be very close to 
an ideal “restrictive model”, characterised by high values for most of the eight 
dimensions. Italy’s initial marks for the eight dimensions before the approval of the 
Directive were high, between 4 and 5. As explained at length, the Italian law was the 
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result of strong pressure exerted by civil society and it is considered one of the main 
conquests of the campaign to “moralise” Italian arms exports. It revolves around the 
principle of responsibility, placing constitutional and ethical principles over commercial 
interests. It was approved at a time (1990, first disarmament agreements and end of 
bipolarism) and in a place (Italy, where civil society participated actively in peace and 
disarmament themes) which were extremely favourable to those supporting 
disarmament, peace and the prevention of conflict. 
What happened after the creation of a European Defence Market with the 
implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC? Did the values of the eight dimensions 
change? In which direction? Where and how great has domestic change been in Italy? 
 
5.2  Empirical findings  
 
Overall, my empirical findings for the Italian case-study show a clear and consistent 
domestic change towards a pro-industry model. In fact, six of the eight dimensions 
consistently lose points after the transposition of the Directive, whereas only two of the 
eight dimensions remain stable.  
The graph below summarizes the “marketisation” process which has characterised 
Italian regulation, with values attributed to each of the eight dimensions before and 
after the Directive. The blue line indicates the marks of the Italian regulation in 2008, 
before transposition, the orange line indicates the points of the Italian regulation after 
transposition. The centre of the graph corresponds to a pro-industry model (Euro 
symbol) where commercial variables have priority, while the periphery represents a 
restrictive ethical model (dove symbol), where ethical and political variables have 
priority. As explained before, Italy starts off close to a restrictive model. In fact, this 
model scores high (between 4 and 5) in all eight dimensions. However, after 
transposition, most of the dimensions shift and narrow towards the centre of the graph, 









Figure 4.2 Direction and intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC: the Italian case (changes from 2008 to 2012) 
 
 
 restrictive model 
 pro-industry model 
 
5.3 The eight dimensions 
 
In particular, by comparing the previous with the new Italian regulation I found that (a) 
the balance between legislative and executive power changed in favour of the 
executive branch which reacquired power, unlike the Parliament, the so-called “loser” 
of this Europeanisation process; (b) the area covered by primary law decreased in 
favour of secondary law or discretion of the executive and administrative authorities, 
particularly concerning general and global licences; (c) that the national responsibility 
on the final destination of coproduced goods was reduced in favour of the mutual 
recognition principle; (d) collegiality and decentralisation in the decision-making 
process was reduced in favour of new centralisation; (e) the ambiguity and vagueness 
of the primary law norms increased, readdressing the specification of several crucial 
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state decreased in favour of the power of the companies and their capacity of 
autoregulation. Some of these changes concerned not only intra-Community transfers, 
but also indirectly touched exports outside EU boundaries.  
Only two dimensions remained, at least formally, at the same level: these are (g) the 
level of transparency and information contained in the annual report to the Parliament 
and (h) the weight of political and constitutional variables compared to economic ones 
in the enucleation of the spirit and principles of the law. In both cases the NGOs 
promoting Law 185/90 have played a determinant role, by pressuring Members of 
Parliament and the Italian government to maintain the same spirit, principles and level 
of transparency for the new kinds of general and global licences as well.  
 
 
Table 4.5 Intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the transposition 




 Italy 2012 
Political vs economic variables 5 5 
Primary law vs secondary law 5 3 
Transparency vs opacity  4 4 
Responsibility vs delegation 5 3 
Legislative vs executive branch 4.5 3 
Checks and balances vs centralisation 5 3.5 
Certainty of law versus fragmentation and flexibility 4 3 
State vs companies 5 3 
 
 
5.4 The scope of domestic change 
 
Overall, the domestic change also affects some fundamental aspects which are not 
directly and explicitly required by the Directive, but which constitute the pillars of any 
arms export control regulation, such as the balance between legislative and executive, 
between primary and secondary law, and impact the same principle of responsibility 
on which the whole Italian regulation is built.  
Despite formally maintaining the spirit of the law and principles, the norms concerning 
general and global licences implicitly introduce a new perspective, a new aim: whereas 
before the main objective was to regulate arms exports, limiting economic dynamics 
and placing commercial variables under constitutional political and ethical principles, 
with the transposition law, the intention is to strengthen the defence industry basis, by 
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removing some administrative and legal obstacles to arms transfers (albeit with some 
exceptions due to the sensitivity of the field). 
Therefore, in origin the starting point of Italian Law 185/90 was represented by 
constitutional principles in the field of foreign policy, security and defence, under which 
economic variables were subordinated. Instead, according to the ICT Directive, the 
starting point is represented by the principle of freedom of movement (extended to 
defence goods with some caveats), whereas political principles of national regulation 
(foreign policy, security policy and international law principles concerning the respect 
for human rights, conflict prevention) are exceptions to the principle of free movement 
which must be used only in extraordinary cases, if essential security interests are at 
stake, under certain conditions (necessity and proportionality), with MS bearing the 
burden of proof (in line with the interpretative Communication of the Commission and 
following the decision of the European Court of Justice). 
This change in functions and objectives of the law recalls the differences existing 
between the Italian Constitution and EU Law. Whereas according to the Italian 
Constitution, the law is a way to intervene and correct unequal and unfair 
consequences due to the free movement of defence material, the Directive (and the 
Treaties) intervenes in order to remove internal lawful barriers and obstacles to the 
free movement of goods to allow the “invisible hand” to operate freely. Using the 
terminology and parameters of Peter Hall, this change does not just involve settings of 
the basic instruments (first order change), and the techniques or policy to attain the 
goals of a law/policy (second order change), but the same overarching goals that guide 
policy.326Thus, in Italy there is a “third order” change modifying the goals that guide 
policy and its “philosophy”, its paradigms, after the transposition of EU Directive 
2009/43/EC.  
These empirical findings support the European integration theories which identify a 
marketisation trend in the Europeanisation process. The literature contains several 
references to the Europeanisation trend. Starting with the specific defence and 
armaments field, Malena Britz analyses the Europeanisation of defence industry 
policies and focuses on one case study: Sweden. 327  Using the Europeanisation 
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literature as a theoretical framework, and a process-tracing analysis as methodology 
she concludes that in Sweden Europeanisation has gone hand in hand with 
marketisation, intended as a process by which national authorities adopt liberal norms 
such as privatisation and an open defence market. According to Hoeffler- who picks 
up from different scholars -“this trend is indeed observable to varying degrees in the 
UK, Germany, France and Sweden”328. Likewise, Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, focusing on 
the French case, also finds a trend towards a neoliberal economic paradigm among 
those which have characterised the adaptation of the French arms export controls to 
the international arms market. 329 . This author’s studies also shed light on other 
similarities between the French and the Italian case. French defence industry 
representatives called for a “change in philosophy” of the arms export control system, 
and requested a reduction in administrative procedures for intra-EU exchanges of 
military goods.330 Similarly to Italy the ICT Directive was accepted because it was seen 
as a way to reform its own domestic export regime.331 According to Béraud-Sudreau, 
[..] “the French Government used the ICT directive to overhaul (revision) the entire 
domestic arms export control regime, instead of only export controls towards EU 
member-states as required by the directive. Indeed, the government 'took the 
opportunity' to reform the entire export control procedure.”332. 
 
 
5.5   Side findings 
 
a) The role of societal actors 
Another side finding concerns the balance between societal actors in Italy. Some 
scholars state that the Europeanisation process has generally increased the power of 
non-state actors and interest groups with regard to the power of the state, or party 
system, and that decision making has become more inclusive. 333 However, with the 
Italian case, not all the societal actors gain ground; some win and some lose. NGOs 
dealing with arms control, disarmament and human rights are the losers and defence 
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companies are the winners. Whereas in the early Nineties the balance shifted clearly 
towards NGOs which were extremely active, and had the support of both left-wing and 
Catholic Members of Parliament, and were able to easily obtain consistent results from 
a normative/legal standpoint; with the transposition of the Directive, in 2009 NGOs 
were bypassed by defence companies in alliance with some governmental and 
administrative sectors which were able to easily and consistently modify Italian Law on 
arms export control and transparency. 
The Italian case appears to adhere closely to what is theorised by some 
Europeanisation scholars who claim that the Europeanisation process may empower 
a specific group of actors, particularly those actors in favour of liberalising the market, 
which is especially true for Europeanisation with negative integration. According to 
Radaelli and Featherstone, “the misfit between European and domestic processes 
policies and institutions provides societal and political actors with the new opportunities 
to pursue their interests.” 334 Two other Europeanisation scholars, Knill and Lehmkul, 
write about the Europeanisation of the transport sector, “Europeanisation may 
empower a specific group of actors.[…]The European liberalisation of the transport 
sector empowered societal and political actors in highly regulated MS, which had been 
unsuccessfully pushing for privatisation and deregulation.”335. According to Scharpf, 
Europeanisation strengthened those actors in favour of greater liberalisation.336 More 
radical but along the same lines was the claim by Seikel, that “[t]he market-liberal thrust 
of integration through law has considerable consequences for the balance of power 
between social groups. Actors having an interest in liberalisation can use European 
law in order to legally bypass previously insurmountable political opposition within the 
national arena. By contrast actors interested in social regulation such as trade unions 
[and NGOs in our case concerning foreign policy], do not have this option”.337 
The same neo-functionalists, despite their optimistic “win-win” vision of European 
integration, identified a differentiation of winners and losers among the various visions 
and actors. They recognized a “relative dominance of the neo-liberal project and a 
relative failure of social democratic vision of Europe” 338  and explained that 
“supranational governance serves the interests of those individuals, groups and firms 
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who transact across borders and those who are advantaged by European rules, and 
disadvantaged by national rules, in specific policy domains.” 339  They conclude as 
follows: “If integration is driven fundamentally by private transactors, and if capital is 
the group with the clearest immediate stake in intra-EC transactions (not to mention 
the resources required for political influence), it is not surprising that the major steps in 
integration should be congenial to those segments of business.” 340  In terms of 
relationships between states and transnational companies the same authors claim that 
“the long term interests of MS governments will be increasingly biased toward the long-
term interests of transnational society, those who have the most to gain from 
supranational governance”. 341 
b) The role of bureaucracies and methodological caveats 
Focusing on the role of Italian Government bureaucracy and civil servants, another 
empirical finding is that they appear to be actors in favour of a change. Since 2007, 
they have appeared to have supported the Directive as a way to introduce global 
reform to Law 185/90, especially as regards a new centralisation process. They had 
the expertise to understand that the Directive would have opened an opportunity for 
change in the directions of centralisation and simplification. 342 Similarly in France, 
according to Béraud-Sudreau, “French civil servants in charge of arms export support 
eventually argued for harmonisation, in order to reach simplification.” 343 In particular, 
“civil servants responsible for export promotion viewed the ICT Directive as an 
opportunity for the simplification of control processes. They convinced the newly 
arrived Ministry of Defence and the Elysée in 2007-2008 that simplification of French 
export controls could be reached thanks to the ICT Directive”. 344 In the same way, 
moving from the national to the European level but still in the defence field Edler and 
James claim that the Commission’s initiative concerning defence research were the 
result of the entrepreneurial role of middle ranking officials in the Commission.345 
In conclusion, in response to the original fundamental question: “What is the direction 
of the Europeanisation process in the field of arms export control and transparency?” 
The answer, limited to the Italian case and to Directive 2009/43/EC, and based on the 
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empirical findings of this research is that the direction of the Europeanisation process 
is skewed towards a pro-market, pro-export, pro-industry model rather than towards 
an ethical and politically regulated one. This offers important insights on the profile of 
the European arms export policy and overall on the European Common Foreign and 






Chapter 5. The impact of Directive 2009/43/EC on Hungarian 






This second case study, Hungary, has been chosen because of the dimension and 
characteristics of its defence industry. It is small and made up of medium and small 
companies, which act as subcontractors. Furthermore, as representative of the Central 
and Eastern European Countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria), which all experienced a shift from a communist political and economic 
system to a parliamentary democracy and a free market in the early 1990s. During this 
transition, the defence industry of most of these countries was reduced sharply as a 
consequence of the end of the Cold War and the consequent drastic fall in demand 
both from the Soviet Union and domestically. The entry of liberal market rules, together 
with the decrease in internal demands for armaments, induced some of these countries 
to liberalise their defence sector as well, and consider arms as a commodity like others. 
For these reasons, particularly in the Nineties, regulation was considered lax during 
this period. What has the impact of Directive 2009/43/EC been on Hungary?  
The chapter starts by explaining the context of domestic defence industry and then 
briefly describes the role and weight of the two fundamental societal actors in this 
sector: defence companies and NGOs.346 The second section thoroughly analyses 
Hungarian regulation on arms export control and transparency, before the approval of 
the Directive, in its main three pillars a) licensing procedures and controls, b) principles 
and export bans, and c) transparency. The third section describes the Hungarian law 
transposing the Directive in its main features. In the fourth section, I compare the earlier 
regulation with the transposing regulation, in order to investigate the direction and 
intensity of domestic change along my eight fundamental dimensions. Lastly, I draw 
the final conclusions on this specific study chapter in order to assess the impact of the 
ICT Directive.           
                                                                




1.1 The main features of the Hungarian defence industry 
 
Arms production 
According to Yudit Kiss, “The Eastern Central European (ECE) countries arms industry 
does not represent a large segment of the world’s arms production and is marginal to 
the global arms production networks that have come to dominate the sector. Neither is 
the arms industry a prominent economic engine in any of the ECE countries. At present 
the arms industry represents only a modest share of gross domestic product (GDP) 
industrial production and employment in the ECE countries. None of these countries 
ranks among the major producers or exporters”. 347  This aspect is even more 
accentuated in Hungary which has one of the smallest defence industries of Central 
and Eastern European countries.348 
Overall, since the late Nineties, the main characteristics and most relevant sectors of 
the defence industry in Hungary have been represented by light weapons and 
ammunitions, pyrotechnic products, land systems, electronics, radar technology, 
communication and telecommunications equipment, software, advanced security 
systems, clothing and equipment, and electronics. “The electronics sector has 
traditionally been the ‘driving force behind the defence industry’ in Hungary, with past 
exports of military communications equipment and other systems to countries such as 
India, Libya and Syria.”349  
According to the 2014 Hungarian report to Parliament, in 2013 496 firms were 
registered with authorised military industry activity and 205 of these were foreign trade 
companies.350 There were 1777 people employed in the field of defence industry.351 
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The total value of production and provision of services of controlled military equipment 
in 2013 totalled 82.5 million euro.352 
A recent report from the Rand Corporation for the European Defence Agency 
describes the following defence industrial actors as major defence industrial 
companies in Hungary:  
  
- ArmCom: Supplies and repairs electronic and communications equipment. 
- Arzenál: Missile repair facility for AGM-65 Maverick (with US firm Raytheon). 
- CURRUS: MRO of tanks and other armoured vehicles, as well as producing 
emergency vehicles (e.g. fire trucks) for the Hungarian military Milipol: Privately 
owned producer of specialist platforms (e.g. Cougar explosive ordnance (EOD) 
vehicle), small arms (AK-63) and software. 
- MOD Electronics, Logistics and Property Management Co: Supplies electronic 
communication and navigation devices. 
- Pannox-Flax NyRt: Specialist textiles for military kits. 
- RÁBA: Manufactures truck components and other vehicles for both military and 
civil use.353 
Despite the panorama being very variegated, the state-owned Raba still dominates in 
terms of employment with about 1500 employees. 354 
Arms exports 
Kiss observes that none of the top 100 arms producers in 2000 were based in Eastern 
Europe. This gap is even more marked for exports data. According to the SIPRI 
database on international arms exports, Hungarian arms exports in the 2000s cover 
from 0% to 3% of the UK arms exports in the same period.  
Thus, the global value of Hungarian arms exports is marginal with respect to its 
European partners, however there has been a rise since the early 2000s. In fact, the 
value of Hungarian exports in 2014 reached 33.6 million Euros, showing an upward 
trend, compared to the 8 million Euros in 2003, 17 million Euros in 2010, and nearly 
doubling in 2014, following approval of EU Directive 2009/43/EC.355 
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Source Annual Reports according to Article B (2) of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of military technology and equipment, (years 
2004-2016) http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/EU_reports, consulted on 
30 March 2015. 
 
The geographical distribution of Hungarian arms exports indicates a prevalence in the 
Northern Hemisphere (excluding re-export cases) and especially to the European 
Union and America (mainly the United States), covering together the majority of 
Hungarian exports or 82.79% of the global annual value. It is worth underlining that the 
whole African continent acquired just 0.85% of the global Hungarian arms exports in 
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Table 5.1 Hungarian arms exports (deliveries): geographical distribution  
 2012 2013 2014 
 Oceania 0% 0.05% 0.01% 
 America 17.69% 31.66% 46.37% 
 Europe 51.29% 47.97% 36.42% 
Africa  10.7% 9.17% 0.85% 
Asia 29.95% 11.5% 16.35% 
Source: Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (years 
2013-2014), National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national, consulted on 30 March 2015. 
 
Among the top ten recipients from 2003-2013, in fact, the United States ranked first 
receiving nearly one third (29.1%) of all Hungarian arms delivered, followed by 
Germany with 14% of the global export value, the Czech Republic (6.2%), Slovakia 
(5%), Italy (4.7%), Ethiopia (4.5%), the United Kingdom (3.6%) and India (3.3%). 
 
Table 5.2 Hungarian arms exports: % on the total of the top ten importers from 2003-
2013 
Licences 2003-13 % Deliveries 2003-13 % 
United States 51.1 United States 29.1 
Germany 8.5 Germany 14.0 
Ethiopia 7.1 Czech Republic 6.2 
Czech Republic 6.7 Slovakia 5.0 
United Kingdom 4.8 Italy 4.7 
Italy 3.2 Ethiopia 4.5 
Austria 2.2 United Kingdom 3.6 
Ukraine 1.7 India 3.3 
Switzerland 1.5 Austria 3.1 
Slovakia 1.5 Cambodia 2.9 
Source: Annual Reports according to Article B (2) of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of military technology and equipment, (years 
2004-2016), available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/EU_reports, 




The kind of arms exported is mainly small arms and ammunitions. In fact, from 2003 
to 2013 nearly half of all Hungarian exports (41.3%) were ammunitions, followed 
distantly by vehicles and tanks (10.6%) and small arms (10.1%) aircraft (8.6%), 
explosive devices (6.9%), and software (4.6%). 
 
 
Table 5.3 - Hungarian arms exports: % of military category from 2003-2013 
Licences 2003-13 % Deliveries 2003-13 % 
Ammunition 56.3 Ammunition 41.3 
Aircraft 9.4 Vehicles. Tanks 10.6 
Small arms 9.1 Small arms 10.1 
Vehicles. tanks 5.5 Aircraft 8.6 
Explosive devices 4.5 Explosive devices 6.9 
Imaging eqpt. 3.4 Miscellaneous 5.9 
Software 3.3 Software 4.6 
Miscellaneous 3.1 Weapon firing eqpt. 3.7 
Light weapons. 
Artillery 
1.6 Imaging eqpt. 2.5 
Weapon firing 
eqpt. 
1.6 Electronic eqpt. 2.3 





0.3 Chemical agents 0.8 
Chemical agents 0.2 Explosives 0.4 
Explosives 0.2 Technology 0.2 
Technology 0.1 Armour 0.1 
Warships 0.1 Warships 0.0 
Armour 0.1 Manufacturing eqpt. 0.0 
Unfinished goods 0.0 Unfinished goods 0.0 
TOTAL 100.0 TOTAL 100.0 
Source: Annual Reports according to Article B (2) of the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of military technology and equipment, (years 
2004-2016), available at http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/EU_reports, 










1.2 Societal actors  
 
Defence companies 
As far as characteristics of defence companies are concerned, Hungary, like other 
CEES, offers a completely different picture to the other two case studies, Italy and the 
UK which are characterised by strong national champions and prime contractors. That 
is the panorama of small and medium companies which are mainly subcontractors. 
Kiss (2015) claims that these companies are dynamic, able to move in a free market 
and establish strategic networks with peers and also with transnational companies. 
“Companies in subcontractor networks tend to be smaller than prime contractors (a 
contractor that has a direct contract for the entire project), but they are often more 
advanced technologically and more efficient. Cutting edge technologies, innovations, 
new products and methods are often developed at the lower echelons of the supplier 
chain. Defence companies (…) tended to be diversified and to move easily from the 
military to the civil sector. They made efforts to have all the certification required by 
NATO and UE standards.”356 As I will explain, the Hungarian defence companies 
obtained the certification envisaged by Directive 2009/43/EC whereas neither big 
Italian nor UK companies undertook the process of certification, complaining about 
onerous bureaucratic procedures. “Following reorganisation and restructuring 
(including several high profile bankruptcies of large firms) what remains of the sector 
is fairly competitive in the EU market”.357 However this has not always been sufficient 
to survive in a market with high entry barriers and dominated by prime contractors with 
strong subsidies and political support from their government. 
There were different obstacles to the Hungarian defence sector’s survival and growth, 
which in a recent report written by the Rand Corporation for the EDA (European 
Defence Agency) are subdivided into two categories: internal and external obstacles. 
As far as internal obstacles go, defence companies have reproached the succeeding 
governments of different political parties (from 1990 until now) about the lack of clear 
defence industrial policy guidelines, and the lack of reliability in following commitments 
                                                                
356 Kiss (2014), p. 32. 
357 Black et alii (2016), p. 55. 
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by the Ministry of Defence to invest in defence, because more than once the MoD 
cancelled orders making it more difficult for companies to plan their activities.358 
As for external obstacles, domestic companies have perceived a growing asymmetry 
between prime contractors and subcontractors, between big transnational companies 
and small and medium enterprises. The first ones are perceived as having more 
economic and political support from the state and all the EU institutions, whereas small 
and medium companies are left to market forces. The big companies (especially the 
first three or four) are consulted regularly by the Commission and can influence the 
decision-making process in the initial phase, whereas the others are consulted only 
rarely. 359  According to the representatives of Hungarian defence companies, the 
“Large scale of NATO or EDA cooperative programmes means that contracts are seen 
to be ultimately geared towards large prime contractors, rather than small firms from 
CEE countries". 360  Prime contractors are overrepresented in the EU institutions, 
namely the Commission, whereas SME are not involved in EU governance and in that 
important initial phase of the decision-making process, leading to EU acts of a different 
nature. They perceive a “double standard”, where small and medium companies are 
left alone to market forces while prime contractors are protected, hugely subsidised 
and supported by the domestic government, and by EU institutions. 
This perception generated an initial scepticism from firms but also from the Hungarian 
Government about EU initiatives on procurement, and in particular with the first attempt 
represented by the Code of Conduct on defence procurement.361 However, in 2007 
                                                                
358 Among the internal obstacles, domestic companies quote that, in addition to a sharp decline in 
overall Hungarian defence spending and the lack of investments, a large proportion of the procurement 
budget is directed towards imports of foreign goods or international programmes, with limited 
involvement from Hungarian industry. The lack of funding is also perceived to cause difficulties in taking 
R&D ideas through to commercialisation and eventual export, creating a disconnect between the 
country’s research base and defence sales, the lack of clear and reliable guidelines: for example “Recent 
ambitious modernisation efforts have been subject to repeated budget revisions, delays or cancellation, 
with a further concern that the military requirements-setting process has not been adequately 
coordinated with defence industrial or R&D policy.” Policy guidelines, procurement decisions and 
measures to downgrade or upgrade weapons [have] usually [been] the result of interaction between 
various, often contradictory political forces [and] have frequently been chaotic and short-lived.’277 The 
resultant degree of uncertainty about the forward programme makes it difficult for Hungarian industry to 
plan ahead or make investments with the limited internal resources available, given the risk attached.” 
See Black et alii (2016), p. 57. 
359 “They perceive an asymmetry between the ability of large countries, e.g. the UK, France, Poland, 
to assert national sovereignty in defence industrial or procurement decisions compared to smaller actors 
like Hungary. They perceive a lack of incentive for prime contractors to use SMEs from foreign countries 
as suppliers, when it is more low-risk to use existing networks and proven supply chains. Black et alii 
(2016), 
360 Ibidem. 
361 Black et alii (2016), pp. 51- 64. 
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Hungary abandoned this policy, pledging to align with European directives, liberalise 
trade, make its MOD procurement plans public and promote Hungarian participation in 
international industrial programmes. 
Overall, the Hungarian defence firms have a marginal influence on government 
decisions and EU institutions. 
 
Non governmental organisation 
It is extremely difficult to find information on NGOs committed to peace, arms control 
and disarmament in Hungary after the collapse of the Soviet Union. A few studies 
describe a peace movement before the end of the Cold War as being mainly focused 
on nuclear disarmament.362 It is equally difficult to find NGOs participating in networks 
of European associations working on these subjects. Even during the Nineties and 
following years, when the Hungarian Government developed a multilateral attitude and 
participated in several meetings and forums organised by governmental and non-
governmental organisations, the main links were with foreign NGOs such as the UK’s 
Saferworld. Thus, in essence, Hungary is characterised by a very marginal role when 
considering the two main non-state actors in arms export control and transparency on 




                                                                
362 Weber (1995). 
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2. Hungarian legislation on arms export control and transparency preceding the 
approval of Directive 2009/43/EC: Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) regulating the licensing 
of the export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and technical 
assistance 
 
This second section is devoted to the Hungarian regulation of arms transfers control 
and transparency before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC. The Hungarian 
legislation preceding the Directive 2009/43/EC is mainly contained in Government 
Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) of 16 April 2004, regulating the licensing of the export, import, 
transfer and transit of military equipment and technical assistance.363 In the description 
of rules, procedures, criteria and bans concerning the authorisation procedure I also 
refer to the National Report on Hungarian Arms Exports, which integrates legal 
information, explaining the current legislation and the main changes that occurred 
during the year, and some sub-legislative orders.364 
 
2.1 The origin of Government Decree 16/2004  
 
Similarly to other countries of this region, Hungary has experienced different phases 
in its recent economic and political history. During the Cold War, Hungary had a one-
party dominated political system and state controlled economy. Hungary was a 
member of the Warsaw Pact and its arms production and exports were highly 
centralized, controlled by the State and functional to the whole Eastern Block. Arms 
export procedures were highly centralized. Before 1990 the control of foreign trade of 
conventional arms was exercised by the individual decisions of the Defence Committee 
of the Council of Ministers.365 The 5-year term Agreements and annual Reports of the 
Warsaw Pact Member States tackled the values and quantities of trade in the various 
                                                                
363 Hungarian Government (2004). Decree 16/2004 (II.6) of 2004 on the licensing of the export, import, 
transfer and transit of military equipment and technical assistance, Hungarian version available at 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top (last accessed March 2019). 
364 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office- Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (years 2004-
2014), National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, various years, Hungarian 
version, available at  http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national, (last 
accessed March 2019). 
365 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office- Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (2009), National 
Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, p. 3 English version, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national, (accessed April 2019).  
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military equipment categories. The licenses were issued by the Technical Department 
of the Foreign Trade Ministry, based on decisions by the Defence Committee of the 
Council of Ministers. Foreign trade was carried out by Technika Foreign Trade 
Company.366 
The end of bipolar system and of the Soviet Union opened up a new phase. Hungary 
moved to a parliamentary democracy and free market rule, developing a multilateral 
attitude and the will to participate in the western European political and military 
organisation, by adapting domestic standards. In this period two main guidelines and 
policy goals of the Hungarian Government in this sector coexist, in order to understand 
the context within which the Decree is placed: 1) From an economic perspective the 
attitude of the government is to leave the defence companies to the forces of the 
market. It is a pure neoliberal attitude that characterises this former communist country. 
Subsidies and help to the domestic industry are circumscribed and in any case they 
are subordinated to the needs of the civil companies and to the overall Hungarian 
economy. Arms are considered commodities like others and this process pushes 
towards a “secularisation” of the defence sector and to a liberalisation of exports. 2) 
From a political perspective, this period is still strongly characterised by the will of 
Hungarian representatives to participate actively in Western political and military 
organisations such as the European Union and NATO, to learn from best practices and 
to adjust their standards to those required by these supranational bodies. In this period 
Hungarian representatives participated in several meetings, conferences, multilateral 
agreements and forums with the aim of improving its national standards in terms of 
control, transparency, marking and tracing defence material. This second trend pushed 
in the direction of strengthening controls particularly end-user controls, improving 
transparency and making the national regulations stricter and more rigorous.  
Government Decree 16/2004 is mainly an expression of this second goal and 
represents another step toward making regulation stricter.367 It is organic, prescriptive 
and well organised. It is worth specifying that it was approved just three years before 
                                                                
366 Ibidem. 
367 The first step in the direction was represented by the approval in 1991 of the first Government 
Decree 48/1991 (III.27.) on the export, import and re-export of military equipment and related services. 
This first Decree already (a) introduced a first form of collegiality in the decision-making procedures, (b) 
introduced clear bans to export to countries in conflicts or under embargo. The decree also (c) envisaged 




the Directive, when the discussion about the role of the Commission in the defence 
field and on creating an internal defence market had already begun.   
 
2.2 The institutional framework: increasing collegiality  
 
After the high centralisation which had distinguished the communist period, the new 
Hungarian regulation of arms export was collegial and characterised by the 
participation of several ministries in the licensing export procedures and controls.  
In particular, there were two Committees that were responsible for licence granting and 
drawing export criteria, the first one with political tasks and the second with more 
technical tasks. Both were composed of members from a wide range of ministries, at 
different levels (bureaucrats and politicians) all involved in the authorisation procedure.  
The first one is the Inter-ministerial Committee on the Foreign Trade in Military 
Equipment, which has the central task of elaborating the criteria and setting policies 
related to licensing of international trade of military equipment.368 Its composition is 
high level political. It is composed of state secretaries of the Ministry of Defence, 
Ministry of Justice and Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy and 
Transport and a person appointed by the minister without portfolio directing civilian 
national security. The chair of the Committee is appointed by the Prime Minister, 
whereas the Secretary is appointed by the Minister of Economy and Transport. 
The second one is the Committee on the Licensing of Foreign Trade in Military 
Equipment, which has a more technical nature, as explained by Article 4 of Decree No 
16/2004. Its tasks are to formulate expert opinions related to trade/activity, negotiation 
and transfer licences, taking into account the criteria elaborated by the “political” 
committee. Its members are appointed by the minister without portfolio directing the 
civilian national security, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and Security, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economy and Transport. The Committee is inter-
ministerial in its composition but independent in its power of proposal. 
                                                                
368 See Art. 3.1 of the Hungarian Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6) of 2004 on the licensing of the 
export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and technical assistance, Hungarian version 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 15 March 2016; see also. 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, National Report 
on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, 2009, English version, available at 





Lastly, the administrative body which represents the main reference for all the 
administrative tasks concerning arms export licensing procedures and controls is the 
“Office”. The Office carries out several tasks ranging from licence granting and 
withdrawing, (Art. 12), to collecting all the information the companies are obliged to 
transmit on the licence portfolio and deliveries (Art. 6.2), to ex post controls, collecting 
End-user certificates (Art. 12). The office may also order the company to submit the 
Delivery Verification Certificate in order to certify that the equipment arrived at the 
customs area (Art. 14.2). 
  
2.3 Export licences procedures 
 
The system for licence granting and successive controls was articulated and detailed 
by primary law. There was only one kind of transfer licence, the individual transfer 
licence. 
In order to obtain it, exporters must have already obtained the activity licence – which 
can be general or specific, and which allows undertaking preparatory activities such as 
market research, preparatory discussion and so on related to export, import or transfer 
of military equipment – that is, the result of registering as a trader (Art.7). Among the 
conditions and documentation to obtain this activity licence, the articles also quote 
banking information provided by the credit institute where the company has the bank 
account. The aim is to reduce cases of illicit activity and corruption (Art.7.par.4, point 
b). The validity of the activity licence is 24 months which can be prolonged for another 
24 months, ensuring periodic checks on the legal and financial situation of the 
company.  
Secondly, to start negotiations, a negotiation licence is necessary which allows 
negotiations to proceed and contracts to be concluded. A negotiating licence 
authorises the applicant to prepare a contract. It lasts 12 months and it can be renewed 
once for a further period of 12 months. In cases of long-term production or cooperation 
programmes, a special negotiation licence valid for 24 months can be issued (Art. 9). 
 
Finally, in order to sign the contract and export the defence material, the defence 
company has to obtain a transfer licence, which is the classical authorisation for export 
and import of military equipment. This can be requested only by those with a 
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negotiation licence. Hungarian primary law does not specify all the information required 
to obtain a transfer licence but readdresses to a format established by the Office and 
delegates the definition of these crucial aspects to the Office. A transfer licence is valid 
for 12 months and can be extended once for 12 more months. For long-term contracts, 
a special negotiation licence valid for 2 years can be issued (Art.10). 
 
2.4 End-user controls and reporting requirements 
 
Overall according to Article 10, any application for a licence for the export or outward 
shipment of military equipment or for the provision of technical assistance shall be 
accompanied by a copy of three kinds of end-user documentation: an Import Licence, 
an International Import Certificate (“IIC”) and an End-User Certificate by the customer 
(“the EUC”). Regarding exports, the office may prescribe the acquisition of a Delivery 
Verification Certificate (DVC). 
Article 13 provides more details concerning the content of the International Import 
Certificate that must contain a declaration that the imported military equipment and 
service will be utilised solely with the terms and conditions stipulated in the Declaration. 
However, the conditions and terms in the Declaration of the End-User Certificate, and 
the formats of all these documentations are not detailed by primary law. Thus, there is 
still a veil of uncertainty on the behaviour of the Hungarian Government in cases of re-
export of defence material. 
According to Art. 6.2, “the companies shall be obliged to provide monthly information 
to the Office about the licence portfolio and the trade transacted, until the 15th day of 
the month after the month concerned, on the form implemented by the Office. This 
duty, established by primary law, is a precious tool in the hands of the Hungarian 
Government to follow and control all trade operations carried out by companies with 
regularity. On the basis of the information collected, the Office maintains a registry of 
licence holders, including their regular data reports, and possesses the tether of 
controlling and forfeiting. Appeals against the first instance administrative resolution of 
the HTLO are judged by the Minister of National Development and Economy.”369  
  
                                                                
369 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, National 
Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, 2009, English version, p. 6. 
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2.5 Bans and criteria for exports 
 
Article 5 is dedicated to restrictions and embargoes. It explains both national bans and 
criteria for arms export and European and international criteria, followed by Hungarian 
authorities in granting arms export licences.  
Starting with national bans, according to paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Decree, export 
and transit of military equipment shall not be licenced to: 
- countries where there is armed conflict, 
- countries where armed conflict threatening international peace and security is 
expected to take place and where the UN Security Council, the Council of the 
European Union or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
have called upon the parties concerned about resolving the conflict through 
peaceful negotiations or have declared an embargo on the shipment of military 
equipment, military technical assistance and related training. 
 
It is important to note that the list of national criteria is not particularly long, and it is 
limited to political principles, whereas economic reasons are not included and the 
criteria are formulated clearly and unambiguously. This is probably due to the weak 
influence of two contraposing non-governmental actors of the sectors (defence 
companies and associations for disarmament and peace) which made it easier to 
reach an agreement in this delicate field.  
Focusing on European bans, Hungary is one of the first countries to have introduced 
the European Code of Conduct criteria in its regulation, with the status of annex to 
primary law regulation, making them legally binding at the national level. In fact, 
according to Article 5, the export and transit of military equipment and services shall 
not be licenced if the transaction contradicts the relevant requirements of the Code of 
Conduct on arms exports accepted by the Council of the European Union on 8 June 
1998. The relevant parts of the Code of Conduct are included in Annex No. 2 of the 
Decree. The binding role of the European Code of Conduct criteria are reaffirmed in 
the last article of the Hungarian regulation, according to which the decree shall serve 
compliance with the European Union Code of conduct and with the Common Military 
list of the European Union Art. 19. Para 2).  
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This gave the European criteria on arms exports a binding force according to 
Hungarian regulation, even before it became legally binding with the transformation of 
the European Code of Conduct into a Common Position in 2008 and before the other 
MS with stronger defence industries.370 
According to the criteria adopted in the Code of Conduct and included in the Hungarian 
arms export control regulation, the Hungarian authorities must observe the following 
requirements:  
- Respect for the international commitments of EU MS, in particular the sanctions 
decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community, 
agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other 
international obligations.  
- Respect for human rights in the country of final destination. MS shall not issue 
an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used 
for internal repression.  
- The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the 
existence of tensions or armed conflicts. MS will not allow exports which would 
provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in 
the country of final destination.  
- Preservation of regional peace, security and stability. MS will not issue an export 
licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient would use the proposed 
export aggressively against another country or assert by force a territorial claim.  
- The national security of the MS and territories whose external relations are the 
responsibility of a MS, as well as that of friendly and allied countries.  
- The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, 
as regards in particular its attitude on terrorism, the nature of its alliances and 
respect for international law.  
- The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer 
country or re-exported under undesirable conditions.  
- The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity 
of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that states should 
                                                                
370 In respect to the other two case studies, for example, it is worth to remember that Italy included the 
criteria of the Code of Conduct only in 2008 when the Code was transformed in Common Position, and 
the UK included the criteria in its regulation in 1998 but with the status of guidance and thus modifiable 
by the executive power.  
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achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion 
for armaments of human and economic resources.  
 
Overall Hungarian prohibition is legally binding and established by the legislator 
through primary law. Hungarian restrictions are extended not only to major 
conventional arms system but also to small arms and light weapons (see arms covered 
by the Decree). 
According to Article 5.5, if an application of identical contents with the rejected licence 
application is submitted within 6 months, it shall have to be rejected. In this way a case 
by case assessment is discouraged, in favour of the uniformity and certainty of law. 
The same article also foresees that export licences may be withdrawn if the conditions 
change (for example if a conflict blows up or an embargo is declared by the UN). In 
fact, prior to delivery, the licence shall have to be withdrawn and the performance 
prohibited if there is such a change in circumstances causing the performance of the 
contract to contradict the contents of bans and criteria of the Hungarian regulation. 
Furthermore according to Article 5. ”The Office shall withdraw the issued licence if 
such a change occurs after the issuance of the licence on the basis of which the 
rejection of the application would be in place, or if the company violates the provisions 
included in the decree, the terms and conditions specified in the licence or the rules 
related to trade.” Equally if the circumstances change. 
 
2.6 Transparency  
 
Transparency has been the Achilles’ heel of the Hungarian regulation, similar to other 
countries of the region. In fact, in the Nineties there was a report from the Hungarian 
Government concerning arms export policy, but this was kept secret.371 However, 
important steps towards an increase of transparency were taken from the late Nineties 
to the date of approval of the decree.  
The 2004 Decree lists two kinds of reports. The first is the report required by the 
European Code of Conduct, concerning arms exports broken down by military 
                                                                
371 B. Mariani (2002). Hungary. Arms Production, Exports and Decision-Making in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Saferworld, June. Available at: https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/68-arms-





category. According to Article 4.8, the Ministry of Foreign affairs and the office shall 
provide a summary about the distribution of military products exported. The report 
gives the total value of arms exports broken down by military list categories and by 
destination and military list categories. This information is offered both for licences and 
deliveries and includes both main weapons systems and small arms and light 
weapons. This summary is addressed to the international community and to the 
domestic public. It is extremely important that for the first time Hungarian regulation 
refers to public opinion. 
The second document envisaged by Decree 16/2004 is the annual national report 
about arms trade licensing activity. According to Article 4.9, the Ministry of Economy 
and Transport shall prepare a report once a year about the military foreign trade 
licensing activity to the following committees of the National Assembly: the Defence 
Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the National Security Affairs 
Committee. This report was first presented behind closed doors, but since 2009, 
probably as a consequence of another EU act coming into force, the Common Position 
on European arms export, it was published and made available to the whole Assembly 
and the public as well, being published both on the website of the Hungarian authority 
and the SIPRI website.372 The annual report contains data and figures concerning 
trends on Hungarian arms exports, arms exports broken down by principal importers, 
articulation of exports according to geographical destination and military category of 
arms exported. This information is introduced by data on the value of defence 
production and employment for the year concerned. The same report offers 
clarification about the last update on the national regulation on arms export control and 
transparency and on the participation of the Hungarian Government in multilateral 
export control regimes at the regional and international levels.373  
However, there were three main limits to transparency. The first limit to transparency 
is of a legal and formal nature. The primary law does not specify which information 
must be reported to the three Parliamentarian Committees, neither the quality nor 
quantity of transparency, but merely specifies the time limit (each year) to report to the 
Parliament. Thus, the executive is free to choose what information to pass on to the 
                                                                
372 www.sipri.org/databases/national-reports/Hungary. 
373 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (various years), 
National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, 




Parliament and whether to communicate this information to the whole Assembly or just 
to three committees behind closed doors, as envisaged by the letter of the law. 
The second limit to transparency concerns all the information that companies are 
obliged to transmit to the Office about their trade activities once a month. These data 
must be considered classified information and may be used only in the course of its 
official procedure (Art. 6.3). 
Thirdly, according to Article 4.7, information about the international trade distribution 
and transit of military equipment and services may be revealed publicly solely by 
persons with separate authorisation. The chairman of the Committee may provide 
authorisation. The Office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may perform, without 
separate authorisation, related data provision. 
 
3. The transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC in the Hungarian context: the main 
features of the Government Decree 160/2011 (VIII. 18.), on the authorisation of 
the export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and services and 
the certification of enterprises374 
 
In this third section I am going to examine the changes of the Hungarian regulation 
after the transposition of Directive n. 2009/43/EC, focusing in particular on the 
Hungarian Government Decree 160/2011 on the authorisation of the export, import, 
transfer and transit of military equipment and services and the certification of 
enterprises, which is the law transposing the Directive in Hungary. 375 
The transposition of the Directive required a change to the previous regulation because 
Government Decree 16/2004 did not make a distinction between transfers among MS 
                                                                
374  This third paragraph widely draws from a previous work of the candidate for the Flemish Parliament 
and the Flemish Peace Institute “Hungarian report” which has been used to realise a benchmark study 
assessing how European regulatory initiatives (with particular attention to Directive 2009/43/EC and the 
Council Common Position 2008/944/EU) have impacted national legislation in six European countries: 
Sweden (S. Bauer), UK (M. Bromley); Germany (M. Bromley), France, Portugal and Hungary (C. 
Bonaiuti). Final publication: Cops D., Duquet N., Gourdin G. (Eds), Towards Europeanised arms export 
control systems?: comparing control systems in EU MSs, report of the Flemish peace Institute, Artoos, 
Bruxelles, 2017. 
375 Hungarian Government  Decree No. 160/2011 (VIII. 18.), of 18 August 2011, on the authorisation 
of the export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and services and the certification of 
undertakings [160/2011. (VIII. 18.) Korm. Rendelet a haditechnikai eszközök és szolgáltatások 
kivitelének, behozatalának, transzferjének és tranzitjának engedélyezéséről, valamint a vállalkozások 
tanúsításáról]                                                                     Hungarian version,available at  




and exports to third countries, applying the same procedures for both types of 
transactions and envisaged only one kind of export licence, the individual export 
licence. Secondly, there was no certification system for companies according to the 
Directive rules enabling them to export under a simplified regime and use general 
licences. Thus it was necessary to change the preceding regulation. 
However, the new Decree 160/2011 is not limited to the changes strictly required by 
the Directive. It covers all the aspects related to arms export control regulation in a 
clear and organic way and substitutes completely for the previous regulation. Also on 
this occasion, the decree is the result of the two opposing goals that reflect two 
opposing perspectives/trends of the Europeanisation process, as explained before. On 
the one hand, the trend towards the liberalisation of defence material exchanges 
mainly within EU boundaries, and on the other, the trend towards a stricter regulation 
of defence material exports. Directive 2009/43/EC embodies mainly the first 
perspective, but the new Decree No 160/2011 also implements the second perspective 
as a result of an ongoing learning process from the MS arms export control regulation 
and the implementation of the European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. These two 
different trends are absorbed in the decree which in most cases is able to conjugate 
together in unforeseen and interesting ways. 
Government Decree 160/2011 on the authorisation of the export, import, transfer and 
transit of military equipment and services and the certification of enterprises 
("Government Decree") became effective on 1 January 2012. In order to better explain 
the changes that the new regulation has introduced with respect to the previous one, I 
will also refer to some executive decrees and orders specifying further the primary law, 
particularly the three decisions, detailing the three general licences released in 
Hungary which were issued by the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office, Authority on 
Defence Industry and Export Controls, Department of Defence Industries and 
conventional arms trade control.376 In the description of rules, procedures, criteria and 
                                                                
376 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200694 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200694 – End-user armed 
forces, law enforcement entities and intelligence agencies - Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version,; 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top (accessed April 2019). 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200703, of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence –Temporary transfers for the 
purpose of repair, exhibition, presentation, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top (accessed March 2019). 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200699 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200699 – End-user 
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bans concerning the authorisation procedure I will also refer to the National Report on 
Hungarian Arms Exports, which has been released annually since 2004 (only in 
Hungarian with the exception of the 2009 report), for the first descriptive part which is 
devoted to explaining current legislation and the main changes that occurred during 
the year. 377  
 
3.1 The debate preceding the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
It is extremely difficult to find material concerning the parliamentarian debate, given the 
obstacle of the language. Via secondary sources, it is known that the Hungarian 
representatives were originally sceptical towards the European Code of Conduct on 
Defence Procurement 378. The Hungarian representatives, giving voice to the defence 
sector initially feared exposing Hungarian defence firms to open international 
competition and limiting offset. 379  They feared that asymmetries between prime 
contractors and small and medium companies would be heightened rather than 
reduced. However, since 2007 Hungary has changed position, pledging support to the 
European directives liberalising trade, making its Ministry of Defence procurement 




                                                                
certified companies of another EU MS, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top (accessed March 2019). 
377 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office- Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (years 2004-
2014), National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary, various years, Hungarian 
version, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national, (accessed April 
2019). 
378 “After the creation of the EDA in 2004, Hungary initially opted to stay out of the European Code of 
Conduct on Defence Procurement amid concerns over the risks of exposing Hungarian defence firms 
to open international competition or the limitation of offsets. However, in 2007 Hungary abandoned this 
policy, pledging to align with European directives, liberalise trade, make its MOD procurement plans 
public and promote Hungarian participation in international industrial programmes” (Black et alii (2016): 
p. 52). IHS Jane’s.( 2006) “Hungary and Spain reject new EU defence procurement code” Jane’s 
Defence Industry, May 22.; S. Lakatos, (2007) “An overview of the system of defence procurement”. 
AARMS 6(1): 97-108. 
379 Black et alii (2016), p. 52. 
380 Defense Aerospace (2007). “Hungary accepts EU code regulating military procurement.” Defense 
Aerospace, May 15, available at http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articlesview/ 
release/3/82267/hungary-accepts-eu-military-procurement-code.html (last accessed 5 May 2018). 
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3.2 The institutional framework 
 
The Hungarian Authority designated to perform export control tasks is the Authority 
of Defence Industry and Export Control of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office, 
operating under the supervision of the Ministry for National Development and 
Economy (in collaboration with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs). The Authority is 
divided into two departments: the Department of Arms Trade Control (subdivided in 
dual use, chemical and bacteriological, international sanctions and nuclear weapons), 
and the Department of Defence Industry and Foreign Trade Department (which is 
subdivided into the Defence Industrial activities department and Conventional Arms 
Trade Control). 
The responsibilities of the Authority of Defence Industry and Export Control of the 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office are extensive and structured and range from (a) 
issuing licences, (b) performing controls and monetary sanctions, (c) having 
jurisdiction to control and impose fines, (d) registering and managing data and reports 
on licences.  
The two inter-ministerial Committees that were envisaged by the previous Decree 
16/2004 disappeared and the system became more centralised. However, at the 
same time there is also a form of collegiality with other ministries involved in the 
procedures for licence authorisation. In fact, according to Article7 of the 2011 Decree 
“The Authority shall issue the licences requesting the expert opinion of the Minister 
responsible for Foreign Affairs, the Minister responsible for Foreign Trade and the 
Economic Development of the Economic Zone of the Carpathian Basin, the Minister 
responsible for Security, the Minister responsible for National Defence, and the 
respective leaders of the Constitution Protection Office, the Information Office, the 
Special Service for National Security, the Military National Security Service, the 
National Police Headquarters, and the National Tax and Customs Administration of 
Hungary.”381 
The main tasks of the Authority, as reported in the annual report to the Parliament, are 
the following: 
The Authority issues licences for the export of military equipment on the basis of 
                                                                
381 Article 7 of the Hungarian Government Decree 160/2011 (VIII. 18.), of 18 August 2011. 
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national legal regulation. However, it takes into account the directives on EU foreign 
and security policies, the provisions of the “Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
on defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and 
equipment.” It performs its Authority activity based on the “EU’s Common Military List”.  
It supervises military industry production and services brought under licensing, on the 
basis of the same list, the activity of Hungarian military industry manufacturers and 
service providers, and controls the obligations of the licences for product marking and 
registration.  
It performs control. The Authority registers and manages the data and reports of the 
licencees; moreover, it has jurisdiction to control and impose fines.  
The Authority controls the export of dual-use items and performs controls of export of 
products under foreign trade restrictions ordered by international sanctions. The 
Authority fulfils the obligations and tasks of the national Authority stemming from the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, in the framework of which the Authority supervises 
the production and trading activity of chemical companies under the scope of the 
Convention. It is also the Authority that fulfils the obligations and tasks of the national 
Authority stemming from the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in the 
framework of which the Authority registers the activity of the legal entities under the 
scope of the Convention, and compiles the country’s annual confidence-building 
report.382 
According to the provisions of the legal regulations related to the licensing of defence 
industry foreign trade, the Authority of Defence Industry and Export Control (Authority) 
of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office (HTLO) complies with its reporting obligation 
on the foreign trade licensing activity of the military industry to various parliamentary 
committees (on defence, security, foreign affairs and national security affairs) every 
year. In fact, according to Article 23 of the Decree 160/2011 the Minister responsible 
for Foreign Trade and Economic Development of the Carpathian Basin Economic Zone 
shall report once a year about the military foreign trade licensing activity to the 
parliamentary committees dealing with defence, security, foreign affairs and national 
security affairs, respectively.  
                                                                
382 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (2013). 
National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary: p. 3, 




Moreover, the Authority regularly provides data to various international forums 
[European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), Wassenaar Arrangement] about the foreign trade activity 
of the defence industry and the export data of dual-use items and technology. Hungary 
takes part in the implementation of the Program of Action and submits annual reports 
to the UN on the export-import data of SALW and developments of the legal 
background of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit 
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects determines 
principles and provisions to eradicate and prevent the illicit trade of SALW; the HTLO 
delegates an expert to the COARM working group, operating on the basis of the EU 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on defining common rules governing 
control of exports of military technology and equipment where besides general agenda 
items (preparation of a published annual report, updating the EU CML, organising 
outreach seminars to third countries to promote export control mechanisms), actual 
questions of export controls are discussed (i.e. country evaluations). 
Furthermore, the Authority co-operates with professional interest groups, and 
organises seminars and issues newsletters to fully inform the partners involved in the 
field of military foreign trade and military production and the provision of services. The 
Authority consists of two organisational units: the Defence Industry and Conventional 
Arms Trade Control Department, and the Export Control Department. 383 
 
3.3 Arms covered by the Decree 
 
The Authority performs its licensing and control activity on the basis of the EU’s 
“Common Military List” ("EU CML"), with the difference that the Hungarian regulation 
supplements the CML list of 22 chapters with another four chapters. The Hungarian 
regulation brought the following under its jurisdiction: other equipment specially 
designed for military purposes, services specially designed for military purposes, 
instruments of coercion and crime surveillance, and secret service devices. The list 
                                                                
383 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, National 
Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary. (2014). Hungarian version, 




of military equipment and services subject to licensing is included and detailed in 
Annex 1 of the Government Decree. 
The Government Decree determines the provisions necessary for carrying out the 
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain 
goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (EC Regulation). Chapter XXV of the Government 
Decree (instruments of coercion and crime surveillance) includes the instruments 
subject to licence in the Annex 1 of the EC Regulation (handcuffs used for keeping 
people in captivity, materials used for self-defence, electric shock devices used for 
curbing rebellion, etc.), thus these are subject to the same licensing procedure as 
military equipment. However, the EC Regulation prohibits the export and import of 
gallows and guillotines; electric chairs used for the execution of human beings; 
chambers used for the execution of human beings; automatic drug injection systems 
and electric-shock belts designed for restraining human beings through administration 
of electric shocks. 
The prohibition does not apply to applications where the goods are used for the 
exclusive purpose of public display in a museum.384 
 
3.4 Export licensing procedures 
 
Individual licences 
The new decree envisages three kinds of licences: individual, global and general 
licences, as required by Directive 2009/43/EC. 
Individual transfer licences are the only ones that are not new for Hungarian exporters, 
in that they are very similar to those used with the previous regulation (Government 
Decree 16/2004 (II.6)). However, they assume residual character with respect to the 
other two. One change from the past is also that all the information requested from the 
companies in the application for export licence is detailed by primary law in an annex 
to Decree 160/2011. 
                                                                
384 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (2013). 
National Report on Arms Export Controls of the Republic of Hungary: pp.12-13 English version, 
available at: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/transfers/transparency/national, last accessed 21 
October 2018: pp. 12-13. 
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Obviously, individual licences are the most detailed and controlled type of licence, both 
because of the number of stages in the licensing procedures and the amount of 
information and documents required. All individual licences (with the exception of those 
directed to EEA countries and Switzerland) are released only after having obtained the 
activity and negotiation licences. 
The first step is comprised of firms (business entities, sole entrepreneurs, publicly 
financed institutions, trade offices) acquiring an Activity Licence. This licence can be 
either general (covering any product, country or transaction) or specific, covering only 
a particular product, country or transaction.  
Secondly, a negotiation licence (for export, import, inward or outward shipment for 
military equipment and/ or for the provisional acceptance of technical assistance) 
authorises the applicant to prepare a 12-month contract which can be renewed once 
for an additional 12-month period. (In cases of long-term production or sales co-
operations, a special 24-month negotiation licence can be issued). The negotiation 
licences are only necessary for individual transfers licences with non-EU countries, 
whereas it is no longer required for global and general licences. An individual transfer 
licence is required for contracts involving the export, import or transfer of military 
equipment and technical assistance. 
Thirdly, the application for the individual transfer licence related to the export or 
outward shipment of military equipment and the provision of services shall be 
submitted to the Authority with data content specified in Annex No. 7 of the Decree. 
The enterprise shall make a declaration vis-à-vis the Authority about the reliability of 
the buyer, the end-user and the broker. The declaration shall include that the buyer, 
the end-user and the broker are registered as enterprises in their own respective states 
that they may perform their activity and operate there in accordance with legal 
regulations. 
Furthermore, as with the other two kinds of licences, the Authority may determine ad 
hoc terms and conditions related to the completion of the transaction with respect to 
end use, re-sale or passing on, in connection with the contents of Article 8, for national 
security or national economy interests or for the purpose of control of the end-user and 
end use, taking all circumstances into account. 
If further data are necessary to assess the case, the Authority may also request other 
documents used to certify end use. If the Authority ties the issuance of the individual 
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transfer licence to the subsequent submission of a Delivery Verification Certificate, 
the enterprise shall be obliged to send the Delivery Verification Certificate to the 
Authority within one month of receipt of the goods in the customs area of the end-user 
country. 
The companies must also include with their application form an International Import 
Certificate and/or an End-user certificate, which contains a non-re-export clause by 
which the end-user has to certify that arms will not be re-exported, generally either at 
all or without the prior written approval from the original exporting State. Furthermore, 
the Authority may request a Delivery Verification Certificate. If further data are 
necessary to assess the case, the Authority may also request other documents used 
to certify end use. 385 
 
Global licences 
Global licences are a new type of licence which have been introduced by the Hungarian 
Government. According to Article 14, upon request, the Authority can issue a global 
transfer licence for military equipment and services, and permanent production and 
sales connection, in cases of contracting parties and end-users settled in EEA states 
(the EU MS, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland) or Switzerland, in cases of both 
outward shipment/export and inward shipment/import.  
The website of the Hungarian Government offers further details: global transfer 
licences cover military equipment and services under the umbrella of permanent 
production and sales connections, with a maximum limit of 4 foreign partners/end-
users located in an European Economic Area States or Switzerland and for a maximum 
of 7 pieces of military equipment or military services in cases of permanent and long-
term business.  
The period of validity for this type of licence is 3 years, and can be prolonged by 12 
months (see Article 14.5). The conditions under which a global licence is released by 
the Hungarian Government can be divided into two main groups. 
                                                                
385 Article 15 and Annex no 7 of the Hungarian Government Decree No. 160/2011 (VIII. 18.), of 18 
August 2011, on the authorisation of the export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and 




1) The first groups of general conditions for releasing a global licence are listed in 
Article 14 and in its Annex 5 and are similar to those for obtaining an individual licence. 
They must be fulfilled ex ante when applying for the authorisation to export.  
The applicant should also enclose the end-user certificate or International Import 
Certificate or other document used for certifying end use, as done for individual 
licences. The details requested for a global licence application are the same as those 
for the classical and traditional individual licence, with a single exception: the 
information on the value.  
The conditions for granting global licences are similar to those concerning the 
individual ones. According to Article 14.5, the enterprise shall make a declaration vis-
à-vis the Authority about the reliability of the buyer, the end-user and the broker. The 
declaration shall include that the buyer, the end-user and the broker are registered as 
enterprises in their own respective states, they may perform their activity and that they 
operate there in accordance with legal regulations. Furthermore, like the other two 
kinds, global licences are subjected to the bans and criteria of Article8 of the decree, 
and the Authority may determine ad hoc terms and conditions related to the completion 
of the transaction with respect to end use, re-sale or passing on, in connection with the 
contents of Article 8, for national security or national economy interests or for the 
purpose of end-user control and end use, taking all circumstances into account. 
 
Overall global licences are very well defined in their use. Hungary is the only one, in 
contrast to the other two case studies, to define a ceiling both in number of pieces to 
be exported and in the number of partners. This makes controls much easier by the 
Hungarian state and at the same time simplifies, by regrouping more transfers under 




The main novelty with respect to the past is the introduction of general licences, which 
are the most flexible kind of licences. However, according to Government Decree 
160/2011, they are valid only for trade in defence material within EU boundaries, only 
in three main cases (described below).  
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According to Article 13 of Decree 160/2001, in order to simplify the security of supply, 
permanent industrial and inter-governmental co-operation, and the procedure, the 
Authority may issue general transfer licences for the transfer—within EU boundaries—
of certain product ranges for facilitating deliveries in the area of the European Union, 
in the following three main cases (see Table 4).  
This type of licence is valid until withdrawal. Website publication of the licences took 
place as of 1 July 2012. The licence does not have a physical licence, however, the 
number of the general transfer licence must be stipulated on the documents 
accompanying the shipment. The control of end use is the responsibility of the licence. 
Moreover, it has to keep up-to-date registration on products shipped inward or outward. 
Control by the Authority is subsequent. 
Several conditions for granting general licences are included both in Article 13 of the 
decree and Article 21, and in the text of the decisions corresponding to each of the 
three general licences. 
1) They must be preceded by an activity licence for foreign trade (such as in the 
case of individual and global licences) whereas a negotiation licence is not 
necessary, unless it is a re-export case; (see Article 13.2); 
2) For general transfer licences, much like for global and individual licences, the 
Authority may determine ad hoc terms and conditions related to the completion 
of the transaction with respect to end use, re-sale or passing on, in connection 
with the contents of Article 8, for national security or national economy interests 
or for the purpose of control of the end-user and end use, taking into account 
all the circumstances. (Article 13.5); 
3) Further conditions are explained/added in the single decisions relating to the 
three fundamental general licences as follows, and differ according to the 
scope, the end-user and the military material which is possible to transfer, as 










Table 5.4 General and specific conditions according to the kind of general licences. 
HU3FAE1200694 HU3FAE1200699 HU3FAE1200699 
July 2nd 2012 July 2nd 2012 July 2nd 2012 
Authorise transfers to end-user 
being armed forces, law 
enforcement entities, or 
intelligence agencies. 
 
Authorise transfers to end-user 
being certified companies. 
  
Authorise temporary, free of 
charge transfers to another MS 
of the EU, for the purpose of 
repair under warranty, 
exhibition, presentation, test 
and trial. 
 
These must be of another MS of 
the European Union 
These must be of another MS of 
the European Union 
These must be of another MS of 
the European Union 
ML 1c, 2c, 2d, 5,6,9,10, 11, 
13,14, 15 e 17 
ML3 note 1 a),b),c) d). ML 4a, 
ML6 note 1 b,c,d; ML6 note 2 
a,b,c,d, ML11, ML 13, ML 15 
a,b,c,d,e, ML 16. 
ML 3/note 1 a),b,c,d, ML 4°, 
ML5, ML6, ML9, ML10, ML11, 
ML 13,14, 15 AND16 
The goods involved can 
exclusively be used by the 
above specific end-user for its 
own purpose. 
The goods involved can 
exclusively be used by the 
above specific end-user for its 
own production. 
 
The goods involved can 
exclusively be used for the 
above specified temporary, free 
of charge, purpose. 
Source: Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200694 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200694 – End-user armed 
forces, law enforcement entities and intelligence agencies - Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version,; 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, consulted on 21 October 2018. 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200703, of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence – Temporary transfers for the 
purpose of repair, exhibition, presentation, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, consulted on 21 October 2018. 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200699 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200699 – End-user 
certified companies of another EU MS, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, consulted on 21 October 2018. 
 
Overall in all three cases, the users of the present general transfer licence have to 
make sure to communicate to the foreign buyer/end-user the special terms and 
conditions prescribed by the Hungarian Authority, including limitations regarding end-
use, re-export and re-transfer. For confirmation, end-user certificates must be 
obtained at the latest when the contract is signed. In case of re-transfer intentions, 
the Hungarian Authority must be informed by the general transfer permit user about 
the limitations of the original owner/its competent Authority. The number of the 
relevant general transfer licence and name of the issuing Hungarian Authority must 
be indicated on the shipping documents (invoice, bill of freight, packing list, etc.). 
The implementation of general licences (together with the certification process) has 
been smooth in Hungary and relatively quick. In fact the Authority published the general 
licences on its website both in Hungarian and English a few months after Decree 160 




3.5 End-user controls 
 
Government Decree 160/2011 in Article 1 gives three key definitions concerning end-
user:  
-End-user certificate: upon request of the exporting country, the declaration of the 
end-user or the country of the end-user that the equipment purchased will be used in 
the country of the end-user as intended; moreover, the goods will not be used to 
develop, produce and use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, or to aid in the 
delivery of such weapons; it may prohibit re-exporting, and include a declaration that 
it may not be re-sold without approval from the original exporting country; 
-International Import Certificate: upon request of the exporting country, the importing 
country issues an International Import Certificate, which is a statement from the 
competent Authority of the importing country that the imported equipment or 
technologies will be delivered in the specified value and for the indicated end use 
purpose, and will not be re-sold without the knowledge of the competent authorities 
of the importing country;  
-Delivery Verification Certificate: the certificate from the competent Authority of the 
end-user country that the equipment exported to the third country or delivered to 
another MS, and imported from the third country or coming from another MS arrived 
at the customs area of the end-user country; the enterprise shall be obliged to send 
the Delivery Verification Certificate to the Authority within one month of receipt of the 
goods in the customs area of the end-user country. 
For global and individual licences, the companies must also include with their 
application form an International Import Certificate and/or a copy of the buyer’s import 
licence and/or an End-user certificate, which contains a non-re-export clause by which 
the end-user has to certify that arms will not be re-exported, generally either at all or 
without the prior written approval from the original exporting State. Furthermore, the 
Authority may request a Delivery Verification Certificate, verifying that the goods 
arrived at the custom territory of the recipient country. If further data are necessary to 
assess the case, the Authority may also request other documents used to certify end 
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use. 386  According to the letter of the law, the end-user controls are extremely 
pervasive in Hungary and export under global and general licence require in any case 
a non-re-export clause. 
For general licences, controlling end use is the responsibility of the licencee; the users 
has also to keep up-to-date registration about the products shipped inward and 
outward, whereas governmental control is subsequent (national report 2014). 
However, even for general licences, secondary law, that is the Hungarian formulation 
of the specific decisions on issuing the three general licences, is particularly strict and 
requires equally strict end use documentation. Thus, Hungarian regulation is one of 
the few requiring end-user certificate also for general licences, albeit this request is 
placed in the realm of secondary law. In fact, in all three cases of general licences, the 
users must make sure to communicate to the foreign buyer/end-user the special terms 
and conditions prescribed by the Hungarian Authority, including limitations regarding 
end-use, re-export and re-transfer. For confirmation, end-user certificates must be 
obtained at the latest when the contract is signed. In case of re-transfer intentions, the 
Hungarian Authority must be informed by the general transfer permit user about the 
limitations of the original owner/its competent Authority. Also the ban on used defence 
goods for purposes linked to unconventional weapons (chemical, nuclear, and 
biological) is extended to general licences.  
The second innovative aspect that concerns global licences is the ban to re-export 
Hungarian defence materials, unless specifically authorised by prior written approval 
from the Hungarian Government, and the prohibition to use the material for purposes 
in connection with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. 
The Hungarian Government maintains full control and responsibility on the final 
destination of material under the general licences by requiring the user to attach an 
end-user certificate. Furthermore, all three general licences that have been released 
by the Hungarian Government contain the same clear clause (stated as follows): “The 
goods involved in the present general transfer licence can exclusively be used by the 
specified end-users for their own production. Unless specifically authorized by prior 
written approval from the Hungarian Authority - except for the purposes of repair and 
                                                                
386 Article 14 and Annex no 5 of the of the 2011 Hungarian Government Decree No. 160/2011 (VIII. 
18.), of 18 August 2011, on the authorisation of the export, import, transfer and transit of military 
equipment and services and the certification of enterprises, Hungarian version, 




maintenance - the end-user is not allowed to re-export/re-transfer the goods.”387 Lastly, 
according to the wording in the three licences “The goods cannot be used for any 
purpose in connection with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles 
capable of delivering such weapons. Goods cannot be re-exported or otherwise re-
sold or re-transferred to any destination subject to UN, EU or OSCE arms embargo 
where the act would be in breach of the terms of that embargo.” 388Thus the Hungarian 
formula is able to combine effectiveness and ease in the exchange of war material, 
with control over the final destination, particularly third countries. In conclusion, on the 
one hand general licences offer a relevant simplification of exporting procedures, but 
on the other the effectiveness and governmental controls on final destination and re-
export is maintained. 
However the letter of the law is different from the practice. According to what is reported 
by Hungarian officers of the Authority, it might happen that a general licence be 
released without knowing the final use and destination of this licence.389 This puts a 
veil of indeterminacy over all the strict and clear norms concerning end use. 
 
3.6 Reporting requirements 
 
Government Decree 16/2004 obliges companies to collect and send to the Hungarian 
authority data concerning defence trade transacted on the basis of individual, global 
and general transfer licences. Article 21 lists in detail by primary law all the 
information that must to be reported and the time limit to report. In fact, according to 
paragraph 3 of this Article: 
"The enterprise shall be obliged to keep up-to-date registration with the following data: 
                                                                
387 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200694 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200694 – End-user armed 
forces, law enforcement entities and intelligence agencies - Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version; 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October 2016. Hungarian 
Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision HU3FAE1200703, 
of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence – Temporary transfers for the purpose of repair, 
exhibition, presentation, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 15 March 2016. Hungarian 
Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision HU3FAE1200699 of 
2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200699 – End-user certified companies of 
another EU MS, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October  2016. 
388 Ibidem. 
389 Interview with a Hungarian officer, August 2016. 
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a) type of military equipment, 
b) quantity and value of military equipment, 
c) dates of delivery, 
d) name, address and registered office of the recipient and the end-user, 
e) end use of the military equipment, if known, and 
f) certifying that the recipient of the military equipment was informed about 
the export restriction included in the transfer licence. 
The enterprise shall be obliged to retain the data recorded in its registration according 
to Paragraph (3) and the related documentation for 5 years. The enterprise may 
provide data from its registration to the organisations specified in Paragraph (1) of 
Article 24." 
 
Companies are also obliged to report the crucial information about the value of the 
military equipment transacted in all three cases of individual, global and general 
licences. 
Paragraph 2 specifies the time limit of data reporting obligation that shall be 30 April, 
31 July and 31 October of the subject year and 28 February of the year after the subject 
year. It is important that the time limit is established by primary law. The frequency of 
communicating data gives the government the tools to exercise effective controls. The 
enterprise shall be obliged to retain the data recorded in its registration and the related 
documentation for 5 years. The enterprise shall be obliged to send the Authority the 
duplicate copy of the paper-based global transfer licence documents, used or not 
effective. 
The Hungarian regulation envisages for general licences the same reporting 
requirements as for the other two kinds of licences, with the difference that they have 
to be done ex post and not ex ante. Thus, all the licences are obliged to keep the same 
records and data and to communicate to the Hungarian authority quarterly these data.  
In summary, the 160/2011 Decree also requires the companies to collect data 
concerning the value of military equipment (unlike the UK case which will be examined  
in Chapter 6). Furthermore, it obliges by primary law the companies to communicate 
all these data every three months to the Hungarian authority, thus enabling the 
government to exercise timely controls also for general licences where the information 
must be communicated, albeit ex post, within the three months. This offers the 
Hungarian authorities the instruments to carry out effective controls and all the 
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information to be potentially communicated to the Parliament via the annual report.  
However, Hungarian Decree 160/2011 (like the Italian and British transposition laws) 
transposes the ambiguous formulation of the Directive concerning the obligation of 
communication about the end-user, “where known”, which offers a leeway to the 
exporters who are now no longer formally obliged to be aware of the final destination 
of their material that they are going to export. 
 
3.7  Certification 
 
Hungary complies with the Directive in introducing new certification for companies 
using general or global licences.  
The criteria and conditions described by the Hungarian law for companies to become 
a certified company are described in article 19 of Decree no 160/2011. They faithfully 
reflect what the Directive required. A company is considered reliable and can obtain a 
certification if (a) It has had an activity licence for foreign trade of military equipment 
as per Government Decree 160/2011 and an activity licence to produce military 
equipment as per Act CIX of 2005, both valid for at least two years; (b) In the course 
of its military foreign trade activity, it has fully complied with the legislative provisions 
of Hungarian regulation concerning arms production and transfers; c) its executive in 
charge undertakes a written obligation that the enterprise shall perform all necessary 
measures to comply with and fulfil any special terms and conditions related to the end 
use of a component or military equipment delivered; d) its executive in charge 
undertakes a written obligation that, when/if questions and examinations arise, he/she 
shall inform the competent authorities in detail about the end users and end use of 
military equipment exported, transferred, or received on the basis of the transfer 
licence of another member state; e) its executive in charge stipulated in the Internal 
Compliance Programme declares in writing that the military equipment received shall 
be used for their own production or activity. 
The certification is valid for 5 years. The deadline to evaluate an application for 
certification is 90 days. The Authority monitors the compliance of the certified company 
with the criteria described in Gov. Decree 160/2011 at least every three years in the 
form of an on-site control.  
197 
  
However it is possible for the Hungarian Authority to also withdraw a company’s 
certification. In fact, according to the following Article n. 20, if a certified enterprise does 
not comply with the terms and conditions of the certification, the Authority shall 
suspend the certificate, taking into account all the circumstances of the case and the 
requirement of proportionality. Concurrently with the suspension of the certification, the 
Authority shall oblige the enterprise to take corrective measures. The Authority shall 
examine the fulfilment of the corrective measures. If the enterprise does not take the 
prescribed corrective measures within 3 months after the suspension, the Authority 
shall withdraw the certificate.  The Authority publishes and regularly updates the list of 
Hungarian certified companies on its own website and on the European Commission 
supported CERTIDER (the European commission database for this purpose) on the 
Europa website.   
Hungary was one of the first countries to certify its enterprises. Whereas big companies 
complained about the administrative and financial costs of certification procedures, 
small Hungarian companies applied for and obtained certification.  Since 2012, four 
companies have been certified, which is a relatively high number compared with that 
of other two case studies, Italy (1) and UK (0). 
 
3.8 Principles and export bans  
 
Like in the previous regulation, Hungarian authorities in granting arms exports licences 
follow both national and European criteria. 
Article 8 of Government Decree 160/2011 lists the domestic criteria and bans on arms 
exports that need to be taken into account before releasing a licence procedure. In 
particular according to Article 8, an export application shall be rejected if it:  
a) is contrary to the international obligations of Hungary, 
b) is contrary to the interests of national economy of Hungary, 
c) is in violation of national security interests, 
d) would hinder or make impossible the performance of activities of defence, security, 
and national security affairs determined in the legal regulations, or 
e) is contrary to the criteria determined in Annex No. 2, which are the assessment 
criteria for the Common Position. 
The list is longer than that envisaged by the previous decree and includes also a 
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criterion of economic nature in line with the perspective of Directive 2009/43/EC. 
The Hungarian legislation implements the common criteria of Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of 
exports of military technology and equipment. Government Decree 160 of 2011 
contains in Article 8 an explicit reference to the criteria of the Common Position. These 
criteria are then listed and included in Annex n. 2 of the Decree making them legally 
binding in the Hungarian territory as well. Their formulation is practically identical to 
the Common Position. What changes is just that they refer to Hungary and sometimes 
they are united together, but in substance they are not even minimally different. 
According to the National Report on Arms Export Controls,390 Hungary was one of the 
MS that first applied the Code of Conduct related to the export of conventional 
weapons, approved by the European Union on 8 June 1998, which thus has become 
one of the approval criteria for applications, and became then a legally binding 
document, valid for all the MS namely the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP 
of 8 December 2008, on defining common rules governing control of exports of military 
technology and equipment on 8 December 2008.  
The government, and specifically the Authority, shall withdraw the issued licence, if the 
situation changes and thus it violates one of the criteria listed in Article 8. It is also 
possible to withdraw a licence if the enterprise violates the provisions included in this 
decree, the terms and conditions specified in the licence or the provisions of legal 
regulations related to trade. It is obligatory to justify the refusal of a licence application 
if it is contrary to national security interests or would hinder or make impossible the 
performance of defence activities and national security affairs determined in the legal 
regulation. 
Overall, the Hungarian prohibitions are legally binding, and established by the 
legislator through primary law. Hungarian restrictions are also extremely wide-ranging, 
in the sense that they apply to war materials as a whole, without exception, including 
small arms and light weapons and dual-use products. They cover individual, global and 
general licences. 
 
                                                                
390 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control (2013). 






The references to transparency are circumscribed in one article. According to Article 
23 of Government Decree 160/2011, the Minister responsible for Foreign Trade and 
the Economic Development of the Economic Zone of the Carpathian Basin shall report 
once a year on the military foreign trade licensing activity to the Parliamentary 
Committees dealing with Defence, Security, Foreign Affairs and National Security 
Affairs, respectively.  
The Article concerning transparency is very similar to that of the previous decree, with 
the difference that Decree 16/2004 stated that the Minister responsible for Foreign 
Trade shall prepare a report, instead of shall report (Art. 4.10 of Decree 16/2004). 
Furthermore the reference to the report to be prepared annually by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for the domestic public and the international community disappears 
(Art. 4.10 of Decree 16/2004). 
However de facto there is an important step forwards, because from 2010, one year 
before the approval of the Decree transposing the ICT Directive, the Hungarian 
Government started to publish its reports and put them on the Hungarian website. The 
annual report is subdivided into two main parts: the first part is devoted to the legal and 
political aspects. In this part the current legislation is explained in detail and also the 
main activities undertaken by Hungary to implement the main international treaties and 
European instruments on trade in conventional, and non-conventional arms are 
illustrated. The second part of the report, instead, is devoted to data and figures 
concerning arms imports and exports both within and outside the EU. These data cover 
individual, global and general licences; they offer information and import and export 
trends, the whole list of importers and the relative value of deliveries that year, 
subdivided per military list, according to the kind of material exported or imported, and 
distribution per macro geographic areas. These data are completed with a list of 
countries under the UE, UN, and OSCE embargos. Similar information is 
communicated to the Council for the annual consolidated report on European arms 
exports.  
As in the past, the main limit to transparency is that the report is still formally 
circumscribed to the three Parliamentary Committees and not to the whole Assembly. 
Secondly, there is no written legal requirement - by primary and secondary law -
concerning the level of qualitative and quantitative data to be reported to the Parliament 
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and to the public. However, international and European obligations, such as the Arms 
Trade Treaty and the same Common Position on European arms export, together with 
praxis confirm the direction towards greater transparency.  
  
4. Comparing the Hungarian regulatory regime before and after Directive 




In this last section of the chapter, I compare the Hungarian regulation before the 
approval of Directive 2009/43 EC (Hungarian Government Decree 16/2004) with the 
Hungarian Decree transposition of the Directive (Hungarian Government decree 
160/2011).  
I do not measure the degree of fit or misfit between European rules and existing 
institutional and regulatory traditions by comparing the European disposal in the 
Directive with the national transposition measures, but the direction of change in 
national transposition measures under European pressure, by comparing the old 
regulation with the new one introduced with the national transposition laws. 
As with the other two case studies, I focus on the policy and institutional domestic 
change along eight dimensions: (a) balance between political strategic variables and 
economic-industrial variables; (b) balance between legislative and executive power in 
regulating arms exports; (c) balance between primary law and secondary law in 
regulating arms exports; (d) balance between transparency and opacity in arms 
transfers data; (e) balance between national responsibility on the final destination of 
co-produced goods and mutual recognition principle/delegation to partner country; (f) 
balance between centralisation and checks and balances in the authorisation and 
control procedures; (g) balance between the role and weight of the state with respect 
to the role of the companies; and (h) balance between common standards and 
fragmentation in arms export control rules. 
In order to measure the direction of change more precisely and also the intensity of 
change at the domestic level, I use a scale of intensity for each of the eight dimensions. 
The scale is based exclusively on the disposal and legal formulation of the regulation 
of arms export control and transparency. Overall lower values are associated with a 
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pro-industry model of European arms exports whereas higher values with a restrictive 
model, where ethical and political values prevail. 
 
4.2  Political and strategic variables versus economic and industrial variables  
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
The 2004 Hungarian regulation did not make any reference to economic and industrial 
variables in assessing the granting of export licence. All the criteria and bans to exports 
were of a political nature. 
In fact, according to Article 5 of Government Decree n. 160/2004, “The export and 
transit of military equipment and the provision service shall not be licenced: a) to 
countries in armed conflict; b) to countries under military embargo by the UN Security 
Council, the Council of the European Union and to organisations and individuals 
forbidden by the EU and international provisions against terrorism. Furthermore, export 
licences shall not be released if the transactions contradict the EU Code of Conduct 
Criteria. According to Article 19, the Decree shall be in compliance with the criteria of 
the European Code of Conduct, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 8 
June 1998. These criteria are part of Government Decree n. 160/2004 as an 
attachment, but not Article 10 of the Code of Conduct, which refers to economic 
principles. 
The words linked to economy were absent from the whole Decree. Even in the case of 
an explicit limit to transparency and the diffusion of information, the official motivation 
is not of a commercial nature (“commercial confidentiality”) but once again of a political 
nature because it is linked to the necessity to classify information for security reasons. 
Thus, the rank of the Hungarian regulation before the transposition of Directive 
2009/43/EC is 5.  
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
On the contrary, the approach informing Directive n. 2009/43/EC is of an economic 
and industrial nature. The aim of the Directive is to strengthen the defence industry at 
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the European level, by reducing obstacles to the exchange of parts, components and 
finished arms systems within the EU boundaries among commercial partners and thus 
as a consequence contribute to the Common Foreign, Security and Defence policy. 
The starting point for arms trade regulation is no longer represented by political 
principles in the field of foreign policy, security and defence, under which economic 
variables are subordinated. On the contrary, the freedom to move goods (extended to 
defence goods with some caveats) is the principle, whereas political principles of 
national regulation (foreign policy, security policy and international law principles 
concerning respect for human rights, the prevention of conflicts) in this sensitive field 
of arms exports, are exceptions which must be used only in extraordinary cases, if the 
essential security interest is at stake, under certain conditions (necessity and 
proportionality), with MS holding the burden of proof. 391 This different functional 
approach which has allowed the circumvention of political obstacles reflects a different 
paradigm and attitude towards arms export policy and even a different function of law.  
As a consequence, the new Decree No 160/2011 transposing the Directive introduces 
for the first time an explicit reference to economic variables. In fact, according to Article 
8 devoted to criteria and bans an application shall have to be rejected if it is a) contrary 
to the international obligations of Hungary and b) it is contrary to the interests of 
Hungary’s national economy (national economy interpreted widely). There is no 
hierarchy between political and economic variables, thus the rank assigned to 
Hungarian regulation after the transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC is 3. 
 
However, the economic principle has a wide interpretation, covering the whole national 
economy of Hungary and not just the profit of defence companies, in the awareness 
that these two aspects cannot always coincide. This is in line with the approach of both 
the left and right wings of the Hungarian Members of Parliament, which were oriented 
to give priority to national economy and employment issues, over the interest of the 
defence sector, particularly during the economic crises which have shocked the 
countries several times after the collapse of communism in 1989. And this is equally in 
harmony with the overall approach of the Hungarian Government which, for example, 
                                                                
391 Koutrakos (2013).  
203 
  
has chosen to use the offsets concerning one of the biggest contracts with Sweden all 
in the civilian sector. 392 
 
4.3  Primary law versus secondary law 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
In Hungarian regulation preceding the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC, the primary 
law detailed precisely a) the export control licensing procedures and b) export criteria, 
but c) norms on transparency were treated in a vaguer way and mostly delegated to 
the executive for the details. In fact, firstly the export licence procedures were 
enshrined by primary regulation, explaining in detail all three phases in which it was 
articulated (activity licence, Art. 7, negotiation licences, Art. 9, and export licence, 
Art.10), including the obligations to attach End-user certificates (Art. 10) and Delivery 
Verification Certificate (Art.14). Furthermore, Decree 16/2004 clearly states the 
obligation of monthly reporting on licences and deliveries for companies (Art.6): it is 
important that primary law details time limit, information and attachments and reporting 
requirement necessary for all companies applying for activity, negotiation and export 
licences. All these aspects acted as a limit to the discretion of the executive.393  
Secondly, Hungarian regulation listed the criteria and bans to exports in a clear and 
unambiguous way, making them easy to apply, in Article 5 of the 2004 Decree. The 
criteria of the European Code of Conduct are also included in the Hungarian Regulation 
(see Article 19.2 according to which the Decree shall be in compliance with the EU 
Code of Conduct on arms export of 8 June 1998 and annex n.2 of the 16/2004 Decree). 
Thus Hungary was one of the first countries making the Code criteria legally binding 
                                                                
392 In December 2001 Hungary signed a contract to lease 14 Gripen JAS 39 fighter aircraft for 12 years 
from the Swedish Government, at a cost of HUF130–140 billion ($479–516 million). Sweden offset 100 
percent of HUF108 billion ($400 million) value of the lease, 30 percent of the nine-year package will be 
re-invested in Hungary and the remainder in the form of Hungarian exports to Sweden and other 
countries. With the signing of the lease in December 2001, Swedish investment is calculated at 48 
million euros for the first nine years of the contract, an investment that is expected to create 9,000 jobs, 
see B. Mariani (2002), p 3. 
393  In order to be more precise, in reference to point a) and b) there are some aspects which could be 
better explained by primary law, such as sanctions and penalties, the lacking definition of International 
Import Certificate, and other end-user documentation such as Delivery Verification Certificates, leaving 
a marge of ambiguity over the delicate cases of re-export. Lastly, all the information required for transfer 
licences are not listed in the Decree but once again delegated to the Office which establishes the format.  
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by primary law, whereas other western partners only transposed the criteria of the 
Code of Conduct with the status of guidance, placing them at a secondary law level. 
Thirdly, however, the references by primary law to c) transparency remains generic. 
Albeit the Hungarian regulation embodies important steps forward with the introduction 
of Article 4.3 - according to which the Minister of Economy and Transport shall prepare 
a report once a year - this report is restricted to three parliamentary committees and is 
not extended to the whole Assembly. Furthermore, the 16/2004 Decree does not 
specify the quality and quantity of data to be reported to the three inter-ministerial 
committees. It is a choice of the government to decide the level of information to report 
to the Parliament and to the general public. Thus, the primary law in Hungary regulates 
in detail only two of the three pillars of any arms export control regulation and as a 
consequence, the overall mark assigned to the Hungarian regulation before the 
transposition of the Directive is 4. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
Overall Hungarian Decree 160/2011 transposition of the Directive maintains the same 
level of details specified by primary law as in the past. It continues to detail precisely 
a) the export control licensing procedures, and b) the export criteria but not the norms 
on transparency which remain vague. In fact, Decree 160/2011 explains in detail the 
three phases of the authorisation procedures and the terms and conditions for granting 
the three kinds of licences - individual transfer licences, global transfer licences and 
general licences (Art.11, 12 and Annexes 3-11 to the Decree), enshrines certification 
procedures (Art. 23), data reporting and deadlines to be reported by companies to 
government including value, quantity and final destination for all the three kinds of 
licences (reporting requirement Art 21), thus offering all the information to carry out 
controls and extend transparency to the two new kinds of licences as well.  
Despite some aspects such as end-user control and re-export controls being left in 
detail to secondary law (Art.13 of the Decree and General Transfer Licences of 2 July 
2012),394 Hungary distinguishes itself among the three case studies for the high degree 
                                                                
394 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200694 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200694 – End-user armed 
forces, law enforcement entities and intelligence agencies - Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version; 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October 2018). 
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of detail in its primary regulation and for the ability to extend this intrusive control to 
global and general licences as well. 395  Overall, the Hungarian transposition law 
represents a good practice in the capacity to combine new forms of intra-Community 
exchange of defence material with the reformulation of efficient controls. Secondly, (b) 
the criteria and bans on exports are equally enshrined in a clear and easily applicable 
way (Art. 8). However, as in the past, the new transposition law continues not to detail 
the level of transparency in terms of quality and quantity of data to be reported to the 
Parliament. The reference to the general public disappears, whereas the general 
obligation for the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Economic Development to report to 
the three parliamentarian committees once a year remains (Art. 23). 396Thus, the 
overall mark of the Hungarian regulation transposing the Directive remains at 4.397 
  
4.4  Legislative branch versus executive branch 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
The Hungarian regulation before the approval of Directive 16/2004 detailed by primary 
law all the licensing procedures, including end-user certificates to be attached and 
subsequent controls, and all the bans and criteria to be followed for arms export 
licences, but remained generic in the third pillar, that is transparency (see dimension 
n.2). The power of the Parliament in assessing arms export licence was ex post and it 
was limited furthermore by the fact that it was not presented to the whole Assembly, 
but just to the three ministerial subcommittees. The data contained in the national 
report include value, category, final destination and cover both licences and deliveries, 
thus offering the basic instrument to carry control but it did not extend to sensitive 
                                                                
395 Details also for global and general licences in a more integrated context. The NEW Decree, in fact 
specifies definitions, certification procedures, data reporting and deadlines to be reported by companies 
to the government, all the information required for individual and global licences, by primary law. 
396 Article 23. The Minister responsible for Foreign Trade and the Economic Development of the 
Economic Zone of the Carpathian Basin shall report once a year on the military foreign trade licensing 
activity to the parliamentary committees dealing with defence, security, foreign affairs and national 
security affairs, respectively. 
397 As a side note it is important to underline that the new Decree improves the detail of primary law in 
some important aspects which are not directly required by the Directive: firstly it introduces new 
definitions including the definition of the international import certificate, and the norms on re-exports 
which have crucial importance. Secondly it is very detailed in the format, information and attachments 
required for individual and global licences. Thirdly it introduces a new section on controls and penalties 
(Art. 24).  
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information (see dimension n. 4). Thus, the rank assigned to the Hungarian regulation 
before the approval and transposition of the Directive was 3.  
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
In Hungary the transposition of the Directive in 2011 did not significantly change the 
balance of power between the legislative and the executive, as in Italy. On the contrary 
the balance, remained more or less the same, with the exception that necessarily for 
general licences the executive has more power in establishing some specific 
conditions and particularly end-user requirements. Secondly, arms export data which 
are not reported in the authorisation phase are reported ex post in the delivery phase. 
Thus, the rank remains the same: 3.  
 
4.5  Transparency versus opacity 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
In Hungary, transparency has been a relatively new development. In fact for a long 
time there was no annual report to the Parliament. However, under the pressure of the 
European Union and in conformity with the needs often expressed at the United 
Nations for greater transparency in international arms trade, seen as a means of 
increasing mutual trust internationally and of preventing the development of conflict, 
Hungary undertook important steps forward so that Government Decree 16/2004 
established two kinds of reports. The first is the report required by the European Code 
of Conduct on European Arms export, concerning arms exports broken down by 
military category and it is addressed to the international community and public (Art. 
4.8); the second concerns arms exports activities and regulation and it is presented 
every year by the Ministry of the Economy but its diffusion is limited to the Defence 
Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, and the National Security Affairs 
Committee of the Hungarian Parliament (Art. 4.7).  
The Hungarian annual reports did not contain sensitive data concerning banking 
transactions or companies but it did include all the basic information on the military 
category of arms, the value and the final destination. The data are aggregated by final 
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destination and military category. They include both licences and deliveries. The 
information concerned all kinds of arms exported (including small arms), and all 
licences (and deliveries), including co-productions and global licences. Thus, the rank 
of the Hungarian regulation before the transposition of the Directive was 3.  
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
Directive 2009/43/EC does not explicitly treat transparency and reporting to the 
Parliament. This lack of explicit reference to transparency offers MS the opportunity 
not to extend the norms of transparency to the new general licences. This aspect has 
created concern among European non-governmental organisations about the impact 
on transparency. This is not an easy task because it requires rethinking new forms of 
transparency for the new kinds of licences which are introduced by the Directive. In 
fact, some information such as value, quantity, kind of defence material exported and 
final destination are no longer collected in the licensing phase and consequently 
transparency is necessarily reduced during this phase. However it is possible to collect 
this information ex post and to communicate it to the Parliament. Some MS have used 
the directive, under the pressure of defence companies, to reduce transparency or at 
least introduce ambiguity about transparency on general and global licences, others 
have instead tried to extend the same norms on transparency for individual licences 
also to the new kinds of licences, global and general.  
After the approval of the Directive, there were some steps forward and some steps 
back, but in substance the rank is the same. In fact, on the one hand the first report 
was presented to the Parliament, and since then the lengthiness of the report has 
increased progressively. On the other hand, the information concerning general 
licences are necessarily less detailed than those concerning individual and global 
licences because the information on value and quantity are not collected in this phase. 
However, data on new licences are recovered in the delivery phase, and reported 
among the delivery data. In a nutshell the annual report does not contain sensitive data 
on banking transactions or companies but it does include all the basic information 
concerning the military category of arms, the value and the final destination. The data 
are aggregated by final destination and military category. They include both licences 




4.6  Responsibility versus delegation 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43  
After the collapse of the Berlin wall, with the drastic decrease of military expenditures 
in the former Eastern bloc Countries and the opening to the market economy, some 
Eastern European Countries started to consider defence material goods similar to 
other civilian goods. Consequently, there were cases of exports to countries in conflict 
(such as the former Yugoslavia), or violating human rights. Some Human Rights 
Organisations and the same NATO representatives exercised pressure so that Eastern 
European Countries would tighten controls of their regulations which were considered 
permissive and lax in some regards. As a consequence, several CEES increased their 
systems of control on the final destination. Hungary was one of the countries that 
worked in making its control stricter and Decree 16/2004 represents an important step 
in this direction.  
According to Art10.5 of Decree 16/2004, it was always obligatory that all applications 
for export of any kinds of defence material were accompanied by three documents 
concerning end-user: the International Import Certificate (IIC), the End-User Certificate 
(EUC), and a Declaration of the buyer. These obligations are valid for exports of any 
kind of defence material (part, component or finished material). The number of 
certifications is reduced to 1 - but not eliminated - in cases of export to EU and NATO 
countries.  
Under Article 13, the IIC must contain a Declaration that the imported military 
equipment and service will be utilized solely with the terms and conditions stipulated 
in the Declaration. However, the primary law does not specify exactly what these 
conditions are. This put a veil of ambiguity on norms concerning re-exports. Thus, this 
lack of specification puts Hungary’s rank prior to approval of the Directive at just 3. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree No. 160/2011 
The EU Directive invites MS to dramatically reduce the use of End-user certificates in 
intra-Community transfers under general licence, also in line with the new 
interpretation of the European Court of Justice, considering defence goods like other 
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traded goods, with some relevant exceptions. However, each MS is free to choose the 
degree of controls that it wants to maintain also in intra-Community transfers. Thus, 
Hungary is exposed to two pressures for Europeanisation going in different directions: 
reducing end-user certificates in transfers of defence material among partner 
countries, and on the contrary, strengthening end-user controls and preventing the risk 
of diversion. The result is an original attempt to conjugate flexibility and the use of 
general licences in intra-Community transfers with controls on final destination. The 
facility to rethink controls in a more integrated context is facilitated by the marginal role 
of the defence industry. 
Decree 160/2011 transposing Directive 43, in fact, extends the end-user controls that 
it applied to individual licences, to global licences (sic et simpliciter) and even to 
general licences. It is important to underline that Hungary is one of the few EU 
countries that envisages strict end-user controls also in case of general licences. In 
fact the texts of all three general licences that have been granted by the Hungarian 
government since 2011, include for the companies using this kind of licence the 
obligation to attach an End-user certificate and prohibits re-export without a written 
approval by the Hungarian Government. Furthermore, in line with the overall trend of 
strengthening end-user controls, it requires a declaration by the importer not to use 
these arms for any purpose linked with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or 
missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Thirdly, defence material cannot be re-
exported or otherwise re-sold or re-transferred to any destination subject to UN, EU or 
OSCE arms embargo where the act would be in breach of the terms of that embargo.398  
Lastly, considering the long lapse of time covered by general licences which often refer 
to coproduction which might last several years and more than a decade, the Hungarian 
government requires the importers to renew the end-user commitments, considering 
that the conditions, as well as governments or company managers, may change over 
a long period of time. Overall this effort to rethink end-user controls in a changed 
                                                                
398 Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200694 of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200694 – End-user armed 
forces, law enforcement entities and intelligence agencies - Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version,; 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October 2016 . 
Hungarian Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision 
HU3FAE1200703, of 2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence –Temporary transfers for the 
purpose of repair, exhibition, presentation, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October 2016. Hungarian 
Trade Licensing Office - Authority on Military Industry and Export Control, Decision HU3FAE1200699 of 
2 July 2012, issuing General Transfer Licence HU3FAE1200699 – End-user certified companies of 
another EU MS, Budapest 2nd July 2012, English version, 
http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, last accessed 21 October 2016. 
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environment of globalised and Europeanised context of production offers some 
interesting suggestions and translates the Hungarian formulation into good practice 
which is able to combine efficient controls with the introduction of general licences.  
However, it is important to underline that end-user requirements for general licences 
are stated by secondary law. Furthermore, after an interview with officers of the 
Hungarian authority it emerged that in practice the decision on whether to request an 
import licence, an IIC, or an EUC is made on a case-by-case basis and, more 
importantly, in cases of co-production, “the export licence is issued for the country 
where the manufacturing site of the industry is located: this data is included in the 
reports. At the time of the issuance of an export licence you may have absolutely no 
information about where in the future the finished product will end up”. 399 Therefore, a 
crucial margin of flexibility in final destination is maintained in practice. As a 
consequence the rank remains 3. 
 
4.7  Common standards versus fragmentation 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
The Decree of 16/2004 in Hungary envisaged only one kind of licence: individual 
licence. Bans and criteria, norms on transparency are applied in a uniform and unique 
way to all individual licences. Export criteria are formulated in a clear and unique way. 
There is one interpretation and application which is established at the primary law level 
and extended to all the licences. A simplified procedure for arms export to NATO and 
UE countries concerns only the possibility of not asking for a negotiation licence and 
of having only an end-user certificate instead of three, therefore not affecting the 
                                                                
399 According to a civil servant of the Hungarian Trade Licensing office, “The authority would prefer to 
have all 3 documents submitted together with an export licence application and we require companies 
to try and obtain all of them. It prefers that state authority of the importing country verify documents, 
therefore they would accept an IIC. However in case of governmental procurements there is only an 
EUC available. The decision on whether an import licence, an IIC or an EUC is asked for and accepted 
in relation to a global or individual licence application is decided on a case-by-case basis and depends 
mostly on what types of documents are available in the importer country. The export licence is issued 
for the country where the manufacturing site of the industry is located: this data is included in the reports. 
At the time of the issuance of an export licence you could have absolutely no information about where 
in the future the finished product will end up.” Interview to a civil servant of the Hungarian Trade 
Licensing Office of 24 June 2016. 
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fundamental aspects of the regulation. Thus, the rank of the Hungarian arms export 
control regulation is 5.  
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
After the transposition of the Directive, the Hungarian legislator introduces two differing 
procedures between intra-Community transfer and export to third countries and three 
kinds of licences for intra-Community transfers, that are general, global and individual 
licences (plus a fourth one concerning firearms and ammunitions according to 
regulation EU n 258/2012). As a consequence, the degree of fragmentation increases. 
Furthermore, the new decree also includes among export criteria one concerning the 
national economy of Hungary, without establishing a clear order of priority between 
political and economic criteria, thus increasing ambiguity slightly, at least formally. 
However the same controls, bans and norms on transparency are also extended to 
global and general licences in a unique and homogeneous way. Control on final 
destinations are equally strong (albeit established by secondary law) and the regulation 
remains clear and unambiguous in its fundamental parts. Thus the rank of the 
Hungarian regulation dropped to 4. 
 
4.8  Checks and balances versus centralisation 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
The Hungarian political system, particularly during the communist period, had a 
tradition of high centralisation of all the tasks concerning arms export control and 
transparency which overcame the same national boundaries to be managed at the 
Warsaw Pact level. However during the 1990s and the early 2000s, some important 
steps in the direction of checks and balances were undertaken. 
As a consequence the 16/2004 Decree embodies these steps towards 
decentralisation. First of all, the administrative tasks have been separated by political 
tasks, with the creation of two Commissions, the Committee on Foreign Trade in 
Military Equipment and the Committee on Licensing of Foreign Trade in Military 
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Equipment. Secondly, both these Commissions with delicate political and technical 
tasks have been set up with a collegial composition. 
The Inter-ministerial Committee on Foreign Trade in Military Equipment, which had the 
central task of elaborating criteria and setting policies related to licensing of 
international trade of military equipment was made up by State Secretaries of the 
Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Justice and Security, Ministry of Foreign affairs, 
Ministry of Economy and Transport and a person appointed by the Minister without 
portfolio directing civilian national security. The chairman of the Committee was 
appointed by the Prime Minister, whereas the Secretary was appointed by the Minister 
of Economy and Transport. (Art. 3). The Committee on Licensing of Foreign Trade in 
Military Equipment, with the tasks of formulating expert opinions related to 
trade/activity was inter-ministerial in its composition and independent in its power of 
proposal. (Art. 4). 
Administrative tasks remained centralised in the hands of the “Office” which depends 
on the Ministry of Economy and Transport. The office regrouped several tasks from 
licence granting, to deliveries and controls of registers filled in monthly by companies 
(Art. 6.4), to End-user certificate collection (Art. 13.2) to controls on end-user and on 
company registers and reporting. In some of these tasks it was flanked by other 
different subjects, such as the Custom and Financial Guards, in the delivery phase. It 
is important to underline that at the primary law level the role of the judiciary, sanctions 
and penalties are not treated in the decree, but they are readdressed to the national 
codes. Thus, the rank assigned to the Hungarian regulation is 3. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
After the transposition of the Directive the two Commissions disappeared in the text 
of the new Decree 160/2011. Most of the administrative tasks are the responsibility of 
the Authority of Defence Industry and export control which operates under the political 
control of the Ministry for National Development and Economy, in collaboration with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The responsibilities of the Authority of Defence Industry 
and Export Control of the Hungarian Trade Licensing Office are extensive and 
structured and range from (a) issuing licences, (b) performing controls and monetary 
sanctions, (c) having jurisdiction to control and impose fines, (d) registering and 
managing data and reports on licences. The system appears highly centralised but at 
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the same time there is also a form of collegiality for the specific crucial tasks of licence 
granting. In fact, according to Article 7 of the 2011 Decree “The Authority shall issue 
the licences requesting the expert opinion of the Minister responsible for Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister responsible for Foreign Trade and the Economic Development of 
the Economic Zone of the Carpathian Basin, the Minister responsible for Security, the 
Minister responsible for National Defence, and the respective leaders of the 
Constitution Protection Office, the Information Office, the Special Service for National 
Security, the Military National Security Service, the National Police Headquarters, and 
the National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary.”400 Furthermore the judicial 
tasks are clearly enshrined in a specific part of the new decree. Thus, after the 
transposition of the directive the Hungarian rank is 2. 
  
4.9  States versus companies 
 
Hungarian regulation according to Government Decree 16/2004 (II.6.) before the 
approval and transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
The Hungarian regulation before the approval of the Directive was prescriptive and 
entailed a strong control on the activities of the companies, including financial aspects. 
In fact, according to Article 6.2 “The companies shall be obliged to provide monthly 
information to the Office about the licence portfolio and the trade transacted, until the 
15th day of the month after the month concerned, on the form implemented by the 
Office.” At the same time, however there was a first form of responsibility because 
companies were requested to verify and be responsible for the reliability of the buyer, 
end-user and the mediators or brokers (Art. 10.7). Thus the rank was 4. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and Hungarian regulation after the 
transposition of the Directive with Decree 160/2011 
One of the explicit aims of Directive 2009/43/EC is that of increasing the responsibility 
of economic actors in arms export control procedures. Thus, according to the letter of 
                                                                
400 Article 7 of the 2011 Hungarian Government Decree No. 160/2011 (VIII. 18.), of 18 August 2011, 
on the authorisation of the export, import, transfer and transit of military equipment and services and the 
certification of enterprises, Hungarian version, http://mkeh.gov.hu/haditechnika/hadikulker_2012/I#top, 
last accessed 21 October 2018. 
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the Directive, companies are responsible for undertaking ex post controls, finding a 
reliable partner, and communicating to the partner the bans and criteria imposed by 
their government in case of re-exports. They are also responsible for managing 
operations under global and general licences.  
The Directive per se increases the power and responsibility of the companies whereas 
it reduces the burden of the state in undertaking strict ex ante controls. As a 
consequence, the transposition of the Directive has entailed necessarily an increase 
of tasks of companies in this field. However, these new responsibilities are not 
enshrined by primary law but by secondary law.  
The text of the three general licences granted in Hungary, in fact, states that the users 
of the general transfer licence have to make sure to communicate to the foreign buyer 
the special terms and conditions prescribed by the Hungarian Authority, including 
limitations regarding end-use, re-export and re-transfer. For confirmation end-user 
certificates must be obtained at the latest when the contract is signed. In case of re-
transfer intention, the Hungarian authority must be informed by the company about the 
limitation of the original owner. 401 Thus, despite the control of the state remaining 
strong both via end-user certificates that are also required in cases of general licences 
for confirmation and for the very detailed reporting, the responsibility of the Hungarian 




In this case study chapter devoted to Hungary I undertook the following steps. Firstly, 
I explained the context of the Hungarian regulation especially the relationship between 
the three branches of power and the relationships between the state and the market, 
the policy philosophy and policy goals in the arms trade sector. Secondly, I analysed 
Hungarian regulation before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC and thirdly I 
investigated the law transposition of the Directive in its main features. Then, I 
compared the Hungarian regulation before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC 
                                                                
401  After the transposition of the EU Directive, Hungarian companies are no longer required to give 
detailed information in the authorisation phases for general licences, but, according to Article 21 must 
give all the information ex post. This information which includes quantity, quality, value and final 
destination of the defence goods transferred under general licence, must be communicated to the 
Hungarian Government quarterly. 
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(Hungarian Government Decree 16/2004) with the Hungarian Decree transposition of 
the Directive (Hungarian Government decree 160/2011), in order to explore the 
direction and intensity of domestic change along eight fundamental dimensions. 
In order to measure the direction of change more precisely and also the intensity of 
change at the domestic level, I used a scale of intensity for each of the eight 
dimensions. Overall lower values are associated with a pro-industry model of 
European arms exports whereas higher values are connected to a restrictive model, 
where ethical and political values prevail. 
 
5.1 Peculiarities of the Hungarian case study 
 
The Hungarian case study has been extremely challenging and interesting. In fact, 
most of the literature and primary sources were written in Hungarian, so it really was a 
slow unearthing of information. As the translation proceeded some unexpected side 
empirical findings were found. 
Firstly, I found that Hungary was characterised by an important peculiarity, the marginal 
role of the defence industry. If Eastern European Countries have a smaller defence 
industry compared to prime contractors and main EU exporters, then the Hungarian 
industry is even tinier, nearly irrelevant. The limited role of the defence industry lobby, 
which is a very important variable in arms export policies and regulation, makes this 
case study extremely interesting from a scientific point of view because it is like 
insulating arms market and production by this elephant in the room that is defence 
industry pressure. At the same time, the other significant societal actor in this field, 
namely the NGOs working for arms control, transparency, peace and disarmament, 
also have a marginal role in Hungary. This has important consequences in the 
decision-making process of arms transfer control regulation, which has been smoother, 
and in the legal formulation which is clear and unambiguous, unlike most other EU 
partners.  
Secondly, I chose Hungary, together with Italy and the UK because I thought they 
represented a group of countries which, after the collapse of bipolarism, was 
characterised by extremely lax and permissive regulation. On the contrary, I found that 
from the early Nineties until mid-2000, Hungarian regulation, particularly during the 




5.2  The Hungarian regulation before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
The starting point of the comparison is the Hungarian regulation of 2004. In that period 
Hungary occupied an intermediate level between the two, having elements of both 
models as well as some particularities such as a strong presence of transnational 
companies.402 Similarly, Hungary’s initial marks for the eight dimensions before the 
approval of the Directive were roughly medium. These middle scores are the result of 
a process to approach European standards, which had begun once Hungary applied 
to join the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Hungary’s 
strong desire to learn from other partners is witnessed by the numerous meetings, 
forums, conferences, and multilateral agreements, the Hungarian Government had 
participated in since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, important first steps forward had 
already been made before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC, with regard to 
transparency, national responsibility and control of the final destination of defence 
goods, decentralisation and the checks and balance system. But what happened with 
the transposition of EU Directive 2009/43/EC? What was the direction, intensity, 
degree and scope of domestic change? 
 
5.3 Empirical findings  
 
Empirical findings in the Hungarian case study show a slight move towards a pro-
industry model as a consequence of the transposition of EU Directive 2009/43/EC. 
However, these changes are less marked than in the Italian case and are absent in 
four of the eight dimensions.  
In the graph below the blue line indicates Hungarian Regulation before the approval of 
the Directive, the orange line after the transposition law. The orange shape becomes 
smaller and nears the centre which symbolises an ideal pro-industry model. However, 
                                                                





some important dimensions remain stable: Legislative vs executive, transparency vs 
opacity, responsibility vs delegation, primary law vs secondary law. 
Figure 5.2 Direction and intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the 




 restrictive arms exports control model 
 pro -industry arms exports control model 
 
 
5.4 The eight dimensions 
 
In fact in Hungary (a) the balance between political strategic variables versus economic 
and industrial variables changed in favour of economic and industrial variables, with 
the introduction of new economic criteria guiding export licence assessment and 
granting; (b) the certainty of the law diminished in favour of fragmentation of primary 
law with the introduction of two new kinds of licences; (c) the role of the state decreased 
slightly compared to companies which became responsible for informing the 
partner/importing company of all the export conditions established by the Hungarian 
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several administrative tasks (from licence granting to delivery checking) to the 
Hungarian Authority (HTLO). 
On the other hand, however, domestic change did not affect the fundamental and 
substantial aspects of Hungarian national regulation. In fact the a) balance between 
legislative and executive branches remained untouched; b) the subjects treated by 
primary law and delegated to secondary law remained the same. From a certain 
perspective there were changes; (c) the degree of transparency in arms exports 
policies and data did not decrease, and (d) the degree of responsibility on the final 
destination of defence material exported by the Hungarian territory including cases of 
coproduction under the new kinds of licences was untouched. In fact, the end-user 
certificate was extended to general and global licences. And it was forbidden to re-
export without the written approval of the Hungarian Government even for material 
under global and general licences. This is unique among the three case studies.  
 
Table 5.5 Intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the transposition 
of Directive 2009/43/EC: the Hungarian case (changes from 2008 to 2012) 
 
HUNGARY 2008  2012 
Political vs economic variables 
5 3 
Legislative vs executive branch 3 3 
Transparency vs opacity  
3 3 
Responsibility vs delegation 
3 3 
Primary law vs secondary law 
4 4 
Checks and balances vs centralisation 
3 2 
Certainty of law versus fragmentation and 
flexibility 
5 4 




5.5 The scope of domestic change 
 
Unlike Italy (and the UK), the Hungarian transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC did not 
impact some fundamental aspects of the domestic regulation concerning transparency, 
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the balance between executive and legislative, control on final destination of defence 
material, and the degree of detail of primary law. The Hungarian Government was able 
to introduce the changes required by the Directive aimed at facilitating exchange of 
defence material between EU MS without impacting the fundamental pillars of the 
domestic regulation.  
Thus, in Hungary, the scope of domestic change is limited to “policy instruments” and 
it does not touch the “fundamental paradigms” nor does it change policy goals. Peter 
Hall in a famous article disaggregates the process whereby policy changes into three 
subtypes, according to the magnitude of the changes involved. First order change 
concerns change of policy instrument settings, second order refers to policy 
instruments and third order extend to policy aims and overarching paradigms. Using 
Peter Hall’s categories, in Hungary the transposition of the Directive has modified the 
techniques and policy instruments, without radically altering the hierarchy of goals, but 
not the overarching goals that guide policy (second order change). On the contrary, in 
Italy, the transposition of the Directive affected the same perspective and aims of the 
law, thus inscribing a wider and more radical change (third order change).403 
 
5.6  Side findings   
 
a) The role of societal actors 
The absence of a strong defence industry lobby is the first macroscopic difference with 
the Italian case. In Italy, these actors especially have pressed the government to use 
the Directive to renew domestic regulation and completely change the approach, the 
same “philosophy” of arms trade control, thus pressing to increase the scope of 
domestic change. In Hungary, where the defence industrial lobby is nearly absent, 
domestic change has been limited to some adjustments to policy instruments. Thus, 
among various factors, a possible interpretation is that the presence/absence of actors 
has influenced the scope of domestic change. 
Secondly, the ease with which the Hungarian Government has been able to transpose 
the EU Directive (which however created some problems of compatibility with the 
domestic regulation and tradition) and to conjugate the introduction of general and 
                                                                
403 P.A. Hall (1993) “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic 
Policymaking in Britain” Comparative Politics, Vol. 25(3): 275-296. 
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global licences while maintaining the traditional paradigms of national regulation, is 
probably also due to the absence of pressure from societal actors such as defence 
companies and NGOs. Overall, the absence of a strong industrial lobby and NGO lobby 
has made the transposition much easier and more linear than for other countries. 
Ambiguity and non-knowledge are reduced to a minimum level in this case study.  
b) The role of bureaucrats 
Hungarian bureaucrats/civil servants show a moderate attitude towards the opportunity 
to change offered by the European Directive on intra-Community transfers. They do 
not use the Directive to sharply change domestic regulation in a pro-industry direction. 
On the contrary they are quite conservative, in maintaining domestic regulation and 
limiting the changes to what is strictly required by domestic tradition and Hungarian 
paradigms.  
Thus once again, comparing the Italian to the Hungarian case can offer some 
interesting empirical food for thought. In Italy, where there is a strong industrial lobby 
there has been a third order change. In Hungary this change has been more limited. 
In Italy even some representatives of the administration seemed more in favour of a 
radical domestic change, in Hungary the approach of civil servants was more prudent 
and limited to a second/first order change. One explanation could be that state actors 
are influenced by the industrial lobby and so civil servants in these cases are not the 
real actor/agents of change but are influenced by societal actors such as defence 
companies. 
Thus these empirical findings partly contradict the state theorists who claim that the 
key agents pushing for change are the experts working for the state (or close to the 
state) and that the state acts autonomously from societal actors. On the contrary they 
support Peter Hall’s articulation of the analysis that sustains the state acts rather 
autonomously on first and second order changes but act under societal actor pressure 
for third order change. 
 
c) Two Europeanisation processes?  
Lastly the Hungarian case clearly shows that the direction of the Europeanisation 
process is not unique but depends not only on domestic variables, but also on the 
nature of the decision-making process. The Hungarian case shed light on and allowed 
observation of two distinct Europeanisation processes with two different directions and 
aims. The first which mostly took place in the early Nineties until the mid-2000s, 
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through intergovernmental channels and focused on arms export to third countries 
(non-European) in the framework of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Thanks 
to this process Hungarian regulation increased in transparency and end-user control 
especially from the early Nineties to the early 2000s, thereby raising the value of some 
dimensions towards an ethical export model. The second, originating in the economic 
context of progressive integration, was based on the extension of the TFEU articles on 
the freedom of movements of goods also to defence goods and led, thanks to the 
proactive role of the Commission and the ECJ to the Directive on Intra-Community 
transfer, thus decreasing other dimensions towards a pro-industry model. The 
Hungarian case has demonstrated further that these two apparently opposite 
directions are not irreconcilable, but rather might work together by covering both the 
internal and external markets, increasing efficiency together with transparency in a 
context characterised by no pressures or exploitation by societal actors. 404 
In conclusion, overall the impact of the EU Directive on intra-community defence 
transfers transposition indicates a slight move of the Hungarian regulatory system 
towards a pro-industry model. However, these changes are less marked than in the 
Italian case and are absent in four of the eight dimensions. Hungary is able to introduce 
the new general and global licences, certification systems and new export controls by 
maintaining the same degree of responsibility, control and transparency that was 
applied for individual licences. The changes introduced are mainly linked to what is 
strictly required by the Directive without going further and without changing any 
fundamental pillars of the Hungarian domestic regulation. This is probably due to the 
marginal role and pressure of the domestic defence industry. 
  
                                                                
404 This means that in certain conditions it is technically and politically possible to simplify exchange of 
defence material, without diminishing political control, power of the Parliament and control on the final 
destination in case the good to conjugate efficiency with democratic controls. One side methodological 
finding is that the eight dimensions are not interdependent, at least for certain conditions in the 






Chapter 6. The impact of Directive 2009/43/EC on UK regulation on 





This case study has been chosen as representative of those European countries 
characterised by a flexible and liberal arms export control regulation. The UK arms 
export model is very similar in spirit, goals and regulatory approach, to Directive 
2009/43/EC. Thus, the degree of “misfit” between the European rules and domestic 
regulation is very low. Furthermore, the UK is characterised by a strong defence 
industry ranking first among the EU and by an active, multifaceted constellation of 
NGOs dealing with disarmament and arms control.  
The present chapter is organised along similar lines as the other case studies. The first 
introductory section offers information on the main features of the UK defence industry 
and the role of the societal actors. The second section thoroughly analyses UK 
regulation on arms export control and transparency (Export Control Act 2002 and 
Export Control Order 2008) before the approval of the Directive. The third investigates 
how UK law transposes the Directive. The fifth compares the previous UK regulation 
with the successor transposing regulation, in order to investigate the degree and 
direction of domestic change along eight fundamental dimensions. A final section 
draws the threads together.  
 
1.1 The main features of the UK defence industry 
The UK defence industry is extremely strong, one of the largest in the world. “[..] Arms 
production forms a meso system of the national economy which […] remains a core 
part of national technological and industrial policies”.405 According to SIPRI (Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute), in 2014 UK companies made up 10.4% of the 
                                                                
405 J. Mawdsley (2015), “France, the UK and EDA” in Karampekios N. and I. Oikonomou (Eds.) The 
European Defence Agency: Arming Europe, London and New York, Routledge, pp.139-154: p. 140. 
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top 100 arms producers in the world, classified by the prestigious Swedish research 
institute. In 2016, there were eight UK companies among the 100 largest arms 
producers in the world, which included in order of size, BAE Systems (3), Rolls-Royce 
(14), Babcock International Group (26) and Serco (39) (Bromley 2016). Overall in 
2014, the arms sales of these four UK companies reached USD 42.7 billion (35.1 billion 
euro).406 
The first one, BAE Systems, was in 2015 the third most important defence industry in 
the world (after the two big American ones: Lockheed Martin and Boeing), with about 
94% of military production and arms sales for 25,510 million dollars in 2015. This 
company employed a total of 82,500 people in 2015, slightly less than the 83,400 in 
2014. “According to the Aerospace, Defence and Security Association, the UK defence 
industry association, the industry had £24 billion in 2015 (32.6 billion euro) – making it 
the second largest in the world after the United States – and employed 142,000 people. 
Furthermore, ADS claims that there are over 5,000 SMEs that are directly involved in 
supplying the MOD”. 407These data explain the weight of the UK defence industry at the 
national level and at the same time its influence at the European and international 
levels.  
Concerning arms exports, it is difficult to find homogeneous data in the UK, despite the 
relevance of this sector. These discrepancies are due to the fact that each source uses 
very diverse methods, collects different data and aggregates them differently. Beyond 
these methodological differences, there is one other fundamental (political) reason for 
this ambiguity in data concerning UK arms exports. The official UK data, which are 
transmitted yearly to the Parliament and the European Union for the Consolidated 
Report, lack one key detail: the value of exports under general licences and open 
individual licences, which are widely used in the UK and cover a significant part of UK 
arms exports. 
According to UK Government data released by the Defence and Security Organisation, 
the UK won orders worth £8.5 billion (€10.9 billion) for new defence products and 
                                                                
406 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (2015) The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and 
Military Services Companies, 2014; SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm: SIPRI. 
407 M. Bromley (2016). Arms export control policy and legislation in the United Kingdom, unpublished 
report written for the Flemish Peace Institute which has been used as basis for the following publication: 
D. Cops, N. Duquet and G. Gourdin (editors) (2017), Towards Europeanised arms export controls? 
Comparing control systems in EU Member States, Flemish Peace Institute, Bruxelles, June 2017, p. 11 
available at the following address: 
https://www.vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/sites/...eu/files/.../rapport_wapenexp_eur_def.pdf, (last accessed 
May 2017). SIPRI Yearbook 2016, Aude Fleurant et al. (2015), “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing 
and Military Services Companies, 2014”; SIPRI Fact Sheet, December 20. 
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services in 2014.408 This made the UK the second largest exporter after the United 
States with roughly 16 per cent of the global market.409 In this case, the source is the 
UK Government, and specifically the defence export figures of the Defence and 
Security organisation statistics.410 The official UK data on arms exports are based on 
‘an annual survey of defence export orders won by known UK companies operating in 
the defence sector.’411 “The same department specifies that of course not all the orders 
became licences and deliveries, thus the data could be overestimated”.412 
The second governmental source is the UK report to the Parliament and the data 
transmitted by the UK Government to the European Union for the annual EU 
consolidated report on UK arms exports.413 According to this source, the UK approved 
over 5 billion Euros in arms export licences in 2013, 2.6 billion Euros in 2014, and 8 
billion in 2015. However, the same UK Government warns that UK export licence data 
do not represent an accurate picture of UK arms exports because some of these 
licences will not be used to make all of the exports authorised and others will not be 
used at all. In addition, a significant proportion of UK arms exports take place under 
open licences which do not have a value attached to them.414 The UK Government 
also specifies that it does not collect data on deliveries. 
The third source is an independent one: the SIPRI database on arms transfers.415 
SIPRI values are lower than those presented by the two UK Governmental sources 
because SIPRI researchers measure only major weapons systems (deliveries) plus 
some components and munitions and do not include exports of related products and 
services. According to this prestigious research institute, the UK ranked sixth after the 







                                                                
408 UK Defence & Security Organisation, UK Trade & Investment, Defence Export Figures for 2014, 
July 14, 2015, available https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-defence-and-security-export-




412 Ibidem: p. 6. 
413 British Government (2015), United Kingdom Strategic Export Control Annual Report 2014, The 
Stationary Office: London July 2015. 
414 Bromley (2016). 
415  SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, available at: www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers (last 
accessed 20 May 2019). 
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Table 6.1 Major world exporters: value of annual arms exports per country 
 
Supplier   2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
2011-
2016 
1 United States 8090 9100 9132 7647 10312 10184 54465 
2 Russia 6172 8658 8317 7779 5103 5554 41583 
3 China 1477 1274 1599 2113 1168 1764 9395 
4 
Germany 
(FRG) 2735 1345 820 727 1762 1792 9181 
5 France 899 1766 1033 1517 1705 2080 9000 
6 
United 
Kingdom 1151 1025 899 1580 1575 1139 7369 
7 Spain 263 1429 546 728 1050 1151 5167 
8 Italy 529 939 753 877 700 692 4490 
9 Ukraine 479 568 1492 671 640 347 4197 
10 Netherlands 381 540 805 348 654 474 3202 
11 Israel 655 572 449 432 399 694 3201 




In terms of geographic destination of UK defence exports, the UK has always privileged 
the transatlantic market, in particular the USA, and has never shown a specific 
European preference. Middle East countries represent another important market, 
particularly Saudi Arabia. SIPRI data relating to the first two most important importers 
of UK arms shows that, from 2003 to 2009 (which was immediately after the approval 
of the Export Control Act and the inauguration of the new ethical foreign policy), the 
USA received 22% of UK arms exports whereas Saudi Arabia just 7%. From 2009 to 
2016, Saudi Arabia jumped to 47%, nearly half of the global UK arms exports, whereas 
the USA decreased to one tenth of British arms exports 9.5%). 
In conclusion, despite some discrepancies, the above mentioned data about defence 
production and exports in the UK explains firstly the weight of the UK defence industry 
at a national level, and at the same time its influence at European and international 
levels.  
 
1.2 Societal actors  
 
Defence companies 
Given the strength of the UK Defence industry, industrial actors have played an 
important role both at the national and European levels. Defence companies are 
regularly consulted by the UK Government in order to decide the defence industrial 
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strategies. In particular, thanks to this consultative “form of governance” they 
developed a particular ability to move also in the European environment. BAE 
Systems, as strong prime contractor, has played a leading role (together with a few 
other companies, such as Thales and Finmeccanica and more recently Airbus group/ 
EADS in the past), at the European level and has regularly been consulted by the 
European Commission in all discussions preceding the approval of the ITC Directive 
since the 1990s. According to Mawdsley, “The ease of access that EADS, Thales and 
BAe Systems especially, but also other defense firms, have to the decision-making 
levels of the EU should also not be underestimated.”416 She explains that “The stress 
laid by the states on the creation of large prime contractors has meant that the results 
enjoy better access to national and European decision-making structures than their 
peers, thus forming an important lobby group that is largely unopposed, and this 
imbalance has impacted on policy.”417 
 
NGOs  
If the UK is characterized by a strong defence industry with a traditional capacity of 
lobbying and collaborating with different ministerial departments, it also distinguishes 
itself by its highly organised NGOs. Their aim is to control arms trade, and to favour a 
strict and rigorous export control regulation aimed to prevent arms that fuel conflicts, 
human rights abuses, hindrances to development, and violations of international law 
(restrictive model). This opposition to exports without adequate controls tends to be 
located in a number of well-organized NGOs, such as Saferworld, the Campaign 
Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Amnesty International UK, the World Development 
Movement and Oxfam UK.“418 Oxfam International based in the UK is equally extremely 
active. What emerges from this analysis is the strong influence that the UK system 
including political actors and companies have played at European and international 
levels, because the detail of several EU instruments and even international instruments 
are largely inspired by the UK regulation and system. Saferworld, Oxfam and Amnesty 
International UK have played a leading role in the process of approval of the European 
Code of Conduct since the late 1990s until now. They’ve demonstrated an 
extraordinary ability to manage networks with other NGOs and representatives of 
                                                                
416 J. Mawdsley (2003). “The European Union and Defense Industrial Policy”. BICC Papers (31), p.13. 
417 Ibidem, p. 14.  
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governments and regional and supranational institutions, and to move effectively in the 
EU environment.  
At the European and international levels, different UK actors (government and 
Parliament, but also non-governmental actors such as companies and relevant NGOs), 
have sharply influenced the Europeanisation and internationalisation process, playing 
a leading role in this field. The British narratives on armaments cooperation seem not 
to be particularly transformed by the Europeanisation process but, on the contrary, 
have sharply influenced this process, shaping both the norms concerning European 
arms exports and those concerning the internal arms market.419  
Overall, the UK profile with regards to the arms export policy is characterised by a neo-
liberal paradigm, particularly expressed in the light and flexible arms export regulation 
and in the early withdrawal of the UK state from the ownership of the defence industry. 
The UK Government policy largely favours the free market and competition.  
Overall, there are three main characteristics that explain the spirit of the evolving UK 
regulation on arms exports control and transparency.  
Firstly, the UK’s approach to the arms market is traditionally considered to be 
“economic liberal”, according to which “the government should regulate the market with 
a light hand, allowing firms to shape the market”.420 The rhetoric around the arms 
market is focused on “economic efficiency”.421 The ideology of liberalism and regulatory 
simplification inform arms export regulation and state ownership of defence 
companies, but they are not reflected in the huge support for British arms exports. In 
fact, there is strong political, financial and economic support for arms export. 
Secondly, the UK has privileged commercial relationships with the USA and has never 
shown a clear European preference. In other words, orientation toward a liberal arms 
market and flexible regulation is not limited to European borders but, on the contrary, 
has a global dimension.  
Lastly, but not least, the third characteristic is Britain’s pragmatic attitude toward 
national and European regulation of arms transfer: “The British discourse on European 
armaments cooperation has always been one of pragmatic engagement, rather than a 
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commitment to European autonomy from the USA, which it regards as undesirable, 
viewing cooperation as a way to save money that could be used to strengthen 
European military capabilities more broadly.”422  
The result is the so-called British model of regulation of arms transfer which has 
maintained some fundamental characteristics: maximum flexibility, pragmatism, a 
deep interpenetration between the political and economic dimensions, a high discretion 
of the executive in the field, with an active role of the Parliament and national NGOs.423  
 
2. The UK legislation on arms export control and transparency preceding the 
approval of Directive 2009/43/EC: Export Control Act 2002 and Export Control 
Order 2008 
 
The central piece of legislation for the UK’s system of strategic trade controls before 
the approval of EU Directive 2009/43/EC is the Export Control Act (2002 Act).424 It 
entered into force in May 2004.  The specific controls introduced under the Act are 
detailed in the main secondary legislation which consists mainly of Export Control 
Orders. The most important and organic one is the Export Control Order 2008 (SI 
2008/3231), which came into force in April 2009.425 
This second section is devoted to the UK regulation of arms transfers control and 
transparency before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC. I will briefly illustrate the 
origin of the Export Control Act and then I will details the provisions in its fundamental 
pillars (principles and bans to exports, licensing procedures and transparency) and the 
main features of the UK regulation. 
 
2.1 The origin of Export Control Act 2002 
 
The Export Control  Act 2002 was put in place in response to the flaws identified in the 
UK’s strategic trade controls by Lord Scott’s Report of the Inquiry into Export of 
Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions of 1996.  
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 “After the Gulf War of 1991, the issue of arms exports to Iraq in the run-up to the 
conflict and the adequacy of UK arms export controls generated a significant amount 
of political controversy.”426 
The UK Government started to prosecute a defence firm; Matrix Churchill, for illegal 
arms export to Iraq but then it came out that sections of the UK Government were 
aware of the intended end-use of the components and that Matrix Churchill were 
supplying the UK Government with intelligence about Iraq.427 
In 1992, Lord Justice Scott was asked to conduct a large-scale investigation into arms 
exports to Iraq. After spending over two years receiving written and oral evidence from 
more than 200 witnesses, including the former Prime Minister, Scott published a 1806-
page report in February 1996.428 The report and arms exports scandal opened a wide 
debate about the UK arms export control regulation.  
After the Scott Report was released, arms export controls became a key issue in the 
1997 national elections. The Labour Party won the election, promising to introduce a 
more ethical approach to national arms exports and to promote protection of human 
rights in foreign policy. In February 1997 the British Labour Party pledged itself to: (a) 
refuse sales to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international 
aggression or in circumstances where the sale of weapons might intensify or prolong 
existing armed conflict or might be used to abuse human rights; (b) press for an EU 
code of conduct on arms transfers and strengthen the UN Register of Conventional 
Arms; (c) immediately ban the manufacture of, and trade in, landmines and torture 
equipment (such as electric-shock batons); and (d) publish an annual report on British 
strategic exports. 429 Once elected, the new government published a memorandum 
containing a list of new arms export criteria. In July 1997, Foreign Secretary Robin 
Cook of the new Labour government, launched a new regulation for the export of British 
arms within the framework of a “new ethical foreign policy”. In 1998, Prime Minister 
Tony Blair asked the government to publish an annual report on arms exports from the 
UK aimed at increasing the level of transparency and parliamentary scrutiny in export 
policy. In July 1998, the Labour government presented the White Paper on Strategic 
Export Controls, which contained a new legislative framework for arms export controls. 
                                                                
426 M. Pythian (2000).The Politics of British Arms Sales since 1964 Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, pp. 47–48. 
427 Ibidem. 
428 UK House of Commons (1995). The Right Honourable Sir Richard Scott, Report of the Inquiry into 
the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions, HC 1995/96 
115 Her Majesty’s Stationery Office: London.  
429 Davis (2002), p.150.  
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In 1999 an annual reporting system was introduced and then strengthened by stronger 
parliamentary oversight. In October 2000 the government presented the UK export 
control criteria to the Parliament. This process eventually culminated in the Export 
Control Act of 2002 which is the core of the UK’s present regulation. 
It is important to note that the change of attitude (as indicated in its official statements) 
of the British Government at the national level was accompanied by an equal change 
of attitude at the European Union level, in favour of the approval of a European Code 
of Conduct in arms exports. In fact, in the EU setting, the UK Government abandoned 
traditional scepticism towards and rejection of European regulation (having blocked 
any steps forward in the past) and led the coalition of actors in favour of the European 
Code of Conduct. 
In conclusion, what emerges from an overview of dynamics triggered after the Scott 
Report and the New Ethical Foreign policy is that: 
1) Both the national and European processes- which led respectively to the 
approval of new export criteria and to the 2002 Export Control Act at the national level 
and to the 1998 European Code of Conduct on Arms Exports at the European level- 
have the same roots: the 1997 new ethical foreign policy of the Labour Party and the 
change in attitude of the UK Government. 
2) The wording of the national UK criteria on arms exports published by the Labour 
Party in 1997, then formalised in 2000 and included as guidance in the new 2002 
Export Control Act, is very similar, nearly identical – with only slight differences- to the 
criteria of the 1998 European Code of Conduct. 
3) UK politics and regulation have preceded and influenced European regulation. 
This influence from the national to the European level has witnessed the participation 
of non-governmental actors; in this case, the most evident was the proactive role of 
UK NGOs in promoting the UK model at the European level. All the UK actors showed 
particular ability in developing networks at different levels, lobbying and exerting 
influence. Overall the UK system of governmental and nongovernmental actors played 
a leading role also at the European level favouring the approval of the European Code 
of Conduct.  
4) Formulating criteria at the national and European levels represents an important 
step forward, an ethical foreign policy and a rupture with the past. However, the 
wording inherits and indirectly recalls the flexibility which characterised the old British 
regulatory model, because the criteria are broadly and generically worded (please see 




2.2 The institutional framework  
 
The Export Control Act gives powers to the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation 
and Skills powers to: 
• impose controls on exports from the UK;  
• impose controls on the transfer of technology from the UK and by UK persons 
anywhere by any means (other than by the export of goods);  
• impose controls on the provision of technical assistance overseas;  
• impose controls on the acquisition, disposal or movement of goods or on activities, 
which facilitate such acquisition, disposal or movement (this is often referred to as 
trafficking and brokering or simply as “trade”);  
• apply measures in order to give effect to EU legislation on controls on dual-use items 
(i.e. items with a civil and potential military application).  
It is important to note that, despite the wide range of power delegated to the Secretary 
of State, according to the Act each Export Control Order must be approved by 
affirmative resolution in both Houses of the Parliament (see transparency paragraph). 
430 Overall, primary law remains general and most of the aspects are clarified and 
regulated at a secondary or lower law level. This is in harmony with the UK’s approach 
to and tradition of regulation which is oriented to the maximum flexibility in order to 
make it adherent to single concrete cases. 
 The Act also formalised for the first time the requirement on the government to report 
annually to Parliament on the controls imposed on both strategic and cultural exports 
(Section 10, Clauses 1 and 2). This is achieved through the Strategic Export Controls: 
Annual Report, which is published by the government, usually every July. Since the 
beginning of 2004 the government has also published annual and quarterly reports 
detailing export licences approved and refused during that period (see paragraph 
devoted to transparency).431 
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The ministry responsible for taking formal decisions on issuing export licences until its 
abolition in 2016 was the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). 432 
During the period we are analysing (from 2002 to 2009), in practice the Export Control 
Organisation (ECO) within BIS was responsible for implementing the UK’s strategic 
trade controls and for issuing and refusing export licences for arms and dual-use items. 
The ECO sets out the regulatory framework under which licence applications are 
considered. The government minister who headed BIS – the Secretary of State for 
Business, Innovation and Skills – took the formal decision on whether to issue, refuse, 
suspend or revoke export licence applications in accordance with the applicable 
legislation and announced policy. 433 The Secretary of State for the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (now Department of International Trade) wields some 
crucial powers, such as imposing controls on export, including terms and conditions 
for issuing licences, end-user certificates, and deciding what to report to Parliament 
and the export criteria. 
However the dimension of collegiality and participation of different ministries is also 
present. The UK system for strategic trade controls – including both arms dual-use 
export controls – is operated by a single Export Licensing and Enforcement 
Community. This Community comprised nine Government Departments or Agencies, 
of which seven play a role in implementing arms export control. These were: 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS); Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO); Ministry of Defence (MOD); Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
(HMRC); Border Force (BF); and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 434 
The Foreign Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department for International 
Development provided ECO with advice on how to assess export licence applications. 
Particularly delicate or sensitive applications are referred to government ministers in 
the FCO for a final recommendation. Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) is 
responsible for enforcing the UK’s strategic trade controls. In particular, HMRC works 
with Border Force to prevent, detect and investigate breaches of the UK’s strategic 
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trade controls. Any criminal prosecutions that result from such investigations are 
undertaken by the Central Fraud Group within the Crown Prosecution Service.435 
 
2.3 Principles, criteria and bans to exports 
 
As illustrated above, after the arms exports scandals and the recommendations of the 
Scott Report, the Labour Party vowed to refuse sales to regimes that might use them 
for internal repression or international aggression, in circumstances where the sale of 
weapons might intensify or prolong an existing armed conflict or might be used to 
abuse human rights. They also pressed for an EU Code of Conduct. Once elected, the 
Labour government announced a new ethical foreign policy and new criteria for guiding 
arms exports policy. 
The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria were included in the 
2002 Export Control Act taking the form of guidance and (as detailed in Export Control 
Order 2008 - (Schedule 4 Part 3), Schedule 4 - Countries and Destinations subject to 
stricter export and trade controls). The formulation of these criteria is very similar to 
the European Code of Conduct criteria and includes them. 
 
2.3.1 Preamble 
The ministerial statement preceding the UK consolidated criteria to arms exports opens 
as follows: “The UK’s defence industry can make an important contribution to 
international security, as well as provide economic benefit to the UK. […]The 
Government remains committed to supporting the UK’s defence industry and legitimate 
trade in items controlled for strategic reasons. But we recognise that in the wrong 
hands, arms can fuel conflict and instability and facilitate terrorism and organised 
crime. For this reason it is vital that we have robust and transparent controls which are 
efficient and impose the minimum administrative burdens in order to enable the 
defence industry to operate responsibly and confidently.” 436  Thus, the criteria are 
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presented as an exception to the support of the UK Government to arms trade and to 
the defence instrument for security and economic reasons.  
 
2.3.2 Case by case 
 According to the preamble of the UK consolidated criteria, the eight ethical criteria to 
arms exports will not be applied mechanistically but on a case-by-case basis taking 
into account all relevant information available at the time the licence application is 
assessed and consulting with relevant departments. This means that “While the 
government recognises that there are situations where transfers must not take place, 
as set out in the following criteria, at the same time it claims that it will not refuse a 
licence on the grounds of a purely theoretical risk of a breach of one or more of those 
criteria.” 437  
The introduction of the case-by-case analysis means that the criteria are not 
immediately and automatically applicable but that their application can change from 
one country to another. While this approach favours the maximum elasticity and 
discretion, it may undermine the certainty of the law, and in cases where these 
procedures and assessments are not communicated to the Parliament, can also 
weaken the principles of transparency and Parliamentary control.  
 
2.3.3 Legal status of the criteria 
 According to Article 9.3 of the 2002 Export Control Act, the Secretary of State must 
give guidance about the general principles to be followed. The Consolidated Criteria 
were issued to fulfil this obligation. Also the Criteria of the EU Common Position on 
arms exports have been introduced in the UK regulation with the status of guidance. A 
guidance must be laid before Parliament without requiring its approval. 
Thus, although the Secretary of State has the duty to give guidance, there are no 
obligations about the content of this guidance in the Export Control Act of 2002. The 
main duty of the Secretary of State is of a procedural nature. This means that he can 
formally change the content of the criteria at his discretion. From a strictly legal 
perspective, the criteria and bans to export are not established by the Parliament and 
do not act as a limit to the executive power, but are placed once again in the area of 
discretion of the executive.  
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The legal status has been discussed (and confirmed) on two different occasions. The 
first was the reformulation of export criteria issued in March 2014. These modifications 
contained only minor changes which revolved around a new preamble and a few small 
additions to the wording of the criteria.438  
According to the Parliament, this new version (and in particular the elimination in the 
preamble of the following sentence “An export licence will not be issued if the 
arguments for doing so are outweighed by concern that the goods might be used for 
internal repression”) could sharply weaken the commitment of the UK Government not 
to export to countries violating human rights.439 According to the government these 
were only minor changes because they were limited to the preamble. By contrast the 
extension of the criteria, also to serious international humanitarian law violations was 
an important addition. Overall the key point is not the limited changes introduced by 
the Secretary of State but the legal power of the government, and in particular the 
Secretary of State, to make minor or major changes to national and European export 
criteria on arms exports, without any prior vote in Parliament. Thus, efforts should be 
addressed first of all towards a new legal status of the criteria and a new stricter 
formulation of them.440 
 
2.3.4 Content of the export criteria: strengths and weaknesses between renewal and 
continuity with the past 
 The Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing Criteria set out the eight 
criteria against which all exports transit and brokering licence applications are 
assessed. Export criteria revolve around some very important ethical principles which 
according to the UK Government should regulate arms exports. Here I describe each 
of the eight criteria highlighting the main features and limits of their legal formulation.  
The first criterion concerns respecting the UK’s international commitments, in particular 
the sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the EU, UN 
and EU arms embargoes, agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, (the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention), as well as other international obligations (Arms 
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Trade Treaty). The government will not grant a licence if it is inconsistent with the 
above-mentioned treaties and obligations. When assessing an Export Licence 
Application (ELA) under Criterion One, the International Organisations Department at 
the FCO is consulted to confirm whether the country of final destination is currently 
subject to any embargoes or other relevant commitments.  
The second criterion concerns the respect for human rights in the country of final 
destination. The UK shall not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the 
proposed export might be used for internal repression or in the commission of a serious 
violation of international humanitarian law.  
Criterion three concerns the internal situation in the country of final destination, the 
existence of tensions or armed conflicts. MS will not allow exports which would provoke 
or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of 
final destination.  
Criterion four envisages the preservation of regional peace, security and stability. The 
UK will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended recipient 
would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by 
force a territorial claim.  
Criterion five concerns the national security of the UK and territories whose external 
relations are the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied 
countries. The government “will take into account” the potential effect of the proposed 
transfer on the UK’s defence and security interests, while recognising that this factor 
cannot affect consideration of the criteria on respecting human rights and on regional 
peace, security and stability; the risk of the items being used against UK forces or 
against those of other territories and countries as described above; and the need to 
protect UK military classified information and capabilities.  
Criterion six concerns the behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the 
international community, especially as regards its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its 
alliances and respect for international law. The government “will take into account”, 
inter alia, the record of the buyer country with regard to its support for or 
encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime; its compliance with its 
international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force, including under 
international humanitarian law applicable to international and non-international 
conflicts, its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and 
disarmament, particularly the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant 
arms control and disarmament instruments referred to in criterion one. 
237 
  
Criterion seven concerns diversion, or the existence of a risk that the equipment will 
be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions. In 
assessing the impact of the proposed transfer on the recipient country and the risk that 
the items might be diverted to an undesirable end-user or for an undesirable end-use, 
the government will consider: (a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests 
of the recipient country, including any involvement in the United Nations or other 
peace-keeping activities; (b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the 
items; (c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls; (d) 
the risk of re-export to undesirable destinations and, as appropriate, the record of the 
recipient country in respecting re-export provisions or consent prior to re-export; (e) 
the risk of diversion to terrorist organisations or to individual terrorists; and (f) the risk 
of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.  
Criterion eight addresses the compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and 
economic capacity of the recipient country, taking into account the desirability that 
states should achieve their legitimate needs of security and defence with the least 
diversion for armaments of human and economic resources. The government will take 
into account, in light of information from relevant sources such as the United Nations 
Development Programme, World Bank, IMF and Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development reports, whether the proposed transfer would seriously 
undermine the economy or seriously hamper the sustainable development of the 
recipient country.  
 
2.3.5 Limits of the UK principles and criteria  
The criteria are formulated in a way that leaves a wide marge of discretion to the 
executive. The first criteria is pleonastic, because it requires the executive to respect 
obligations that already exist for the UK (UK and EU embargoes, duties deriving from 
being part of international treaties and so on). The second, third and fourth are core 
criteria and they are formulated as real obligations, but the use of the words “risk” 
(criterion 2 and 4), or subjective evaluations such as those concerning whether some 
arms exports “may prolong a conflict or not”, without any reference (in the primary or 
secondary regulation) to evidence, or to impartial supranational or scientific sources. 
The last four criteria, 5, 6, 7 and 8 do not contain any obligations, but just the 
suggestion to take these into account, leaving the final decision to the executive. 
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Given the sensitivities of this field, the UK regulation did not envisage an impartial 
assessment and a certain and unique application of the law -- which could have limited 
flexibility in a field where several factors are at play -- but on the contrary, opted for a 
subjective interpretation based on the balance of multifaceted factors and sources. 
Once again the final say is left to the government – which should of course consult 
several sources of information including intelligence, British embassies and the 
importing government - but which has discretion in weighing and balancing all this 
information, and different sources, according to a case-by-case analysis. Thus, as 
confirmed by the High Court’s ruling on the difficult case of arms exports to Saudi 
Arabia, the British Government’s duty and responsibility is just procedural and does 
not involve the merit and content of the criteria. The sentence of the Court is reported 
in the last governmental report to Parliament as follows: on 10 July 2017, the Court 
handed down its judgment, dismissing CAAT’s claim. The judgment recognises the 
rigorous processes in place across government to ensure that UK defence exports are 
licenced consistent with the government’s Consolidated EU & National Arms Export 
Licensing Criteria. It describes the government’s decision-making about export 
licensing as “highly sophisticated, structured and multi-faceted” and points to “the 
essential rationality and rigour of the process”.441 
These limits were understood by experts since the early approval of the criteria both 
at the national and European levels.442 First, in comparing the new criteria with their 
predecessors, the Trade Industry Committee has already concluded that “the July 
1997 criteria represent a rather less radical break with past policy than is sometimes 
represented to be the case and the same patterns of behaviour and justification are 
being repeated. As before ministerial interpretation of the criteria in the difficult cases 
is the touchstone of their real significance”.443Along the same line, according to Davis 
“(A)lthough the new export criteria introduced by Labour held out the promise of greater 
restraint, the scope for flexible interpretation still remains [..]”.444 
Similar evaluations were expressed about the European Code of Conduct which is 
quite similar to the UK in its formulation of the criteria. According to some scholars, the 
Code’s criteria represented a still rather weak instrument that does not prevent MS 
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from preserving different foreign and exports policies. The European Parliament 
defined the Code’s criteria as “a general abstract guide” that grants wide discretion to 
MS.445 According to Burkhard Schmitt, former researcher at the Institute for Security 
Studies of the Western European Union now working at the EU Commission, “the Code 
only provides a common set of ethical standards beyond which national control 
regimes continue to differ widely.”446 The criteria are worded in a way that leaves wide 
discretion to MS. Schmitt concluded that “the principles outline broad moral and 
political considerations that licensing authorities have to take into consideration. But 
there has been little progress in establishing prescriptive criteria that could help define 
these principles.” 447  
Overall, the legal status represents the first legal weakness of the UK consolidated 
Criteria, the content of which is at the discretion of the Secretary of State. However, 
the second and more important weakness is represented by their vague formulation 
which, once again, allows the executive to make assessments based on subjective 
rather than objective analysis of the evidence. In other words, there are no clearly 
defined indicators on how to apply the criteria, based on scientific or supranational 
sources; rather most is left to the discretion of the executive who is obliged to follow 
rigorous procedures and hear from different sources, but who can decide the balance 
between these references, and definitely has the final say. This flexibility is 
emphasised by the case-by-case approach. The modality and ways to assess criteria 
are opaque to the public and Parliament. Lastly, the political, ethical and economic 
industrial variables (which are not always in harmony) reiterated in the preamble and 
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2.4 Transparency and parliamentary control 
 
As explained in 3.1 above, the Blair Government’s decision to issue an annual report 
on arm exports was embodied in the Export Control Act of 2002 thus representing an 
important innovation with respect to the previous legal regulation. 
The primary law dictates that the government shall present the annual report on arms 
export to Parliament, but it does not specify the quality and quantity of data that should 
be presented, nor the time limit in which to present it. The “level” of transparency 
depends on the discretion of the government. The report is presented to Parliament 
but it does not require approval from the legislative power. 
Since 1997 the government has published Annual Reports, and since 2004 Quarterly 
Reports, which provide details of individual export and trade licensing decisions. The 
information covers individual licences issued, refused and revoked by destination and 
gives the rating, a generic description (the “annual report summary” or ARS) and total 
value of items licenced to that destination. The Quarterly Reports are published 3 
months after the end of the quarter to which they refer. 448  
Overall, despite the abundance of sources and different reports both from the 
government and parliament, the current information on the value of exports reported 
from the British Government concerns only exports licences relating to single licences. 
They present two main deficiencies: the value of the material exported each year under 
open and general licences which cover a very relevant part of British arms exports, 
and the data on deliveries which are the real exports, and which governments usually 
collect and compare with licences. The UK is one of the few EU countries not to report 
data on effective exports. The comparison is important because each delivery must be 
previously authorised and because not all authorisations become effective deliveries 
(and it might happen that some deliveries have not been previously authorised). 
Furthermore data are presented in an aggregated way which may change from year 
to year, making it difficult for parliament and civil society to exercise efficient cross 
controls.449 
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Another important instrument to control and guide the UK’s conduct in this delicate field 
are the Parliamentary Committees on arms export control, with a direct interest in the 
UK’s regulatory framework for arms exports: the Foreign Affairs, Defence, International 
Trade and International Development Committees. Originally known as the 
Quadripartite Committee, in March 2008 it was renamed the Committees on Arms 
Export Controls (CAEC). The House of Common Committees on Arms Export Controls 
publishes annual (and quarterly) reports. The CAEC annual report has details of the 
hearings, the evidence submitted and recommendations for how UK arms export 
controls can be improved. The UK Government is not required to act on the 
recommendations made but it must produce a written response to each 
recommendation.  
Documentation produced  
UK regulation provides a very rich (but limited) yearly documentation on UK arms 
exports data and on the main regulatory developments. The first group of sources are 
governmental sources to the Parliament and among these there are two main 
reports. 450  The second group of sources are parliamentary sources: the CAEC 
publishes its annual report with details of the hearings, evidence submitted and 
recommendations for how UK arms export controls can be improved. It is very rich and 
articulated, reaching 800 pages each year. Both the annual reports and the quarterly 
reports represent another source which adds details to the classical governmental 
report, both from a legal and an economic-statistical perspective.451 
In conclusion, there are abundant sources, governmental reports, detailing the average 
time used by the government to issue a licence, discursive parliamentary reports 
analysing governmental data on UK arms exports, but there are at the same time two 
fundamental limitations. First, references to transparency by primary law are extremely 
vague. There is no reference to the quality and quantity of data that should be 
presented nor a reference to the time limit. Second, some crucial key details are 
                                                                
450  For example for 2014: Defence & Security Organisation, UK Trade & Investment, “Defence Export 
Figures for 2014,” July 14, 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-defence-and-security-
export-figures-2014. Defence & Security Organisation, UK Trade & Investment, “UK Defence & Security 
Export Statistics for 2014,” July 14, 2015, 4, https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uk-defence-and-
security-export-figures-2014.  
451 UK House of Commons Committees on Arms Exports Controls (various years), “Scrutiny of Arms 
Exports and Arms Controls (various years): Scrutiny of the Government’s Strategic Export Controls 
Annual Report 2013, the Government’s Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014, and the 





missing: the value of general and open licences, and the value of the deliveries. This 
makes the picture concerning the UK arms exports only partial.  
 
2.5 Export licences 
 
In the UK according to the 2008 Export Control Order, arms export licences are granted 
by the Secretary of State and may be either general or granted to a particular person 
via Art. 26.6a. Thus, the UK regulation, unlike that found in the majority of other 
European Countries, already envisaged general licences by primary law. 
According to letter b) and c) of the same Article, export licences granted by the 
Secretary of State may be limited so as to expire on a specified date unless renewed, 
subject to or without, conditions (and any such condition may require any act or 
omission before or after the act authorised by the licence). Article 9.2 of the 2002 
Export Control Act states that “(T)he Secretary of State may give guidance about any 
matter relating to the exercise of any licensing power of other functions to which this 
section applies”. A guidance is an act of the Secretary of State which must be laid 
before the parliament but which is not approved by the legislative branch. Thus, the 
UK Export Control Act of 2002 and the Export Control Order of 2008 provides the 
executive and especially the Secretary of State with a wide margin of discretion in 
establishing when to use general or individual licences, their conditions, what must be 
declared by the exporters, and documents to be attached, including end-user 
certificates. This is in harmony with the spirit of maximum flexibility and case-by-case 
analysis which guides the whole UK regulation. 
Under this broad legislative framework, in practice since the early Nineties, the UK 
licensing system has been divided into three main types of licences: 
1. The individual licences which are called Standard Individual Export Licences 
(SIELs): these licences are issued to a single exporter for a single transfer (allowing 
shipments of specified items) of defence material to a specific consignee. This kind of 
licence is one of the most widely used in Europe. When filling out the application the 
exporter has to specify all information concerning quantity, value, description of the 
good and final destination and attach an end-user undertaking. Single Individual Export 




2. Open Individual Licences (OIELs) are the second type, and are specific to an 
individual exporter, but cover multiple shipments of specified items to specified 
destinations. OIELs are generally valid for a period of five years, with the exception of 
OIELs for the transfer of military items to destinations in other EU MS, which are valid 
for three years but may be renewed at the exporter’s request. 452 
 
Table 6.2 Open Individual Licences and Standard Individual Export Licences  
Year SIELs OIELs 
2016 13734 334 
2015   
2014 13126 279 
2013 13578 406 
2012 12896 277 
2011 11936 231 
2010 12933 279 
2009 10850 133 
Source: UK annual report various years. 
 
3. The third kind of licences are Open General Export Licences (OGELs). OGELs are 
pre-published licences that permit the export of specified controlled goods by any 
qualifying company or person, removing the need for exporters to apply for an 
individual licence, provided the shipment and destinations are eligible under the OGEL 
and that the terms and conditions set out in the licence are met. If exporters are eligible 
to trade under an OGEL then they just have to register. Once registered, there is no 
need for an exporter to submit further applications to trade under the licence they have 
registered to use.  
These are normally issued by ministerial decree ex officio and for this reason the 
exporter is not required when registering to specify quantity, value or description of the 
good intended for export. Furthermore, the undertaking is not required to send to the 
UK Government End-user certificates. The exporter is required to register with the ECO 
before the licence is used (Art. 28 and Art. 30). 
However, the loosening of ex ante controls is replaced by ex post controls: the exporter 
under general licence is required to keep relevant records (Art. 29.1), and allow ECO 
                                                                
452 There are several subtypes of OIELs including Global Project Licences, as well as Dealer-to-dealer, 
Cryptographic, Media and Continental Shelf OIELs Dealer-to-dealer OIELs (or simply Dealer OIELs) 
authorise UK registered firearms dealers to export certain categories of firearms and ammunition solely 
to other registered firearms dealers on the European Union only, provided that copies of valid 
documentation are forwarded to the Home Office at least 2 working days before each shipment. 
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to carry out compliance visits to ensure all conditions are being met (Art. 31). Other 
terms and conditions are specified in the single general licences.  
As explained above, general licences have been widely used in the UK, since the early 
Nineties. In 2009 the UK National Report to the Parliament states that there were 37 
open general licences active that year (see Table 4).453 In 2016 there were 40 open 
general licences, including those related to military material and dual-use items. 
 
 
Table 6.3 Open general licences issued in 2009 
 
Source: UK Strategic Arms Export Report 2009 
 
General licences are used in the UK in an extensive range of cases (exhibitions repairs, 
but also co-productions and national armed forces, and so on), and they cover different 
kinds of defence material, including dual use, small arms, and technology. 
Furthermore, they do not have geographical boundaries, but are released for exchange 
with European countries, western countries, Middle East and Northern African 
countries, and so on. This is possible thanks to the very flexible general legal 
formulation. Terms and conditions may change from one general licence to another. In 
the UK they are estimated to cover between 30% and 50% of UK arms exports.454 
This simplified and quicker export system, in terms of the required ex ante 
documentation, is based on a high level of trust between government and companies 
which use general licences. Since the early 1990s, Members of Parliament and the 
                                                                
453  UK Government (2010). United Kingdom Strategic Export Control Annual Report 2009, The 
Stationary Office: London July 2010. 
454 Bromley (2016). 
1. Military Goods: Government or Nato End-Use 11.06.0814. Access overseas to Software Technology for Military26. Cryptographic Development 
2. Military Components 11.06.08 Goods: Individual Use Only 27. Dual-Use Items: Hong Kong Special Administrative
3. Technology for Military Goods 11.06.08 15. Military and dual-use Goods: UK Forces Deployed inRegion (HKSAR)
4. Export After Repair/replacement under warranty:non-embargoed destinations 28. Oil and Gas Exploration: Dual-Use Items 
Military Goods 16. Military and dual-use Goods: UK Forces Deployed in29. OGTL (Dual-Use Goods: HKSAR) 
5. Export After Exhibition or Demonstration: embargoed destinations 30. Open General Transhipment Licence 
Military Goods 17. Turkey 31. Open General Transhipment Licence (Sporting Guns) 
6. Export for Exhibition: Military Goods 11.06.08 18. Computers 32. Open General Transhipment Licence (Postal Packets) 
7. Military Surplus Vehicles 29.09.06 19. Technology for Dual-Use Items 33. Open General Trade Control Licence (Category C Goods) 
8. Export For Repair/Replacement Under Warranty: Military goods20. Export After Repair/replacement 34. Software and Source Code for (Category C Goods) 
9. Historic Military Goods: 11.06.08 Under warranty: Dual-Use Items 35. Exports of non-lethal military and Dual-use goods:
10. Vintage Aircraft 01.05.04 21. Export After Exhibition: Dual-Use Items To UK Diplomatic Missions or Consular Posts
11. Accompanied Personal Effects: Sporting Firearms 01.05.0422. Low Value Shipments 36. Open General Trade Control Licence (Small Arms)
12. Military Goods: For Demonstration 24.05.07 23. Specified dual-use items 1 37. Vintage Military Vehicles
13. Exports or transfers in support of UK Government24. Chemicals 
Defence contracts 25. Export For Repair/Replacement under Warranty:
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CAEC (Committees of Arms Export Controls) recommended prudence in using and 
issuing general licences, given that the drastic reduction of ex ante control requires 
such a high level of trust between government and companies (and also between 
companies and importing governments). These recommendations were addressed to 
the government in the late Nineties, before the approval of the 2002 Export Control Act 
(see previous paragraph) and were renewed recently in the 2000s as a reaction to the 
attempt by the government to increase the proportion of exports that are carried out 
under ‘open’ rather than ‘individual’ licences. Thus, more recently the UK Government 
has sought to encourage exporters to utilise open general licences and more 
specifically, open individual licences where possible. However, the CAEC has recently 
raised concerns about this policy, explaining that there is a risk of an increase in 
breaches of the Government’s arms export control policies.455 The CAEC has argued 
that its “concerns about this policy [were] reinforced by the fact that since the start of 
the so-called Arab Spring in December 2010 the Government has had to revoke or 
suspend a total of 52 Open Licences”. 456  The high number of revocations or 
suspensions of licences issued for export with the countries involved in the repression 
of Arab Spring has made it clear that the government enjoys excessive ease in issuing 
licences, including those licences granting a very light form of controls. Greater 
prudence is needed because these licences require a very high level of trust with the 
importer.457 
 
2.6 Reporting requirements 
 
After the authorisation phase, there are two main systems of control in the UK: 
reporting requirements and inspections. The first form of controls consists in reporting 
requirements to exporters using open and general licences. These controls are very 
important considering it is not possible to collect specific information in the 
                                                                
455  UK House of Commons Committees on Arms Exports Controls (2015), “Scrutiny of Arms Exports 
and Arms Controls (2015): Scrutiny of the Government’s Strategic Export Controls Annual Report 2013, 
the Government’s Quarterly Reports from October 2013 to June 2014, and the Government’s Policies 
on Arms Exports and International Arms Control Issues,” London: The Stationary Office. 
456 Ibidem. 
457 In the October 2014 Westminster Hall debate, Sir John Stanley pointed to the rise in the number of 
existing licences (individual and general) revoked by the Coalition Government in recent years as 




authorisation procedures for open and general licences. Thus, information is not 
collected ex ante, but rather ex post requiring licence holders to keep detailed records 
on what is exported and to whom. 
However, there are significant weaknesses in the reporting requirements. Firstly, the 
end-user, which is very sensitive information, must be declared in the reporting 
requirements only if it is known by the person responsible for exports. Secondly other 
essential sensitive information: the value of the material exported is missing from the 
list of reporting requirements. This may compromise transparency but also 
governmental controls over a significant part of UK arms exports. Thirdly, there is no 
obligation to communicate all the data regularly to the government. In practice they are 




Inspections are the second kind of controls. In the UK, the absence of regular and 
systematic communication from the companies to the governments of all the data 
concerning deliveries is replaced by a system of inspections, undertaken ex post on a 
percentage of companies that export each year. The inspectors control the regularity 
and lawfulness of all the data collected in the register. According to Article 31 of the 
Export Control Order, the person responsible for keeping registers shall permit those 
compulsory records to be inspected and copied by a person authorised by the 
Secretary of State or the Commissioners. A person authorised by the Secretary of 
State or the Commissioners shall have the right to enter the company at any 
reasonable hour, in the case of compulsory records required to be kept under Article 
29 or 30 of this Order. 458  The approach is usually based on mutual trust and 
collaboration between the government and industries. Thus, companies which are 
found not fully compliant are not immediately sanctioned but are firstly notified and 
encouraged to collect the missing information. According to the most recent 
governmental report to the parliament on UK strategic arms exports, the Compliance 
Team carried out a total of 572 inspections in 2016. Where at the first visit about 50% 
                                                                
458 Section five of annual governmental report on UK arms exports offers very detailed information 
about inspections undertaken by the UK Government. ECO (Export Control Organisation) has at its 
disposal a compliance team to inspect companies holding open individual and open general licences. 
UK Government (2017). 
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were fully compliant and about 25% noncompliant, upon revisiting the companies, 70% 
were compliant whereas only 3% were noncompliant.459 
 
2.8 End-user controls 
 
Details concerning end-user controls and certificates are not enshrined by primary law, 
but, in conjunction with the spirit of the UK regulation, geared toward maximum 
flexibility. The Secretary of State is delegated the authority whether to introduce end-
user controls, require end-user undertakings or documentations, and impose 
conditions according to the kind of licences or kind of arms exported. According to the 
current guidance on End-user Undertakings, the end-user controls are different 
according to the kind of licences: Standard Individual Licences, Open Individual 
Licences, and Open General Licences.460 
Particularly in recent years, the information on end-user required to exporters covered 
the consignee, the end-user and even the ultimate end-users, are explained extremely 
clearly in a table elaborated by ECO. The table covers all the possibilities of co-
productions, re-exports with two or more countries involved, in the global chain of 
production and all cases of re-export. Nevertheless, Mark Bromley explains, it is still 
possible not to report the end-user, if it is not known to the exporters.461 According to 
Bromley: “Both the EEU form and SSU form require information to be provided to 
identify the known end-use of the arms. However, there does not appear to be a 
mechanism to explicitly declare cases of ‘unknown end-use’”. 462 
Also with Open Individual Export Licences, applications require a consignee 
undertaking in accordance with licence conditions. This document must be obtained in 
advance from the end-user. The undertaking should confirm the nature of the goods 
ordered by the consignee and what they will be used for. The OIEL consignee 
undertaking should be completed by the organisation or company to whom the goods 
are being sent, confirming that the end use of the items match the OIEL conditions. 463 
                                                                
459 Ibidem, pp.21-22. 
460 Guidance - End-User and Stockist Undertakings for SIELs and Consignee Undertakings for OIELs. 
Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/402
903/15-118-OIELs-process-guidance.pdf (last accessed September 2018). 





Open General Export Licences are normally issued by a ministerial decree ex officio. 
For this reason, in 2009 the year of ITC approval, the exporting company was not 
asked for the End-user undertaking or End-user Stockist Undertaking (SU) upon 
registration. Given the nature of this kind of licence, the information about the end-user 
was usually verified only ex post. OGEL holders are required to adhere to all the 
specified terms and conditions. This includes keeping certain records as required by 
the licence for the controlled goods and technology being exported and to open the 
company’s doors for inspections.  
 
2.9 Re-export controls 
 
The UK requires exporters to specify when an export relates to items that will be 
incorporated and re-exported from the destination country. The issue of if and how to 
assess licences for the exports of components that are due to be incorporated into a 
military system and re-exported to a third state has been a subject of discussion in the 
UK since the early 2000s. Much of this debate has evolved around the export of 
components to the USA that are due to be incorporated into US-made weapon systems 
and re-exported to Israel.464 
As a consequence, in July 2002 the Secretary of State presented new guidelines for 
assessing licence applications for goods destined to be incorporated in defence 
equipment in a second country and re-exported to a third country. According to these 
guidelines the UK Government must take into consideration the following criteria:  
“(a) the export control policies and effectiveness of the export control system of the 
incorporating country;  
(b) the importance of the UK's defence and security relationship with the incorporating 
country;  
(c) the materiality and significance of the UK-origin goods in relation to the goods into 
which they are to be incorporated, and in relation to any end-use of the finished 
products which might give rise to concern;  
(d) the ease with which the UK-origin goods, or their significant parts, could be removed 
from the goods into which they are to be incorporated; and  
                                                                
464 Ibidem: p. 148. 
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(e) the standing of the entity to which the goods are to be exported.” 465 
According to a new formulation of the guidelines, in assessing the risk of re-exports 
the UK Government must refer to the EU Code of Conduct criteria, but may also 
consider a range of other factors, including ‘the importance of their defence and 
security relationship with that country’.466These different factors (political, ethical and 
economic) may conflict with each other and, in the absence of a clear order of priority, 
may offer a wide margin of discretion to the government in assessing re-export control 
guidelines, according to the concrete case. As a consequence, despite these 
guidelines for re-export representing an important step forward, they still need to be 
more clearly defined in order to be more effective. 
In conclusion, the UK model already has a regulation in which a) commercial variables 
played an important role and were given full weight in arms export policies b) the 
executive branch enjoyed a wide marge of discretion, in regulating the three pillars of 
any export regulation (transparency, export criteria and procedures); c) primary law 
dictated only a general framework and delegated most of the activities of the field to 
the executive: export control orders, guidance, other acts of bureaucratic authorities in 
order to maintain a high degree of flexibility to regulate this delicate field and to adhere 
to the single cases. d) the government decided the level of transparency and the quality 
and quantity of data to be reported to the Parliament: there is an abundance of 
information and transparency but some crucial data such as value and deliveries are 
not included; e) end-user and re-export control can change according to the kind of 
licences, and the principle of delegation to the partner country, the awareness of the 
exporting company and of the government about the final end use; f) most of the power 
is centralised in the hands of the Department for Trade and Industry and its head, the 
Secretary of State; g) companies enjoy a high level of trust by the government; h) the 
UK regulation is characterised by great differentiation from case to case and by a great 
differentiation in different kinds of licences and related controls. 
Overall the UK arms transfer regulation before the approval of the Directive is 
characterised by great flexibility, a strong power of the executive in applying the export 
criteria and in establishing the main characteristics of arms transfers licences, and 
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thorough, detailed information produced by the Parliamentary committee on arms 
trade, despite some crucial aspects not being reported.  
 
 
3. The transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC in the UK context: focus on the main 
features of the transposition law Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012  
 
The Directive was transposed into UK law via the Statutory Instrument that is the 
Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1910).467 The amending 
Order came into force on 10 August 2012. This Order implements Directive 
2009/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 simplifying 
terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community, 
as amended by Directive 2012/10/EU as regards the list of defence-related products. 
Furthermore, the Order introduces changes to the control lists agreed upon in the 
Wassenaar Arrangement (this Arrangement is an international control regime) and 
some amendments as a consequence of changes to Council Regulation 428/2009 for 
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items and to Council 
Regulation 1236/2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for 
capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. It decontrols the movement of historic military vehicles.468I focus only on 
the amendments related to the transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC and not those 
related to the Council Regulation concerning torture nor those related to the Council 
regulation on dual-use items. 
Overall, the legal modifications are very limited because the last formulation of 
Directive 2009/43/EC and the UK regulation present very strong similarities in the spirit 
and in two of the three pillars of the exporting system: the new types of global and 
general licences and a system of ex-post controls based on inspections. This low 
degree of misfit between the EU and domestic level, is due also to the fact that the UK 
tried successfully to upload its regulation at EU level before the Directive was approved 
                                                                
467 Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1910), brought into force on 10th August 
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accessed 7 January 2020). 
468 Explanatory memorandum on the Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1910)., 






and downloaded at the domestic level (see next sub-section). As a consequence, the 
amendments contained in the transposition only concern the introduction of a 
certification system for companies and some changes in the definition of military items. 
Moreover, according to the UK regulation, the Secretary of State already enjoys great 
discretion in using general or individual licences, in establishing terms and conditions 
to issuing a licence or not. Thus, part of the few changes generated by the Directive 
are not regulated with amendments to primary law but delegated to the Secretary of 
State who introduces them by guidance or directly modifying the text of general 
licences.   
Considering the low degree of misfit between the UK and EU regulation, the following 
sub-section will focus not only on the few amendments of Export Control Amendment 
Order 2012, but also on the extraordinary similarities between the UK domestic 
regulation and the disposal of the Directive, as well as few but meaningful differences 
between the domestic and EU levels, which were not included in the Export control 
amendment, but rather were ignored.   
  
3.1 The debate preceding the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC  
 
The initial position of the UK Government toward a defence industry strategy by the 
European Commission, was sceptical. In 2004, together with France, they stated that 
there was no need for a Directive and opted for intergovernmental cooperation, instead 
of envisaging a role for the Commission.469 This scepticism was due mainly to two 
reasons.  
Firstly, the UK did not want to penalise commercial relationships with its traditional 
favourite commercial ally (the USA) and other western allies.470 Overall, traditionally 
the UK orientation towards the market is “global”, overcoming European and even 
Western boundaries. General licences were already issued not only for defence 
exports with European Countries, but also with the USA and several Middle Eastern 
countries. The UK is mainly characterised by pragmatism with one fundamental 
principle: a free global market. 
                                                                
469 Strikwerda (2017): 19-36. 
470 Fiott (2017): 1045-1061. 
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The second reason was a reluctant approach towards a supranational regulation of the 
arms market, particularly towards the EU Commission’s power to oversee UK export 
regulation and policies: “While industry generally saw the proposed directive as a 
positive piece of legislation for the European defence market (UK Government, 2014, 
p. 2), both industry and government were aligned in seeking assurances that adoption 
of the directive would not lead to greater supranational oversight for defence exports 
or a 'weakening of the UK's export control system' (House of Commons, 2008c; UK 
Government, 2014, p. 2).” 471 They feared that a new directive regulating the arms 
market could have added to the burden on arms exporters with limited benefits.472 
However, between 2005 and 2006 the UK’s position changed and became favourable 
to the internal market directive. According to a 2015 interview of a British official by 
Strikwerda this happened once the UK Government understood that the arms market 
was considered a single market issue, and as a consequence the Commission could 
have legitimately legislated on it, on the basis of internal market rules: "The big legal 
issue was whether they had competence. And the legal advice was that they had 
competence because it is a single market issue”.473 Secondly, the UK Government 
declared to be in favour of the creation of a European Defence Market, favouring 
competition in this field. “The UK, as a leading European defence exporter, was a 
strong advocate for an open defence equipment market”.474 “An open market was 
expected to bring increased competition for the national defence industry”. 475  The 
possibility to save money made possible by the Directive was viewed as a benefit.476 
Thus, the UK Government started to glimpse the possibility of a convergence with the 
Commission principles of free market, giving priority to liberalisation over 
harmonisation. 
Moreover, once the UK Government understood that the Commission had legal 
competence to initiate a legislative process in this field, the attitude of the UK 
Government was that of leading and influencing this process as much as they could: 
“And so what we will do, we will go along with this, we will join their discussion groups, 
and we will participate in the drafting of the Directive, and have our lawyers be very 
careful that nothing is done which contradicts the ultimate big bazooka of our national 
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security interest. And then when the Directive finally comes into force we will ignore 
it.”477 
Therefore the UK government tried to shape the content of the Directive. As the then 
UK Secretary of State for Defence, Desmond Browne, reported: ‘we did not agree with 
the early proposals. We argued for a set of proposals which were much more akin to 
the scheme that we have in this country’.478 However the footprint of the UK is much 
more evident than the German influence, and the Directive much more similar to the 
UK regulation than to the German one. Indeed, the Commission realised during the 
negotiations that the Germany–UK ‘three-tier’ system offered an efficient blue-print for 
the proposed EU regime.479 
According to a Commission’s senior official, interviewed by Fiott, “Without the 
Commission’s willingness to adopt and promote the British–German export model, 
there would likely have been little reason for Germany or the UK to continue with 
negotiations.”480 
Thus the UK pressed for regulation similar to that in the UK and succeeded 
impressively. In fact, as admitted by the ECO, and as I will explain in the next 
paragraph, the ITC Directive has been heavily influenced by the UK regulation.  
The UK’s traditional pragmatism and its impressive capacity for influencing 
Commission decisions, led to the adoption of a new draft proposal heavily shaped and 
influenced by the UK and German three-tier system.481The UK was able to approve a 
proposal that was nearly identical to its own national regulation.  
 
3.2 Definitions  
 
The first amendment introduced by the Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 
2012 concerns definitions. It introduces the term “European military items” which is 
used to limit the amendments to the 2008 Order to the items within the scope of the 
Directive. However the transposition law does not adopt all the new definitions 
envisaged by the Directive which distinguishes between intra - EU transfers (defence 
                                                                
477 Interview British official as quoted in Strikwerda (2017): 20. 
478  Cited in Fiott (2017).  
479 F. Liberti, et alii (2010). Pratiques communautaires internes de contrôle des exportations et des 
transferts intracommunautaires de produits de defense. Paris: Institut de relations internationales et 
stratégiques, p. 6 
480 Interview British official as quoted in Fiott (2017): 1054. 
481 Fiott (2017). 
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material exports within the EU boundaries) and exports (defence material exports 
outside the EU), maintaining its traditional national different meaning for these two 
terms.482 This is because, as previously explained, the UK does not want to penalise 
its exchange and relationship with its main transatlantic partner with respect to the 
European partners.  
 
3.3 Three-tier system: general licences and global licences. 
 
As already explained in previous chapters, the main revolution of the Directive is 
represented by the introduction for intra-European exchanges of armaments material 
for three kinds of licences: the general licences, the global licences, as well as the 
traditional individual licences, in order to improve the competitiveness of the European 
defence industry, reduce national obstacles by simplifying the system of licences, aim 
to harmonise national export procedures, lighten the burden of companies in the 
exchange of defence material within the EU borders and to favour collaboration and 
coproduction. To achieve these ambitions, the Directive introduces a three-tier 
licensing system for those military goods listed on the EU Common Military List.  
Overall, the legal modifications are very limited because the UK regulation is extremely 
similar to the text of the Directive. It is the same ECO (Export Control Unit) as a note 
to the exporters explains: “Broadly speaking, there are few practical implications for 
UK companies arising from the implementation of the Directive in the UK. The ICT 
model used by the Commission is heavily UK inspired and will allow the UK to operate 
a system of licensing very close to our current arrangements.”  
Firstly, as clearly summarised by the same ECO the UK regulation […] “already 
operates a similar three-tier structure for the export licensing of military and dual-use 
goods, software and technology”.483 This structure comprises  Open General Export 
Licences (OGELs), Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs)  and Standard Individual 
Export Licences (SIELs). 
                                                                
482 According to the UK regulation and definitions, exports refer to any material moved from the UK to 
any other countries and transfer to the export of technology.  
483 UK Export Control Organisation (2012b). “Implementation of the European Union Directive 2009/43 
(Intra-Community Transfer of Defence Goods or ‘ICT Directive’)”. Notice to Exporters 2012/37, available 
online at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015093035/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/export-




Thus there was no need to change the architecture of the UK licensing regulation, in 
contrast to several other European countries. 
 
3.3.1 General licences 
According to Article 5.1 of the Directive, MS shall publish general transfer licences 
directly granting authorisation to suppliers established on their territory. These 
suppliers must fulfil the terms and conditions attached to the general transfer licence, 
to perform transfers of defence-related products, as specified in the general transfer 
licence, to a category or categories of recipients located in another Member State. 
According to Article 4.6., MS shall determine the terms and conditions of transfer 
licences for defence-related products.  
According to 26,(6) of the UK 2008 Export Control Order, a licence granted by the 
Secretary of State may be (a) either general or granted to a particular person; (b) 
limited so as to expire on a specified date unless renewed; (c) subject to, or without, 
conditions and any such condition may require any act or omission before or after the 
doing of the act authorised by the licence. Thus, Article 26 of the Export Control Order 
potentially include all the terms and conditions contained in the Directive, the cases in 
which a general licence should be used, and even including re-export controls and 
controls on parts and components.  
Terms and conditions established in the Directive, re-export requirements, norms 
concerning export of parts and components fall to the discretion of the Secretary of 
State and the executive, and are treated as guidance, for an act of the executive that 
however must be laid before Parliament. Consequently, there is no need for any 
amendments to the Export Control Act. The UK legislator decided not to define all these 
aspects by primary law, but on the contrary, in harmony with the nation’s traditional 
spirit of flexibility to delegate authority to the executive using the instrument of 
guidance.484  
According to point 2 of Article 5 of the Directive there are four main cases when general 
licences can be released: allowed to release general licence typologies of general 
licences,  
                                                                
484 Explanatory memorandum on the Export Control (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2012 (SI 2012/1910). 
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 the recipient is part of the armed forces of a Member State or a contracting 
authority in the field of defence, purchasing for the exclusive use by the armed 
forces of a Member State.  
 the recipient is an undertaking certified in accordance with Article 9. 
 the transfer is made for the purposes of demonstration, evaluation or exhibition.  
 the transfer is made for the purposes of maintenance and repair, if the recipient is 
the originating supplier of the defence-related products.  
Furthermore, MS may issue general licences in cases of coproduction. 
 
The UK Export Control Order gives the Secretary of State a wide range of possibilities 
to allow general licences, nearly a carte blanche – with only a few exceptions - in 
deciding if and when to use general licence, and whether and which conditions to apply 
or not. Thus, once again the four main cases listed in Article 5.2 are potentially included 
at the discretion of the Secretary of State in issuing general licences. 
In practice, the Secretary of State has issued 37 general licences, covering a broader 
range of cases than those foreseen by Article 5.3 of the Directive.  
As explained in a notice to exporters and in the previous paragraph, there were several 
cases in which the UK was allowed to release general licences, covering an even wider 
range of typologies than the Directive had indicated. However, in practice only one 
type of general licence envisaged by letter b of Article 5 of the Directive - general 
licences to be used with EU companies certified under Article 9 of the Directive – was 
not present among the nearly 40 general licences issued by the UK Government. Thus, 
it was necessary to create a new general licence to be used with other EU certified 
companies (which is available for any UK company to use providing that they can meet 
all the terms and conditions of the licences) also to adjust five other ones concerning 
the other letter of Article 5 in order to include all the EU countries.485  
As summarised by ECO in a notice to exporters, the only changes made to OGELs, as 
a result of the Directive’s implementation, were the addition of Cyprus and Bulgaria to 
five named OGELs which correspond to the categories listed in the Directive, and to 
create a new general licence to be used with other EU certified companies. These 
changes were not introduced at primary law level with amendments to the Export 
                                                                
485 UK Export Control Organisation (2012a). “Amendment to the military goods Open General Licences 
adding Cyprus and Bulgaria as permitted destination”. Notice to Exporters 2012/29, available online 
at:https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015093035/http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/export-
control-organisation/eco-notices-exporters (last accessed 16 January 2020).   
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Control Order. Acting correctly within the disposition of the UK regulation, they were 
introduced directly by the Secretary of State by creating and modifying existing general 
licences, and did not require any amendment to Export Control Act 2002 or to Export 
Control Order 2008.  
 
3.3.2 Global licences  
Global licences play an intermediate role between general and individual licences. 
They authorise one supplier to send one or more shipment to one or more specified 
recipients.  
According to Article 6 of the ICT Directive,486 MS shall decide to grant global transfer 
licences to an individual supplier, at its request, authorising transfers of defence-
related products to recipients in one or more other MS. MS shall determine in each 
global transfer licence the defence-related products or categories of products covered 
by the global transfer licence and the authorised recipients or category of recipients. A 
global transfer licence shall be granted for a period of three years, which may be 
renewed by the Member State.  
In the UK, according to what was clearly explained by the Export Control Organization 
in a notice to exporters, the global licences already exist and correspond to the UK 
Open Individual Export Licences. OIELs are specific to an individual exporter, but cover 
multiple shipments of specified items to a specified destination or a category of 
destination. OIELs are generally valid for a period of five years, with the exceptions of 
OIELs for the transfer of military items to destinations in other MS of the EU, which are 
valid for three years but may be renewed at the exporter’s request. Thus, no 
amendment to the Export Control Order was necessary to implement the Directive.  
  
3.4  Certification  
 
All the norms concerning the certification process required an amendment to the 
Export Control Order of 2008, because they were not included in it originally. 
An important element of the Directive is the introduction of the certification process for 
the companies in order to identify reliable companies among different EU MS. The 
                                                                
486 Article 6 of the Directive 2009/43/EC. of the European Parliament and the Council of 6 May 2009 
simplifying terms and conditions of transfers of defence-related products within the Community [2009] 
O.J. L146/1.  
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overall aim is to offer a common European system to certify the reliability of the 
companies addressed in particular to foreign companies and foreign governments. 
According to Article 9 of the Directive, in fact “[..]The certification shall establish the 
reliability of the recipient undertaking, in particular as regards its capacity to observe 
export limitations of defence-related products received under a transfer licence from 
another Member State. Reliability shall be assessed according to the following criteria:  
(a) proven experience in defence activities, taking into account in particular the 
undertaking’s record of compliance with export restrictions, any court decisions on this 
matter, any authorisation to produce or commercialise defence-related products and 
the employment of experienced management staff; 
(b) relevant industrial activity in defence-related products within the Community, in 
particular capacity for system/sub-system integration; 
(c) the appointment of a senior executive as the dedicated officer personally 
responsible for transfers and exports; 
(d) a written commitment of the undertaking, signed by the senior executive referred to 
in point (c) that the undertaking will take all necessary steps to observe and enforce all 
specific conditions related to the end-use and export of any specific component or 
product received; 
e) a written commitment of the undertaking, [..] to provide to the competent authorities, 
with due diligence, detailed information in response to requests and inquiries 
concerning the end-users or end-use of all products exported, transferred or received 
under a transfer licence from another Member State; and 
(f) a description […] of the internal compliance programme or transfer and export 
management system implemented in the undertaking. This description shall provide 
details of the organisational, human and technical resources allocated to the 
management of transfers and exports, the chain of responsibility within the 
undertaking, internal audit procedures, awareness-raising and staff training, physical 
and technical security arrangements, record-keeping and traceability of transfers and 
exports.”487 
The UK Export Control Amendment transposes, with minor changes, the whole Article 
9 of the Directive. Amended Article 2(1) of the 2008 Order defines “certification” by 
reference to the Directive. New Article 28A(2) of the 2008 Order sets out the criteria 
for the granting of certification. These provisions are copied out from the Directive (Art. 
                                                                
487 Ibidem.  
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9.2). New Article 28A(3) of the 2008 Order provides that conditions may be attached 
to certifications relating to provision of information and suspension/revocation (Art. 
9.4). New Article 28A(1) of the 2008 Order provides the Secretary of State with the 
power to grant certifications. Amended Article 2(1) of the 2008 Order defines 
“certification” by reference to the Directive. 
Despite the certification system representing one of the few consistent amendments to 
the previous UK regulation, there are two points worth underlining. 
1) Once again the certification system is largely inspired by the UK regulation 
which has preceded it. The ECO specifies to the exporters that “the [certification] 
criteria used by the Commission has been taken from the UK’s existing Code of 
Practice on Compliance. This Code represents UK best practices for those UK 
companies who already currently make use of open licences.488  
2) The UK Code of Practice is voluntary. In line with its approach to arms export 
control, the ECO explains to the exporters that the certification process under the 
Directive is voluntary and that it is worth “tackling” this – long and difficult- process only 
if UK companies want to benefit from general licences released by other European 
countries. Thus, in line with its traditional pragmatism, the UK Government does not 
encourage UK companies to certify unless strictly necessary in order to use general 
licences issued by other EU Member State companies. 
Overall the UK, in line with its traditional liberal approach to the arms market, has 
privileged an interpretation of the Directive as a tool of liberalisation of the market, 
rather than as a means of building mutual confidence and creating common 
procedures and regulations for the arms market. It is possible to find a very similar 
approach in two other major EU exporters, Italy and France, where the Directive has 
been interpreted as a tool of liberalisation and less as a means of integration and 
supra-nationalisation, despite their traditional approach to arms market regulation 






                                                                
488 http://www.businesslink.gov.uk/exportcontrol/compliance.  
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3.5 Record keeping requirements 
 
According to the Directive 2009/43/EC, all the holders of general, global and individual 
community transfers licences are obliged to keep a register updated and filled with 
crucial information concerning all the transfers/movement of parts and components 
undertaken under the umbrella of the Directive. This information is vital especially for 
general and global licences, given that they are not disclosed by the companies during 
authorisation procedures. In absence of ex ante control, this is an essential form of ex 
post control. 
Comparing the previous 2008 UK regulation and specifically Article 29 of the Export 
Control Order of 2008 and Article 8 of the 2009 Directive reveals that they are very 
similar, and that once again the UK regulation seems to have greatly inspired the 
Directive. The ambiguous formula about the awareness of the end-user listed in Article 
8 of the Directive, seems to have been inherited from Article 29 of the 2008 Export 
Control Order. In fact, according to Article 29, the exporting company must keep 
records on the name and address of the end-user, in so far as it is known. Equally, 
according to Article 8 of the Directive, a company must give information on the end-
use and end-user of the defence-related product “where known”. Thus, both these 
legal instruments allow exporting without knowing the final destination of the defence 
material; it seems that the UK regulation and its extreme flexibility and liberal 
perspective have influenced the Directive in this crucial aspect as well. 
Nonetheless, the UK national regulation presents some important differences from the 
norms and disposition of the European Directive. The first one was translated in an 
amendment to the Export Control Order and concerned the extension of the reporting 
requirements also to the holders of individual licences. The existing Article 29 of the 
2008 Order (record-keeping requirements) is amended so that it also applies to 
individual licences to export/transfer items within the scope of the Directive (it 
previously only applied to general licences).  
Secondly, there is another important difference between the two regulations which is 
worthy of attention: the Directive obliges exporters to keep data concerning the value 
of the material exported in the register, whereas this crucial detail is not mentioned in 
Article 29 of the Export Control Order. Given that this information (supported by 
documentation) is obligatory under the Directive, it is curious that it is not mentioned in 
the transposition law, nor has there been any discussion in the Parliament on this. The 
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obligation to report one detail crucial for increasing transparency was missed by the 
UK actors in this delicate game.  
The Directive also offered the opportunity to make the controls on reporting 
requirements more regular and more systematic by the UK Government, but this 
opportunity to fill in the missing data on deliveries under general licences was 
neglected.489 
 
3.6 The transparency initiative  
 
It is worth mentioning another softer political initiative which is oriented to increase 
transparency and regularity in reporting requirements with attention to general and 
global licences, which is called the “transparency initiative”. This process, which could 
have been indirectly and implicitly triggered by EU Directive 2009/43/EC, is emblematic 
on the one hand of the capacity and will of the Secretary of State and the Export Control 
to conjugate liberalisation with controls, efficiency with transparency, and on the other, 
of the dynamics between governmental and non-governmental actors. It is articulated 
in four main steps. 
 
1. As a first step, on 7 February 2012, the Secretary of State Vince Cable made a 
written ministerial statement to Parliament, where he presented his proposals to 
improve transparency.490 The main proposal was to include in all open export licences 
a provision requiring the exporter to report periodically on transactions undertaken 
under open individual and general licences. The government would have then 
published this information. There were also two other proposals: The second one 
concerned information contained in standard export licence applications but not 
reported in the government’s annual and quarterly reports. The Export Control 
Organisation believed certain additional information contained in licence applications 
could be made public without causing concern to exporters. The third proposal was to 
                                                                
489 In fact Article 8 of EU Directive 2009/43/EC clearly specifies that MSs shall ensure and regularly 
check that suppliers keep detailed and complete records of their transfers, in accordance with the 
legislation. This aspect of regularity on controls is absent in the UK 2008 Export Control Order. 
Regularity of controls could have strengthened a new reporting system based not on inspection of only 
a percentage of companies, but rather based on regular collection of data on exports and referred to 
OIEL and OGEL. But this reference to regularity has not been formally transposed as an amendment to 
the Export Control Order. 
490  The full statement is available online at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120207/wmstext/120207m0001.htm
#12020767000002, (last accessed 15 September 2018). 
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appoint an independent person to scrutinise the Export Control Organisation’s 
licensing process. The role of this independent person would be to confirm that the 
process is indeed being followed correctly and report on their work [...].491  
 
The reasons for this initiative were identified in the necessity to overcome the 
weaknesses of the UK reporting system, which are clearly explained by the Export 
Control Order “Since 1997 the government has published Annual Reports, and since 
2004 Quarterly Reports, which provide details of individual export and trade licensing 
decisions. The information covers individual licences issued, refused and revoked by 
destination and gives the rating, a generic description (the “annual report summary” or 
ARS) and total value of items licenced to that destination.”492 But this system has some 
relevant limits. 
(i) the information only covers individual licences – no information is provided on open 
general licences other than the number of registrations;  
(ii) there is no information on the quantity and value of items licenced under Open 
Individual Export Licences since these licences are not limited by value or quantity and 
applicants do not have to provide this information in their licence applications;  
(iii) the reports only provide information on the items licenced for export, not on 
quantities/values actually exported;  
(iv) the reports give no information on end-use or end-users for the items licenced for 
export or trade.  
2. The second step of the transparency initiative was represented by a questionnaire 
given to the companies as well as other non-governmental actors. The questionnaire 
revolved around some crucial preliminary questions concerning the kind of information 
that companies would be willing to disclose to the public (with reference to the value, 
quantity, description of the goods), the way of giving this information (in real time using 
information technology) and a quantification of the burden of regularly communicating. 
                                                                
491 Ibidem. See also Lunn (2017): p. 23. 
492 Recognising that the published reports do not always meet the needs of readers the Government 
launched the Strategic Export Controls: Reports and Statistics website in April 2009 
http://www.exportcontroldb.bis.gov.uk. This provides a user-friendly searchable database of data 
published from 1 January 2008 onwards. Users can create bespoke reports covering one or more 
destinations, specific ratings or ARS, and user-defined time periods (with a minimum 30-day period). 




Additional information on exports would have implied high costs in terms of time and 
money for the companies.493 
To this end, it is important to quote a part of the ECO survey and especially consider 
the question of additional administrative burdens on exporters to communicate value, 
quantity, end-users and other sensitive data to the government. The survey results 
revealed that the administrative burden was estimated to be extremely low by the 
exporting companies. In particular, according to the survey results, “a small company 
estimated £100 per annum; medium sized companies’ estimates included figures of 
£200 per month, £3000 per reporting period and £40,000 per annum (which includes 
IT support); while large companies provided estimates ranging from £170 for 10 to 15 
hours work inputting data, £1000 per reporting period up to an exceptional figure of 
£245,000 per annum for supplying information in a disaggregated format on SPIRE. 
The cost is dependent on the level of detail required and is clearly greater for larger 
companies operating across multiple sites.”494 
3. As a third step, in July 2012 the Secretary of State, based on the questionnaire 
outcome, was able to better define the proposals around the transparency initiative: 
companies would report data on open and general licences, including a description of 
the items exported or transferred, the destination, value and/or quantity, and some 
information about the end-user.495 This data would be published in an aggregated form, 
by destination, in the government's quarterly and annual reports on strategic export 
controls, and would be searchable through strategic export control: reports and 
statistics website. All this information should be reported quarterly via the “SPIRE” 
website. 
This transparency initiative was relevant for several reasons: firstly, because the UK 
Government was willing to fill an important gap on transparency covering open 
individual and general licences. Secondly, based on long held practices in the past for 
general and open licences, the UK Secretary of State with the help of ECO was able 
to find an efficient way to combine simplification through controls, efficiency with 
transparency whilst rethinking controls and transparency in a more interdependent 
                                                                
493  UK Department for Business Innovation and skills (2012). “Export Control Organisation, 
Transparency in Export Licensing”. Discussion Paper, March 2012.  
494 Ibidem, p.3. 
495 When submitting a licence application, applicants would have been required to indicate whether 
any information in their applications was sensitive and should not be made public, and give reasons 
why. In considering whether to release this information the Government will take the applicant's wishes 
into account but will not be bound by them, see UK Department for Business Innovation and skills (2012) 
“Export Control Organisation, Transparency in Export Licensing”. Discussion Paper, March 2012). 
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system of coproduction and export. Thirdly because it also envisaged the possibility to 
transmit these data quarterly or even in real time thanks to an efficient informatics 
system of reporting data, with a very light administrative burden. This is a modern 
solution that could also inspire other EU countries and the whole EU in the hypothesis 
of creating a common database on intra-Community transfers. Lastly, the way of taking 
the final decision on such a sensitive issue was really inclusive of the opinion of 
different companies and actors involved in the process. All the companies declared 
that they were in favour of a lighter informatics system of reporting and declared that 
uploading data on value or quantity would mean irrelevant or low costs. 496 
 
4. The fourth step of the transparency initiative was a step backward. In fact, one year 
later, on the 18th July 2013, the Secretary of State announced to Parliament important 
changes to the strategic export control transparency initiative.497 The Secretary of State 
explained that reporting requirements on the use of Open licences under the 
transparency initiative “would be scaled back significantly”.498 
The reasons why are clearly identified by the Secretary of State in a notice to Exporters 
as follows: “Many companies have expressed concerns that this would place an 
unacceptable administrative burden on exporters.”499 As a result the Secretary of State 
has decided that “exporters will only have to provide information on the country of 
destination; type of end-user; number of times the licence has been used for that 
country/end-user type.”500 The notice also declared that the report will not be made on 
a quarterly but rather annual basis.  
Consequently, it was no longer necessary to report the quantity, value, and description 
of the items exported and their classification. Thus, all efforts for transparency were 
reduced to merely secondary information, continuing to make it difficult to draw a clear 
picture (and keep effective control) of the one of the most important and sensitive 
sectors in the UK. 
                                                                
496 This initiative could have been an important quality step for the UK in transparency and reporting 
for a significant part of UK arms export, aligning the first EU exporters to the other leading exporters of 
the UE.  
497  UK Export Control Organisation (2013). “Important Changes to the Strategic Export Control 
Transparency Initiative”. Notice to Exporters 2013/18, available at 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160701133534/http://blogs.bis.gov.uk/exportcontrol/unca
tegorized/notice-to-exporters-201318-important-changes-to-the-strategic-export-control-transparency-






This step backward indirectly shows the power of economic actors in the UK, and in 
this case the superiority of worries about commercial confidentiality over the instances 
of transparency and control on such a delicate and important sector for the UK 
economy and policy. It also shows the gap between rhetoric and official reasons 
(administrative burden) and real reasons (commercial confidentiality).  
 
3.7 Re-export requirements 
 
There are also two processes that were probably triggered by the discussion linked to 
the approval and transposition of the Directive which are worth mentioning (despite not 
entailing any amendment to the UK Export Control Order or Export Control Act). Article 
8.1 of the ICT Directive sets out an obligation on exporters to inform recipients of any 
terms and conditions of a licence relating to end use or re-export. Licences will contain 
a condition requiring exporting companies to inform recipients of any terms or 
conditions relating to end-use or re-export and to keep records showing compliance 
with this obligation. The UK regulation does not detail by primary law this delicate and 
crucial aspect for coproduction. Thus,  this Article does not entail any amendments to 
the UK regulation, because it can be regulated (or not) by the Secretary of State, by 
guidance or directly in the text of the licences. However, the added value of Article 8.1 
is that it poses the problem of reflecting on specific re-export controls and conditions 
and on increasing responsibility on the final destination of UK defence material.  
In fact, in recent years some steps have been made in the direction of strengthening 
exports control. In 2010 the UK Government began requiring companies and states 
importing UK military goods to commit to not re-exporting them to countries subject to 
a UN, EU or OSCE embargo.501 Furthermore, in the EUU (End-user Undertaking) form, 
the end-user is required to state that he will not: supply the goods to an entity known 
or suspected to likely use the defence material for any purpose connected with 
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such 
weapons. In addition, the UK Government has become more willing to carry out other 
aspects of post-export monitoring, particularly tasking embassies with collecting 
information on how weapons are used after delivery.  
                                                                
501 UK House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and International 
Development Committees (2010). Scrutiny of arms export controls (2010): London: the Stationery 
Office: pp. 27-30.  
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Despite these steps forward, the Commission on Arms Export Controls continued to 
press the UK Government to release more information about cases where re-export 
controls have been breached. In the 2015 CAEC Report, the Committee “recommend 
that the Government states in its Response whether, apart from the sniper rifles to 
France case in 2012, it remains unaware of controlled goods with export licence 
approval from the UK Government having subsequently been re-exported for 
undesirable uses or to undesirable destinations contrary to the Government’s re-export 
controls and undertakings which became compulsory from July 2010.”502 In response, 
the UK Government stated that it was not aware of any other such cases.503 This 
answer confirms that it is hard to strengthen the principle of responsibility in the UK 
regulation. 
 
3.8  End-user controls and export requirements for OGEL 
 
The second step forward concerns strengthening controls on Open General Licences. 
Despite these aspects being introduced in the text of single general licences and not a 
superior legal source, they testify to the will to ameliorate controls in order to find the 
right balance between reducing administrative burden on the one hand and 
maintaining controls and transparency on the other. For example, the text of the Open 
General Export Licence,” Exports in Support of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) TF-
X Programme” of July 2017, includes three aspects worthy of attention. 
1) Exporters must provide in advance (with the registration) an original 
undertaking from the person or entity of the goods which confirms the export is for (in 
this case) the design, manufacture or development of TF-x, including the contact 
number and the name of the items which can be checked against the control list. It is 
recommended that companies renew this document every year. In other words any 
End-user certificate is also requested ex ante for general licences with the 
recommendation for annual renewal, considering the length, flexibility and broad range 
of material covered by general licences. This documentation is a very important step 
towards better controlling all the material which is exported under the general umbrella 
                                                                
502 UK House of Commons Committees on Arms Exports Controls (2015), p.19. 
503 UK House of Commons Committees on Arms Exports Controls (2015). p.28. 
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of the general licence. It is the first time that a version of an end-user certificate is 
required immediately after the registration and before the effective delivery.  
2) Exporters must explicitly and regularly communicate the data on their 
exports under general and global licences to the government via the SPIRE system. 
This regularity in communicating ex post is a consequence of the transparency 
initiative and a first step towards having a complete picture of all the material 
transferred under general licences. 504  However, as explained before, the most 
important data such as end use and value, is lacking from the report. 
3) Thirdly, the requirement not to re-export to countries under UN OSCE or 
EU embargo, or not to export when that material is likely to be used for purposes linked 
to weapons of mass destruction (biological, chemical or nuclear), is also extended to 




Additionally there are a number of other aspects arising from the UK’s implementation 
of the ITC. A range of new penalties have been introduced by the new legislation. This 
includes making it a criminal offence to supply misleading information in support of 
applications for certification. These new penalties have been included in the Export 
Control Order as an amendment. However, as explained above, their practical 
application is minimal given that there are no certified companies in the UK, according 
to the EU Commission CERTIDER website.  
 
 
4. Comparing the UK regulatory regime before and after Directive 2009/43/EC: 
domestic change along the eight dimensions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Having given an overview of UK regulation before the approval of Directive 2009/43/EC 
and after the transposition of the Directive, the chapter now seeks to measure the 
direction of change more precisely and also the intensity of change at the domestic 
                                                                
504 Open General Export Licence, “Exports in Support of Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) TF-X 




level. To do this I used a scale of intensity for each of the eight dimensions. Overall 
lower values are associated with a pro-market model of European arms exports and 
higher values with a restrictive model, where ethical and political values prevail. 
 
4.2  Political and strategic variables versus economic and industrial variables  
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The first dimension concerns the balance between economic, industrial variables and 
political variables (defence, security, foreign policy and ethical variables). The UK 
regulation has been characterised by a strong interpenetration of these two groups of 
variables: political strategic variables and economic variables. The old British model 
was characterised by the open promotion of arms sales, and the UK defence 
companies received strong support from the government. DESO (Defence export 
service organization within the Ministry of Defence) was the concretisation of this 
support. The organisational situation changed and DESO was closed in 2007, but there 
was still a strong interpenetration and huge staff in the government devoted to following 
commercial variables of arms trade. 506  
The UK regulation, unlike some other EU regulations, makes explicit reference to 
commercial and industrial variables. This in particular happens in the preamble and 
conclusion of the UK consolidated criteria on arms exports, which have the status of 
guidance. The preamble is emblematic because it helps to understand the spirit of the 
whole UK regulation. It starts by quoting exactly the UK defence industry and 
establishing a crossover and mutual support between the interest of the UK defence 
industry and the interest of the UK Government in terms of peace and security. The 
rules of a free market are a principle governing the defence trade field and producing 
security, whereas export criteria and bans are considered an exception to this principle 
and geared toward making sure arms do not finish in the “wrong hands”.  
In the UK transposition of the EU consolidated criteria, which state they “may where 
appropriate also take into account” the effect of proposed exports on their economic 
social and commercial interest, the commercial dimension is also strengthened. In fact, 
                                                                
506 Stavrianakis (2008). 
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the UK consolidated guidelines specify that when considering licence applications the 
UK Government will “give full weight to the UK’s national interest”. They then explicate 
all the dimensions of the UK national interest paying particular attention to the 
commercial aspects: the potential effect on the UK’s economic, financial and 
commercial interests, the potential effect on any collaborative defence production or 
procurement project with allies or EU partners; and the protection of the UK’s essential 
strategic industrial base. “In a legal context, ‘full weight’ is a term given to evidence 
weighting, and attributes primary significance and importance to this type of 
evidence.”507 Thirdly, case-by-case analysis in practice allows giving priority both to 
commercial and ethical variables according to the single case study. Fourthly, the 
ministry responsible for taking formal decisions issuing export licences was the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) and recently the Department for 
International Trade. In conclusion, with reference to the scale concerning this first 
dimension, the position of the UK regulation before the transposition of Directive 
2009/43/EC was 2.  
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and the UK regulation after the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC  
This UK approach is considered “economic liberal” according to which the government 
should regulate the market with light hands, allowing firms to “shape the market” and 
the rhetoric of economic efficiency, based on the presumed coincidence between 
commercial and political (security/defence) interests, is very similar to that of the EU 
Directive, according to which the freedom to move goods (extended to defence goods 
with some caveats) is the principle, whereas political principles of national regulation 
(foreign policy, security policy and international law principles concerning the respect 
for human rights, the prevention of conflicts) in this sensitive field of arms exports, are 
exceptions which must be used only in extraordinary cases, if the essential security 
interest is at stake, under certain conditions (necessity and proportionality). 
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Finally, in overall spirit the UK regulation seems to have inspired the Directive with the 
difference that liberal auspices do not limit within European boundaries but extend to 
the European level. Thus, the Export Control Amendment Order does not imply any 
modification to the UK regulation and does not entail any change to the balance 
between economic and industrial variables with the political and ethical ones. As a 
consequence, the UK situation stayed the same after the approval of the Directive and 
the entry into force of the transposition law. Thus, in 2012 UK regulation assessment 
was 2 again. 
 
4.3  Primary law versus secondary law 
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The UK regulation in 2009 (ECA 2002 and ECO 2008) offers general guidelines and 
leaves it to secondary law to define the details concerning the three fundamental 
aspects of any regulation a) the criteria and bans on exports have the status of 
guidance and can be modified by the executive; b) it is the secondary law which 
regulates terms and conditions of the three fundamental kinds of licences, including all 
the articulation concerning end-user controls and re-export requirements and c) lastly, 
the quality and quantity of information to be reported to the Parliament are decided at 
the secondary law level. Consequently, UK regulation was evaluated as 2 in 2009. 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
The balance between primary and secondary law remains unchanged after the 
approval of the Directive and the entry into force of the transposition law. In fact, all the 
details concerning the application of the Directive and of general and global licences 
(with the exception of few aspects concerning certification process and penalties) are 
regulated at the secondary law level or via “Notes to the exporters”. Thus UK regulation 







4.4 Legislative branch versus executive branch 
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
A characteristic of the UK regulatory model was the flexible discretion the government 
enjoyed, both in authorisation procedures and in establishing criteria and bans. This 
discretion was particularly broad in the Eighties but, after the scandals of arms export 
to Iraq, the Scott Report explained that this discretion gave the government “an 
unfettered power to impose whatever export controls it wishes and to use those 
controls for any purpose it thinks fit” and recommended increasing transparency and 
accountability. 508 As a consequence, with the 2002 regulation, the legislative branch 
put a framework and limits in arms export policy. Firstly, it established the obligation to 
present a report to the Parliament on the arms trade of the previous year. Secondly, it 
introduced the obligation for the statutory instruments, implementing the 2002 Export 
Control Act, to be approved by both houses of parliament. However, within this 
framework the executive still enjoyed a marge of discretion. This power included all 
three fundamental pillars of any arms export control regulation: bans and criteria, 
licensing procedures and control and transparency. In fact, according to Article 9 of the 
Export Control Act, a) it is the executive which must give guidance concerning bans 
and criteria and can decide the content of the criteria; b) it is the executive and in 
particular the Secretary of State who may decide when using general licences and 
individual licences (with few exceptions established) whether to put conditions on 
licences including end-user assurances or not; and c) lastly, the legislative imposes 
the duty to present to the Parliament an annual report on UK strategic arms exports, 
but it is up to the executive to establish the quality and quantity of information to be 
reported. The power of the UK Parliament is successive to the licence granting from 
the government and the degree of transparency is medium, considering that some 
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crucial details are lacking. Thus, the evaluation of the UK regulation before the 
approval of the EU Directive was 2. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
In line with this UK tradition, the 2012 Arms Export Control Amendment Order (which 
is redacted by the executive but which must be approved by both houses of 
Parliament), introduced only a few amendments concerning the certification process 
(which remains voluntary) and penalties and a few small adjustments to the existing 
regulation. In contrast, whereas all the details about when to use general and global 
licences, terms and conditions for issuing general licences, very delicate cases 
regarding end-user control, re-exports, and differences between parts, components 
and finished products are not mentioned in the Export Control Amendment, but rather 
delegated to the Secretary of State who regulates them by guidance or even in the text 
of the single licence. This is in line with the spirit of the UK regulation oriented towards 
maximum flexibility in applying the general UK primary law guidelines, in order to 
adhere to the single case. 
Thus, the balance between executive and legislative power stays exactly the same as 
before the approval and transposition of EU Directive 2009/43/EC. As a consequence, 
the scaling stayed the same after the approval of the Directive and entry into force of 
the transposition law. In 2012 UK regulation was assessed as 2 again. 
 
4.5. Transparency versus opacity 
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
From a strictly legal point of view, the 2002 Export Control Act formalises the obligation 
for the government to present to the Parliament an annual report on the strategic 
exports undertaken in the previous year. However the quality and quantity of the data 
are not established by primary law, but fall under the discretion of the government.  
In practice, since 1997 the government has published annual reports on individual 
licences, issued, refused and revoked by destination. These reports give the rating, a 
generic description of the good and total value of items licenced to that destination. 
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There are also three different documents that are available to the Parliament and the 
public. Thus, in the UK there is a wealth of information on strategic arms exports. 
However, in practice the UK transparency model is not complete because of the lack 
of information on a very sensitive, crucial aspect: the value of general licences which 
cover a relevant part of UK arms exports. These data would have been essential for 
both transparency and controls and to have a reliable picture of UK arms exports. 
Furthermore, unlike most European countries, there is no information on deliveries, 
which are important for transparency and control reasons. The lack of this information 
is perfectly legal because primary law does not specify the level of transparency. Thus 
the overall mark assigned to the UK regulation before the approval of the Directive was 
2. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
Despite the Directive having been criticised by the NGOs for the lack of explicit 
reference to transparency, it introduces in Article 8 the obligation for those companies 
using general, global or individual intra-Community transfer licences to keep updated 
registers and to report regularly to the government data on the quantity, value, 
description of the goods, end-users and other details. A faithful transposition of the EU 
Directive would have increased UK transparency on arms export by introducing the 
obligation to report the value of exports under global and general licences, albeit ex 
post, and introducing regular communication of these data to the government as well 
as offering the government regular information on effective deliveries. 
However, the UK Government did not opt for a formal amendment to the ECO, but for 
a softer and more inclusive political initiative, the “transparency initiative”, aimed to fill 
the lack of information on general and open licences, with explicit reference to value 
and quantity. This softer initiative was further reduced in its impact, because the 
companies asked to delete the reference to the value and description of the goods. 
Thus, at the end of this long process the increase in transparency for open licences 
was limited to reporting data on the country of destination (OIEL) and the number of 
registrations per year, with a long list of exceptions. Overall, compared to previous UK 
regulation, the “transparency initiative”, has entailed a slight marginal increase in ex 
post transparency concerning open licences. However, the value of open general and 
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individual licences is still excluded from the annual report. Thus, UK regulation after 
the transposition of the Directive increased by half a point, to 2.5 in 2012. 
 
4.6 Responsibility versus delegation 
 
 UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The UK regulation concerning end-user controls and re-export is fragmented and 
differentiated. In fact, this delicate and crucial aspect is not regulated by primary law 
but instead is delegated to guidance by the Secretary of State. Thus, firstly end-user 
controls change according to the kind of licences. Exporters using Individual and Open 
Individual Licences are required to attach an end-user undertaking whereas 
companies exporting under general licence are not. Furthermore, there is an escape 
route of not reporting the end-user if it is not known to the exporters. As far as re-export 
requirements are concerned, the UK Government in 2002 adopted general guidelines 
which allow the possibility for placing conditions based on the strategic function of the 
material exported, the reliability of the importer country, and other variables. Thus, the 
overall assessment of the UK regulation is 3. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
The Directive makes a clear distinction between transfers within EU boundaries and 
exports to third countries. In the first case, it encourages MS to minimise the use of 
end-user certificates to a few cases involving security concerns whereas they allow 
each MS to set conditions for a partner country on re-exports. This is in line with the 
European Court of Justice’s establishment of the mutual recognition principle rule 
stipulating that products “lawfully produced and marketed in one of the MS must be 
allowed by the national market”. The principle is a real driving force for European 
integration and expansion of European law, which might favour a process pushing MS 
with stricter or more regulated laws and politics to harmonise with those having more 
flexible or lax regulation, in order to maintain their competitiveness. However, for 
exports to third countries the Directive allows MS the possibility to put export conditions 
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and controls in harmony, considering that these aspects fall under the realm of a 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
The 2012 Export Control Amendment Order does not make any distinction between 
intra-Community transfers and exports, in line with its openness to a global market. 
Overall, the global UK regulation concerning end-user control and re-export remains 
unchanged after the approval of the Directive and the entry into force of the 
transposition law in 2012. However, the debate on final destination triggered by the 
approval of the Directive has slightly improved end-user controls with respect to two 
political dimensions. The first concerns re-export requirements. In recent years some 
steps have been taken towards strengthening exports control. In 2010 the UK 
Government began requiring companies and states importing UK military goods to 
commit to not re-export them to countries subject to a UN, EU or OSCE embargo, or 
for any purpose connected with chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or missiles 
capable of delivering such weapons. This step has proven not to be very strict but 
merely a sign of good intention about the future. The second (small) step forward 
concerns end-user controls for OGELs: in the text of some new general licences the 
exporter is required for the first time to provide in advance an original undertaking form 
to the importer which confirms the export is for that specific use including the name of 
the item exported. It is recommended that this End-user certificate form for general 
licences be renewed every year. In the following years, the situation was slightly 
ameliorated from two main perspectives. Firstly, in 2010 the UK Government began 
requiring importing companies and states to commit to not re-exporting them to 
countries subject to UN, EU or OSCE embargoes, or for purposes connected to 
weapons of mass destruction. But these commitments are generic. Secondly, for some 
general licences the UK Government started to require a sort of end-user assurances 
ex ante. It is recommended that this End-user certificate form for general licences be 
renewed every year. 
Thus, the assessment of the UK regulation after the approval of the EU Directive rose 







4.7 Common standards versus fragmentation 
 
UK regulation according to the 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the approval and transposition of the Directive 
UK regulation has always been characterised by maximum flexibility. Firstly, there are 
several kinds of licences: general, open individual and individual licences which are 
subdivided into several other subcategories. Each kind of licence has a different type 
of control and the Secretary of State may change terms and conditions for single 
licences. Equally, the export criteria are vaguely formulated, without a unique 
interpretation, but on the contrary, favour a case-by-case approach, based on a form 
of shopping between different sources, criteria and interpretations and leaving the final 
say to the Secretary of State. Overall, the system is set up to leave maximum flexibility 
of the regulation and adherence to the single case study and the wider marge of 
manoeuvre to the executive in arms export control policies. Consequently, the position 
of the UK regulation before the transposition of the EU Directive was 3. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Order Amendment) 
The Directive is heavily inspired by UK regulation. Given the similarities between the 
two systems (both based on a three kinds of licence) the degree of fragmentation 
remains substantially the same before and after the approval of the Directive. The UK 
regulation just adds another general licence to the 37 already existing in 2009. Most of 
the modifications concerning general and global licences (such as terms and 
conditions for issuing general licences, very delicate cases concerning end-user 
control, re-exports, difference between parts, components and finished products) were 
introduced using guidance, or intervening directly in the text of the licences, or via 
communications of the Secretary of State, keeping in line with past high levels of 
flexibility. Thus, the assessment of the UK regulation after the approval of the EU 






4.8 Checks and balances versus centralisation 
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
 
The UK regulation is characterised by a strong centralisation of several powers into 
the hands of the Ministry for Business Innovation and Skills and in particular those of 
its head: the Secretary of State. 
The Minister who heads BIS - the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
- undertakes a wide range of tasks: he formally decides on whether to issue, refuse, 
suspend or revoke export licence applications in accordance with the applicable 
legislation and announced policy, establishes terms and conditions for licences, 
including end-user certificates and norms for re-export, authorises inspections, defines 
the political guidelines and content of the export control criteria. However, several 
governmental departments and ministries (nine) participate in assessing export licence 
applications. In one case it is reported that the executive branch influenced the judiciary 
thus compromising the division between the three fundamental powers. It is reported 
that the UK Serious Fraud Office was stopped from proceeding with investigations into 
allegations of bribery and false accounting by BAE Systems in relation to arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia. This was because the UK Government argued that continuing the 
investigation “might have led to a withdrawal of Saudi diplomatic cooperation on 
security and intelligence issues and thus represented too great a risk to national 
security. Thus this investigation was dropped.” 509 This example underlines the scope 
the executive power had to centralise decisions, interpreting national interest. The 
position of the UK regulation before the transposition of the EU Directive was at 2. 
 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
In line with this tradition of centralisation, the 2012 Export Control Order Amendment 
gives the Secretary of State the responsibility for the certification procedures and 
releasing certificates. Furthermore in line with the UK tradition the Secretary of State 
                                                                




will define terms and conditions for issuing general and global licences. Thus, the 2009 
Directive and the transposition law of 2012 do not change the degree of centralisation. 
Accordingly, the rank of the UK after the transposition of the EU Directive remains the 
same 2. 
 
4.9 States versus companies 
 
UK regulation according to 2002 Export Control Act and 2008 Export Control Order 
before the transposition of the Directive 2009/43/EC 
The UK regulation has traditionally been based on mutual trust between the state and 
companies. The wide use of general and global licences since the late nineties has 
been based on trust with companies, giving these commercial actors the responsibility 
for keeping registers and for the final destination of defence products. This is in line 
with the UK approach to the arms market and is considered to be economically liberal 
according to which the government should regulate the market with a light hand, 
allowing firms to shape the market. Accordingly, the overall mark assigned to the UK 
regulation before the transposition of the Directive is 2. 
The principles introduced by Directive 2009/43/EC and by the UK regulation 
transposing the Directive (2012 Export Control Amendment Order) 
The new regulation does not change the relationships between states and companies. 
They must keep their registers in order and communicate ex post all the data 
concerning transfers and exports under general and global intra-Community licences. 
They are responsible for communicating all export conditions and restrictions dictated 
by their governments to partner companies from other EU MS. Undertakings should 
declare to their competent authorities when requesting an export licence to third 
countries whether they have abided by any export limitations attached to the transfer 
of defence-related products by the MS which issued the transfer licence. Thus, the 
distribution of duties and responsibilities between the UK state and companies does 
not change after the approval of the Directive and entry into force of the transposition 
law. The score is still 2. 
To summarise this assessment, the UK is a very particular case because its model 
heavily inspired the Directive. Thus, the degree of misfit is really low and the changes 
between the previous regulation and the transposition measures are marginal, 
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particularly from a strictly legal perspective, whereas the influence of the UK model 
appears much stronger in shaping the spirit and the letter of the EU Directive. Overall 
six of the eight dimensions stay the same and there is no change as an effect of the 
Europeanisation process and transposition of the Directive. However there are two 
dimensions, transparency and national responsibility, which demonstrate a very slight 
political change in terms of increasing transparency and end-user controls. These two 





5.1 The UK regulation before the approval of the ICT Directive 
 
The UK was considered an example of Liberal Market Economy characterised by very 
light intervention of the state in the market. The arms export control regulation that 
characterised the UK immediately before the approval of the Directive reflected the 
overall liberal model and was found to be the closest to the ideal arms export control 
from the perspective of a “pro-export” model. In fact, UK arms export control regulation 
before the transposition of the Directive was characterised by very low values for all 
the eight dimensions, ranging from 2 to 3. The degree of misfit of the UK domestic 
regulation compared to the EU Directive guidelines was equally low. What happened 
after the creation of a European Defence Market with the implementation of Directive 
2009/43/EC? Did the values of the eight dimensions change? In which direction? 
Where and how great has domestic change been in the UK? 
 
 5.2 Empirical findings 
 
The overall result is that the UK is only marginally influenced by the Europeanisation 
process in this field and in particular by the ICT Directive. In fact, the political and 
institutional changes following the domestic transposition of the Directive are really 
marginal. Only two of the eight dimensions change (transparency and responsibility). 
These two dimensions change only slightly albeit they move in the opposite direction 






Figure 6.1 Direction and intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the 




 restrictive model 




5.3 The eight dimensions 
 
In particular, after having analysed each of the eight dimensions, I found that the UK 
a) already had a regulation in which commercial variables played an important role and 
were given full weight in arms export policies; b) the executive branch already enjoyed 
a wide margin of discretion, in regulating the three pillars of any export regulation 
(transparency, export criteria and procedures); c) primary law dictated only a general 
framework and delegated most of the activities of the field to the executive: export 
control orders, guidance, other acts of bureaucratic authorities in order to maintain a 
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single case context; d) the government decided the level of transparency and the 
quality and quantity of data to be reported to the Parliament: there is an abundance of 
information and transparency but some crucial data such as value and deliveries are 
not included; e) end-user and re-export control can change according to the kind of 
licences, and the principle of delegation to the partner country, the awareness of the 
exporting company and the government about the final end use; f) most of the power 
is centralised in the hands of the Department for Trade and Industry and its head, the 
Secretary of State; g) companies enjoy a high level of trust by the government; g) the 
UK regulation is characterised by great differentiation from case to case and by many 
different kinds of licences and related controls. 
 
Thus, the policy-related institutional effects of the Directive are marginal (half a point) 
and involve only two of the eight dimensions: transparency and responsibility. I 
registered a very slight increase of transparency (because the approval of the Directive 
triggered a process aimed at reporting the number of general licences registrations 
and end-users of open individual licences) and a very slight increase in responsibility 
(because after the approval of the transposition law, some general norms for re-exports 
and a form of end-user assurance for some general licences were also introduced). 
 
Table 6.4 Intensity of domestic change along eight dimensions with the transposition 
of Directive 2009/43/EC: the UK case (changes from 2008 to 2012) 
 
   UK 2008  UK 2012 
Political vs economic variables 2 2 
Primary law vs secondary law 2 2 
Transparency vs opacity  2 2.5 
Responsibility vs delegation 3 3.5 
Legislative vs executive branch 2 2 
Checks and balances vs centralisation 2 2 
Certainty of law versus fragmentation and flexibility 3 3 










5.4 Side findings 
 
Uploading a UK model and the power of attraction of the UK model 
The UK has been only marginally influenced by the Europeanisation process, but UK 
regulation has heavily influenced the Europeanisation process. This dynamic exists in 
other areas of the common market. Despite its initial scepticism towards supranational 
regulation of the EU internal market, the UK Government has shown an extraordinary 
power of influence over the ICT Directive. The attitude of the UK Government toward 
the Directive can be explained with the words of one UK functionary: once they decided 
“not to leave”, because they pragmatically understood that the cost in terms of burden 
did not outweigh the drawbacks in terms of liberalisation of the arms market, they 
decided “to lead” and to influence the process, and tried to be influenced as minimally 
as possible. Before the House of Commons the UK Secretary of State explained that 
they argued for a set of proposals which were much more akin to the scheme that we 
have in this country.  Finally the Export Control Organisation explains to the exporters 
that there are very minimal changes compared to the previous regulation, because the 
UK “heavily influenced” the ICT Directive.510 
 
Contradictions of the UK model 
When observing the uploading and convergence towards the UK model, it is important 
to remember its contradictions. The UK model in the armaments field is not a real pure 
pro-industry model. In fact, on the one hand there is “less state” in arms export control 
regulation and as state ownership. On the other hand, there is the heavy presence of 
the state in supporting arms exports, in terms of subsidies, research funds and political 
and financial support (in terms of government and embassy personnel employed to 
promote UK arms exports, also after the closure of DESO) as an expression of that 
military Keynesism which characterises Anglo-Saxon models and which grows in 
LMEs. This model (or military Keynesianism model) has been uploaded at the 
European level and it is now characterising the EU Commission strategy in this field.  
 
Leading role of UK actors 
Second, this impressive power of influence has been exerted by the whole country 
system involving both a) government and b) societal actors (defence companies and 
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NGOs) which demonstrate extraordinary ability and familiarity to move within the 
machinery and governance of European institutions, and to lead networks of other 
similar actors at the European level. This is also due to several similarities between 
the EU and UK models (soft governance leaving a wide space to societal actors, strong 
executive with initiative power, centrality of the market, competitiveness and freedom 
of movement of goods, flexibility) and to the low degree of misfit with the European 
regulation. The UK influence and leading role can be found also in other important EU 
acts and institutions in the armaments field, such as the 1998 European Code of 
Conduct on arms exports and the creation of the European Defence Agency. In the 
case of the European Code of Conduct, for example, the wording of the national UK 
criteria published by the Labour party in 1997 preceded and is nearly identical to that 
of the criteria of the 1998 European Code of Conduct. In the case of EDA, the 
Europeanisation of British defence policy demonstrates that it is the UK pushing its 
preferences onto the EU and not the reverse.511 
 
In conclusion, the UK has sharply influenced and shaped the wording of the ICT 
Directive and has been only marginally influenced by the Europeanisation process. 
Similar conclusions were reached by Dover analysing the process that led to the 
creation of the European Defence Agency. He found that the UK was able to advance 
its preferences at the European level and saw its influence multiply as a result. 512 
According to Mawdsley, ”(T)he British narrative on armaments cooperation seems not 
to be particularly transformed by the Europeanisation process, but on the contrary has 
sharply influenced this process.” 513 
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The overall aim of the dissertation was to investigate the direction of travel of the 
Europeanisation process in the arms export control field. It started from three 
fundamental questions: 
1) As a consequence of the transposition of the EC Directive 2009/43/EC what and 
how much has changed domestically in Italy, the UK and Hungary? 
2) Are MS converging, and if so, what do they converge around?  
3) Is the Europeanisation process making the arms export control field more or less 
restrictive? 
In order to answer these three questions, I narrowed the field of analysis to one 
directive, Directive 43/2009, and three case studies, Italy, the UK and Hungary. To 
assess the direction and intensity of domestic change I used two models – a restrictive 
arms export control model and a pro-industry model - and eight dimensions. In order 
to measure the direction of change more precisely, and also the intensity of change at 
the domestic level, I used a scale of intensity; a synoptic scheme which indicates the 
direction and degree of change for each of the eight dimensions. Then, I compared the 
national regulations of the three MS as they were before the approval of the Directive 
with the domestic laws (or regulations), transposing the Directive. Each dimension was 
articulated along a scale ranging from 0 to 5 described in a synoptic table, which helped 
to identify the direction and assess the entity of domestic change. Lower values for 
each dimension corresponded to a commercial arms export regulation model, whereas 
higher value indicated an ethical arms export legislation model.   
This final chapter is divided into three main sections. The first is devoted to my 
empirical findings. It compares domestic change in the three case studies and then, 
using the same taxonomy, assesses if MS are converging and, if so, around which 
arms export control model are they converging.   The second section focuses on the 
theoretical implications of these findings and the third section discusses future 
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trajectories of research.  
 
 
2. Empirical findings 
 
2.1 The domestic arms exports control regulation before the approval of the 
Directive in the three case studies 
 
The analysis concerned three case studies which were extremely different with respect 
to their arms exports control regulation immediately before the approval and 
transposition of the Directive on Intra-Community transfers in 2007: one country had 
especially intrusive and strict regulation (Italy), one country had more flexible regulation 
(the UK), and one country had newer regulation (Hungary). 
Italy was characterised by a restrictive arms exports control law which obtained high 
values for most of the eight dimensions, all ranging from 4 to 5, very near to the ideal 
restrictive arms exports control model. Actually, Italian law 185/90 was considered to 
be a result of the pressure from public opinion and NGOs for arms control and 
disarmament to control arms exports and place constitutional and ethical principles 
over commercial interests. Thus, the Italian regulation was characterised by a high 
level of transparency, strong control of the Parliament over the discretion of the 
executive power, and intrusive end user control in arms exports. 
The UK, on the other hand, had a very flexible and light touch arms exports control 
model, with low values for most of the dimensions, ranging from 2 to 3. This model was 
based on collaboration between state and companies, which enjoyed a high degree of 
confidence. The written regulation was lighter touch than in Italy. The executive 
enjoyed a wide margin of discretion and flexibility in arms exports licence granting and 
arms exports control, including end user controls. The overall regulation was less 
prescriptive and characterised by a great differentiation from case to case and by 
different kinds of licences. 
Hungarian arms exports control regulation fell in the middle between Italian and British 
regulations, with most of the dimensions ranging around 3 or 4. Some of these values 
had increased thanks to the pressure the EU had exercised before the approval of 
Directive 43/2009 on the new EU members from Easter Europe in order to strengthen 
their arms exports control regulations, which had been too lax for European standards. 
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The three case studies also differed in the defence industry dimension, with Italy and 
the UK placing among the six strongest EU exporters and Hungary with a small but 
dynamic panorama of defence companies. Furthermore, each of these three case 
studies was characterised by different legal and economic contexts and different 
relationships between the state and the market, different policy paradigms in the 
defence sector, different roles and weight of the actors in the field, different legal 
traditions, and by distinct varieties of capitalism.  
Starting from these very different case studies, I investigated what happened after the 
transposition of Directive 2009/43/EC. Where did domestic change occur in these three 
countries and how significant was the change? Have regulations become more or less 
liberal? The initial hypothesis was that, despite some great differences, these three 
case studies tend to converge around a similar arms exports control model as a 
consequence of the domestic change generated by the Europeanisation process in 
this field.  
 
2.2 Intensity and direction of change: different patterns for the three case studies 
 
The empirical findings firstly show that the dynamics and intensity of change are 
different in the three countries. The convergence is not uniform. 
The Italian case which started furthest from the center and which was very strict, was 
characterized by the highest intensity of change. Empirical findings show a clear and 
consistent domestic change towards a pro-industry model. In fact, six of the eight 
dimensions consistently lose points after the transposition of the Directive, whereas 
only two of the eight dimensions remain stable.  
The research found: 
(a) the balance between legislative and executive power changed in favour of the 
executive branch  (decreasing from 4,5 to 3);  
(b) the area covered by primary law in favour of secondary law or discretion of the 
executive and administrative authorities, particularly concerning general and global 
licences, decreased from 5 to 3;  
(c)  the national responsibility for the final destination of co-produced goods was 
reduced from 5 to 3 in favour of the mutual recognition principle;  
(d) collegiality in the decision-making process was reduced from 5 to 3,5 in favour of 
new centralisation around UAMA, an administrative body of the Italian Foreign Ministry;   
(e) the certainty and clearness of primary law norms in regulating arms exports 
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decreased from 4 to 3, meaning some crucial detailed are now decided at secondary 
law level or at an administrative level;  
and (f) the power of the state decreased in favour of the power of the companies and 
their capacity for autoregulation, from 5 to 3.  
Some of these changes concerned not only intra-Community transfers, but also 
indirectly effected the regulation of exports outside EU boundaries. 
Only two dimensions remained, at least formally, static: these are (g) the level of 
transparency and information contained in the annual report to the Parliament and (h) 
the weight of political and constitutional variables compared to economic ones in the 
spirit and principles of the law. In both cases, the NGOs who had campaigned for Law 
185/90, have played a decisive role, by pressuring Members of Parliament and the 
Italian government to maintain at least the same spirit, principles and level of 
transparency for the new kinds of general and global licences as well.  
In Italy, domestic change also concerns some fundamental aspects which were not 
directly and explicitly required by the Directive, but which constitute the pillars of any 
arms export control regulation, such as the balance between legislative and executive, 
between primary and secondary law, and affected the same principle of responsibility 
upon which the whole Italian regulation is built. Furthermore, using Peter Hall’s 
terminology and parameters, this change did not just involve basic instrument settings 
(first order change), and the techniques or policy to attain the goals of a law/policy 
(second order change), but the overarching goals that guide policy. Thus, in Italy there 
was a “third order” change modifying the goals that guide policy and its “philosophy”, 
its fundamental paradigm, after the transposition of EU Directive 2009/43/EC514.  
This consistent domestic change in the direction of a pro-market, pro-export model 
finds some analogies in the literature concerning case studies similar to Italy with 
regards to the defence industry and regulation which is restrictive or prescriptive. 
These changes were not limited to Italy, and research on other cases supports my 
findings. According to Lucie Béraud-Sudreau’s study, the French arms exports control 
model has been progressively liberalised and the ICT Directive has represented an 
opportunity for a radical change of philosophy and structure of the entire domestic arms 
export control regulation in a pro-export direction 515 . Similarly, Malena Britz who 
analysed the evolution of the Swedish arms exports control model, claims that 
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Europeanisation has gone hand in hand with marketization516 .  She concluded that 
“market oriented UK model of defense industry policy was transferred to Sweden and 
the changes in Swedish defense industry policy were then part of the emerging 
European defense industrial policy”. 517   
 
Hungary followed the same direction of change as Italy, towards a pro-market, pro-
industry model, but the magnitude of change is much more limited than in Italy, both 
for the number of dimensions involved and the intensity of change for each dimension. 
In fact, domestic change concerned only four of the eight dimensions:   
(a) checks and balances diminished in favour of a more centralized system from 3 to 
2 (thus reversing the trend toward a pluralistic model of arms exports which had been 
initiated with the collapse of the communist regime);  
(b) the detail and clarity of the law decreased in favor of a greater flexibility from 5 to 
4; 
(c)  the control of the state over the companies diminished by one point from 4 to 3 in 
favor of greater confidence and trust given to defence industries in managing their 
arms exports;  
(d) and the weight of political and strategic variables decreased from 5 to 3 by 2 points 
in favor of economic variables which were listed for the first time among the principles 
inspiring arms export control policies.  
Unlike Italy, the Hungarian transposition of Directive 43/2009 did not impact 
fundamental aspects of the domestic regulation concerning transparency, the balance 
between executive and legislative, control on final destination of defence materials, 
and the degree of detail of primary law. The Hungarian government was able to 
introduce the changes required by the Directive without impacting its fundamental 
pillars of domestic regulation. Thus, in Hungary, the scope of domestic change is 
limited to policy instruments and does not touch the fundamental paradigms nor does 
it change policy goals. However formally it appears perfectly compliant with the EU 
Directive. 
  
Lastly, the United Kingdom presents different patterns from the first two countries. 
Firstly, it goes in the opposite direction with respect to the other two case studies. In 
                                                                
516 Britz (2010).  
517 Ibidem, p.4 
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fact, the EU pressure boosts towards an increase of the value of some dimensions and 
thus towards a restrictive arms exports model. However, this pressure is extremely 
weak and concerns only two dimensions, because of the strong resemblance between 
the UK domestic arms exports control model and that introduced by the ICT Directive. 
The two dimensions that show a slight increase in their value are transparency (from 
2 to 2.5) and responsibility for the final destination of exports (from 3 to 3.5), thus 
approaching the values of the other two countries for these dimensions. 
However overall the UK does not show any consistent domestic change. Instead, it 
remains stuck in its original position for the other six of the eight dimensions.  Unlike 
Italy, the UK appears only marginally influenced by the Europeanisation process.  On 
the contrary, the UK seems to have exercised an extraordinary power of attraction with 
respect to the other two countries, and an ability to influence the Europeanisation 
process, starting from uploading important characteristics of their regulation at EU level. 
This dynamic exists in other aspects of arms field-such as its influence on the 
European Code  of Conduct on Arms Exports and in shaping the European Defence 
Agency, as widely explained by Davis, Dover and Cooper respectively518. This policy 
area tracks UK influence in other areas of Single Market policy. For example Egan, has 
described the phenomenon of “first mover advantage”, where British firms have sought 
to get the national standards that they operate under accepted by the European 
standards agencies in order to minimise costs to British firms and force the greater 
regulatory adjustment on competitors.519  Padgett cites Bomberg and Peterson in 
noting how countries seek to gain competitive advantages for their firms and industry 
in the Europeanisation process by seeking to ‘upload’ national policies to the EU level 
where they will then be adopted by the other MS.520 
 
In conclusion, on the basis of this empirical work, it emerged that Italy has been 
characterised by an intense change in most of the dimensions, covering both explicit 
request of the directive, but going beyond what required by the directive in the direction 
of the liberalisation of arms export control market, increasing the role of the executive 
in respect to the parliament, of secondary law in respect to primary law. The overall 
                                                                
518 N. Cooper, (2000). “Arms exports, New Labour and the pariah agenda.” Contemporary Security 
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520  S. Padgett, (2003). "Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector." 




direction is towards a UK arms export model, a liberal and flexible arms export model 
(albeit with some contradiction that will be returned to later). Hungary has moved in a 
less marked and intense way once again towards a more flexible model, maintain 
however some pillars of their regulation untouched such as the relationships between 
executive, the level of transparency Lastly the UK remains stable, that is it does not 
register any change. This is due to the low degree of misfit between the British 
regulation and the ICT Directive disposals on the one hand, and to the high capacity 
to upload domestic regulation in the decision making phase, so that it was not 
necessary any formal change to national regulations but just some limited changes 
included in administrative decrees. Overall, it seems that UK exercises its power of 
attraction in respect to the other two countries.   
 
 
2.3 Convergence around what? The direction of the Europeanisation process in 
the arms export control field 
 
According to the empirical findings, the three case studies follow different directions of 
domestic change and are characterised by different intensities of change. Overall the 
UK seems to be more or less stationary, whereas the other two approach the UK, albeit 
with different speed and intensity. Placing the three domestic changes in the same 
figurative plan shows more clearly that the three case studies tend to converge. What 
is interesting to note when considering these three cases is that the convergence does 
not occur at a middle point between the regulations of the three case studies, but rather 














Figure 7.1 Direction and intensity of domestic change after the transposition of 
Directive 2009/43/EC: Italy, Hungary and UK (changes from 2008 to 2012) 
 
 
       Restrictive model 





The convergence can be better visualized by looking at the Figure above. At the center 
of the graph the value for each of the eight dimensions is 0. Thus, the center represents 
the ideal pro-market, pro-industry model. The external periphery, where each of the 
eight dimensions reaches 5, represents the ideal type restrictive model. 
The first spider graph represents the starting point. It draws a picture of domestic laws 
on arms export control for the three case studies before the transposition of the 
Directive. Italy (blue line) with arms export regulation characterized by high values 
ranging from 4 to 5 for all eight dimensions (close to the ideal restrictive model); 
Hungary (orange line) with intermediate values, and the UK (grey line) with lower 
values around 2 and 3, characterizing flexible and liberal arms export regulation, 
nearer to the pro-industry model.  
The second spider graph represents the domestic arms trade control regulation of our 
three case studies after the transposition of the Directive. At first glance, it is clear that 
the lines are narrowing towards the center of the spider graph. Overall, they tend to 
converge roughly towards a pro-industry UK model.   
 
2.4 Three limits of the convergence towards a pro-industry model 
  
Although the pro-market model has managed to gain greater influence in EU arms 
control regulation, the model contains some significant limits. We emphasise three 
here: convergence versus harmonization, the relative and mixed rather than absolute 
and pure characteristics of the model, and fundamental questions about its long-term 
sustainability. 
 
A. Convergence does not coincide with harmonization. 
Despite tending to converge towards a pro-market model overall, differences exist in 
arms export regulations of the three case studies because each MS interprets the 
shape of this liberalization trajectory in different ways, according to its domestic 
traditions and according to the weight and alliances of national and European actors. 
Thus, Italy, Hungary and the UK have separately interpreted the format, the terms and 
conditions of new kinds of general and global licences, including some crucial aspects 
concerning re-exports, the kinds of arms, parts or components covered, based on their 
individual circumstances. This makes the overarching EU panorama extremely 
fragmented and particularly multifaceted, not only between countries but even within 
the same country. Figure 3 below shows for each MS the categories of arms which are 
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included in the new general licences (green) and those which are excluded. 
 
Figure 7.2 Convergence without harmonisation: kinds of arms covered by general 




Source: Luc Mampaey, Virginie Moreau, Yannick Quéau  and Jihan Seniora (2014) Study on the 
Implementation of Directive 2009/43/EC on Transfers of Defence-Related Products (Brussels: Groupe 
de Recherche et d’information su la paixet la securite). Available online at: http://www.grip. 
org/en/node/1421 (last accessed, 10 May 2016). 
 
Other analysts and scholars also recognize this low degree of harmonization in the 
format and conditions for granting of the new licences introduced by the ICT Directive. 
According to Masson: 
 “the analysis of the various implementation processes at the MS level reveals at least 
four major trends: a) a lack of availability of the relevant documents, b) diversity of 
scope and structure of the documents, c) several differences regarding the conditions 
attached to the general licences for the certified firms and d) various definitions of what 
sensitive products are, which are a corollary of the multiplicity of defence-related 
products lists.”521 
Along the same lines using a legal perspective, Trybus and Butler state that “it is 
questionable to what extent the ICT achieves substantive minimum harmonization”.522 
They conclude therefore, that “the simplification to be achieved through standardized 
licensing is undermined by the continuing diversity of national approaches to these key 
issues.”523 
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In conclusion, convergence towards a pro-market, pro-industry model has not implied 
harmonisation. Whereas the intensity of domestic change has been high, the degree 
of harmonisation has been low. The actual degree of supranationalisation has been 
even lower considering MS did not reach an agreement around any form or 
supranational control, including a simple database following the transfers of parts and 
components of defence goods. In conclusion, paraphrasing the words of Baccaro and 
Howell, who were looking more generally at the neoliberal trajectories of European 
systems, institutions have changed in a neoliberal/pro-industry direction while 
remaining allomorphic.524  
 
B. The pro-market model is not pure  
The pro-industry model is not a “pure” pro-market model as it carries some internal 
contradictions. This is firstly because of the general nature of the arms market, which 
cannot be considered as just any other market sector, as it involves sensitive strategic 
and security variables. Thus, despite the process of privatization, which has 
characterized the European defense industry, the presence of the state is still strong. 
Focusing specifically on the UK arms export control model, it emerged that, on the one 
hand, the state had a light hand with regard to export procedures, leaving maximum 
flexibility to the executive and lightening the administrative burden.  On the other hand, 
the British state intervened with a heavy hand in terms of subsidies to foreign 
companies, political and financial support, and with a high number of public personnel 
and civil servants paid by the state to support arms exports. Similarly, despite the 
principle of “value for money” proclaimed by the British government, even after the 
approval of the procurement directive “92% of British contracts were awarded to 
domestic firms”.525  Therefore what emerges is a pro-industry model which is not pure, 
but rather pro-export and pro-companies. 526  This approach seem to have been 
uploaded to the European level. In fact, the ICT Directive has the aim of lightening the 
administrative burden for defence materials moving within EU boundaries, while at the 
same time the Commission and MS are converging to invest in huge defence research 
funds.  Overall, the model that prevails  envisages the presence of the State and of the 
EU institutions more in terms of support than in terms of direction of the production and 
                                                                
524  L. Baccaro, C. Howell (2017), Trajectories of Neoliberal Transformation. European Industrial 
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525 P. Sartori, A. Marrone and M. Nones (2018) “Looking Through the Fog of Brexit: Scenarios and 
Implications for the European Defence Industry”   Roma, IAI, July 2018. 
526 C. Crouch (2005). Postdemocraza. Milano: La Terza. 
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control of the arms exports.  
 
C. The pro-industry model is unsustainable in the long run 
The affirmation of the pro-industry model has created both winners and losers. The 
first fracture is between NGOs working towards a responsible and ethical arms export 
policy at the national and European levels, and companies, particularly the strongest 
and most integrated ones. In fact, non-governmental organisations were weakened 
after this Europeanisation process, whereas companies were strengthened and 
appeared to be winners in this process. Companies have benefited from a 
convergence with other EU bodies and partners aimed at liberalising the arms market, 
whereas NGOs have found more and more difficulties in influencing the decision-
making process. For NGOs, the panorama is ever more interdependent, complex and 
demanding especially considering their limited resources.   
By comparing different case studies and the intensity and direction of change, it can 
be seen that the presence of strong defence companies (Italy) corresponds to a high 
intensity/third order domestic change in a neoliberal direction for arms transfer, 
whereas in the relative absence of defence companies (Hungary) the change is much 
less intense and limited to only a few dimensions. However, the presence or absence 
of strong, experienced, networked non-governmental organisations at the national and 
European levels seems not to influence (or to do so marginally) the direction and 
intensity of change: the presence of strong articulated NGOs in Italy didn’t make any 
relevant difference when compared to Hungary where NGOs were nearly absent. The 
influential power of civil society organisations appears drastically reduced compared 
to the Nineties. 
The number of actors who feel penalised or excluded from the decision-making 
process and from the benefits of the directive is not limited to NGOs. According to 
Masson, “(t)he benefits of the ICT Directive will not be felt similarly by all MS, national 
authorities and defence companies. Its effects will certainly be different among MS 
depending on the structure of their national defence sector and its reliance on 
exports.”527  In the same vein Mawdsley argued that the European Commission and 
the EDA favoured larger arms producing states- second tiers arms supplier and few 
firms, and left little room for smaller states to act in their national interest and that the 
                                                                
527 Masson and Martin (2015): 57. 
296 
  
European defence market is highly concentrated. 528 In fact, smaller EU countries 
showed a modest or non-existent interest towards the Directive and small and medium 
companies complained about not being involved in the initiative phase by the 
Commission and were afraid that the European measures would mainly benefit big 
companies and prime contractors. 529  More recently at the European level, some 
companies working in the IT sector felt penalised by the decision to move funds for 
defence research.  
Thus, requests from defence companies prevailed over those placed by European 
Non-Governmental Organisations. Within defence companies however, the needs and 
requests of prime contractors companies and second-tier exporters, particularly 
working in more integrated sectors such as aerospace, and their association, prevailed 
over small and medium subcontractors in the supply chain and smaller states. Still 
more recently strong prime contractors in the defence sector prevailed over strong IT 
companies in decisions about allocating research defence funds, and the DG Market 
prevailed over DG Research. 
This progressive narrowing of the winner area has correspondingly enlarged that of 
those who perceive themselves to be losers and excluded by the decision-making 
process, which in fact are the majority.  
The imbalances that emerges between the winners and losers of the Europeanisation 
process can offer a new light in investigating some possible causes of the dis-
integration process and growing Euroscepticism, involving countries that feel excluded 
from the decision-making process such as Hungary as well as some sectors of the 
electorate who want to take back control on political decisions. 
Leruth et al introduce the concept of differentiated disintegration, as the general mode 
of strategies and processes under which (a) MS(s) withdraw(s) from participation in 
the process of European integration (horizontal disintegration) or under which EU 
policies are transferred back to MS (vertical disintegration) and offers some 
suggestions for the future of the literature on European integration.530 Copeland argues 
that government change can also result in de-Europeanization, and this illustrates that 
there is nothing unidirectional with respect to Europeanization: it can roll forward, but 
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it can also roll back.531 Overall the pro-market pro-industry model appears imbalanced 
towards a small group of strong actors and if not corrected and rebalanced, is not 
sustainable in the long run. 
 
 
3. Theoretical findings 
 
As Howell notes, by bringing together different aspects of Europeanization we are not 
simply pursuing theory testing, but organizing concepts, selecting relevant facts and 
constructing narrative as well as ensuring a level of empirical reliability.532 This moves 
the study away from thin causal effects towards thicker understandings and 
perspectives of process at work in the EU.  
As recognized by several scholars, for example Graziano, Europeanisation is not a 
“big” theory but rather a phenomenon, an analytical tool to use and follow in order to 
organise the analysis of the impact of the EU at domestic level.533 Starting from a post 
ontological stance the aim of the thesis was not to demonstrate a theory but to 
investigate how Europeanisation works in practice assessing direction and intensity of 
domestic change, as explained at length in Chapter 2. 
However, the empirical findings of the dissertation also allow me to assess whether 
five of the basic theoretical assumptions elaborated and discussed by Europeanisation 
scholars (which were introduced in Chapter 2), are confirmed or not in the specific case 
of the transposition of the ICT Directive.  
 
1. The first basic theoretical assumption consists of the theory of the goodness of fit. 
Drawing on Graziano and Vink, “the degree of adaptational pressure generated by 
Europeanization depends on the fit or misfit between European institutions and the 
domestic structures. The lower the compatibility (fit) between European institutions, on 
the one hand, and national institutions, on the other, the higher the adaptational 
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pressures”.534 We will thus expect domestic change to occur particularly in those cases 
where the ‘misfit’ is high and the adaptational pressures are therefore strong.535 
 
This theoretical assumption is confirmed in the cases of Italy and the UK. Italy was 
characterised by lower compatibility with the directions and spirit of the Directive. This 
created high adaptational pressure that led to a consistent domestic change. On the 
contrary in the UK which had the lowest degree of misfit with the EU Directive, the 
change was minimal. In Hungary which was located between the two case studies the 
adaptational pressure led to a domestic change, but less intensely than in Italy.  
 
2. Another version of the goodness of fit theory focuses on compliance performance: 
the assumption was that successful compliance depends on the fit between European 
policy requirements and existing institutions at the national level: if EU policies do not 
match existing traditions, implementation will be contested and delayed and risk of 
failure.536 
This assumption was not confirmed. In fact, Italy started with the highest degree of 
misfit between the domestic regulation and the Directive. The transposition in Italy 
required time and involved an intense public debate. However, in the end Italy complied 
perfectly with what was required at the EU level and even went beyond the directive’s 
disposal in some cases. Similarly, Hungary, despite a medium misfit with the EU 
directive, turned out to be perfectly compliant with it, at least formally. On the other 
hand, the UK, despite having the least misfit with EU policy requirements, was 
relatively less compliant. In fact, the UK did not transpose the norm on transparency, 
and in particular the requirement that the value of material exported under the new 
licences be registered and reported to the Parliament.  
Thus, the thesis ascertaining that successful compliance depends on the fit is not 
proven. On the contrary, particularly for the UK case, another thesis presented by 
Daniel Naurin at the European University Institute seems to be more fitting: the most 
powerful states are less generous in terms of concessions to other EU partners and to 
the supranational requests. He found that a representative from one of the Big 3 (UK, 
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France, and Germany) is four times less likely to be generous than the average 
negotiators.537  
 
3. A third initial assumption made by Europeanisation scholars was that governments 
and bureaucracies will always try to defend their existing policy tradition and not accept 
deviation from the status quo.538 
This theoretical assumption explains only the Hungarian case but not the overall 
picture, which is much more multifaceted. In fact, Hungarian bureaucracies showed 
only a moderate interest in the opportunity to change the arms exports control system 
offered by the European Directive on intra-Community transfers. They did not use the 
Directive to sharply change domestic regulation in a pro-industry direction, like in Italy. 
Overall, they were quite conservative, in maintaining domestic regulation and limiting 
the changes to what was strictly required by domestic tradition and Hungarian 
paradigms. 
On the other hand, Italian bureaucracy and civil servants appeared to be actors in favor 
of a radical change. Since 2007, they had supported the Directive as a way to introduce 
global reform to Law 185/90, especially as regards a new centralization process. They 
had the expertise to understand that the Directive would have opened an opportunity 
for change towards the directions of centralization and simplification.539 Similarly, in 
France, according to Béraud-Sudreau, “civil servants responsible for export promotion 
viewed the ICT Directive as an opportunity for the simplification control processes. 
They convinced the newly arrived Ministry of Defence and the Elysée in 2007-2008 
that simplification of French exports controls could be reached thanks to the ICT 
Directive”. 540  
Lastly, in the UK the attitude again differs from the other two countries. In the UK, high 
level bureaucrats and the Secretary of State were moderately in favor of change aimed 
at increasing transparency over arms exports under general and global licences. 
However, the same Secretary of State later argued they should scale the change back 
due to the companies’ concerns. An important difference with the other two cases is 
that the adaptational pressure for change, albeit weak, went in the direction of a 
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restrictive model, which was against the interests and preference of UK domestic 
defence companies, and opposite to what was exercised in the other two case studies.  
Overall, in these three case studies, bureaucracies appear to follow different directions. 
In Italy, they were strongly in favor of a renewal of the domestic regulation in a more 
liberal dimension, whereas in Hungary they were defenders of the status quo, but 
accepting only the changes legally required by the directive, without altering the 
fundamental pillars of the Hungarian law. In the UK, they were moderately and 
prudently in favor of a slight change towards greater transparency and a restrictive 
model, but were stopped by defence companies. Thus, the hypothesis ascertaining 
that bureaucrats are quite conservative is not confirmed in two of the three case 
studies. 
4. A fourth thesis formulated by Europeanisation scholars is that different types of EU 
pressure have a differential impact on domestic change. 541  By comparing these 
empirical findings with those obtained by Europeanisation scholars dealing with the 
other EU instruments on arms exports control and transparency, the European Code 
of Conduct on Arms exports (as approved in 1998), it clearly emerges that different 
European decision-making mechanisms, in different historical periods, can reach 
different outcomes and can reveal different directions to the Europeanisation process. 
Whereas according to Europeanisation studies, the Code of Conduct brought a 
convergence around a mid-way solution between states with more rigorous regulations 
and those with more liberal regulations, the Directive favoured an imbalanced 
convergence towards a pro-industry model. Moreover, whereas the Code of Conduct 
pushed a (very slight) domestic change in the direction of a more ethical and 
transparent arms exports control model, the Directive favoured a change in the 
opposite direction towards a pro-industry and pro-company model. Whereas the 
principal limitation of the Code is its ineffectiveness and the risk that the pull to change 
is too weak and destined to end soon, the principal limitation of the Directive is the pro-
market bias and other asymmetries that might render the model illegitimate and 
unstable in the long run. 
 
Lastly, several Europeanisation scholars recognise that between the process of 
downloading EU policies and acts, and uploading domestic preferences of MS there is 
continued interaction and that these two perspectives are interlinked. They claim that 
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top-down and bottom-up approaches happen simultaneously, being mutually 
constitutive. Börzel in particular explains that MS upload their policy preferences to the 
EU level through policy making processes to ease the downloading of the policies once 
they have been adopted.542  The empirical findings concerning the UK cases show 
perfectly how these two levels are in continual interaction. In fact, the UK was initially 
diffident towards the proposal for a directive on intra-community transfers and 
concerned about the potential misfit with their domestic regulation. In order to reduce 
this misfit, they decided to try to change the EU regulation, instead of adapting their 
domestic regulation, by influencing the decision-making process. As explained by a UK 
functionary, the UK decided to influence the process by putting forth a set of proposals, 
which were very similar to their own regulation and so heavily influenced the directive.  
In other words, they tried to upload their domestic regulation to ease the downloading. 
And they succeeded because several salient aspects of the Directive are largely 
inspired by the UK regulation. On the other hand, the other two countries, Italy and 
Hungary, did not try to upload their domestic regulations to the EU level. This 
demonstrates both differential attitudes and the impact of various MS on the decision-
making process and its outcome. 
Overall, the empirical findings of the dissertation support the European integration 
theories, which identify a pro-industry bias in the Europeanisation process. By adopting 
both a Europeanisation lens and a post ontological attitude with the aim not to 
demonstrate a theory but to investigate how Europeanisation works in practice, the 
thesis had scope to reconsidering integration theories in a slightly less abstract way, 
and answering questions about who is empowered in the end.543 These results show 
that those empowered by the Europeanisation process triggered by the ICT Directive, 
are the most integrated and strongest European defence companies and second-tier 





                                                                
542 T.A. Börzel (2012). “MS Responses to Europeanization”. Journal of Common Market Studies, 40 
(2): 193-214.  
 
543 C.M. Radaelli and T. Exadaktylos  (Eds).(2012). Research design in European studies : establishing 
causality in Europeanization.Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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4. Directions for future research 
 
4.1 Inter-institutional power dynamics in the European decision-making process 
and its impact on policy output: arms exports control and transparency 
legislation 
 
One empirical finding of this dissertation is that the transposition of the ICT has 
generated convergence towards a pro-market, pro-industry model.  Europeanisation 
has triggered a pro-industry trajectory. At the same time, however, a side finding 
concerning Hungary reveals that a different EU act, the European Code of Conduct, 
which is the result of a different decision-making procedure, generated a different 
direction of the Europeanisation process towards a restrictive arms exports control 
model, at least in one country. 
One initial study could look into the interinstitutional dynamics in EU arms exports 
control regulation, by comparing different decision-making processes and different 
institutions involved at the EU level in order to see if the direction of domestic change 
generated is the same or not. It might be equally interesting to see if there are 
differences in terms of effectiveness, legitimacy, and transparency according to 
different institutions and decision-making processes.  
In particular, the joint decision making mode, which led to the approval of Directive 
2009/43/EC could be compared with other two modes. The first is the traditional 
intergovernmental approach (using both unanimity and qualified majority), within the 
Council, whose main outcome was the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on 
European Arms Exports (8 December 2008). The second is the supranational mode, 
which has characterised the pro-active role of the EU Commission and the ECJ. The 
ECJ has ruled ten times about the interpretation of Article 346 of the TFEU; the 
Commission has displayed all its range of powers producing communications, 
infringement procedures, preparatory actions and creating a group of experts to put 
together the ESRP (European Security Research Programme) and later the EDF 
(European Defense Fund).  
The overall aim of this research could be to offer empirical evidence and/or assess the 
consistency of the outcomes from different institutions and their different trajectories, 
identify the prevailing direction and offer instruments to facilitate the overall coherence 
of the EU initiatives in the arms export control regulation. 
303 
  
In the same vein, it could be interesting to develop an inter-sectoral analysis in order 
to compare trajectories and dynamics that I discovered in arms exports control field 
with other fields. For example, the dynamics concerning labour law, employment and 
social Europe show impressive analogies with those concerning arms exports control 
sector. Both are biased towards the diffusion of a pro-industry model and a progressive 
erosion of some norms concerning labour rights. However, for example, environmental 
politics follows completely different patterns and trajectories, more oriented towards a 
more restrictive model.  
 
 
4.2 The impact of Brexit on EU arms exports control policies 
 
Secondly, once again starting from the conclusions of this dissertation—that is the bias 
towards a pro-industry, UK-style model—another angle for future research would 
assess the impact of Brexit on arms exports control regulation. The dissertation 
showed that the UK played a very active and overpowering role in the decision-making 
process that led to the approval of the directive, by uploading salient parts of its 
domestic regulation to the EU level. Moreover, UK societal actors such as defence 
companies and non-governmental organizations have played a dynamic and leading 
role in the Europeanisation of societal actors in this field, projecting their way of work. 
MS have converged towards the UK model. 
However, it is not clear if the bias towards a UK model is due to the weight and ability 
of the UK or to other national or supranational variables, such as EU institutional 
asymmetries or global dynamics. Actually, the theoretical framework used in this 
dissertation focused on assessing the degree and intensity of change but does not 
explain why there is this convergence towards a UK model.  
Brexit offers a unique opportunity to cut off a very important variable (despite there 
being several ways the UK still influences the EU, for example via diplomats and 
functionaries who will remain in the EU until retirement, the continued activity of its 
societal actors and so on).  What will happen without the UK’s presence? Where will 
MS tend to converge? Will the bias towards a pro-export model be reduced in favor or 
a more restrictive one? Will the bias towards negative integration be reduced in favor 
of new form of positive integration?  
The answers to these fundamental questions could feed the wider debate about the 
impact of Brexit on EU dynamics and imbalances, and which is characterized by two 
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different visions. On the one hand, there are those who think Brexit will be just the first 
step in a process of disintegration, and on the other those who claim the withdrawal of 
the most reluctant MS will favor positive integration, and that the EU will become more 
supranational as a consequence of the UK leaving.  
 
4.3 Assessing the normative power of the EU in the arms exports control field  
using mixed methods 
 
The main findings of the thesis, concerning the bias towards a pro-industry arms export 
control model, are based on qualitative methods based only the analysis of the letter 
of the laws and regulations. However, considering the limits of qualitative methodology 
in the arms control and disarmaments field mentioned, and considering the gap 
between rhetoric and reality, between the letter of the law and their effective application, 
that characterises armament issues, it could be interesting to experiment with a mixed 
methodology in order to provide a “more complete understanding of the research 
problem.  I could combine a qualitative methodology - based on the details of the arms 
exports control law - with a quantitative methodology based on arms exports control 
practices.  In this way, the empirical findings, as they emerge from a qualitative 
methodology based on case study analysis and on the comparison of legislative texts, 
is supported by quantitative methodology aimed at investigating the direction of the 
arms export policies in practice. 
I assume that, in a pro-export model, states export arms to countries regardless of their 
respect for human rights, their attitude towards the international community, their 
situation in terms of conflicts and tension, and their support of terrorism. In the 
restrictive model at the other end, MS do not export arms to countries violating human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. In order to measure the propensity towards a pro-
industry or pro-restrictive model I could start from a very simple yet clear and effective 
indicator: the percentage of arms exports towards countries where the governments 
do not respect human rights compared to the total value of exports from the EU. 
The use of mixed methods could help to understand whether MS show convergence 
towards a pro-industry arms export model in practice after the transposition of the ICT 
directive increasing their percentage of arms exports to governments in conflict or 
violating human rights. These methods could help to distinguish the EU dynamics from 
global ones, and identify the EU net value in promoting arms exports control policies 
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and practices oriented to prevent conflicts and protect human rights, compared to the 
global context. 
The aim of this third branch of research is threefold: theoretical, political and 
methodological. The empirical findings would  
a) to contribute to the theoretical debate about the weight and influence of ideas and 
norms in the EU CFSP, assessing the EU’s normative power;  
b) offer empirical evidence to the political debate concerning EU arms exports control 
regulations, and their effectiveness and  
c) create a mixed methodology tool aimed at assessing the application and 
implementation of EU arms exports control instruments. 
 
The process of Europeanisation in the field of arms export control and transparency in 
the period analysed has favoured convergence toward a pro-market model, 
characterised by increasing importance of economic factors over ethical ones, 
flexibility and pragmatism over binding general rules, executive power over legislative, 
and centralization over checks and balances, which allow the executive a wider margin 
of manoeuvre to implement an arms export policy on a case-by-case assessment. A 
similar approach might influence also the balance between preventive diplomacy and 
successive military intervention. It might create some problems of compatibility with 
the European Common Foreign and Security Policy and with the values enshrined in 
the Treaty of the European Union. In fact, according to Article 2 of the Treaty of the 
European Union, the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights. According to Article 21 
of the TEU the European Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by 
the principles which have inspired its own creation, including democracy indivisibly of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.  More in general a pro-industry approach 
might reduce the role played by preventive diplomacy in favour of a successive 
intervention. Some EU law scholars have focused on this contradiction, analysing the 
ways and the extent to which values and ideals such as the promotion of the rule of 
law and human rights, clash with material interests of EU external relations.544 However, 
the main narrative in the European Integration theories perspective in recent years, 
was based on a belief in the connection between the health of the defence industry 
                                                                
544 Presentation of the Doctoral Symposium on democracy, Rule of Law and Human Rights in Europe 
and the World in time of contestation, Louvain, 18 September 2018. Available at https://reconnect-
europe.eu/events/doctoral-symposium,( last accessed march 2019). 
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and the strength of Common Security and Defence Policy. 545  It would be interesting 
to see how this narrative - and the concept of European security - evolves face to the 
new non-military threat that is addressing security and health of the people of the EU 
and of the whole world.    
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